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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the biodiversity offsetting programme for England initiated by the UK 
government in 2011 and abandoned in 2014. Offsetting enables developers to purchase biodiversity 
credits, representing conservation gain somewhere else, to compensate for residual loss on the 
development site, ensuring no net loss of biodiversity overall. Recent years have seen increasing 
interest globally in market-based instruments for nature conservation, which advocates promise will 
deliver win-win outcomes, facilitating economic growth and safeguarding of nature at the same time, 
through market efficiencies. Political ecologists, on the other hand, have long highlighted the 
contradictions encountered in efforts to commodify nature. Drawing on Marxist political ecologies and 
literature on the neoliberalisation of nature, this thesis examines why the UK government was unable 
to establish its proposed biodiversity offsetting programme in a particular geographical and historical 
setting, in a climate of fiscal austerity and growth-orientated deregulation. As the government 
attempted to enrol sympathetic actors, disputes soon emerged over the purpose and technical details 
of the proposals. Deeper tensions were quickly revealed: the government’s non-negotiable position 
that offsetting should impose no new costs on developers, that it should be voluntary and that no new 
resources would be provided for planning authorities administering the policy locally, meant that it 
could not convince offsetting’s advocates – let alone its detractors – that it would achieve either 
meaningful biodiversity outcomes. Nor could it stimulate a substantial offset market, which it hoped 
would lubricate the planning system and accelerate land development, which was its primary goal. 
The thesis explores how the government’s non-interventionist, strictly pro-growth conditions played 
out in different moments of the policymaking process. It argues that it was precisely offsetting’s appeal 
to government, predicated on its promise of a win-win for development and conservation, in a 
neoliberal world of limited and diminishing public resources, which undermined the possibility of its 
implementation. Though the English case is specific, the thesis concludes that this underlying tension 
appears politically hard-wired into the very concept of offsetting, raising questions over its meaningful 
implementation anywhere. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is about how and why nature is conserved, and contemporary efforts to use environmental 
markets and economic instruments to reconcile the demands of land-based economic development 
and growth with the need to protect nonhuman life in its path. Its empirical focus is on an abandoned 
attempt by the UK government to introduce a formal ‘biodiversity offsetting’ policy into the English 
land use planning system, between 2010 and 2015. Biodiversity offsetting refers to a mechanism 
designed to neutralise the impact of land development on nonhuman habitats and species. It does 
this not by proscribing environmental damaging projects per se, but by insisting that such activity is 
only permissible if ecological loss in the development footprint is materially compensated for by the 
recreation or protection of equivalent ecologies elsewhere, paid for by the developer. The goal is that 
there is measurably no net loss of biodiversity overall, using biodiversity metrics to quantify ecological 
value. Though offsetting is something of an umbrella term for a variety of similar practices, it is widely 
thought of as a market-based instrument, through which ‘offsets’ are bought by developers from offset 
providers to meet the requirements of environmental compliance.  
Over the past decade or so, the use of offsetting has attracted increasing attention from policymakers 
and researchers, and has been implemented in approximately 50 countries and localities around the 
world. Its widening appeal for governments rests largely on its promise to meet political, 
environmental and legal pressures to address biodiversity loss, without compromising the social and 
economic benefits generated by one of its major material drivers, land development. For its most 
enthusiastic advocates, a well-designed offsetting system can deliver ‘win-win’ outcomes for the 
economy and environment, facilitating sustainable growth by harnessing the efficiencies of the 
market, and making nature’s economic value visible. The UK government drew heavily on this 
narrative, hoping that establishing an offsetting system would both lubricate the planning system to 
enable an acceleration of development in a stagnating economy, supposedly constricted by 
environmental laws governing the regulation of land, while at the same time delivering ambitious but 
faltering conservation targets. 
Yet biodiversity offsetting is a complicated and controversial conservation tool, with limited evidence 
of success on the ground. Governments and others face a complex array of technical, institutional 
and political challenges when trying to implement offsetting in a meaningful way. It has deeply divided 
conservationists. For those opposed, offsetting represents a compromise too far with an economic 
model and vested interests at its centre which need reining in, giving ‘license to trash’ to those most 
responsible for the continuing destruction of natural habitats and loss of wildlife on an industrial scale. 
Many raise moral objections to the notion that biodiversity can be meaningfully priced and traded, 
arguing that the drive towards economic value desecrates and displaces nature’s inherent, 
irreplaceable and non-instrumentalist values, the defence of which lies at the heart of the conservation 
ethic. Those who have embraced offsetting say they recognise the dilemmas it poses, but at the same 
time see opportunity in the context of enduring policy failures and lack of credible alternatives. 
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Moreover, they deny that economic valuation is the be all and end all, but argue that it provides a 
language and set of tools which decision-makers understand, and allows conservationists to make 
their voices heard where it matters. Working with rather than against the grain of business provides 
scope for the refinement of a robust and consensual instrument developed through partnership, which 
can benefit from the resources and dynamism of the private sector as much as the expertise and 
understanding of conservationists. 
I am sympathetic with the former, though I find the narrative built around traditional nature 
conservation somewhat romantic and blind to the movement’s long history of complicity with capitalist 
development, (neo)colonial rule, and all manner of socially regressive ideas and practices. Relatedly, 
I would challenge recurrent conservationist tendencies, embedded in many of these criticisms, to 
construct a wild nature ‘out there’ which needs protection from human expansionism. When I first 
encountered biodiversity offsetting in 2013, I was leafing through the UK Conservative-led 
government’s 2011 Natural Environment White Paper, which set forth plans to roll out such a system 
in England. Coming from a political and intellectual background in Marxist-orientated, left-wing 
environmental activism, the proposals immediately struck me as a move towards the financialisation 
of nature. In this I was heavily influenced by Larry Lohmann’s brilliant dissection and critique of carbon 
emission markets in the Socialist Register, titled ‘Financialization, commodification and carbon: the 
contradictions of neoliberal climate policy’, in which he claimed: 
It is probably not too much to say that since the 1980s, one of the unvoiced mottos of carbon 
markets’ more sophisticated supporters in government and the private sector has been to 
stop effective climate action before it starts (2011a, p. 95). 
The analysis and conclusions appeared germane to biodiversity offsetting too, and the topic looked 
like something which could be usefully studied in more depth, since the social and environmental 
consequences of this nascent component of the new ‘green economy’ seemed as though they would 
be far-reaching. While I still believe the basic premise of Lohmann’s argument holds true, the reality, 
as explored in this thesis, was more complicated, ordinary and small-scale. While much of the 
language, logic and transnational institutional infrastructure around biodiversity offsets mirrors that of 
carbon markets, this turned out to be only part of the story. Rather than a cynical tool created at the 
behest of large development interests, those I found advocating for a formal offsetting programme in 
England were mostly highly committed environmentalists, ecologists and conservationists, even if 
there were many I disagreed with politically and in terms of their views on offsets. Yet by the time my 
fieldwork had come to an end, the policy had been abandoned before nationwide implementation, 
after it became apparent those technical, institutional and political problems which commonly beset 
offsetting could not be satisfactorily resolved. The question posed in this study then is why the UK 
government failed altogether to overcome these combined obstacles, in a particular historical moment 
and geographical context.  
A burgeoning literature has illuminated much about the problems experienced in trying to 
meaningfully implement the biodiversity offsets around the world, which is thoroughly reviewed in 
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Chapter 4. As well as the considerable policy literature extolling the virtues and benefits of biodiversity 
offsets, a large amount of technical research has been produced on the challenges presented by 
ecological complexity and uncertainty. It has highlighted the limitations of natural scientific knowledge 
in being able to fully and accurately measure biodiversity, to provide widely accepted definitions of 
ecological equivalency, and to address the practical difficulties of delivering conservation gain on 
which offsetting rests. This work has revealed much about offsetting’s material and technical limits, 
and the need for tools, safeguards and restrictions on use to manage common risks of failure on the 
ground. Another part of the literature has focused on issues surrounding the construction of the 
institutional architecture, regulations and mechanisms needed to operationalise offsetting as a 
market-based instrument, designed to ensure compliance and standards are effectively met, while 
contributing to wider strategic vision of ecological restoration. This work has shown the dilemmas 
faced by policymakers, as they attempt to compose functional regulatory frameworks in a complex 
social landscape of competing demands and constraints, which can enable optimal outcomes for the 
environment and economy.  
A third set of literature has taken a more critical perspective, drawing attention to the political 
dimensions of offsetting, and its place within today’s ‘green economy’ paradigm. Much of it is aligned 
with work on the neoliberalisation of nature, and has traced the policy’s historical evolution alongside 
the development of other environmental markets, market mechanisms and economic instruments 
over the past several decades. This work has challenged many of the conceptual presuppositions of 
offsetting, while highlighting the constitutive role of unequal power relations in its design, application 
and effects. Moreover, in explaining the many problems encountered in practice, critical scholars 
have drawn on theoretical work on the commodification and marketisation of nature to highlight 
underlying social and ecological contradictions which are far from reconcilable. In essence, the thesis 
follows the lead of this literature in its examination of the English offsetting policy, the experience of 
which deeply resonated with the themes identified in the neoliberalisation of nature. Yet capitalism 
has always been adept at managing to resolve its contradictions, however partially, temporarily and 
unevenly. The growth of environmental markets is a case in point, and offsetting has only become 
more prominent in recent years on the global stage, despite its shortcomings. So why not here and 
now? And what are the implications? 
It is that question which is addressed over the coming pages, based on an in-depth study of the 
aborted introduction of a biodiversity offsetting system to England between 2010 and 2015. 
Empirically, it draws on a very large amount documentary data related to the UK government’s 
proposals, collected and analysed between early 2013 and late 2015. Fieldwork carried out between 
late 2013 and early 2015 involved semi-structured interviews with 36 individuals engaged in the 
policymaking process, either in its design or implementation at various scales. In addition, data was 
collected through participant observation at four policy-focused events, taking place between late 
2013 and the middle of 2014. The thesis itself was written between October 2015 and November 
2016. A fuller account of the methods used in given in Chapter 6. To answer the overarching question 
12 
 
of why the policy was abandoned, the thesis is structured around the aims and objectives detailed 
below. 
 
1: Research aims and objectives 
The aim of the thesis was to critically examine the ultimately failed moves to develop and implement 
a national biodiversity offsetting programme, in the land use planning system in England, between 
2010 and 2015. It looks to shed light on important political questions of contemporary nature 
conservation and biodiversity offsetting in particular, orientated by the broader theoretical lens of the 
neoliberalisation of nature. The research had five interrelated and overlapping objectives, in order to 
realise the overall aim: 
I. To explain the motivations and theoretical underpinnings of moves to introduce biodiversity 
offsetting into the English planning system, as a response to biodiversity loss and 
development pressure. 
II. To identify the various actors and interests involved in the policymaking process, and their 
specific roles in the policy’s design, implementation and contestation. 
III. To assess the key moments of consensus and conflict around the establishment of 
biodiversity offsetting in England, and uncover the tensions, dilemmas and deep 
contradictions which emerged during the policymaking process. 
IV. To analyse the reasons for the government’s eventual retreat, paying close attention to 
political economic and ecological factors as well as technical and institutional challenges 
faced, and to reflect on the wider implications of this failure for biodiversity conservation in 
England. 
V. To discuss the implications for the increasingly popular use of programmes and tools known 
as biodiversity offsets around the world, and similar attempts to reconcile economic and 
environmental goals through developing neoliberal environmental policies and market-based 
instruments for nature conservation. 
The more detailed research questions are to be found in Chapter 5. 
 
2: Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of 11 chapters, split into three main parts. The first four chapters build a 
comprehensive conceptual framework for the study, based on secondary academic and policy 
literature. Chapter 1 provides the most broad and abstract theoretical foundations of the thesis. It 
constructs a conceptual framework, based on critical political ecology underpinned by various Marxist 
theories of the capitalist relation to nature, which elucidates the particular social and historical form 
capitalist natures take. Furthermore, it explains how the internal contradictions of capitalist natures 
generate socially mediated crises, and degrade the conditions of capitalist production. It ends with a 
short account of the ecological crises which animated modern environmentalism in the 1960s and 
1970s, which ushered in a raft of legislation designed to protect ‘nature’ from the damaging effects of 
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capitalist industrialisation – laws which have been significantly modified but still form the basis of 
many environmental protections today. The chapter helps situate contemporary nature conservation 
as both a product of and response to the social and ecological contradictions of capitalism. Chapter 
2 develops the theoretical framework further, through a constructive engagement with the literature 
on the neoliberalisation of nature and neoliberal conservation, as a distinctive set of ideas, policies 
and practices through which nature has been governed in the wake of the combined economic, 
environmental and political crises of the 1970s. This chapter provides conceptual tools for 
apprehending the significance of certain characteristics of offsetting as a ‘market-based instrument’, 
at the same time as orientating the thesis around particular thematic questions opened up by the 
literature, animated by a recognisable set of logics, processes and effects.   
Chapter 3 is the first chapter which deals substantively with the topic of the thesis. It does three things, 
which both define and contextualise offsetting, and help specify it as an example of the 
neoliberalisation of nature. First, it provides a description of the mechanism, as commonly used in 
the policy and academic literature, together with key terminology needed for the subsequent 
discussions. Second, it presents a historical account of the development of biodiversity offsetting, 
from its origins in regulations governing the protection of important wetlands in the United States in 
the 1970s, through to its rise as a globally recognised policy instrument, promoted widely by 
international institutions and adopted by governments and businesses around the world. Finally, it 
introduces the core arguments mobilised by its advocates today, which construct offsetting as a 
flexible market-based instrument, capable of resolving conflicts between development and 
conservation with ‘win-win’ outcomes. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth review of the technical, 
institutional and critical literatures on biodiversity offsetting outlined earlier in the Introduction. It 
furnishes the reader with an understanding of the major themes of academic debate surrounding 
offsetting, many of which are germane to the case study. Furthermore, it helps specify what is distinct 
about biodiversity offsets as a neoliberal policy instrument, and the significance of certain biophysical, 
geographical and institutional features which underpin its peculiarity and variation in practice. 
The second part of the thesis consists of two chapters, which lay out the aims, objectives and research 
questions for the empirical study, and the methods used to do so. The content of Chapter 5 is self-
explanatory, while Chapter 6 lays out the methodological approach of the research. It begins with 
some discussion of the ontological and epistemological basis of the thesis, drawing on the conceptual 
apparatus constructed in the first two chapters. It then turns to a justification and detail of the largely 
qualitative approach taken, followed by a substantial description of how the empirical data was 
generated and analysed, together with an overview of the all the data collected through obtaining key 
documentation, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The chapter ends with some 
discussion of problems encountered during the research, and the limitations of the findings. 
The last five chapters then comprise the final part of the thesis, consisting of four empirical chapters 
and one discussion chapter. Chapter 7 is largely descriptive, and constructs a thorough policymaking 
history of biodiversity offsetting in England. While on the one hand it gives the reader background 
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information and a reference point from which to navigate the remaining chapters, it also provides vital 
context for the subsequent analysis. It brings into view the role of key actors and events which 
precipitated offsetting’s rise and fall, the political economic circumstances which shaped its trajectory. 
Of particular pertinence was the UK government’s interest in offsetting in the wake of the global 
financial crash of 2008. The new administration developed their proposals while implementing a 
programme of deep fiscal austerity, and as part and parcel of a series of planning reforms and 
environmental deregulation aimed at removing regulatory barriers to economic growth through land 
development. Together with other factors covered in the chapter, this heavily constrained and 
mediated subsequent efforts to establish a voluntary offsetting system, and lay at the root of the 
myriad problems the government faced. Chapter 8 lays out the policymaking landscape through which 
the proposals moved. Its role is twofold. First, it maps out a rough synthesis, in the form of a table, of 
the political positions of all the main stakeholder groups the government needed to enrol to 
operationalise its preferred system, including the national government itself, its allies in the green 
business sector, local planning authorities, conservation NGOs, developers and landowners. Second, 
using this table, it explains how the government and its allies managed to construct a fragile 
consensus around the desirability of a formalised offset programme, based on overlapping interests 
and the promise of a ‘win-win’ for development and conservation, generated through market 
efficiencies. 
Chapter 9 then explores and analyses in depth some of the underlying tensions and divisions 
concealed by this surface-level agreement, by focusing on disputes around the appropriate technical 
design features of the government’s proposals. These debates followed similar tropes to those 
identified in the Chapter 4’s literature review, and concerned issues of measurement, equivalence, 
the quality of ecological assessments, and the limitations of ecological restoration. Yet the tensions 
were not merely technical, but political too, and concerned whose interests would be served by 
specific characteristics of the metric. Moreover, possible resolutions were constrained by the 
government’s insistence that market functionality and cost effectiveness were the most crucial 
aspects of the system, which environmental groups felt would compromise offsetting’s ecological 
outcomes. As a result, politically conditioned and unresolved tensions over the technical aspects of 
offsetting threatened to destabilise consent for the methods of quantification at the heart of the policy. 
Chapter 10 examines the similarly mediated controversies over the institutional architecture, the 
capacity of regulatory bodies and the scope of offsets to force developers to comply with no net loss 
requirements. Like the previous chapter, the unwillingness of the government to impose any 
additional costs on developers proved deeply damaging to its efforts to enrol the actors it needed to 
operationalise offsetting. Eventually, all the major groups walked away from what had become an 
increasingly controversial policy, at around the same time as the government’s leadership decided to 
block offsetting, on the grounds that even a voluntary system risked placing unacceptable, additional 
regulatory burden on developers.  
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Chapter 11 concludes the thesis with a long discussion and reflections on the implications of the 
study, for offsetting in England and more generally, as well as for the neoliberalisation of nature 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Chapter 1: Capitalist and Liberal Natures 
 
Introduction 
These opening two chapters aim to build a broad theoretical framework for the thesis, based on two 
related sets of critical environmental studies literature: neoliberal natures and neoliberal conservation. 
They are designed to both provide a framework with which to understand the development of 
biodiversity offsetting, as well as a set of critical tools with which to investigate what unfolded in 
England between 2010 and 2015. The reason for engaging with these particular literatures is as 
follows. Biodiversity offsetting, as explained in the introduction, is usually identified as a market-based 
instrument designed to deliver specific conservation outcomes, discursively justified by its purported 
ability to reveal or foreground nature’s ‘value’ in economic decision-making processes. These signal 
features have significant resonance with a set of interrelated philosophical, programmatic and 
practical tropes that have come to be associated with the neoliberalisation of nature (Castree, 2010). 
The literature on neoliberal natures, though in some ways a disparate and uncoordinated body of 
theoretical and empirical work, has furnished us with a broad critical framework and set of tools for 
understanding and interrogating society’s relation to the biophysical world, at multiple levels and 
scales, in what has been termed the neoliberal era – a period beginning sometime in the 1970s and 
continuing through to the present day. As a critical environmental research agenda, it begins from the 
premise – shared by the present author – that there is something profoundly wrong with the existing 
social and environmental order, in its ability to deliver social and ecological outcomes which are just 
and sustainable, for humans and the rest of nature.  
As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, the neoliberalisation of nature is treated as distinct from what 
came before in variety of ways (Bakker, 2010b; Castree, 2008b, 2008a). Importantly, the literature 
makes the case that neoliberalism is necessarily an environmental as well as a political economic 
project, which has and continues to be constituted through its relationship with the discursive, material 
and symbolic emergence of environmental limits and crises in the 1960s and 1970s. While all 
societies are foundationally constituted through their relation with the rest of nature, the 
neoliberalisation of nature is viewed as specific in the way these historical natures and the depletion 
of environmental resources have been confronted, mediated and governed in the context of neoliberal 
or capitalist growth imperatives. Before delving into this literature, Chapter 1 gives space for the 
author’s own conceptual understanding of the relationship between human societies and the rest of 
nature, and between capitalism and the biophysical world in particular. This conceptual work 
undergirds the foundational proposition above that nonhuman natures play an active and relational 
role in putatively social processes, and alludes to the influence of political ecology on neoliberal 
natures (see for instance Bakker & Bridge, 2006). Political ecology is more than an ontological 
viewpoint specific to neoliberal natures. It encompasses a broader set of theoretical and 
methodological approaches to nature-society relations, which can help frame an understanding of the 
historical natures of capitalist modernity. In situating the neoliberalisation of nature in relation to 
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capitalist modernity as an environmental project in general, a political ecological take provides a 
framework with which to trace through and differentiate from what I will term capitalist natures, 
identifying continuities and changes in nature-society relations.  
As will become clear, I lean more towards the Marxist end of the theoretical spectrum of political 
ecology and neoliberal natures – though I join James McCarthy (2012, p. 184) in seeing compatibility 
between Marxist and other approaches to neoliberalism and nature, such as poststructuralism. While 
any comprehensive review of this diverse field is far beyond the scope of this opening chapter, there 
are two salient methodological features worth dwelling on. Firstly, political ecology refuses the 
discrete separation of an external nature from society under capitalist modernity, instead 
foregrounding the relational complexity of socio-natural entanglements in all aspects of society’s 
relation to the rest of nature. Drawing from an eclectic mix of theoretical traditions, socio-
environmental change is understood as a continually unfolding set of uneven, contested and 
contingent historical and geographical processes, through which human and nonhuman natures are 
assembled, co-produced and interwoven – materially and symbolically, discursively and politically, at 
different spatial and temporal scales (see for example Peet et al., 2010; also Bryant, 2015; Perreault 
et al., 2015). Secondly, these are never ecologically or socially neutral in logic, process and effect, 
but are irreducibly political, mediated through relations of power, such as class, race, gender and so 
on (Heynen et al., 2006, pp. 11–12). What I present in Chapter 1 is a selective political ecological 
take on these relations, combining insights from Marxist political ecologies1, particularly the work of 
Smith (2010a), Moore (2015), Foster (2000), Burkett (2014) and O’Connor (1998), with a focus on 
the role of classical liberal thought in the symbolic and discursive production of capitalist natures.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of capitalist modernity’s relation to nature in general, as both 
historical and abstract. It aims to foreground the notion that all forms of social organisation are 
necessarily environmental projects as well, but that capitalism constitutes and is constituted by a 
specific constellation of historical natures, materially and symbolically, proceeding in the following 
manner. Section 1 starts with the materialist notion of the production of nature in general, and moves 
to the development of the specifically capitalist production of nature, highlighting the importance of 
processes of commodification, capitalist value, and primitive accumulation. Section 2 roughly 
synthesises the symbolic and ideological roles played by classical liberal thought and the Cartesian 
scientific revolution, in producing and ordering modern capitalist natures. Section 3 reviews three sets 
of contradictions, theorised by mostly Marxist writers, internal to capitalist natures: (i) alienation and 
the metabolic rift; (ii) fictitious commodities and the ‘second contradiction’ of capitalism; and (iii) use-
value and exchange-value and nature’s ‘free gifts’. Section 4 then briefly outlines how some of these 
                                                     
1 By Marxist political ecologies, I refer not only to the work of self-proclaimed eco-Marxists or political ecologists, 
but also others who have dealt substantively with the question of ‘nature’ (for reviews, see e.g. Henderson, 2009; 
Castree, 2000). 
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contradictions have played out as ecological crises which have animated the world since the 1960s, 
as context leading into the subsequent chapter on the neoliberalisation of nature. 
 
1: Capitalist Natures 
1.1: Humanity in nature and the production of nature 
The starting point for Marxist political ecologies revolves around humanity’s relationship with the rest 
of nature, as they appropriate and transform the biophysical world, in the form of use-values, in order 
to meet their own needs. This is described as a process of metabolic exchange between humans and 
the rest of nature, mediated by the sensuous and productive activity of human labour-power (and 
other biophysical processes) (see variously Moore, 2015; Loftus, 2012; Smith, 2010a; Castree, 2000; 
Foster, 2000). Human nature and labour-power were understood by Marx to be fundamentally part 
of nature in a universal sense; products of nature and subject to its most basic laws. Humanity could 
never be separated and survive apart from the nonhuman world, but at the same time existed in 
differentiated and dialectical unity with the rest of nature. According to Marx, what differentiated 
human natures was the development of the ability to separate mental and manual aspects of labour, 
and use mental conceptions to intentionally design that which they materially produce. From this 
perspective, humanity’s history and societal development as part of the rest of nature is fundamentally 
the story of the social appropriation and production of various use-values, to meet human needs for 
survival and reproduction, and the subsequent production of new needs (Smith, 2010a). Both human 
and nonhuman natures are understood to be the ultimate sources of wealth, and labour is both a 
social and a natural process, as are the products of this process of metabolic exchange. This 
historically unfolding process of socio-natural metabolism at once transforms (or produces) human 
nature and social relations, as well as those of and with the rest of nature. This is the basic premise 
upon which Smith (2010a, chap. 2) builds his ‘production of nature’ thesis, where, extrapolating from 
Marx, he argues that production in general – not only of the material creations of human labour but 
institutions, and the legal, economic and political rules of society as a system (Loftus, 2012, p. 11) – 
is necessarily the production of nature. Smith describes the production of nature as the ongoing and 
uneven process through which nature is at once internalised by humanity and the system of 
production, and nature is increasingly produced as socio-natures out of society2.  
1.2: Commodification, value and capitalist production 
As human societies developed beyond those of subsistence, the production of nature allowed for the 
conditions for commodities to emerge, where commodities are described as products of labour which 
could be traded for other use-values. Commodities take on the form of exchange-values as well as 
use-values, where exchange-value allows for the trade of specific quantities of use-values, made 
                                                     
2 As Henderson puts it, the: “point of the production of nature idea is that it is not sufficient to think of nature as 
that which is not human, nor sufficient to say that nature includes the human” (2009, p. 281). 
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commensurable through a universal equivalent, usually money. Importantly, the abstraction through 
which use-values are made equivalent is the socially necessary labour time (or abstract labour) to 
make a commodity. This is the definition and measure of a commodity’s value, which its exchange-
value is said to represent3. Producers are able to obtain different use-values through selling their 
products for money, with which they can buy other commodities through markets: the C-M-C circuit. 
For Marxists, commodification describes production increasingly motivated by or for exchange, 
synthesised here by Prudham (2009, p. 125) as the: 
interlinked processes whereby: production for use is systematically displaced by production 
for exchange; social consumption and reproduction increasingly relies on purchased 
commodities; new classes of goods and services are made available in the commodity-form; 
and money plays an increasing role in mediating exchange as a common currency of value. 
As Smith explains, the social production of ‘second nature’ under capitalism is increasingly the 
production of nature as exchange-values. This takes place, according to Prudham (2009, pp. 125–
6), through two interrelated moments of commodification. The first is market expansion – the 
development of relations of exchange across greater distances of time and space: stretching. The 
second is the systematic increase in the provision of goods and services in commodity-form: 
deepening. 
For Marx, a capitalist society is one organised according to the generalised production of 
commodities, where expansive commodification is driven by a peculiar and transformative logic of 
the law of value combined with the nature of capital. Under capitalist social relations, rather than 
selling commodities in order to buy other commodities, capitalists bring money-capital to the market 
with the purpose of making more money: perpetual accumulation of surplus value, or the constant 
search for profit and the pursuit of money as an end in itself over and above particular use-values. 
The simple circuit of C-M-C driving production changes to M-C-M’, where M’ represents the original 
investment plus a certain quantity of surplus value. Marx described the nature of capital as: 
value in process, money in process … It comes out of circulation, enters into it again, 
preserves and multiplies itself within circulation, emerges from it with an increased size, and 
starts the same cycle again and again (Marx, 1990 p. 256).  
By its very nature, capital has to expand to survive (Henderson, 2009, pp. 270–2). Commodification 
is therefore the lifeblood of capitalism, not only producing and remaking nature as exchange-values, 
but on a world scale, bringing more and more facets of human and nonhuman nature into the orbit of 
capitalist value relations. On the one hand, the growing scope and scale of commodification is 
necessary as an outlet for the continued expansion of capital; on the other, various features of 
capitalist competition tend to erode profits over time, meaning individual capitalists are forced to seek 
to constantly renew the conditions of profitability. Both capitalists and workers are ultimately caught 
                                                     
3 The specific value-form of commodities, which values abstract labour while devaluing all other forms of human 
and nonhuman natures, has important implications for Marxist political ecologies of crisis, as will be discussed 
shortly. 
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up with and reliant upon, and subordinated by this restless, systemic process of accumulation for 
their own reproduction. 
1.3: The commodification of land and labour-power 
Due to the expansive nature of capital as value in motion, the commodification of labour-power as 
wage labour becomes a precondition for capitalist production. This is for two reasons. First, workers, 
through wage labour, are required to generate value and produce a growing number of commodities. 
Second, capitalists need people to purchase their commodities so that the value of those commodities 
is realised, and the expansion of the proletariat provides one major source for this (Prudham, 2009, 
p. 127). 
The creation of wage labour is linked historically on the commodification of land, and the often violent 
process of primitive accumulation4. This was described by Marx (1990) and Polanyi (2001), whose 
work is also central to many Marxist political ecologists, as fundamental to the development of 
industrial capitalism. The enclosure of the commons, in separating labour from the land and the 
means of production, forced people to enter the cities to sell their labour-power for a wage, so that 
they could buy commodities to survive. It subordinated workers to the system of capitalist value, 
accumulation and profit, since they required both employment and the ongoing production of 
commodities to meet their needs (Wood, 2013). At the same time, the commodification of labour-
power created a series of separations from the rest of nature, not only from the land and means of 
subsistence but from the products of their labour, now appropriated by the capitalist and alienated 
from themselves. 
The law and measurement of value and the production of nature as exchange-values turned on the 
establishment of abstract and linear time, but it equally turned on two other real abstractions which 
were central to the modernist project: abstract space and external nature (Moore, 2015). The 
commodification of land required the imposition, through various state-led methods of 
territorialisation, of abstract space: a flat and geometric space made up of “empty, exchangeable 
units” (Crang, 2005, p. 203) or as Lefebvre described it: “space … that is homogeneous yet at the 
same time broken up into fragments” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 342; see too Smith, 2010a; Harvey, 2007a). 
This meant mapping, coding, surveying and quantifying space and nature, the subject of Section 2. 
 
2: Cartesian binaries and liberal natures 
2.1: The Cartesian scientific revolution 
The more or less materialist account outlined above provides a useful starting point for understanding 
the nature of capitalist natures. However, the transformations of nature-society relations exceed the 
                                                     
4 It is important to note, however, that primitive accumulation should not generally be seen as a historical artefact 
of pre-capitalism, but as a systemic tendency of capitalist development (e.g. Bonefeld, 2011; Glassman, 2007; 
Harvey, 2007b; de Angelis, 2006). 
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material, as should be clear from the processes of separation taking place through capitalism’s 
historical development and law of value. For political ecologists ‘Nature’ is social and natural, material 
and symbolic (e.g. Castree & Braun, 2001; Braun & Castree, 1998). Moore highlights the important 
epistemological and ideological groundwork implicit in the transformation of nature-society relations, 
and the so-called domination of nature (in the Baconian sense) of the modern era:  
The notion that social relations (humans without nature) can be analyzed separately from 
ecological relations (nature without humans) is the ontological counterpoint to the real and 
concrete separation of the direct producers from the means of production (2015, p. 19).  
From a Marxist-orientated perspective, these are mental conceptions which have material force and 
application in the world (at the same time as being products of socio-natural relations), both 
productive and destructive, liberating and oppressive.  
Moore sees the ‘violent abstractions’ (2015, p. 21) of the Cartesian scientific revolution as equally 
foundational to the project of capitalist modernity (see also Merchant, 1990) as the process of 
primitive accumulation:  
If the accumulation of capital is the proletarianization of labor, it is also the production of 
knowledges aimed at controlling, mapping, and quantifying the worlds of commodification 
and appropriation. For early modern materialism, the point was not only to interpret the world 
but to control it: ‘to make ourselves as it were the masters and possessors of nature’ 
(Descartes, 2006, p. 51). In the history of capitalism, the ‘material’ and the ‘symbolic’ form an 
organic whole (Moore, 2015, p. 20). 
Advances in the fields of cartography and the physical and natural sciences were critical to socially 
constructing and re-envisaging space, time and nature as external and discrete quantifiable objects, 
which could be separated and bordered, observed and measured, and ultimately made into 
exchangeable parts. This moves us beyond the economic realm of commodity production, 
foregrounding the critical territorialising activities of the state in the ongoing process of environment-
making through the construction of new property regimes, physical infrastructure and scientific 
knowledge (see in particular Parenti, 2015; but also Robertson & Wainwright, 2013; Whitehead et al., 
2007; Mitchell, 2002; Scott, 1999; Luke, 1995). 
By invoking the Cartesian revolution (otherwise referred to as the Age of Enlightenment or Reason), 
Moore is talking about more than merely scientific methods, binding historical natures with what he 
calls the ‘technics’ of modern civilisation: empire, science and culture (2015, pp. 58–9). He is talking 
of a full-spectrum transformation, encompassing the realms of philosophy and social theory, literature, 
art and so on, in how nature came to be framed and symbolically represented as one half of a nature-
society binary (see Watts, 2005), and as an external object of reality (see for instance Smith, 2010a, 
chap. 1 on the ‘ideology of nature’; Williams, 2005; Cronon, 1992 on the social construction of 
‘wilderness’ in the United States). Cartesian thought denoted the discursive construction, based on 
Descartes’ separation of mind over body, of a series of hierarchical dualisms – male-female, reason-
emotion, culture-nature, self-other, subject-object and so on – which would structure the dominant 
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philosophical and analytical worldviews of the modern capitalist era, and facilitate new regimes of 
rational control and organisation.  
2.2: Liberal natures 
The ideas of classical liberalism, built on this emergent ontological landscape, furnished capitalist 
natures with philosophical underpinnings which both justified and naturalised laissez faire capitalism 
and free markets. The intersection of the rationalist claims of Descartes, Bacon and Hume with 
classical liberal ideas about human nature and the individual – as well as the natural wealth of the 
Earth – provided the ontological and moral cornerstone of liberal political economy. The sanctity of 
the individual rights pivoted on the model of human nature found in Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke, 
bringing together ideas of violence and order, freedom and property – and a critical role for the state 
in enforcing those rights to protect the individual. The prefigured and self-interested individual was 
the agent standing at the centre of the free market orthodoxy and trade liberalisation propagated by 
Smith and Ricardo, where the material concern of individuals and national prosperity rested on the 
value-generating activity of labour, and the productive transformation of an external nonhuman world 
into private property for use or sale (Foster et al., 2011, chap. 1). As Harvey (1996, pp. 124–5) puts 
it: “the domination of nature was viewed as a necessary prerequisite to emancipation and self-
realization” to eighteenth century political economy. 
Later the reimagining of the individual as utility-maximising, turning on Mill and Bentham, as well as 
Say and Bailey (Robertson & Wainwright, 2013; Foster et al., 2011), would provide the basis for the 
marginal revolution and birth of neoclassical economics and markets. The neoclassical revolution 
would abolish use-value altogether in favour of the fully relativist concept of value as exchange-value. 
As will be explained in Section 3.3, this would leave the realm of ‘nature’ with no value in and of itself 
in modern economics, but only through exchange, under conditions where it was an endlessly 
substitutable external category (Mirowski, 2013, p. 335). 
Locke, meanwhile, is seen as particularly important figure in providing the intellectual case for private 
property as the natural outcome of the mixing of labour with nature (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004, p. 
277). With the initial phase of primitive accumulation representing such a formative yet contested 
moment of modern capitalism’s development, justifications for privatisation were crucial. This turned 
critically on a dual logic. While the enclosure of the commons generated the scarcity necessary for 
the constitution of generalised wage labour5, classical liberalism reconstructed scarcity as a natural 
and external condition of the land. This is most clearly apparent in the pessimism of Malthus’ 
conservative ruminations on overpopulation. As Ross observes, ideas of absolute scarcity have 
always been a “political tool, skillfully manipulated by the powerful whenever it suits their purpose” 
(1994, p. 16). Mansfield (2008a, pp. 4–5) agrees, arguing how private property is envisaged as more 
than natural by Locke, but also as a deliberate transformative device (based on a socially generated 
                                                     
5 As Foster et al. (2011) also point out, there is no exchange-value in conditions of abundance. 
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scarcity) which disciplines its owners, incentivising productivity. The other side of the coin placed a 
more optimistic faith in the efficiency of free markets to combat this scarcity, undergirded by strongly 
enforced private property rights, by raising productivity through competition and specialisation.  
Though the two appear in some tension, the Promethean drive behind market expansion aimed at 
escaping existing material constraints is at once born of necessity, on the grounds of supposedly 
naturally imposed resource scarcity. Harvey again:  
The genius of eighteenth-century political economy was this: that it mobilized the human 
imaginary of emancipation, progress, and self-realization into forms of discourse that could 
alter the application of political power and the construction of institutions in ways that were 
consistent with the growing prevalence of the material practices of market exchange. It did 
so, furthermore, while masking social relations and the domination of the labor that was to 
follow, while subsuming the cosmic question of the relation to nature into a technical 
discourse concerning the proper allocation of scarce resources (including those in nature) for 
the benefit of human welfare (1996, p. 131). 
The ambiguity in classical liberal thought around the potential and desirability for perpetual growth 
gave way somewhat following the marginal revolution (and later the neoliberal turn in economics, see 
Mirowski, 2013, pp. 335–6). Neoclassical theory posited all goods and services as limitlessly 
substitutable, including environmental resources, which meant there could be no natural limits to 
economic activity – reinforcing the notion that free markets were the most efficient mechanisms for 
overcoming scarcity. At the same time, the thermodynamic paradigm on which neoclassical 
equilibrium markets were modelled, would later form the basis for mainstream environmental thinking 
around the limits of economic growth in a closed system (Walker & Cooper, 2011; Mirowski, 1992). 
 
3: Marxist political ecologies of contradiction and crisis 
3.1: Alienation and the metabolic rift 
The critical question underpinning much of Marxist political ecology regards how these relations at 
the heart of capitalist production are bound up with the advent and playing out of increasingly large-
scale environmental crises, of rising social concern since the 1960s. Smith’s production of nature 
thesis is of uneven geographical development more than crisis. It shows how the generation of 
second nature under capitalist modernity is not under human control but the consequence of both 
intentional and unintentional production, unfolding in contingent yet historically specific ways. As 
Castree (2000) summarises, the production of nature is a “continuous process in which nature and 
capital co-constitute one another in temporally and geographically varied and contingent ways” (p. 
28), and that “in particular times and places in relation to particular environments capitalism is 
ecologically harmful whereas in others nature is produced in ways that have positive social and 
ecological effects” (p. 30). While the penetration of capital into nature gets ever deeper, and nature’s 
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subsumption more intensive (Smith, 2006; Katz, 1998), the nature internal to capital is greatly 
variegated and unpredictable (Harvey, 1996)6. 
The production of nature thesis does however link capitalist production, nature and alienation. For 
Smith, the capitalist production of nature led producers to increasingly producing a social nature 
external to themselves, which is then appropriated from them by capital. As such, it is a process 
through which people are progressively separated and alienated from the products of their labour 
and, by definition, from the rest of nature. For Foster (1999, p. 383), the alienation of nature or the 
“material estrangement of human beings in capitalist society from the natural conditions of their 
existence” was central to Marx’s concept of the metabolic rift. The ‘irreparable rift’ between “human 
production and its natural conditions” (Foster, 1999, p. 370) Marx identified during the second 
agricultural revolution related to the reproduction of soil fertility, which Foster contends can be 
extrapolated as a general theory of environmental degradation under capitalism.  
The rift in the metabolic exchange between human beings and the soil emerged as a consequence 
of the simultaneous development of large-scale industry and large-scale agriculture (Foster, 2000, p. 
156), reflected in a growing antagonism between town and country. Soil fertility had become a major 
issue between 1830 and 1870, during the reconfiguration of agriculture as a primarily commercial 
enterprise. Commercial agriculture saw the export of produce to distant burgeoning industrial centres, 
where waste built up or expelled into the sea, breaking the nutrients cycle which had previously 
replenished the land. This rift saw the soil become increasingly exhausted, with its further exploitation 
requiring the import of fertiliser from other parts of the world to replace what had been lost, as well as 
the industrial development of fertiliser which characterised the second agricultural revolution (Foster, 
1999, p. 373). As a result, agriculture ceased to be self-sustaining, since it was now reliant on inputs 
from a separate industry, a situation exacerbated by the increasingly long-distance nature of trade as 
capitalist production developed, while the production of fertiliser was equally dependent on extraction 
and the depletion of land elsewhere. 
At the other pole of this process, Marx recognised how the feeding of growing industrial centres with 
food, labour and natural resources was also resulting in the build-up of pollution and waste in the 
towns and cities. This included material flows other than from agriculture, and allowed for a more 
generalised understanding of the contradictory relationship between capitalist production and the 
natural conditions of its reproduction. As Foster observes, Marx recognised that this growing 
antagonism between town and country – the geographical expression of the metabolic rift constituted 
by the new spatial division of labour – was being replicated on an increasingly global scale, as “whole 
colonies saw their land, resources, and soil robbed to support the industrialization of the colonizing 
                                                     
6 It should be noted that Harvey’s (2015, chap. 16) most recent work argues that the contradictions of capital’s 
relation to nature and accumulation of unintended consequences of its production are becoming increasingly 
dangerous at the current inflection point of exponential capitalist growth. 
25 
 
countries” (2000, p. 164). This separation was also central to the generation of the symbolic 
dichotomy between society and nature. 
Foster’s development of the metabolic rift emphasised Marx’s view that the exploitation of the worker 
under capitalism was bound up with the exploitation of the land, and capitalism’s unsustainability 
intricately linked with primitive accumulation and the commodification of land. It was for this reason, 
Foster et al argue:  
Few things were more important, in Marx’s view, than the abolition of the big private 
monopolies in land that divorced the majority of humanity from: (1) a direct relation to nature, 
(2) the land as a means of production, and (3) a communal relation to the earth (2011, p. 60).  
The critique of land commodification takes us back to Polanyi (2001) as another influence on many 
Marxist political ecologies, particularly through the work of O’Connor (1998).  
3.2: Fictitious commodities and the ‘second contradiction’ of capitalism 
For Polanyi, the commodification of land and labour, foundational to the formation of market society, 
saw the creation of ‘fictitious commodities’ – fictions because they are emphatically not produced for 
exchange, but the very substance of society, nothing more than “the human beings themselves of 
which every society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 75). 
The commodification of land and labour represented for Polanyi a radical disembedding of society 
from nature, a tearing apart of the inseparable socio-ecological conditions of (re)production. The 
splicing up of nature into discrete, exchangeable units was, he contended, inimical to the deep and 
complex relations which constitute the realities of human and nonhuman natures. The monetary 
exchange-values assigned to them in a market society simply cannot express their full social, cultural 
and environmental values or the totality of their functions and relationships. These would always be 
produced outside of exchange relations to some degree. As a result, labour and land will be 
undervalued if treated as commodities, due to the necessarily incomplete nature of that 
commodification, and will tend to be overexploited and degraded over time. As Polanyi puts it: 
while production could theoretically be organized in this way, the commodity fiction 
disregarded the fact that leaving the fate of the soil and people to the market would be 
tantamount to annihilating them (2001, p. 137).  
The consequence, as Polanyi argues has been the case historically, is a tendency towards what he 
calls the ‘double movement’, whereby pressure from social forces and movements, both reformist 
and radical, will eventually compel governments to intervene to mitigate the negative social and 
environmental effects of markets.  
O’Connor’s (1998) synthesis of Polanyi’s ideas with those of Marx leads him to argue there is a 
‘second contradiction of capitalism’: a tendency for capitalist production to perennially under-produce 
the social and environmental conditions – ecological resources and processes, labour-power and 
communal social life – for the reproducing and sustaining of capitalist social relations. According to 
O’Connor, capitalism is entirely dependent on these conditions as use-values for the production of 
material wealth, but as they are all generated outside of the relations of production, they are 
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undervalued and appropriated as free and eternal gifts, resulting in their degradation and despoliation. 
Capitalism is theorised as producing its own scarcity through undervaluing its conditions. This tends 
to induce social movement opposition and state regulation – the “real [political] substance of the 
second contradiction” (Henderson, 2009, p. 276) – since those conditions and use-values tend to be 
of great importance to ordinary people. Ultimately, the second contradiction raises the prospect of 
rising costs of the reproduction of the conditions of production. 
3.3: Use-value and exchange-value and nature’s free gifts 
Marxist political ecologists have extrapolated from and augmented Marx’s critique of political 
economy in various ways to develop ideas of environmental contradiction (see e.g. Walker, 2016). 
For both Foster and Burkett, there is a fundamental ecological critique to be found in Marx’s own 
oeuvre. Foster sees one of these as immanent in the contradiction between use-value and exchange-
value, or the problem of the Lauderdale Paradox: the distinction between public wealth (understood 
as the totality of use-values) and private wealth (as the sum of exchange-values) in classical political 
economy (Foster et al., 2011, chap. 1). Lauderdale suggested that increases in overall wealth, 
measured by increases in private wealth or exchange-values, necessarily entailed the diminishment 
of public wealth, since value in exchange would only exist under conditions of scarcity of available 
use-values. For the classical political economists, however, public wealth was not valueless. 
Breathable air for instance, clearly had substantive and intrinsic use-value, even if it had no (relative) 
exchange-value. The same went for myriad other vital aspects of ‘nature’, yet value as the measure 
of wealth could not account for them, unless they became scarce and took on exchange-value (Foster 
et al., 2011, pp. 54–6).  
Locke and Ricardo therefore insisted on the distinct conceptual separation between wealth and value, 
or use-value and exchange-value. However, since the paradox could not be resolved, use-value was 
always ultimately subordinated to value as measure of wealth, and with production geared towards 
the accumulation of surplus-value, Marx noted how nature as a fundamental source of wealth was in 
fact treated as a ‘free gift’ under capitalism, as explicitly advanced by the physiocrats, Smith, Ricardo, 
Malthus and Mill (Foster et al., 2011, pp. 59–61). The proto-marginalists and precursors to 
neoclassical economics – such as Say, Bailey (see Robertson & Wainwright, 2013, pp. 895–6) and 
Mill – would ultimately reject the Lauderdale Paradox and category of use-value altogether. All that 
‘counted’ was economic value-added as measured by GDP and its equivalents. In practice 
neoclassical economics relegated nature, and its associated social costs and benefits, to the realm 
of externalities and welfare economics. 
The contradiction remained implicit however, since the idea of nature as free gift continued to 
underpin the capitalist economy, leading to two problems for the environmental sustainability of 
capitalism (Foster et al., 2011, pp. 67–9). First, the presumption of infinite exchangeability – that 
natural resources could simply be substituted by another factor of production – meant neoclassical 
economics could get no grip on material existence, and the natural conditions of capitalist 
(re)production. As Foster et al. put it, there is ultimately no feedback mechanism to prevent 
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environmental degradation which takes place, for example, through the metabolic rift. Second, not 
only does the distinction and focus on the production and accumulation of exchange-values over use-
values devalue the importance of abundant reproductive processes, the expansion of value 
necessarily feeds on the destruction of public wealth. If ‘environmental’ use-values only become 
valuable by becoming scarce, this means the imperative of value accumulation actually makes waste 
and destruction rational under capitalism, since they provide new opportunities for profit, while their 
negative effects continue to be externalised onto society and the rest of nature (Foster et al., 2011, 
p. 69).  
Burkett (2014, chap. 6) develops the idea of capital’s ‘free appropriation’ of nature’s gifts further, 
signalling its central importance to accumulation since commodity production always involves a 
combination of abstract labour with ‘natural conditions’. Reemphasising how natural conditions 
contribute to the use-values of commodities, he shows how ‘nature’ is appropriated as use-values 
which specifically serve value accumulation – that is, the ‘forces of nature’ are selectively utilised as 
means of production which increase labour productivity without requiring more labour (i.e. cost 
nothing in terms of value composition as a whole). For Burkett (2014, chap. 9), this brings about two 
potential crises. The first is the metabolic rift as explained by Foster, which he describes as 
environmental. The second, which he calls economic, relates to recurrent episodes of shortages of 
raw materials, since leaps in labour productivity translated directly into “huge increases in the 
throughput of matter and energy drawn from and emitted into the natural environment” (Burkett, 2014, 
p. xviii). Raw materials in this sense meant those supplied out of and limited by biological, ecological 
and geological conditions, which could not be reproduced independently by capitalist enterprise. The 
accelerating pace of capital accumulation and its appetite for raw materials increasingly outstrips the 
capacity of these processes to replenish these raw materials, leading to supply shortages and rising 
input costs for capitalists.  
Burkett (2014, p. xx) notes how capitalism has typically managed to resolve these crises by treating 
“workers and the natural conditions of production as separate inputs” that can be reorganised spatially 
and technologically, and through a ‘slash and burn’ strategy across space. More recently Moore 
(2015) has built on this analysis to argue these crises have always been historically resolved through 
capitalism’s Cheap Nature strategy. He suggests that both successive reconfigurations of human and 
extra-human natures, combined with geographical expansion, have been at the heart of capitalism’s 
waves of accumulation since around 1450. Like others, Moore (2015, p. 51) sees the peculiar value-
form under capitalism, through which value is determined by labour rather than land productivity, as 
necessarily devaluing all forms of work and energy other than commodified labour-power. Raising 
labour productivity, however, requires ever-increasing inputs of unpaid work and energy, and as such 
the accumulation of value in co-constituted by another moment of value relations, called the zone of 
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appropriation: capitalism’s Cheap Nature strategy7. Crucially, this a process of activating and 
mobilising unpaid work and energy of non-capitalised human and nonhuman natures outside of 
commodity production, the flows of which can increase labour productivity.  
To sustain accumulation cycles, the zone of appropriation needs to outpace that of commodification, 
in order to stave off the problem of rising value composition and declining profitability (Moore, 2015, 
chap. 5). The appropriation of Cheap Nature therefore takes place through non-economic processes 
and procedures, called regimes of ‘abstract social nature’8. New regimes of abstract social nature 
have historically been produced through geographical frontier expansions combined with scientific 
advances (broadly defined). However, these ‘ecological revolutions’ are one-off events, and each 
new configuration eventually becomes exhausted relative to the demands of capital (Moore, 2015, 
chap. 6). Moore contends that the prospect of new frontiers –  as yet untapped sources of cheap 
food, energy, natural resources and human labour – is quickly receding. For Moore, capitalism’s 
ecological question is ultimately not so much about what capitalism is doing to the environment, but 
how much longer nature can provide capitalism with what it needs in terms ‘socially necessary unpaid 
work’. 
 
4: Environmental crisis 
The environmental history of capitalism has been a turbulent one, and can be theorised according to 
the relations and contradictions of capitalist natures described above. The global spread of value 
relations and spectacular growth inaugurated by the industrial revolution has been constituted 
through an accelerating metabolism of human and nonhuman natures as so-called taps and sinks to 
feed and regulate the increasing pace of capitalist production and consumption, industrialisation and 
urbanisation. In the current moment we are confronted with a series of ‘converging crises’ (George, 
2010) on an increasingly planetary scale, and as Harvey (2015) argues in recent work, capital’s 
relation to nature has become one of its most ‘dangerous’ contradictions, even if political attention 
has moved elsewhere since the economic crisis beginning in 2008. Climate change and efforts to 
curb global warming, and to some extent global biodiversity loss ([Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment] MEA, 2005), have been the most visible. Yet the more ubiquitous character of current 
environmental problems is represented by the apparent breaching of three of the nine ‘planetary 
boundaries’ identified by the Stockholm Resilience Centre, and the near-breach of several others, 
which demarcate a ‘safe operating space’ for humanity (Steffen et al., 2015; Rockström et al., 2009; 
see also Angus, 2016; Foster et al., 2011), as well as the growing consensus that humanity has been 
the driving force behind these processes, of a new geological age called the Anthropocene, 
                                                     
7 Moore (2015, p. 53) classifies the Four Cheaps necessary to undergird labour productivity as food, energy, 
natural resources and labour-power (especially unpaid reproductive work). 
8 The corollary to abstract social labour. 
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inaugurated by the industrial revolution (Steffen et al., 2007; but see Moore, 2016, for some 
conceptual critiques). 
The playing out of capital’s contradictory relation to nature has long involved disruptive episodes of 
resource exhaustion, the build-up of waste and pollution and so on in certain places. Yet it was the 
1960s and 1970s that saw the formation of modern environmentalism, which culturally and politically 
permeates today’s crises. This was not a period which represented a sudden material tipping point 
for capitalist natures, but was one which certainly saw increasing visibility of its effects on a variety of 
scales. Growing environmental consciousness was punctuated by a number of iconic cultural events, 
such as the first images of the Earth from space and the publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 2000), 
enabled and refracted through new state-developed technologies and ways of seeing. Mediated 
through the technologies and ideological narratives of Cold War militarism, environmental issues were 
often narrowly conceived and propagated in relation to their implications for national security and 
geopolitics (e.g. Ross, 1994). As such, the environment was constructed – both scientifically and 
politically – as constituting external and observable threats in a fundamentally violent world, in need 
of monitoring and control, shaping the regulatory regimes enacted in that time (Ioris, 2014; Whitehead 
et al., 2007).  
These ways of seeing operationalised in the geopolitical context of the Cold War combined with a 
series of political, discursive and cultural antagonisms and crises manifesting themselves in civil 
society, arising in response to concern around catastrophic ecological and civilisational collapse, 
particularly relating to the prospect of nuclear apocalypse, and exacerbated by the oil crisis of the 
1970s. While the radical environmental movement made ecological matters a vital pillar of the new 
social movements, centred on a critique of the social and environmental effects of industrial society, 
materialist culture and alienation (if often remaining somewhat blind to the material conditions and 
concerns of the majority of humanity), much of environmental discourse had a more conservative 
register. Malthusian ideas returned to the fore, with the so-called Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 
1972) using computer modelling to predict the imminent material overshoot of modern industrial 
society, while overpopulation once again gained popular intellectual ground (e.g. Ehrlich, 1971; 
Hardin, 1968).  
Nevertheless, pressure from civil society, especially from the new environmental movement, was key 
to the enactment of important environmental legislation, aimed at tackling air and water pollution as 
well as species extinction, in many of the advanced economies in the heyday of post-war social 
democracy and state intervention. The establishment of these latterly defined ‘command-and-control’ 
regulatory protections (see, e.g. Holling & Meffe, 1996), however, took place right on the cusp of the 
political and economic crisis of Fordist-Keynesian model of development, which would ultimately 
usher in the neoliberal era. During the 1980s, environmental issues became increasingly 
internationalised, with recognition of the need for coordinated cross-border action over new problems 
such as acid rain and ozone depletion, leading to the subsequent ascendance of the sustainable 
development agenda. This would see issues such as climate change, urbanisation and global 
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biodiversity loss take centre stage in environmental politics, and the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 open 
legally binding, global conventions to curb (most famously) climate change and biodiversity loss, for 
signature9. Importantly, the trajectory of modern environmentalism came to both shape and be 
shaped by what has come to be known as neoliberalism, to which Chapter 2 now turns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 These were the Convention on Biological Diversity (CDB), the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. It also importantly produced the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21 and the Forest Principles. 
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Chapter 2: Neoliberalisation of Nature and Conservation 
 
Introduction 
This second chapter reviews literature on the neoliberalisation of nature and conservation, following 
on from the conceptual apparatus presented in Chapter 1. The neoliberalisation of nature is a vast 
and heterogeneous field, focusing on two of the most contested and all-encompassing objects of 
inquiry to be found in the contemporary social sciences and humanities. As Raymond Williams (1983, 
p. 219) said, nature is probably the most complex word in the English language, while some have 
gone as far as question whether neoliberalism should be used at all by political economists (Barnett, 
2005), due to the increasing lack of theoretical and analytical precision and coherence associated 
with the term. This chapter will consider some of these debates, but the main intention is to use the 
neoliberalisation of nature literature as an orientation for the aims, objectives and research questions 
of the thesis. The argument made in the chapter is that the literature on neoliberal natures gives 
important context and analytical tools for the empirical work on issues such as biodiversity offsetting, 
while neoliberal conservation provides an extra element of specificity.  
Biodiversity offsets are policy instruments intended to deal with this particular set of issues, and the 
specific problematic of reconciling economic growth, in the form of land development, with globally 
agreed efforts to stem the decline of biodiversity – one of the most pressing environmental crises of 
today’s world. Hence the second focus of this chapter is on neoliberal conservation, since this thesis 
is ultimately an investigation into how and why ‘nature’ is conserved today, and the dilemmas and 
contradictions encountered in ongoing efforts to do so. The neoliberal natures literature has shone 
important light on the changing goals, procedures and effects of environmental management in the 
neoliberal era, but initially produced relatively little on the topic of (biodiversity) conservation – i.e. the 
governing and protection of nonhuman species, habitats and life processes, outside of food 
production and biotechnology. As a result, since the late 2000s neoliberal conservation studies 
emerged and developed as a relatively discrete subfield, tracing the longer-term trajectories of 
conservation theory and practice as a distinctive mode of environmental protection and management 
– with its own set of values and methods traditionally viewed as more hostile to economic growth than 
other forms of environmental governance. According to this literature, conservation has been 
undergoing its own path-dependent process of neoliberalisation, analogous with the neoliberalisation 
of nature more generally (Büscher et al., 2012). 
The chapter starts by outlining what I understand by the term neoliberalism (Section 1), presenting 
neoliberalism as worldview, policy programme and practices, as well as a geographically variegated 
yet hegemonic phenomenon. Section 2 turns to the neoliberalisation of nature and conservation as a 
mode of analysis, that refers to related yet distinct historical formations, emerging out of the 
convergent economic and ecological crises of the 1960s and 1970s. After a brief overview of the two 
topics, the section reviews three major themes found in these literatures that are of relevance to the 
thesis: privatisation and enclosure, marketisation and commodification (Section 2.1); eco-
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governmentalities and shifts from government to governance (Section 2.2); and the constitutive role 
of human and nonhuman resistance to the variegation of neoliberal natures (Section 2.3). The review 
is necessarily selective in focus, and somewhat descriptive, but as a whole is designed to outline a 
broad schema of the author’s understanding of the neoliberalisation of nature and conservation, and 
to provide a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding contemporary reformulations of 
nature conservation practice. Section 3 completes the chapter, reflecting on the conceptual 
framework constructed in Chapters 1 and 2, and how it orientates the rest of the thesis. Chapters 3 
and 4 will then look at some of the debates and questions opened up in more detail, bringing them to 
bear on the historical and geographical development of biodiversity offsetting. 
 
1: Neoliberalism 
As noted above, neoliberalism has become an increasingly messy and debated term, but one I 
believe to be useful nonetheless in positioning the study of biodiversity offsetting. This section 
provides a synopsis of neoliberalism as deployed and contested by social scientists as a worldview, 
policy programme, and set of practices as observed and critiqued in the ‘real world’. 
1.1: Neoliberalism as worldview 
In describing neoliberalism as a worldview, I mean a set of ideas analogous to those of classical 
liberalism, developed among a relatively small cohort of thinkers associated with the Mont Pelerin 
Society, most notably Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, and the Austrian and Chicago 
schools of economics, and from the German ordo-liberal tradition (Davies, 2014; for some recent in-
depth intellectual histories, see Dardot & Laval, 2014; Peck, 2012; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). The 
early neoliberals – though the term ‘neoliberalism’ has long been disavowed by its proponents – saw 
their ideas as succeeding those of classical liberalism, a failed project they believed to have been 
flawed (Mirowski, 2013, chap. 2). As an intellectual and political project, neoliberalism was set up in 
reaction to the rise of totalitarian fascism and communism, but also against the perceived illiberalism 
of bureaucratic planning and social democracy of the post-war settlement (Davies, 2014, p. 29). At 
the heart of neoliberal thought was an extreme normative position with regard to the individual liberty 
and freedom, as an ideal which should be promoted above all others (Harvey, 2007b, chap. 1). For 
governments, this would translate to taking an active role in maximising the independence of 
individuals, and dismantling bureaucratic structures and institutions – both inside and outside the 
state – which foist collective or redistributive agendas on society, and impinge on particular neoliberal 
notions of freedom (Castree, 2010, p. 9). The programmes with which neoliberal governments should 
pursue these objectives will be discussed shortly, but for individuals the corollary of non-interference 
is a heightened position of personal responsibility. Following Foucault (2010), many have focused on 
the notion of neoliberal governmentalities, and the reconstruction of the individual as so-called homo 
economicus (e.g. Dardot & Laval, 2014; Gane, 2013; Ferguson, 2010): the competitive and 
entrepreneurial self, as portrayed in Becker’s (2009) writings on ‘human capital’.  
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Another core feature of neoliberal thought has been the status of the market as principal mechanism 
for efficient delivery of the goals of liberty and freedom (Castree, 2010, p. 9). The market is seen as 
an appropriate instrument to deploy outside of the realm of the economy, with markets or market-like 
instruments put forward as both legitimate and desirable ways of conducting and organising social, 
political and environmental life, over deliberative and collective decision-making processes (Davies, 
2014). The market is presented as a natural phenomenon with emergent properties, intrinsically 
superior to any other form of governance, with an epistemological quality specifically juxtaposed to 
any kind of centralised planning (Mirowski, 2013, p. 54). This notion, most closely associated with 
Hayek, says that only the market can hope to process the complexity of individuals’ inherently partial 
knowledge and subjective, ever-changing preferences, into clear information through price signals – 
where value and price are understood as synonymous. Combined with its radical commitment to a 
particular type of individual liberty, usually inseparable from private property, free market exchange 
is envisioned as the ultimate crucible of democracy under neoliberalism, while traditional notions of 
democracy as popular sovereignty have been treated with a certain level of ambivalence (Davies, 
2014; Mirowski, 2013). This leads Davies to define neoliberalism at the most basic level as the 
“disenchantment of politics by economics” (2014, p. 4). Following Foucault’s (2010) observation that 
the state’s new reason for being was one of pursuing economic growth as its core social policy, many 
have focused on the state’s explicitly strong role – though denied at the level of popular public 
discourse as propagated most expertly by Friedman – as a central point of departure from the 
philosophy of classical liberalism. The state’s role goes far beyond that of so-called night-watchman. 
This shift rested on the early neoliberals’ conclusions that laissez faire fell apart due to non-
intervention10, and a belief that markets and the liberal order would need to be actively imposed and 
policed, and the individual continually reshaped accordingly (Mirowski, 2013, pp. 58–9)11. While 
resolutely anti-planning in one sense, neoliberalism has always been an explicitly constructivist state-
led project (Bonefeld, 2010, 2012).  
1.2: Neoliberalism as policy programme 
Despite its emergence in the 1930s, the worldview of neoliberalism was largely considered extremist, 
and remained politically marginal until the crisis of Keynesianism in the 1970s. At this moment, 
however, neoliberal ideas began to make serious inroads into the consciousness of political leaders 
capable of taking power, with the Pinochet dictatorship often thought of as the first ‘neoliberal’ 
government, following the Chilean coup of 1973. This was crucially followed by the first elected 
neoliberal leaders among the advanced economies, with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
winning power in the UK 1979 and US in 1981 respectively. Precipitated by the economic turbulence 
                                                     
10 Though as Polanyi (2001) showed, the formation of market society in England was fundamentally reliant on 
state intervention too. 
11 Neoliberalism disavowed classical liberal ideas of preformed individuals based on natural laws and rights. 
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of the 1970s and 1980s, the spread of neoliberal doctrine was rapid12. By the 1990s and the fall of 
the Soviet Union, neoliberal ideas were largely hegemonic, embedded in governmental thinking and 
the institutions of global governance. As a recognisable policy programme, through which the 
neoliberal worldview as the constructivist and normative project sketched out above might be realised, 
many came to connect neoliberalism with the economic doctrine of the Washington Consensus 
(Wade, 2010; Saad Filho, 2005). However, the far-reaching scope of ‘ideal type’ neoliberal 
programmes has been observed to go well beyond what is traditionally thought of as the economic 
realm, as outlined below, adapted from Castree’s (2008b, 2010) framework. 
Privatisation and marketisation are sometimes taken together under the banner of commodification 
(e.g. Harvey, 2007b), but can at the same time be undertaken separately as distinct strategies. 
Privatisation refers to the establishment of clear private property rights to previously unowned, 
commonly owned or state-owned aspects of the social, cultural or biophysical world, creating legally 
enforceable regimes of exclusive use and access. Marketisation describes the subjection of 
processes and things to market logic which were not so before, such that they can be given a price 
and traded as commodities between legally distinct entities (which do not need to be private 
individuals or groups). 
Deregulation and reregulation have been described as twin logics of neoliberal programmes (Castree, 
2008b; Peck & Tickell, 2002), even if the former is more recognisable in mainstream public discourse, 
as the rolling back of the state (e.g. Peck & Tickell, 1994). Deregulation denotes the removal of 
supposedly inefficient and pejoratively named command-and-control regulation (for instance relating 
to finance, labour and the environment), with the purpose of freeing individuals and businesses from 
the shackles of state bureaucracy and interference, promoting greater self-sufficiency and flexibility 
(e.g. Peters, 2009). Increased market competition meanwhile is expected to raise standards on a 
more voluntary basis, if demanded by consumers. Reregulation, or ‘roll out’ neoliberalism (Lockie & 
Higgins, 2007; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Snyder, 2001), describes the more interventionist role of the 
state in creating markets, and crucially, in actively maintaining ‘competitive’ markets. The state is 
discursively reconfigured with a more enabling and managerial brief, tasked with intervening “for the 
market economy, not, as it were, in it” (Castree, 2010, p. 10). 
Remaking of state, civil society and individuals in market image describes the final set of common 
features frequently observed in neoliberal programmes. Firstly, residual non-privatised public 
institutions are reorganised and restructured to mirror entrepreneurial market actors (Ferguson, 
2010). On one level, this means the increased use of market proxies to govern public bodies, and 
increased use of internal markets, standardised instruments of measurement and auditing processes; 
                                                     
12 Though neoliberalism’s quick ascendance to hegemonic status was in some ways fortuitous, many historians 
are keen to point to the political savvy and fastidious planning undertaken by the Mont Pelerin Society, and 
particularly the role of its global network of associated think tanks aimed at influencing politicians and 
policymakers, and its targeted infiltration of key university institutions, especially law and economics departments 
(Davies, 2014; Mirowski, 2013). 
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putting government departments and subnational authorities in direct competition for funding streams; 
and opening up to competitive tendering of specific functions, such as everyday operational activities 
and service delivery (Jessop, 2002, p. 461). This is connected to a growing role for civil society 
organisations (charities, NGOs, ‘communities’ and so on) in providing services, particularly social and 
environmental, withdrawn by the state (Miraftab, 2004; Kamat, 2004; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001). 
These groups are encouraged to professionalise by reconfiguring their organisational cultures and 
structures in the image of commercial enterprises (Evans et al., 2005). Within this formation state-
civil society relations are recomposed, with a heightened individualisation and devolution of 
responsibility away from the national state (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002; see also 
Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004), while an ethic of self-reliance is cultivated and imposed on lower 
levels of government, as well as other institutions, producers and consumers, communities, families 
and individuals, who are increasingly tasked with their own reproduction.  
1.3: Neoliberalism as set of policy practices and processes 
This broad programme has been rolled out in various and variegated forms around the world, via a 
number of concrete policy tools, practices and processes. Again, despite the public disavowal of the 
state by neoliberals, the programmes and policies outlined above and below are very much 
government and state-led. The transformative logic of neoliberalism at once reconstitutes the state in 
a more hands-off and hands-on role. While relinquishing direct responsibility in some ways, to enable 
individual liberty and competitive markets to flourish, the state’s remit is at the same time deeply 
interventionist and managerial13. Macro-economic policies are some of the more recognisable, 
including the targeting low inflation rates and balanced budgets, restrictions on government 
borrowing, money creation and tax-and-spend policies, alongside a preference for floating exchange 
rates and independently (or market) set interest rates. The liberalisation of trade, investment and 
ownership rules, and the removal of subsidies, together with tools (such as tax breaks) to incentivise 
‘entrepreneurial’ activity all aim to increase market competition (Castree, 2010, p. 11).  
The state acts in various ways to open governance and decision-making processes to non-state 
actors, in a bid to devolve responsibility to civil society groups and organisations. State functions and 
services are increasingly subjected to procedures of audit and measurable target-setting, connected 
with systems of incentives and penalties for success and failure. These practices have been extended 
to the regulation of the economic, social and environmental realms, either state-enforced or voluntary, 
where sectors are routinely encouraged to self-regulate, using industry standards and accreditation 
                                                     
13 It should be noted that since the financial crash of 2008 and major recessions in most of the advanced 
economies, many of these cornerstone policies below have been abandoned for extended or indefinite periods, 
with some raising the spectre of a ‘post-neoliberal’ era. Others however have emphasised the flexibility of 
neoliberal doctrine in times of crisis, and how ‘states of exception’ have long been constitutive to neoliberalism 
and its rhetorical goal of preserving the market above all else (Davies, 2014; Mirowski, 2013). Furthermore, while 
some objectives have been suspended or temporarily deprioritised, others have been pursued with renewed 
vigour under the auspices of austerity.  
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schemes for example, to ensure good practice14. Collectively-orientated rights (e.g. environmental 
protections, labour rights, wage and rent controls) meanwhile are actively eroded, through legislative 
or other means, allowing and encouraging businesses and people to act under more flexible 
conditions. Focus is instead put on the individual, with policies focused on constant education and 
(re)training, such that labour is more adaptable, and designed in ways which encourage self-reliance, 
risk-taking and entrepreneurialism.  
The other side of these policies promoting individual responsibility has seen a more disciplinary role 
for the state. With regard to social security functions, state support is shifted progressively towards 
‘workfare’ (Peck, 2002), increasingly made contingent upon recipients undertaking various self-
improvement actions to improve their employability, such as training courses and unpaid work, with 
perceived non-compliance potentially resulting in sanctions and withdrawal of support. This more 
punitive character of the state is reflected too in a greater concern for ‘law and order’. Though 
rhetorically committed to individual liberty, free expression and so forth, the neoliberal state is also 
seen as taking an “uncompromising approach to rule breakers, ‘trouble-makers’, and those who 
otherwise cause social disruption and infringe upon the rights of others” (Castree, 2010, p. 11). The 
state is observed in this respect to embody a more revanchist and violent dimension (MacLeod, 
2002), with criminalisation of supposedly transgressive activities a key feature of neoliberalism (see 
for example Wacquant, 2009)15. 
1.4: Neoliberalism as impure, variegated but hegemonic 
The policy practices outlined above are far from invariant in the real world. Many authors have 
highlighted the impurities of ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism (Larner, 2003; Brenner & Theodore, 
2002). In more recent years the idea of neoliberalisation as process – rather than neoliberalism as a 
‘thing’ – has been developed further, placing “the geographical, temporal, and sectoral variability of 
neoliberalisations” (McCarthy, 2012, p. 184) at the heart of a contemporary research agenda on the 
topic (Brenner et al., 2010a, 2010b). According to these authors, differentiation and variegation should 
be recognised as overarching and constitutive features of neoliberalism, as it plays out in the real 
world as a process of uneven regulatory development, interacting with, facing resistance from and 
being redirected by, other social structures and circumstances. As a result, plural neoliberalisations 
– uneven and incomplete, hybrid and heterogeneous – are hypothesised as the present-day and 
ongoing reality of neoliberalism. According to this line of thought, there are still core logics and 
tendencies to the project of neoliberalism, but these are now deeply embedded and hegemonic rather 
than transformative, and more difficult to dislodge (Peck et al., 2010).  
                                                     
14 Such governance mechanisms are increasingly important with the state extracting itself from direct 
responsibility for various social and environmental issues. 
15 In some parts of the world at least, this is also connected to rising incarceration rates, predominantly among 
the most marginalised groups and people of colour. 
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While many of these ideas rest on the materialist and structuralist foundations of regulation theory, it 
should be noted there is a deep ideological and cultural current to work on neoliberalism as well, with 
emphasis placed on neoliberalism centred on a ‘politics of inevitability’ (Peck, 2004, p. 394). 
Pronouncements regarding the ‘end of history’ and the persistence of Thatcher’s famous idiom ‘there 
is no alternative’ are seen as instructive of neoliberalism’s status, as the (re)establishment of the 
natural order. Frederic Jameson’s (2003) oft-repeated quote: “it is easier to imagine the end of the 
world than to imagine the end of capitalism”, meanwhile, has become shorthand among many critics 
for neoliberalism’s deep and debilitating penetration of the popular cultural imaginary and 
consciousness (Fisher, 2009). 
 
2: Neoliberal Natures and Neoliberal Conservation 
The previous section laid out the main contextual logics and processes behind the proliferation of 
markets and market-like mechanisms over the past several decades, and describes how they have 
played out in the real world. The now expansive literature on the neoliberalisation of nature brings 
this framework to bear on the environmental realm, but also challenges more orthodox ideas about 
what neoliberalism is. The development of a distinctive field, relating to how nature (such as 
‘biodiversity’ in the current study) has come to be governed in this manner, highlights the relative lack 
of attention given to this topic in the vast amount of writing on neoliberalism. Situated in relation to 
other critical takes on neoliberalism, work on neoliberal natures points to something more than an 
empirical blind-spot, but a lacuna with greater implications.  
By combining political ecological analysis of capitalist modernity in general with the historical and 
geographical specificity of the neoliberal era, this literature rejects the Cartesian abstractions and 
external nature it sees as recapitulated in most critical studies of neoliberalism. The premise of the 
neoliberalisation of nature is that the formation and unfolding of neoliberalism is necessarily and 
inseparably social, economic and environmental. ‘The environment’ is not something that can be 
added on, since the crisis out of which neoliberalism arose was irreducibly economic, social and 
ecological – meaning it cannot be separated or relegated, theoretically or practically. From this 
perspective, neoliberalism is not simply a social formation which acts upon or interacts with nature, 
but a set of processes which are irreducibly co-constituted and unfold through nature-society relations 
and crises. Taking this as a starting point, the literature seeks to uncover what exactly is new and 
specific about the ongoing reconfiguration of nature-society relations which takes place through the 
neoliberalisation of nature, understood as a geographically variegated set of processes and effects. 
The burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature has been geared towards analysing and 
explaining how and why neoliberal environmental governance of different natures, in different places 
and at different scales, unfolds contingently and unevenly, mediated by factors which are historical 
and geographical, social and natural, material and symbolic.  
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Nature conservation clearly has an important part in all this. However, as a specific area of 
environmental governance it was largely unexplored in the early days of the neoliberal natures 
literature. As a result, neoliberal conservation studies began to develop as its own subfield a little 
later, gathering pace as a relatively autonomous body of research from around 2010 (Büscher et al., 
2012; see Castree & Henderson, 2014, for a critique). While the general themes are largely 
analogous, there are several particularities to bear in mind. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
neoliberalisation of conservation should be viewed to some extent as a path dependent process. 
Environmental conservation, as opposed to management more generally, has historically had 
something of a peculiar and ambiguous relationship with capitalism (Büscher & Arsel, 2012; Adams, 
2004). In one sense, conservation is seen as a moment of a Polanyian double movement, pushing 
back against the encroachment and destructive effects of market society on the natural environment. 
As a movement, conservation orientates its discourse and activity around attempting to protect or 
promote certain values considered to be in tension with instrumentalist or utilitarian values.  
The increasing neoliberal character of conservation is posited as the subordination of these values 
to capitalist growth imperatives, or at least a concerted effort to bring them into greater harmony 
(Büscher et al., 2012). At the same time, conservation has always been historically bound up with 
capitalist and class power, as well as a variety of colonial and neo-colonial discourses and practices 
of (often violent) dispossession (Adams & Mulligan, 2012; Brockington et al., 2008). Important too is 
conservation’s modern concern with governing and protecting ‘biodiversity’, a new and 
interdisciplinary concept coined in the US as recently as 1986 (see Farnham, 2007). Biodiversity 
became the subject of the newly created field of conservation biology, an explicitly normative ‘crisis 
discipline’ (Takacs, 1996), containing all kinds of assumptions about nature-society relations and 
economic and population growth, and is widely recognised as both scientifically and politically 
contested (e.g. Vadrot, 2014; Lanzerath & Friele, 2014; Robin, 2011; Zimmerer, 2009).  
The rest of this section provides a review of three major themes found in these literatures, which will 
be crucial for analysing the empirical case of biodiversity offsetting. They are: (i) privatisation and 
enclosure; marketisation and commodification; (ii) eco-governmentalities and shifts from government 
to governance; and (iii) human and nonhuman resistance to the neoliberalisation of nature. Though 
what follows is brief, many of these topics and debates will be returned to in more detail in Chapter 
10. 
2.1: Privatisation and enclosure; marketisation and commodification 
As with the literature on neoliberalism in general, privatisation and commodification are two of the 
defining features of the neoliberalisation of nature (e.g. Himley, 2008; Castree, 2008b; Heynen et al., 
2007; Heynen & Robbins, 2005). In fact, many mainstream treatments of neoliberalism highlight 
‘nature’ as a particular target for these twin neoliberal strategies (e.g. Harvey, 2007b, p. 160), as 
realms typically non-privately owned, and either un-commodified or de-commodified under previous 
modes of governance. Privatisation of nature is often associated in the literature with large-scale 
transfers of wealth from public to private hands, and what Harvey has popularised as ‘accumulation 
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by dispossession’. Commodification meanwhile, and the growing use of market-based instruments 
(MBIs), are viewed as furthering the core rationalities of market governance and capitalist techniques 
of valuation. Privatisation is not strictly necessary for marketisation, but the two are intimately 
entwined under neoliberalism. Tradeable commodities clearly need to be legally alienable from their 
owners, while the assignment of exclusive property rights over parts of nature is designed with the 
purpose of enabling use and access to be sold, as a way of generating income, and encouraging 
entrepreneurial attitude to environmental management. Consequently, there is much overlap 
between the arguments highlighted below, as the processes tend to be interpenetrating and not easily 
separable. 
2.1.1: Privatisation and enclosure 
Enclosure and privatisation may well be motivated by opportunities for rent-seeking and consolidation 
of class power and wealth (e.g. Harvey, 2007b), but its environmental rationale has long been 
underpinned by a distinctly neo-Malthusian logic (Katz, 1998), frequently justified according to the 
‘lifeboat ethics’ of Garrett Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’. As Mansfield argues, the broader 
theoretical position behind privatisation rests on the classical liberal assumption that it is through the 
improvement of private property that wealth is generated. This in turn is deemed to operate in a self-
disciplinary manner, reinforced by market competition, through which private property regimes are 
said to spur new and more efficient management practices (Mansfield, 2008a, pp. 3–4).  
Empirically, water privatisation has featured heavily in this part of the literature (Bakker, 2003, 2010a; 
Swyngedouw, 2005), as has work on the liberalisation of concession rights for transnational capital 
in the extractive sectors (Gordon & Webber, 2008; Liverman & Vilas, 2006; McCarthy, 2004). The 
social and environmental implications of growing concentration of corporate agribusiness has long 
been of concern to critics of neoliberalism. In more recent years, the issue of ‘land grabbing’ for 
various forms of ‘green’ production, rent or speculation (in relation to biofuels, renewable energy or 
carbon offsetting schemes, for instance) has caught the attention of scholars of the neoliberalisation 
of nature and conservation (Holmes, 2014; Corson et al., 2013; Fairhead et al., 2012). With the rising 
focus on new income-generating forms of conservation – ‘selling nature to save it’ as McAfee 
famously (1999) put it – as strategies for economic development and poverty alleviation, such as 
ecotourism (Ojeda, 2012) and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes (Shapiro-Garza, 
2013; Corson & MacDonald, 2012; Kosoy & Corbera, 2010), privatisation and enclosure have become 
central to debates around neoliberal conservation as well (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Corson, 
2011b; Robbins & Luginbuhl, 2005). 
Many of these latter forms of green grabbing are connected to the growth of tradeable permit regimes. 
These have generated another tranche of empirical case studies, and include environmental policy 
instruments such as tradeable emission rights (Bond, 2012; McNish, 2012; Lohmann, 2011b), fish 
quotas (Mansfield, 2004) and water quality credits (Robertson, 2007). Much of this work stresses the 
deeply interventionist role of the state in creating and enforcing new property regimes (Kelly & Peluso, 
2015; Robertson, 2006a). This part of the literature is crucial with respect to considering biodiversity 
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offsets as a set of neoliberal environmental mechanisms, since they ultimately boil down to tradeable 
conservation credits or development rights, constructed and certified as the saleable property of their 
holders. Advanced scientific practices are seen as crucial in the construction of new rent-seeking 
property regimes, concerning newly constructed or previously undiscovered entities and processes 
at different geographical scales (Pellizzoni, 2011). Biotechnology (Neimark, 2012; Prudham, 2007; 
McAfee, 2003) and atmospheric science (Lohmann, 2011a) have frequently been the focus of 
empirical study, while various theories such as the ‘industrialisation of nature’ (Boyd et al., 2001) or 
the ‘real subsumption of nature’ (Smith, 2006) under neoliberalism have been associated with the 
production of new and frequently financialised natures. Again, the state is seen as an absolutely 
critical actor in these processes, with some highlighting the instability of highly contingent formations 
of capital, science and law at the centre of commodity definition, as in the case of wetlands banking 
(Robertson, 2006a). 
As with the literature on neoliberalism in general, a great deal of geographical unevenness and 
variegation has been seen as a defining feature of the privatisation (and commodification) of nature. 
While some of the reasons for this relating to resistance will be discussed in Section 2.3, it should be 
noted here that both processes have been observed as exceedingly difficult. Socio-legal geography 
has shown how cultural and institutional property relations are specific, and as Blomley (2008) insists, 
property is a verb as well as a noun, a practical process which tries to simplify a whole host of 
complex, heterogeneous and contradictory social, ecological and legal factors (see also Kay, 2015). 
As an effect privatisation is usually partial and incomplete (Mansfield, 2008b; Bakker, 2003). 
However, though property is ultimately a highly contested socio-natural relation, it has nevertheless 
been a critical factor in the neoliberal recomposition of nature-society relations. 
2.1.2: Marketisation and commodification of nature 
The marketisation and/or commodification of nature is another area of central importance in the 
literature on the neoliberalisation of nature (Prudham, 2009; Castree, 2003) and conservation 
(Büscher et al., 2012). As discussed in Section 1, ‘the market’ is endowed with a special quality in 
neoliberal thought, a supposedly unique capability to generate information about value in complex 
phenomena through price discovery. The justifications for ‘market environmentalism’, as it is 
sometimes termed (e.g. Bailey, 2007; Bakker, 2005), rest on the market’s related ability to deliver 
efficiency, spurring innovation via competition and more rational decision-making in the allocation of 
natural resources, goods and services (O’Neill, 2007). In nature conservation these theoretical tropes 
have been increasingly mobilised in support of extending the use of markets and market-based 
instruments to achieve policy goals, namely reconciling competing economic and ecological demands 
under the rubric of ‘win-win’ outcomes (Fletcher, 2013; Roth & Dressler, 2012; Arsel & Büscher, 
2012).  
Much work has also been done on the process of nature commodification, theorised by Castree 
(2003) as a series of moments which splice bits of nature up into discrete and fungible entities; 
unbundled from their social and ecological context, standardised, measured and quantified, made 
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commensurable in time and space, all so they can ultimately be circulated as alienable, tradeable 
commodities. Commodification’s increasing scope and scale constitutes a core theme of neoliberal 
natures, with authors surveying the ever deeper penetration of capital into the circuits of life from the 
smallest to the largest scales (Prudham, 2009). These are backed up by a wide range of empirical 
cases (e.g. Kosoy & Corbera, 2010; Robertson, 2004; Liverman, 2004), as well as a growing body of 
work nature’s financialisation – the creating and circulation of ‘green’ bonds, derivatives, futures and 
other speculative financial products (Sullivan, 2013b; Bracking, 2012; Lohmann, 2011a; Smith, 2006). 
Some have made the case that the capital’s extension into previously uncommodified parts of the 
nonhuman world constitutes a mode or strategy of accumulation in its own right, viewed as an outlet 
for surplus value (Büscher & Fletcher, 2015; Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Smith, 2006; though see 
Dempsey & Suarez, 2016).  
As with work on privatisation, there is a focus on the growing prevalence of regulatory markets in 
tradeable rights, permits and quotas, and similarly novel markets actively constructed to govern a 
variety of contemporary environmental problems (such as climate change, overfishing or ozone 
depletion). The intellectual origins of these markets can be traced back to seminal texts and ideas of 
neoliberal thinkers like Ronald Coase (1960) and John Dales (1968), both important figures in the 
development of environmental economics (Felli, 2015; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). Empirical 
work by Robertson (2006a) in particular has drawn attention to how commodities need to be actively 
made and imposed by the state in these markets, but often also require the legitimating enrolment of 
a variety of experts and different interests at different scales, such as scientists, lawyers, NGOs and 
so on. It is important to remark here that marketisation and commodification do not necessarily 
indicate the same thing, and there is some discussion over whether the creation of regulatory markets 
denote commodification in the strict sense (see for instance Robertson, 2007). Some aspects of the 
human and nonhuman world have proved exceedingly difficult to fully commodify, but the 
neoliberalisation of nature also incorporates the use of market proxies outside the commodity circuit. 
To reiterate a point from Section 1, neoliberalisation is as much marked by the inscription of market 
rationalities across socionature as it is by commodification or privatisation per se, and techniques of 
measurement and valuation, as well as other internal market-like organisational techniques, are 
frequently deployed in efforts to drive efficiencies in non-commodified areas of environmental 
governance (Gómez-Baggethun & Ruiz-Perez, 2011).  
Other approaches highlight the symbolic and discursive work in reconfiguring or reassembling nature 
into more pliable economic categories. Büscher et al (2012, p. 8) talk about neoliberal conservation 
“infusing conservation policy and practice with the analytical tools of neoliberal economics”, a process 
which can be observed in the reconstitution of nature as ‘natural capital’ (MacDonald & Corson, 2012) 
or biodiversity credits (Sullivan, 2013a). These necessarily involve symbolic reconstructions of nature, 
drawing on the Cartesian methods outlined in Chapter 1, which allow ‘nature’ to be viewed as 
objective and external, and to be mapped, measured and divided in abstract time and space – all 
critical to the process of commodification. As Prudham (2009, p. 124) points out, it is also the semiotic 
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constructs themselves which are often subject to commodification, something which seen as 
particularly prevalent in the neoliberalisation of nature conservation (Büscher et al., 2014; for critical 
reviews see Lansing et al., 2015; Castree & Henderson, 2014). 
As demonstrated by the literature, nature’s marketisation and commodification is frequently found to 
be deeply uneven, impure and incomplete. Many reasons have been offered in explanation, not least 
of which are the many practical limits and tensions met in trying to abstract nature from specific socio-
cultural and spatio-temporal contexts (Lee Peluso, 2012; Prudham, 2009; Sullivan, 2009; Robertson, 
2006a). The biophysical world tends to be unpredictable and frequently elides the systems of 
bordering and classification needed to make it fungible, and the maintenance of markets often 
requires constant intervention as a result (Bakker & Bridge, 2006). As will be returned to in more 
detail in Section 2.3, some scholars see the implications of both privatisation and commodification as 
often ambiguous in outcome, precisely because of their indeterminacy. However, for Büscher and his 
fellow authors, commodification represents the core ecological contradiction of capitalism, 
accelerated under neoliberalism, in the manner in which it cuts up the “[d]iversity, connectivity and 
relationships … crucial for the resilience of ecosystems … in order to produce, sell, and consume 
their constituent elements” (2012, p. 8; see also Kosoy & Corbera, 2010). The issue raised is not 
merely that the abstractions and simplifications wrought through commodification are reductionist, or 
devalue some aspects of nature, but that they have very material consequences in the way nature is 
managed in practice. Whether nature ‘resists’ or not, the integrity of complex interrelationships is 
nonetheless degraded by the ‘violent abstractions’ of commodification, yet markets are presented as 
the solution to a crisis or crises of which they are the primary cause (Spash, 2015; Büscher et al., 
2012; Lohmann, 2011a; Bakker, 2010b; O’Neill, 2007). Moreover, the effects are social as well as 
ecological, and found to exacerbate poverty and inequality (Fletcher, 2012; McAfee, 2012; Corbera 
et al., 2007).  
2.2: Neoliberal environmental governance 
As discussed in Section 1, neoliberalism is closely associated with state restructuring, changing state-
civil society relations and a shift from government to governance, sometimes theorised together as a 
new mode of social regulation. These approaches have been mirrored in the literature on the 
neoliberalisation of nature, with respect to changing modes of environmental governance and 
regulation, and their socio-environmental logics and effects (Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Himley, 2008). 
Here I draw attention to two areas of work most relevant for the thesis, namely the changing nature 
of environmental regulation away from command-and-control government, towards more voluntary 
and partnership models of governance; and work drawing on Foucault’s notion of neoliberal 
governmentality, to shine light on the reordering of nature-society relations taking place through the 
neoliberalisation of nature. 
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2.2.1: From government to governance 
Neoliberal reregulation is generally understood to be part constituted by moves toward more flexible 
and other non-binding forms of regulation (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004, p. 276), and has seen 
innovations in voluntarist and private forms of regulation (Collard et al., 2016). Through this process, 
the state’s relationship with the private sector is understood to be shifting away from so-called 
command-and-control modes of environmental protection, which had become increasingly prevalent 
between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, towards more flexible, cooperative and enabling 
arrangements (Ioris, 2014). In the neoliberal era, the state is viewed as taking a more ‘light touch’ 
approach, and firms, industries and sectors encouraged to self-regulate and develop their own 
standards (Newell, 2008)16. The shift towards more flexible forms of governance has on the one hand 
been associated with the neoliberal logic of deregulation (Prudham, 2004); on the other with specific 
forms of market friendly reregulation (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; McCarthy, 2004). Much work has 
been done on the creation of new public-private partnership governance organisations as central to 
these moves, often hybrid in nature, bringing together a variety of state and non-state actors across 
scales (Reed & Bruyneel, 2010; McCarthy, 2005a).  
Neoliberal conservation studies have focused heavily on this area, particularly the role of high-scale 
or transnational bodies and institutions in building or imposing the institutional architecture for market-
based governance (Fletcher, 2014; Corson & MacDonald, 2012; MacDonald & Corson, 2012; 
McAfee, 1999). Together with the focus on the growth of public-private partnerships, attention is 
frequently given to the roles played by non-state actors within governance, particularly private sector 
organisations (MacDonald, 2010) and NGOs (Corson, 2011a). Duffy (2006) for instance examines 
the increasingly powerful role played by large international NGOs in influencing policy in Madagascar 
and southern Africa, and the political implications of their mediation through close relationships with 
international donors and financial institutions. Another significant component of devolved 
responsibility relates to the growth of certification and labelling schemes, which have developed 
alongside the more general shift towards voluntary standards over strong state regulation. Research 
here has looked at a range of sectors, such as forestry (Klooster, 2010, 2005), food and agriculture 
(Bacon, 2010; Higgins et al., 2008; Guthman, 2007), and fishing (Foley & Hébert, 2013; Baird & 
Quastel, 2011). Though the rise of standards is seen in some ways as a response to public pressure 
and campaigning, these new forms of governance – and the rise of Corporate Social and 
Environmental Responsibility practices more generally – are also presented as decisively neoliberal 
in character. Authority, it is argued, is ultimately placed in the market, with mixed results (Collard et 
                                                     
16 For some authors (Himley, 2008, p. 441; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004, p. 280), these new approaches are also 
connected to the normative environmental discourse of ecological modernisation (Mol & Spaargaren, 2000), 
which posited that economic growth could be dematerialised and ultimately decoupled from environmental harm 
through technological innovation. However, I will leave this to one side here, along with the related sociological 
theory around ‘risk society’ (Beck & Lash, 1992). 
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al., 2016), while the development of standards and certification schemes turn largely on notions of 
consumer agency and competition (Liverman, 2004). 
Other parts of the literature have theorised the shift from government to governance alongside 
processes of rescaling under neoliberalism (e.g. Cohen & McCarthy, 2015; Reed & Bruyneel, 2010). 
Certainly, the devolution of functions to non-state actors and creation of hybrid governance 
institutions, referred to as scaling out in this literature, has been bound up with the rescaling of some 
governance mechanisms up and down (Apostolopoulou et al., 2014; Liverman, 2004). Meanwhile, 
authors have highlighted how this has been complicated by the co-constitutive role of environmental 
issues, such as environmental politics, nonhuman natures and biophysical processes, in the 
production of scale (Neumann, 2009, p. 399; see also Cohen & Bakker, 2014; McCarthy, 2005b; 
Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003). However, the degree to which rescaling has been constitutive of the 
neoliberalisation of nature, as opposed to a contingent effect, remains unclear, and the issue remains 
somewhat marginal within the literature. 
2.2.2: Neoliberal environmental governmentalities 
Related to work on governance has been the mobilisation of ideas of environmental governmentality 
(see Darier, 1999) – which has variously been referred to as eco-governmentality (Bridge & Perreault, 
2009), green governmentality (Rutherford, 2007; Luke, 1999) and environmentality (Fletcher, 2010; 
Agrawal, 2005) – and their intersection with neoliberalism. Neoliberal environmental governmentality 
draws largely on Foucault’s writings on governmentality, biopolitics and decentred notions of power, 
but expands them to conceptualise how the governing of biological and ecological life, processes and 
populations are critical to the production of social or socio-natural order (e.g. Rutherford, 2007; Braun, 
2007, 2000). According to Bridge and Perreault (2009, pp. 489–91), eco-governmentalities have been 
useful in illuminating three aspects of environmental governance in particular: the production of green 
knowledge and expertise; the creation of environmental subjectivities; and the role of national projects 
of power in making particular natures visible, which grant ‘epistemological’ access to nature to certain 
groups.  
Discursive approaches have been used by a number of authors (e.g. Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006; 
see also Fischer & Hajer, 1999; Hajer, 1997), and are important to the framing of neoliberal 
conservation alongside ideas of ideology (Büscher et al., 2012) and virtualism (Fletcher, 2013; 
MacDonald & Corson, 2012). Governmentality is however perhaps more prominent in the literature 
(e.g. Boelens et al., 2015; Dressler, 2014; Fletcher & Breitling, 2012), as with Wynne-Jones (2012), 
for instance, who uses the concept of neoliberal governmentality and hegemony to critically analyse 
the role of conservationists as expert intermediaries in the development of PES schemes. This is 
related in turn to writing stressing the role of environmental subject formation: the way in which 
“individuals and communities internalise environmental objectives and rationalities” (Bridge & 
Perreault, 2009, p. 490; drawing on Robbins, 2007; Agrawal, 2005; see also Holmes & Cavanagh, 
2016). Guthman for instance considers about how contemporary food activism in California 
“intersect[s] with neoliberal rationalities: consumer choice, localism, entrepreneurialism, and self-
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improvement” (2008, p. 1171). Others meanwhile have looked at the biopolitical dimensions of 
conservation biology as a scientific discipline, which rules over matters of population, life and death 
(Srinivasan, 2014; Biermann & Mansfield, 2014), as well as in other emerging forms of nature 
conservation and environmental management in the Anthropocene (Cavanagh, 2014).  
The role of knowledge and expertise, in the construction and legitimation of market governance, is a 
theme of particular interest to those writing about markets for biodiversity, ecosystem services and 
natural capital (Turnhout et al., 2014; MacDonald & Corson, 2012; Goldman, 2006; Robertson, 2004). 
Studies such as these have helped illuminate how biophysical processes and objects are made 
legible through specific governmental rationalities and techniques, particularly quantification and audit 
(Cook et al., 2016; see also Fioramonti, 2014; Demeritt, 2001), mobilising an array of calculative 
devices and tools of measurement, which make certain aspects of nature visible but others not. The 
focus on legibility is connected more broadly to matters of technocratic rule (see Mitchell, 2002; Scott, 
1999) and the central role of the state-led territorialisation (Bridge, 2014; Watts, 2004; Peluso & 
Vandergeest, 2001) – not just a process through which power is produced, but crucial to the rendering 
of space and nature external and abstract. The insights from these studies are particularly pertinent 
to the case study, where the defining and measuring of biodiversity, and the construction and 
stabilisation of standardised offsets as tradeable credits is central to the operationalisation of these 
kinds of market-based instruments. The chapter now finally turns more substantively to the issue of 
resistance to the neoliberalisation of nature and conservation. 
2.3: Human and nonhuman resistance to the neoliberalisation of nature 
Resistance to the neoliberalisation of nature is the final feature of the literature surveyed here. In the 
realm of environmental policy, neoliberalism rarely has its own way. As the Section 2.1 briefly 
mentioned, moves to privatise and commodify nature are often frustrated by the intransigence of 
human and nonhuman natures, resulting in an uneven geographical landscape of incomplete 
neoliberalisations and hybrid governance arrangements. While Sections 2.1 and 2.2 laid out some of 
the core processes of the neoliberalisation of nature, this third element of the literature points to the 
playing out of key tensions, fissures and contradictions of capitalist natures, as described in Chapter 
1. It deals not only with the ways neoliberalisation is resisted, but are also how neoliberal natures are 
themselves products of resistance.  
2.3.1 Human resistance 
In terms of origins, it is important to note how neoliberalism’s rise to hegemony coincided with the 
birth of modern environmentalism, and the politicisation of a variety of environmental issues by new 
social movements. According to McCarthy and Prudham (2004, p. 278), this can be viewed alongside 
the establishment of strong Keynesian era environmental protections (in the advanced capitalist 
countries at least) as part of a Polanyian double movement, through which social movements and the 
state moved to temper the harmful social/environmental effects of market society. The subsequent 
neoliberalisation of nature can then be seen as part of a wider strategy which sought to contain the 
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political threat posed by environmentalism to the state and capital. Felli (2015) for instance argues 
the purpose of environmental markets, as designed by neoliberal theorists like Coase and Dales (but 
also drawing on Hayek), was fundamentally to depoliticise the notion of environmental limits, while 
simultaneously helping secure capital accumulation. Büscher et al. (2012) claim that quelling or side-
lining dissent is one of the primary functions of the neoliberalisation of conservation (see also 
MacDonald & Corson, 2012). Combining insights from political ecology and autonomist Marxism, 
Nelson (2015, 2014) makes the case that the ‘neoliberal counterrevolution’ and neoliberalisation of 
nature were in part constituted by capital’s recuperation and redirection of the creative excess of 
environmentalism and nonhuman nature.  
Whether neoliberalism’s relationship to modern environmentalism and ‘limits’ is intrinsic or contingent 
remains a source of some debate. What is more readily agreed upon is the endurance of resistance 
and social movement activity around issues of environmental degradation and its uneven socio-
ecological impacts, and to the neoliberal ‘solutions’ proposed and imposed by the state, capital and 
global governance organisations. One of the four sections of Neoliberal Environments, edited by 
Heynen et al. (2007), is dedicated to ‘resistance’. Mansfield’s (2008b) collection Privatization similarly 
brings together a series of case studies which demonstrate how the creation of new private property 
rights around nature is rarely untroubled or complete. Examples abound of resistance to neoliberal 
policies that restrict access to vital resources and services, such as water, land and energy, whether 
through privatisation, land grabbing, liberalisation and unaffordable price hikes, or the removal of 
public subsidies (Latorre et al., 2015; Matose, 2014; Perreault, 2008, 2006; Bakker, 2007). Many of 
these cases coalesce around so-called ‘livelihood’ issues, but environmental resistance often targets 
the knowledge claims and value frames embodied in neoliberal environmental policies too (McAfee 
& Shapiro, 2010; Robbins & Luginbuhl, 2005; Laurie & Marvin, 1999; Escobar, 1998). The role of 
expert scientific knowledge, usually presented as purely technocratic, often comes under particular 
scrutiny and contestation, especially when seen as propping up narrow and utilitarian visions of 
nature, in tension with the multiplicity of ways people relate to and value the nonhuman world 
(Turnhout et al., 2013; McAfee, 2003).  
While the case studies attest to the various resistances to efforts to neoliberalise nature, the critical 
question for many scholars is not so much whether the neoliberalisation is resisted, but how and to 
what extent? More contentious are the implications (see for instance Bakker, 2010b, pp. 728–9). 
Moves to neoliberalise nature are often observed to have been redirected because of resistance, 
resulting in a geographically uneven landscape of environmental regulation and governance (Dibden 
et al., 2009; McCarthy, 2006). On the other hand, resistance is often seen as recuperated by 
processes of neoliberalisation (Guthman, 2008, 2007; Holifield, 2004). For some, these are 
expressions of the failure of neoliberalisation in many cases, while for others this hybridity (through 
which tensions and contradictions are incorporated and contained) should be seen as a constitutive 
element of how nature becomes neoliberal, and a feature of its adaptability in the face of resistance. 
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2.3.2 Nonhuman resistance 
It is not only human resistance which impedes the neoliberalisation of nature. Of central importance 
to the literature is how nonhuman natures behave in disruptive ways, helping to shape variegated 
outcomes in different times and places (Bakker & Bridge, 2006). Different bits of nature require 
neoliberalism to be adaptive in its tactics and responses. The material and discursive nature of 
biodiversity for instance presents particular problems which condition and shape the trajectories of 
‘neoliberal’ policies like biodiversity offsetting. As with human resistance the results can be somewhat 
ambiguous, raising questions of how we define the outcomes and evaluate their socio-ecological 
consequences. The outcomes are uneven and frequently not as they were designed, yet are not 
uniformly negative (Bakker, 2010b). From a Polanyian perspective, it is clear nature can only ever be 
partially incorporated into capitalist modes of organisation. ‘Land’ (or nature) is a ‘fictitious commodity’ 
because it will always be produced outside of the capitalist relations of production. A number of 
studies have shown how various biophysical properties and processes of the nonhuman world, which 
operate outside these relations, exceed and run contrary to imperatives of privatisation and 
commodification. Neoliberal policies, which demand nature be made divisible, commensurable, 
quantifiable and ultimately fungible, meet natures which are difficult to abstract from their 
surroundings as discrete and individuated objects, and tend to be impure and qualitatively different 
in different times and places (Prudham, 2009; Castree, 2003).  
While much research focuses on the biophysical properties of particular natural resources, such as 
water (Bakker, 2003), there has also been a growing interest in ecological processes in relation to 
neoliberalisation. This part of the literature has paid attention to the shifting foundations of natural 
science, and specifically the rise of the ‘new ecology’, otherwise known as non-equilibrium ecology, 
away from existing homeostatic systems theory. Non-equilibrium ecology, emerging around the 
1960s as the dominant paradigm in ecological science, has stressed the dynamic, unstable, 
indeterminate and nonlinear nature of ecological processes (Walker & Cooper, 2011; Zimmerer, 
2006, 2000; Leach et al., 1999). Again, the nature of nature is said to be uncooperative and tends to 
refuse the imposition of neoliberal categories. The inherent unpredictability and uncertainty of the 
biophysical world is posited as another significant obstacle to nature’s neoliberalisation, since the 
delineation of stable objects across time and space is crucial to the construction of fungible 
commodities. This trope of the literature is of specific relevance to the topic and biodiversity offsetting 
and nature conservation, which today are increasingly concerned with managing and sustaining 
ecological processes and ‘services’ through neoliberal means (Robertson, 2006a).  
A word of caution should be noted however, as expressed by a number of scholars (e.g. Scoones, 
1999), which relates in part to the problematic conflation of neoclassical and neoliberal economics 
(see Mirowski, 2013). Walker and Cooper (2011) for instance make the case that the dominant 
position of resilience theory in the new ecology, based on complex systems and second-order 
cybernetics theory, shares much theoretical ground with Hayek’s ideas of spontaneous market 
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order17. These common roots allowed for, they say, resilience theory’s adoption as a neoliberal 
“methodology of power” relating to risk management in realms such as security, finance and 
development economics, where complex social-ecological systems’ adaptability and dynamism is a 
function of their financial, biophysical or organisational ‘capital’ (Walker & Cooper, 2011, p. 147; 
though for others the threat of recuperation or containment is far more contingent, e.g. Braun, 2015; 
Nelson, 2014). 
The issues outlined above again point to political ecology’s influence on the neoliberal natures 
literature, and the mobilisation of insights from the natural sciences to challenge the political economy 
of environmental governance. However, as Bakker (2010b, p. 717; see also Bakker & Bridge, 2006) 
points out, the bulk of work on neoliberal natures suffers from relatively narrow, dualistic and 
anthropocentric conceptions of ‘the environment’, due to an empirical overreliance on natural 
resources. This trend, she argues, has underplayed various non-anthropocentric and more 
profoundly non-dualistic modes of thought, based on relational ontologies, cyborg theory, hybridity 
and socionature and so on, which have radically decentred notions of agency (Bennett, 2009; 
Lorimer, 2007; Whatmore, 2006). Emphasising deep heterogeneity of hybrid socionatures and 
against attempts at unifying notions of nature, Bakker (2010b) argues for greater incorporation of the 
active cultural, libidinal and emotional roles of affective bodies – of humans, companion species and 
bio-cultural entities – into theoretical work on neoliberal natures. Collard and Dempsey (2013) for 
instance call attention to particularities and uneven geographies of the commodification of what they 
call ‘lively commodities’, using the examples of exotic pets and ecosystem services (see also Lorimer, 
2010). From this perspective, more traditional political economic approaches to the neoliberalisation 
of nature may have highlighted the sometimes troublesome characteristics of the nonhuman world 
as objects of neoliberal governance, but have failed to really develop any notion of nonhuman 
subjectivity, as a co-constitutive element of social and economic life (Braun, 2008) – in effect 
recapitulating the foundational political ecological demand to reject Cartesian binaries and view 
nature as material and symbolic, social and ecological (Braun & Castree, 1998).   
 
3: Situating biodiversity offsets in the neoliberalisation of nature 
Overall, the purpose of these first two chapters has been to situate the development of biodiversity 
offsetting in a wider context, while providing an orientation and series of conceptual tools with which 
to analyse the English case study. Drawing on Chapter 1, it is possible to understand the development 
of contemporary nature conservation policies, such as biodiversity offsetting, as expressions and 
responses of capitalism’s internal environmental contradictions. More concretely, the establishment 
of increasingly comprehensive environmental legislation in the 1960s and early 1970s (in the 
advanced capitalist countries at least), was designed to protect certain use-values and conditions of 
                                                     
17 The limitations of human knowledge in an infinitely complex world, remember, is critical to Hayek’s claim 
regarding markets’ epistemological superiority as an information processor. 
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production not accounted for by the prevailing political economy. Though shaped partly by popular 
and social movement pressure to tackle environmental degradation, the environmental legislation of 
that period reflected the top-down and paternalistic characteristics of the post-war social compact. 
Today’s ‘neoliberal’ policies need to be understood as descendants of these ‘command-and-control’ 
laws, which have gone through decades of mutation and reconfiguration, increasingly mediated at 
higher scales through international conventions. Chapter 3 provides some detail of the historical 
trajectory of biodiversity offsetting along these lines. 
Chapter 2 set out some defining characteristics of what might be neoliberal about biodiversity 
offsetting, before we move into detailed discussion of the mechanism in Chapters 3 and 4. Offsetting 
is frequently presented as a market-based instrument for conservation, designed to render 
biodiversity’s value economically visible and incentivise certain actions, superseding command-and-
control regimes. Its historical development, meanwhile, clearly resonates with critiques of 
environmental markets reviewed in this chapter, as instruments designed to depoliticise ecological 
degradation, while facilitating development-led accumulation. The insights of the work reviewed here 
also help explain the geographically and institutionally variegated landscape of ‘actually existing’ 
systems described in the offsetting literature – an array of hybrid mechanisms, standards regimes, 
economic instruments and tradeable permits. In addition, the manifest problems encountered by 
offsetting regimes, reviewed in Chapter 4, can be usefully explained in terms of the difficulties of 
subjecting nonhuman nature to economic logics and categories. The neoliberal natures literature 
helpfully points too to the importance of nature’s symbolic and material particularities. In the case of 
offsetting, biodiversity’s ecological complexity and indeterminacy, together with its peculiar and 
contested status as both scientific object and political construct, have proved enduringly troublesome, 
requiring frequent reregulation to limit the scope of commodification and its negative consequences. 
These themes will be revisited in Chapter 4, and again in the Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 3: Biodiversity Offsetting – definitions, the history and 
the case for 
 
Introduction 
The third and fourth chapters move onto the of biodiversity offsetting. Chapter 3 is somewhat 
descriptive, providing an overview of what biodiversity offsetting is, where the policy came from, and 
the key arguments mobilised in its favour by proponents. Though descriptive, it is nevertheless 
orientated by the framework laid out in the previous chapter, and is intended to show how offsetting 
can reasonably be theorised and analysed as a case of the neoliberalisation of nature. In view of 
progressing the thesis, the chapter’s purpose is twofold. First, it introduces key concepts, terminology 
and narratives associated with offsetting, which will be vital for understanding the academic literature 
reviewed in Chapter 4, and the debates which took place in England and are analysed in the later 
empirical chapters. Second, it contextualises the UK government’s moves to develop an offsetting 
system, in terms of the policy’s historical and geographical development. This allows for the 
identification of commonalities and differences in the case study compared to what has come before, 
and follows the insistence within the neoliberal natures literature as to the importance of paying close 
attention to the specificities – biophysical, cultural, institutional and so on – of particular neoliberal 
environmental policies.  
Chapter 3 is structured as follows. Section 1 lays out a brief and largely technical overview of 
biodiversity offsetting as it is understood today. Though the policy is characterised by a high level of 
geographical variation, some basic technical definitions, standards and principles are widely agreed 
upon – even if their interpretation, deployment and effectiveness are the source of continued debate 
and contestation. This provides explanation of key terminology used in the literature, and the rest of 
the thesis. Section 2 sketches a broad-brush picture of the historical development of biodiversity 
offsetting, from its origins in regulation governing the protection of wetlands in the US from the early 
1970s, through to its prominence today as one of the major ‘market-based instruments’ (MBIs)18 for 
dealing with biodiversity loss, promoted by some of the most influential governance organisations, 
corporations, governments and NGOs around the world. It highlights key ideas, actors and conflicts 
in the development of offsetting, touching too on conditioning relations of power. While not going into 
detail of how various iterations of offsetting have functioned, this section historically and politically 
situates the policy’s contemporary appeal to various interests. It also serves to explain how the 
definitions, standards and principles outlined in Section 1 were politically constituted through conflict 
and compromise, with ongoing implications. Lastly, Section 3 presents the claims made in favour of 
offsetting by its main proponents. This is laid out in four parts: (i) the business case; (ii) the 
                                                     
18 I put ‘market-based instruments’ in scare quotes because, as will become clear, there is some debate over 
biodiversity offsets being classified in these terms. However, the term is widely applied of offsetting in the 
literature, and will continue to be used with this caveat. 
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conservation case; (iii) the economic case; and (iv) the regulatory case. As will become obvious, 
these claims strongly correlate with many of the tropes identified in the last chapter as key to 
neoliberal environmental policies. A brief summary is then given of key points to take forward19.  
 
1: Biodiversity offsets: definitions, principles and terms 
1.1: What are biodiversity offsets? 
The family of conservation mechanisms known as ‘biodiversity offsets’ has its origins, as will be 
discussed in the next section, in laws enacted in the 1970s protecting US wetlands. Today, 
biodiversity offsets has become something of an umbrella term to describe a variety of mandatory 
and voluntary conservation policies and practices, often but not always described as MBIs (e.g. eftec 
et al., 2010), including wetlands mitigation banking, habitat credit trading, species banking and many 
others (see for instance Madsen et al., 2010). Though there is much variation around the world in 
how these schemes operate, and multiple definitions (e.g. IUCN, 2014; OECD, 2013; Doswald et al., 
2012; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; eftec et al., 2010; ICMM, 2005; ten Kate et al., 2004), there exist 
some broadly agreed features and principles which qualify particular procedures as biodiversity 
offsets.  
Among the most commonly cited are those developed by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP), an organisation and transnational coalition founded in 2004, dedicated to the 
promotion of biodiversity offsets worldwide and the establishment of recognised standards. BBOP 
describes biodiversity offsets as: 
measurable conservation outcomes resulting from actions designed to compensate for 
significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project development after 
appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have been taken. The goal of biodiversity 
offsets is to achieve no net loss and preferably a net gain of biodiversity on the ground with 
respect to species composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s use and 
cultural values associated with biodiversity (2013, p. 4). 
BBOP has also developed ten guiding principles designed to govern offsets (which are far from 
universally adopted, but see Table 1), Bull, Suttle, Gordon, Signh and Milner-Gulland argue there are 
three major features of biodiversity offsets which make them unique:  
(i) they provide additional substitution or replacement for unavoidable negative impacts of 
human activity on biodiversity, (ii) they involve measurable, comparable biodiversity losses 
                                                     
19 Before proceeding, a quick note on sources for Chapters 3 and 4 is necessary. A significant portion of the 
writing drawn from and reviewed in these chapters comes from the so-called ‘grey literature’. The reason for this 
is that while biodiversity offsetting is an increasingly prominent topic of academic scholarship, an unusually high 
proportion of the literature is produced by non-academic institutions, such as private companies, public agencies 
and NGOs. At the same time, there is significant overlap between material produced by academic and non-
academic institutions and authors, both peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed, and much cross-referencing 
between them (see Coralie et al., 2015). As a result, it is difficult to disentangle these literatures, and somewhat 
arbitrary to do so. Leaving aside this ‘grey literature’ would significantly hamper broad coverage of the issues. 
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and gains, and (iii) they demonstrably achieve, as a minimum, no net loss of biodiversity 
(2013, p. 370).  
Based on these two main definitions, some basic terminology used in the literature is explained in 
Section 1.220. 
Table 1: BBOP’s 10 principles 
1 Adherence to 
the mitigation 
hierarchy:  
 
A biodiversity offset is a commitment to compensate for significant residual adverse 
impacts on biodiversity identified after appropriate avoidance, minimization and on-
site rehabilitation measures have been taken according to the mitigation hierarchy 
2 Limits to 
what can be 
offset 
There are situations where residual impacts cannot be fully compensated for by a 
biodiversity offset because of the irreplaceability or vulnerability of the biodiversity 
affected 
3 Landscape 
Context 
A biodiversity offset should be designed and implemented in a landscape context to 
achieve the expected measurable conservation outcomes taking into account 
available information on the full range of biological, social and cultural values of 
biodiversity and supporting an ecosystem approach 
4 No net loss 
 
A biodiversity offset should be designed and implemented to achieve in situ, 
measurable conservation outcomes that can reasonably be expected to result in no 
net loss and preferably a net gain of biodiversity 
5 Additional 
conservation 
outcomes 
A biodiversity offset should achieve conservation outcomes above and beyond 
results that would have occurred if the offset had not taken place. Offset design and 
implementation should avoid displacing activities harmful to biodiversity to other 
locations 
6 Stakeholder 
participation 
In areas affected by the project and by the biodiversity offset, the effective 
participation of stakeholders should be ensured in decision-making about 
biodiversity offsets, including their evaluation, selection, design, implementation and 
monitoring 
7 Equity A biodiversity offset should be designed and implemented in an equitable manner, 
which means the sharing among stakeholders of the rights and responsibilities, 
risks and rewards associated with a project and offset in a fair and balanced way, 
respecting legal and customary arrangements. Special consideration should be 
given to respecting both internationally and nationally recognised rights of 
indigenous peoples and local communities 
8 Long-term 
outcomes 
The design and implementation of a biodiversity offset should be based on an 
adaptive management approach, incorporating monitoring and evaluation, with the 
objective of securing outcomes that last at least as long as the project’s impacts and 
preferably in perpetuity 
9 Transparency The design and implementation of a biodiversity offset, and communication of its 
results to the public, should be undertaken in a transparent and timely manner 
10 Science and 
traditional 
knowledge 
The design and implementation of a biodiversity offset should be a documented 
process informed by sound science, including an appropriate consideration of 
traditional knowledge 
Source: BBOP Standard for Biodiversity Offsets (2012b, pp. 17–22) 
                                                     
20 Other key terminology will be explained as the chapter progresses. However, for a more comprehensive 
glossary, see BBOP (2012a).  
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1.2: Key terms in the biodiversity offsetting literature 
1.2.1: The mitigation hierarchy 
The mitigation hierarchy, originating as the mitigation sequence governing the protection of wetlands 
in the US (see Section 2), denotes the consecutive steps which must be followed when considering 
to offset environmental damage, and designates compensation or offsetting as the last resort after 
other measures have been taken. The mitigation hierarchy consists of three or four steps: (1) avoid 
harm; (2) mitigate or minimise unavoidable impact; (3) rehabilitate or restore degraded or lost 
ecosystems; (4) compensate for or offset residual, unavoidable damage. In many cases step 3 is 
collapsed into step 2, leaving a three-part hierarchy: avoid, mitigate, compensate. 
Avoidance refers to the prevention of impacts occurring in the first place, and questions whether the 
project is necessary in its proposed location and scale, and if the nature and timing of its activities 
can be adjusted. Mitigation and minimisation are used interchangeably, though mitigation is more 
commonly used21. Mitigation is usually interpreted as on-site measures (i.e. within the development 
footprint) which reduce the intensity and extent of damage resulting from development activities 
during its lifetime. Rehabilitation and restoration refers to actions taken after particular development 
activities have ceased, and degraded habitats or ecosystems are restored to their prior condition as 
far as possible (see e.g. ICMM, 2005).  
Compensation and offsetting are sometimes used synonymously, but not always. Rather than 
reducing direct impact which results from development activity, compensation aims to provide benefit 
elsewhere to make up for that unavoidable damage. As such, they are usually distinguished from 
other measures as conservation actions taken off-site in another location (i.e. outside the 
development footprint). Offsetting is a specific form of compensation, which assumes some level of 
ecological equivalence between the environmental damage caused by the development and the 
compensation offered in remediation. Compensation more generally could include non-ecological 
benefits, such as the building of physical infrastructure or monetary payment, whereas a biodiversity 
offset would exclusively involve positive conservation actions such as ecological restoration or 
preservation (known in offset terminology as ‘averted risk’ or ‘avoided loss’), in order to replace lost 
biodiversity value, such that there is no net loss. The two techniques will be explained in more detail 
later in Chapter 4, but it should be briefly noted that there are limits to ‘offsetability’. It is generally 
recognised that some ecosystems and components of biodiversity are too unique and difficult to 
replicate. 
                                                     
21 Mitigation will be the term favoured for the rest of the thesis, as the most commonly used word in the literature. 
The reason minimisation is sometimes deployed is that mitigation is technically the term assigned to the whole 
process – hence wetlands mitigation banking’s name. However, since the final compensatory/offsetting step has 
become the focal point over time, mitigation has increasingly become synonymous with earlier-stage on-site 
minimisation measures. 
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1.2.2: No net loss 
All offset programmes and schemes aim to achieve at least no net loss of biodiversity, or net gain in 
some instances. This identifies the centrality of quantitative measurement and accounting in 
biodiversity offsetting. Offsets use metrics to calculate the biodiversity value of a site before 
development takes places, setting a baseline (which can be fixed or moving) against which loss and 
gain can be measured. Though there are a great many metrics in use around the world, each instance 
of offsetting is required to apply the same metric throughout the process – i.e. use a consistent 
currency to account for loss and gain. Biodiversity loss or debit is calculated as the residual fall in 
biodiversity value relative to the baseline, resulting from development activity. This can be 
compensated for or offset by an equivalent gain in another location, achieved by the purposeful and 
certified uplift in biodiversity value of another site through the actions of ecological restoration, 
creation or preservation, measured in the same way against a baseline, over a pre-determined length 
of time. A biodiversity credit is derived from this uplift in biodiversity value, and can either exist and 
be acquired pre-packaged from a certified ‘bank’, where the restoration or creation has already taken 
place, or in the form of contracted future work to be carried out. Offsets can either be provided by 
developers themselves through work on their own land, or purchased from third party providers 
(public or private), but must be financed by the developer. To achieve no net loss, any residual losses 
must be balanced out by at least an equivalent gain, so there is no overall loss. The ‘net’ is what 
allows for the trade of offset credits to achieve conservation goals, alongside the assumption that loss 
and gain can be defined as ecologically equivalent in some abstracted sense, in time and space 
(though there are often certain restrictions or caveats).  
1.2.3: Additionality 
The final major stipulation is that credits can only be derived from additional conservation activity. 
Ecological gain is considered additional if the conservation actions and outcomes would not have 
occurred anyway, even if the development project was not taking place and financing the offset. 
1.2.4: Biodiversity 
What is meant by biodiversity is often not stipulated in definitions of offsetting, but rather assumed 
under the rubric of nature conservation. In its most abstract sense, biodiversity refers to the variability 
of living organisms at the various levels of genes, species, communities/assemblages, and 
ecosystems. Though there is no universal measure for biodiversity and its meaning is not necessarily 
straightforward or uncontroversial, offset metrics attempt to quantify biodiversity or its value using 
proxies attached to various components of biodiversity, such as: 
species diversity, functional diversity and composition, ecological integrity or condition, 
landscape context (e.g., connectivity, landscape position, adjacent land uses or condition, 
patch size, etc.), and ecosystem services (including people’s use and cultural values) (BBOP, 
2012c, p. 15). 
Nearly all these terms are open to some degree of interpretation, and require further clarification and 
criteria to be operationalised. The ongoing contestation of these and other key terms, rules and goals 
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of offsetting have proved difficult to resolve, for reasons which are both technical and political. These 
disputes are covered in Chapter 4, while the rest of the thesis explores how these issues played out 
in England. First though, the chapter turns to the story of how and why biodiversity offsetting, as a 
conservation tool with the specific components outlined above, emerged in the way it did. It gives 
both historical context as to why certain debates are so prominent today, at the same time as 
providing some of the political economic contours which condition how they play out. 
 
2: The history of biodiversity offsetting 
2.1: US wetlands protection, Section 404 and compensatory mitigation 
Biodiversity offsetting, as it is known today, originated in policy shifts around the federally mandated 
protection of wetlands in the US in the post-war period, as governments, business and 
environmentalists tried to negotiate ways of balancing economic development with environmental 
protection. Mitigation of the detrimental effects of development upon wildlife had first become 
enshrined in law as early as 1958, when the updated Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act posited the 
environment as a ‘public good’ equivalent to development, with impacts of the latter on the former 
needing to be mitigated accordingly. As a tool, Lave observes, mitigation was developed at this time 
from a position of weakness as a tactic for regulators to “salvag[e] something” (2014, p. 66) in the 
face of rampant development. It was not until the beefing up of environmental regulation in the early 
1970s that mitigation was made a requirement rather than simply a request, enshrined in the National 
Environmental Protection Act of 1970. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972), retitled the 
Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1977, provided guidance as to how mitigation was to be defined and 
carried out, institutionalising a regulatory permitting system. It was one of a raft of major pieces of 
legislation of the so-called command-and-control era in the US, which amended and significantly 
strengthened existing environmental regulation, aimed at addressing the consequences of rapid 
economic development, particularly industrial pollution and urbanisation. The other two of particular 
significance were the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (1973) and Clean Air Act (CAA) (1970), the 
stories of which are interwoven with the development of offsets.  
Though public good remained largely justified in economic terms, the implications of these legislative 
changes were quite radical, partly in response to heavy public pressure from the nascent 
environmental movement (Pittman & Waite, 2009, chap. 2). Section 404 of the CWA stipulated that 
all development involving the dredging or discharge of other materials into US waters required 
permitting, to minimise damage to aquatic ecosystems. Permits were to be granted or denied by 
regulators, in the form of district branches of the US Army Corps of Engineers, overseen by the newly 
created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which was given veto power, and with further input 
expected from federal wildlife agencies (since there is often overlap between CWA and ESA 
requirements). The development of mitigation as a tool was not initially considered a particularly 
important part of the 1972 CWA. The main questions revolved around the scope of the CWA’s 
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jurisdiction, since it was anticipated that regulators would simply deny or veto permits to 
environmentally inappropriate projects, with developers modifying their plans as required, if 
necessary. However, due to political pressure from the powerful development lobby and its allies in 
Congress to speed up the permitting process, and the regulators’ related reticence to deny permits 
in practically any circumstance, mitigation quickly became the central feature of the regulation in 
practice, growing as “a consequence of the agencies’ minimal use of their CWA authorities” (Hough 
& Robertson, 2009, p. 17; see also Pittman & Waite, 2009, chap. 3)22. Across the board where 
mitigation was required, it was clear from the very early days that regulators’ priorities were to request 
or demand compliance in a manner which did not compromise or impede development. This has 
broadly been a feature of offsetting schemes ever since.  
Mitigation requirements, when they were used, often took the form of off-site compensatory mitigation 
through the creation of new or restoration of degraded wetlands, or compensation as it is now 
commonly known23, which had first been established at the Ramsar Convention on wetlands in 1971 
(Hrabanski, 2015, p. 143). The 1977 amendments to the CWA significantly simplified the permitting 
regime (partly in a bid to speed up the processing of applications) in a manner which made 
compensatory mitigation the regulatory norm24. In effect this laid the foundations for spatial 
abstraction, through which distinct wetlands in different places could be considered ecologically 
commensurable. Though the mitigation sequence was formally established as part of the definition of 
‘mitigation’ in 1978, the sequence was rarely followed in practice, with compensatory mitigation often 
the first option rather than the last resort (Hough & Robertson, 2009; Robertson, 2000). This reflected 
the continued aversion to permit denial on the part of the Corps and EPA, especially in the face of 
concerted deregulatory attack during the Reagan years. Importantly, developments during the 1970s 
had established compensation as the primary mechanism for complying with mitigation requirements. 
While the move towards market environmentalism was already on the horizon by the late 1970s25, 
this quite separate development in the permitting system was both crucial and somewhat 
serendipitous. As Lave remarks: “once compensation was firmly in place as a mitigation strategy in 
the environmental regulatory field, it was not a large leap to imagine marketizing the whole process” 
(2014, pp. 67–8). 
                                                     
22 Regulators were already under severe pressure to speed up decision-making, since the number of applications 
was consistently outpacing capacity to process them. This was in part due to the complexity of determinations, 
but also limited capacity of the agencies themselves. 
23 As a result, mitigation under wetlands protection in the US became synonymous with off-site compensatory 
mitigation or compensation, rather than on-site minimisation or mitigation. This accounts for the odd discursive 
dissonance between mitigation and compensation in the biodiversity offsets literature.  
24 This was also the year that air pollution offsets first became officially sanctioned in California under the CAA 
(Robertson, 2013a, 2013b). 
25 Investigations into the potential for environmental markets as alternatives to command-and-control regulation 
began during the Carter administration, as the ideas of Coase and Dales slowly filtered through to policymakers 
(see Robertson, 2013a, 2013b). As Robertson points out however, the driving concern at this stage appeared to 
be geared more towards flexibility than markets per se. 
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2.2: From attacks on command-and-control regulation to ‘no net loss’ 
Subsequent developments in mitigation took place during the Reagan and Bush years, though it 
would not be until the 1990s that functioning compensation credit markets would appear. For Bonneuil 
(2015) offsetting’s evolution between 1973-90 is marked most heavily as a period of environmental 
backlash and regulatory roll back, with mitigation measures under fairly consistent attack from their 
inception, held up as prime examples of inefficient and increasingly intolerable command-and-control 
regulation (see also Hrabanski, 2015; Robertson, 2004). Mitigation took concerted flak from a well-
organised conservative business movement, backed by an intellectual critique that environmental 
regulation was costly and uneconomical, following the lead of Chicago School Law and Economics, 
and that resource governance was best privatised, the contention of the ‘new resource economics’ 
inspired by Hardin and Coase (Bonneuil, 2015, pp. 486–8)26. This issue formed a crucial battleground 
during the Carter-Reagan presidential race, and during the triumphant Reagan’s first term:  
federal agencies acted under formal regulatory directives (and informal political directives) to 
reduce the coercive nature of environmental regulation. In the case of Section 404, this took 
the form of Corps resistance to using EPA’s environmental criteria to issue permits. Early in 
Reagan’s first term, the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief identified the Section 
404 regulatory program as ‘a priority program for review’ (Hough & Robertson, 2009, p. 20). 
This deregulatory drive was hugely significant; there was even talk of Section 404 being abolished 
altogether (Pittman & Waite, 2009, p. 42). At the same time, attacks on mitigation requirements as a 
barrier to free market enterprise were increasingly matched by criticism from environmentalists over 
the evidential failure of mitigation policy to deliver on the ground (Robertson, 2004, p. 363). This was 
principally due to regulators’ failure to impose requirements (a situation exacerbated by political 
pressure and severe budget cuts), a lack of clarity over the rules, and poor quality (largely 
unregulated) compensation. Despite opposing viewpoints, there was a kind of consensus from both 
sides that the regulation was inadequate as it stood, jurisdictional scope was unclear and needed 
clarification, and alternatives were needed. 
The 1987 National Wetlands Policy Forum, bringing together divergent interests and convened by 
the EPA, managed against the odds to articulate this consensus around the concept of ‘no net loss’, 
later picked up almost by chance by Bush Sr. in his presidential election campaign (Pittman & Waite, 
2009, chap. 7; Robertson, 2004, p. 363). The term had been coined in 1985 as part of wetlands policy 
in New Jersey, but in reality no net loss merely formalised an effective compromise which had been 
developed between the various actors and agencies in the 1970s, which had established 
compensation as the primary focus of mitigation (Robertson, 2000). No net loss became national 
policy soon after, with the ‘net’ once again foregrounding compensatory mitigation as the core focus, 
                                                     
26 This reflected the growing role of economists in public policy from the 1960s onwards, through which 
environmental issues were increasingly framed in economic terms, and ‘resources’ treated as factors of 
production which could be substituted for others such as fixed capital or labour. In terms of the interpretation of 
mitigation requirements, this meant the economic benefits of development could be seen as justifying 
environmental damage on a cost-benefit analysis. 
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enabling the formation of compensation markets. During Reagan’s second term, market solutions 
were increasingly sought as more flexible tools to deal with environmental issues, following the path 
begun under the Carter administration. This built on the success of market devices in battling acid 
rain where the CAA had previously failed (Mann & Simons, 2015, p. 146), and the market orientation 
was cemented by the influential ‘Project 88’, the cross-party initiative during the Bush Sr. presidential 
campaign promoting ways of harnessing market forces for protecting the environment (Bonneuil, 
2015, p. 489). For weakened environmentalists, the markets appeared to offer the best way of 
managing the ongoing deregulatory attack without upsetting ascendant business interests. No net 
loss seemed an opportunity to both streamline the regulatory process, while containing those forces 
intent on opposing regulation altogether (Mann & Simons, 2015, p. 328). 
2.3: Banking and the emergence of mitigation credit markets 
With compensation recognised as the primary mechanism to deliver mitigation, and no net loss 
establishing policy objectives in a broadly quantitative register (even if rarely demanded in practice), 
the conditions for marketisation were nearly in place27. The primacy of compensation enabled the 
idea of mitigation ‘banking’ to ease and speed up the permitting process: the generation of off-site 
compensatory mitigation in advance of a development project as credit, which could then be used to 
pay off the debit created through development damage. While the concept had been around for some 
time, banks were first used in the early 1980s, overwhelmingly by public agencies on their own land 
for internal use. The first commercial sale of banked wetland credits took place in 1986, but the ad 
hoc development of a system of commercial banking only began in earnest in 1991, on the back of 
federal guidance on the practice, and somewhat uneven enactment of no net loss legislation across 
a number of states. The first entrepreneurial mitigation bank was set up in Georgia in 1992, and the 
first sale of credits from an entrepreneurial bank took place in Florida in 1994 (Hough & Robertson, 
2009, pp. 24–5), but the number of commercial enterprises then expanded dramatically from 1995, 
following further federal guidance produced across all the relevant agencies, which more clearly 
sanctioned commercial banking. 1995 also saw the emergence of species banking in California, 
which applied the concept of compensatory mitigation banking, in the form of habitat creation or 
restoration, to the mitigation requirements of the ESA (Mead, 2008, p. 11). 
Wetlands banking in the US has moved on significantly since the 1990s, into a large-scale commercial 
industry. Today it is one of the most developed environmental markets in the world, worth several 
billion dollars, and is the model on which numerous biodiversity offsetting markets and mechanisms 
are now built (Madsen et al., 2011; Robertson, 2006b). Much of the story has been that of the 
                                                     
27 Pittman and Waite sum up the situation for which banking offered a supposed ‘free market’ solution like this: 
“By the mid-1990s, everyone in wetlands regulation realized the 404 permitting system was broken. Developers 
complained bitterly that a permit to wipe out even a small wetland took too long to get, driving up their overhead 
costs. Environmentalists complained that permits came too easy, and what was offered in replacement offered 
too little and usually failed. The regulators themselves realized they were overwhelmed by the number of 
applications and that could do little beyond checking to make sure the forms were filled out correctly” (2009, p. 
252). 
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consolidation of a wetlands banking industry as an economic and political force; state-facilitated 
efforts at standardisation and (often increasingly market-orientated) reconfiguration of governance 
rules to resolve ongoing problems and meet new goals; and disputed attempts to refine of the 
scientific tools and forms of measurement central to wetlands commodity definition, production and 
exchange. In short, the history of wetlands banking shares many themes and similarities with other 
case studies reviewed in Chapter 2, particularly as an ongoing and incomplete process of nature 
commodification. Though a controversial and unstable process (see Robertson, 2004, 2006a), with 
at best mixed results, in terms of the ecological performance of compensation schemes, it is for Hough 
and Robertson (2009, p. 25) indisputable that wetland banking has significantly improved the quality 
and governance of compensation measures (as distinct from mitigation in general).  
2.4: Corporate interest in voluntary biodiversity offsets 
As mentioned, the development of species banking – trade of habitat-based compensation credits – 
was intertwined with that of wetlands mitigation banking, partly due to certain procedural similarities 
between the CWA and ESA, but also because wetlands ecosystems were often also home to 
endangered species. This provided the conceptual bridge between wetlands mitigation and non-
aquatic conservation banking, and biodiversity offsets in general. Various forms of biodiversity 
offsetting were soon taken up by other governments, most notably in Australia (Miller et al., 2015), 
while the mitigation hierarchy and goal of no net loss were replicated in conservation strategies 
around the world. The role of large-scale corporate interests was also critical in the shaping of 
biodiversity offsetting as a transnational phenomenon. Seen as a successful instrument in the US at 
streamlining compliance procedures and reconciling divergent economic and environmental 
objectives, the tool attracted the particular attention of the mineral extractives sector, whose high 
environmental impact was largely unavoidable due to the specific locations of certain natural 
resources – many of whom began developing their own voluntary no net loss policies and industry 
standards (Virah-Sawmy et al., 2014; Benabou, 2014). 
Importantly, the development of voluntary no net loss and offsetting standards were business-led, 
turning on the identification of biodiversity loss as material (financial) risk to firms (Dempsey, 2013; 
see e.g. KPMG, 2011; KPMG et al., 2011; UNEP-FI, 2010; PWC, 2010; F&C Asset Management, 
2004), rather than the result of ongoing regulatory negotiation and compromise – since most of their 
operations took place in parts of the global south where no net loss policies and regulations were not 
in place. This material risk was the basis of the ‘business case’ for offsetting, which was more 
resolutely market-oriented, and where development activity was even more non-negotiable. Instead 
it foregrounded markets’ potential as non-antagonistic instruments for settling disputes (Benabou, 
2014, p. 118), and at the same time constructed biodiversity as financial risk – something which could 
simultaneously be viewed and pursued as a profitable opportunity (Dempsey, 2013, p. 42). 
Major multinationals, especially mining companies, were concerned about a number of potential and 
interconnected business risks associated with biodiversity loss and the large-scale environmental 
impacts and dependencies of their operations. Public pressure, changes to regulation, new lending 
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and procurement standards and physical scarcity of resources all presented risks. The anticipation of 
new regulation and standards was perhaps of greatest concern, but addressing them pre-emptively 
offered ‘first mover advantage’ (Dempsey, 2013, pp. 45–6). At the same time, reputational damage 
done to extractive industries for their high environmental impacts galvanised moves towards the 
development of recognised standards for no net loss and voluntary offsets (Benabou, 2014, pp. 105–
6). This was a bid to improve the image of the sector and help guarantee license to operate, and 
more speed and certainty around access to finance, resources and supply chains, and markets. The 
mining sector, led by Rio Tinto (Penca, 2015, p. 95; see also Rio Tinto, 2004), was at the forefront of 
these efforts, through the formation of the Global Mining Initiative in 1999 and later creation of the 
International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) in 2002. Participants in a joint workshop held in 
2003 between ICMM and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) agreed to explore 
biodiversity offsets as a strategy to reduce mining’s environmental footprint (Benabou, 2014, p. 105; 
see ICMM, 2005). Early moves had also been made in 2001 by a group of oil and gas companies, 
who teamed up with a number of international environmental groups including Flora and Fauna 
International (FFI), IUCN and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), to form The Energy and Biodiversity 
Initiative (EBI), which had also proposed no net loss as a minimum industry standard in 2003 (Mann 
& Simons, 2015, p. 329; see also EBI, 2003).  
Further business-led and market-orientated developments continued through a series of international 
workshops, policy forums and publications. This period saw the consolidation of a relatively small 
cohort of experts, drawn from big business, environmental organisations and consultancies, financial 
institutions and investors. These initiatives crystallised the growing role of partnerships between the 
private sector and major conservation NGOs in the development of offsets. It was out of these that 
the ‘business case’ emerged (ten Kate et al., 2004), culminating in the creation of the Business and 
Biodiversity Offsets Programme in 2004, an organisation dedicated to promoting the use of offsetting 
worldwide (Benabou, 2014, p. 106). Contained within the market-orientated Forest Trends group, 
BBOP brought together a range of actors from the emergent biodiversity offsetting constituency, as 
well as government departments (see BBOP, 2013). This constituency, their interests and their 
market-orientated perspective has been key to the spread of biodiversity offsetting around the world 
in the past decade. 
2.5: Global governance institutions, market-based instruments and biodiversity offsetting 
BBOP has done much to shape biodiversity offsetting over the past decade. Its leaders have 
emphasised the potential for collaborative win-win outcomes through offsetting, and have been 
crucial in cohering the discourse more solidly around tradeable permit markets, framing nature 
conservation as a major opportunity for private companies and investors akin to carbon markets 
(Hrabanski, 2015, p. 146). On top of lobbying, BBOP has developed widely recognised principles and 
standards for offsetting, alongside policy design handbooks and the specialist online platforms 
Ecosystem Marketplace and SpeciesBanking.com, which link together a range of water, carbon and 
biodiversity markets, and act as central information and exchange hubs for market actors (Mann & 
61 
 
Simons, 2015, p. 329). The organisation also offers its expertise and guidance to organisations and 
governments looking to develop offsetting programmes. 
The spread of biodiversity offsets on the international stage was never simply a business-led initiative 
however, and the overall impact of organisations like BBOP on the global policy landscape should 
not be overstated. Since the 1980s, the influential Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) had been spearheading efforts to move beyond command-and-control 
regulation, pressing for the deployment of market mechanisms and other ‘flexible’ economic 
instruments in environmental policy (see also Mann & Simons, 2015; Hrabanski, 2015, p. 145). This 
rested particularly on the role played by tradeable permits in tackling acid rain and air pollution during 
the 1980s, and the nascent field of environmental economics (see Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). 
Since the mid-2000s, the OECD has been actively promoting biodiversity offsets, around the same 
time the utilitarian ecosystem approach was becoming an increasingly prominent feature of the 
literature (Coralie et al., 2015; Hrabanski, 2015, p. 147; see OECD, 2013). Such efforts filtered 
through to other major global governance institutions and documents, most notably the Brundtland 
Report of 1987 and the Rio Summit in 1992, which saw the inauguration of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), all of which advocated for greater use of MBIs to meet environmental 
objectives. 20 years later, the green economy and environmental markets were the very centrepiece 
of Rio+20. 
By 2010 and moving into the present decade (during which the UK government moved to develop its 
own formal policy), a number of other major organisations and institutions joined the ranks of those 
promoting or exploring biodiversity offsetting, as well as developing technical manuals, standards and 
other types of policy material. Among the more prominent examples, the CBD’s Financial Resources 
and Mechanisms group has been working on and promoting offsets since 2010 (Hrabanski, 2015, p. 
148); mandated at the World Conservation Congress of 2012, the IUCN established a similar group 
working on the development of an offsets policy, publishing a major technical paper in 2014 and policy 
statement in 2016 (IUCN, 2016, 2014); the International Financial Corporation, the lending arm of the 
World Bank, integrated offsets into its 2012 ‘Performance Standards’ on new loans (IFC, 2012), on 
which the Equator Principles have long been based, which are particularly important in the world of 
banking and investment; the Cross Sector Biodiversity Initiative, formed in 2013 and bringing together 
the oil, gas, mining and financial sectors has since been developing best practice guidelines to meet 
IFC requirements (CSBI, 2015); and the European Commission has, since 2012, committed to 
developing a No Net Loss strategy, including offsetting, for the whole of the European Union 
(European Commission, 2012). Biodiversity offsetting and similar instruments are now the mainstay 
of smaller scale conservation events, such as the IUCN-convened World Conservation Congress and 
World Parks Congress, while recent years have seen governmental programmes multiplying around 
the world. The latest comprehensive State of Biodiversity Markets survey undertaken by Ecosystem 
Marketplace counted 45 existing compensatory mitigation programmes operational, with another 27 
at various stages of investigation or development (Madsen et al., 2011) – and these numbers have 
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risen over the past five years. The US remains home to by far the largest and most developed 
markets, with much of the experience, data and expertise which comes with it, as well as many of the 
more influential organisations and individuals – though early policy transfer to Australia has made 
that another important node for knowledge exchange (see Coralie et al., 2015). Finally, a variety of 
large corporations and banks are increasingly developing their own policies and material related to 
biodiversity offsets (e.g. Credit Suisse & McKinsey Centre for Business and Environment, 2016; 
NatureVest & EKO Asset Management, 2014; Credit Suisse et al., 2014).  
Despite the impressive rise of the policy over the past decade, its success should not be overblown. 
Though international agreements through the CBD exist to curb and halt biodiversity loss, there is no 
intergovernmental framework analogous to those governing carbon markets and emissions trading28. 
Consequently, biodiversity offsetting practices have developed in a markedly uneven manner, often 
on a voluntary basis at the sub-national level. Partly as a result, biodiversity loss remains a marginal 
issue for most companies, and efforts to develop agreed-upon metrics and standards have been 
frustrated. Many members have left BBOP over the decade of its existence, while other organisations 
like the EBI have broken up – providing one explanation for the proliferation of alternative tools and 
standards (Benabou, 2014; Dempsey, 2013). These issues be explored in Chapter 4, but for the 
moment it stands as a reminder that despite biodiversity offsetting’s often apparent ubiquity, its future 
is far from certain or guaranteed. 
 
3: The appeal of biodiversity offsetting: a win-win for the economy and 
environment 
Proponents offer a number of arguments in favour of the expanded roll out of biodiversity offsets, as 
a conservation tool capable of delivering ‘win-win’ outcomes for economic development and 
environmental sustainability. The historical account of offsetting’s formation and establishment on the 
global policy landscape above gives a sense of the highly contingent nature of its development as an 
MBI. Its appeal today however, among policymakers, supranational bodies, various parts of the global 
business community and many of the more powerful conservation organisations, can be located in 
this specific yet overarching narrative, which promises that seemingly intractable dilemmas and trade-
offs between development and conservation are reconcilable, through no net loss strategies and 
policies enabled by tradeable offsets. The case made by advocates has a number of related 
components, which have been divided below as the business case, the conservation case, the 
economic case and the regulatory case. Each element comprises claims of how biodiversity offsets 
can provide benefits for different sectors and interests and ameliorate problems relating to regulation 
of biodiversity loss. Many of the texts drawn on in this section also identify a number of risks and 
                                                     
28 However, an Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) was established in 
2012, aimed at playing a similar role as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) at the science-
policy interface (Turnhout et al., 2014). 
63 
 
limitations associated with biodiversity offsets, which are not detailed here, but are reviewed in 
Chapter 4. 
3.1: The business case 
Since the mid-2000s the business case has come to the fore in the discourse around biodiversity 
offsets. As explained in the previous section, the emergence of the business case was largely the 
result of collaborative work between the extractive industries, particularly the mining sector, and some 
of the large conservation organisations and financial institutions. It laid the foundation, from an 
instrumental point of view, for moves towards the use and standardisation of biodiversity offsets, and 
occurred in response to the identification of a series of business risks associated with biodiversity 
loss, namely reputational, operational and physical, regulatory, market and product, and financial 
(Dempsey, 2013, p. 45).  
3.1.1: License to operate 
The first element of the business case is often considered the most salient, and primarily concerns 
regulatory risk. Access to land and license to operate are the most basic requirements for any 
development project, and will nearly always necessitate some kind of state approval or permitting 
(Darbi, 2015, p. 4). This is likely to be more difficult where development will have a high impact on 
the natural environment, and an increasing number of governments are pursuing no net loss policies 
and/or stipulate adherence to the mitigation hierarchy in environmentally sensitive or protected areas 
(The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2014; ICMM & IUCN, 2013, pp. 12–13). For businesses, siting 
operations in such areas might be favoured for any number of strategic or commercial reasons, while 
extractive industries are constrained to some extent by geology and the locations of particular mineral 
deposits (ICMM, 2005, pp. 5–6). The development and refining of biodiversity offset mechanisms has 
a clear advantage for businesses in these scenarios, if they facilitate easy compliance with prevailing 
rules, and allow development to proceed without financial or reputational risks associated with legal 
challenges, delays in permitting and possible fines. Even where existing protections are weak, 
concessions or permits will still require present and future ‘regulatory goodwill’, especially in 
competitive environments where demonstration of best practice may give one company the edge over 
another (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008, p. 197). There is also an anticipatory element related to regulatory 
risk, with the possibility of realising first mover advantage for companies developing offsets before 
they become mandatory, and the potential for forward-thinking businesses to “shape policy, and 
possibly legislation, in the future” (ten Kate et al., 2004, p. 44). 
3.1.2: Reputation and Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility 
As discussed in the previous section, reputational damage to mining companies provided part of the 
impetus behind the development of voluntary offsets. As ten Kate and Inbar note, environmentally 
damaging activities are often extremely controversial:  
Examples in the mining and oil and gas sectors reveal project costs of hundreds of millions 
or even several billion dollars stemming from delays in regulatory approval and the 
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commencement of operations and operations blockaded by communities (2008, p. 197; see 
also Rainey et al., 2015).  
Consequently, part of the business case revolves around using biodiversity offsets to showcase a 
commitment to the goals of sustainable development (ICMM, 2005, p. 6) as part of corporate social 
and environmental responsibility (CSER) portfolios (The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2014, p. 6). 
Developing offset schemes which are transparent and accountable, meanwhile, is expected to 
improve relationships with local communities, environmental organisations and other stakeholders, 
helping secure so-called ‘social license to operate’ and regulatory goodwill in sensitive areas, where 
companies need to be perceived as good partners in development (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008, p. 197).  
3.1.3: Access to finance 
Though there is some debate over the importance of CSER with regard to relationships with local 
communities and environmentalists (Darbi, 2015, p. 4), the integration of biodiversity offsets and no 
net loss into companies’ reputational strategies is increasingly tied to concerns over access to finance 
and lending conditions (ICMM & IUCN, 2013, pp. 13–15). The establishment of the Equator Principles 
has become hugely significant, especially since the use of the mitigation hierarchy and offsets were 
integrated into the environmental safeguard Performance Standard 6 (PS6) (see IFC, 2012). Since 
PS6 has been adopted by all the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (over 80 in total) and a 
number of the regional development banks, large developers are increasingly likely to encounter 
loans with offsetting conditions attached. On top of the standards stipulated by most of the large-
scales lenders, proponents also argue the integration of biodiversity offsets into business strategies 
is likely to generate higher investor and creditor confidence, with respect to “risks related to 
governance, social, environmental and ethical issues” (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008, p. 197). 
3.1.4: Efficiency  
The fourth part of the business case relates to several ways offsets viewed as more efficient and cost-
effective than other approaches to biodiversity impact. The demonstration of best practice is assumed 
to simplify compliance procedures, reducing delays resulting from lengthy negotiations. 
Consequently, permitting should become quicker, simpler and more certain, while offsetting may also 
prove to be cheaper than further on-site mitigation measures (ten Kate & Inbar, 2008, p. 197). This 
claim rests partially on the assumption that offsets will offer more flexibility over how companies 
comply with biodiversity obligations, and, as we will see shortly, that the stimulation of market 
competition in the provision of offsets will increase choice and drive down the price of credits. The 
other aspect of the efficiency argument focuses on long-term risk planning, and the ability for 
companies to transfer biodiversity risks and liabilities to third parties through commercial offset 
agreements (The Biodiversity Consultancy, 2012, p. 5; ten Kate & Inbar, 2008, p. 193; ten Kate et al., 
2004, p. 44). 
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3.1.5: New markets and business opportunities 
The final aspect of the business case points towards the business opportunities and new markets, 
opened up by the development of biodiversity offsetting strategies and regulatory systems (see for 
instance Duke et al., 2012, pp. 26–7). There are opportunities for new entrepreneurial ventures and 
expansion of services provided by ecological consultants and others involved in the restoration 
industry. In addition, landowners “may find that land which was previously considered useless, or at 
least not very financially productive, can now generate income through the sale of offsets and/or other 
long term conservation measures” (ten Kate et al., 2004, pp. 43–4) – or as Bayon (2008, p. 130) puts 
it, there is an opportunity, through the development of biodiversity banking programmes, of changing 
species on the land “from liabilities to assets”. The private sector is expected to play a more significant 
role in global biodiversity conservation in the future, as envisaged by the CBD and TEEB (ICMM & 
IUCN, 2013, p. 15), with first-mover advantage again projected as paying dividends. 
3.2: The conservation case 
The other side of the win-win case for biodiversity offsets regards the benefits for conservation, the 
arguments for which have been embraced and promoted by a number of leading conservation 
organisations.  
3.2.1: The power of numbers: accountability and transparency 
The first advantage identified centres on how biodiversity offsetting as a conservation tool provides 
quantifiable outcomes (Gardner et al., 2013). Offset metrics make it easier to ‘capture’ the biodiversity 
value of a site in an unambiguous way, including low level impacts which are often ignored as 
insignificant. No net loss, calculated through transparent and consistently measured loss and gain, 
make accounting for and evaluating conservation actions more straightforward (Briggs et al., 2009, 
p. 117). This in turn is argued to make negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of mitigation 
measures more straightforward for regulators, and compliance simpler to evaluate. The use of ‘hard 
numbers’ is also held up as an effective and persuasive way of communicating impacts of 
development to businesses and non-experts (BBOP, 2014). 
3.2.2: Partnership and influence over developers 
The communicative aspect of quantifiable offsets, or ‘speaking the language of business’, 
foregrounds the reconciliatory work offsets are anticipated to perform. As White writes of conservation 
banking in the US:  
It has become a practice that satisfies not only the laws and their requirements but goes 
further, and creates business practices that suit the needs of developers, private investors 
and natural resource agencies. Most importantly, it creates biological and ecological 
preserves that are environmentally worthwhile (2008, p. 34).  
The divergent goals of development and environmental protection are not only supposed to be 
technically balanced through offsets, they are also designed with the intention of reconciling the 
antagonistic relationship between businesses and conservationists. As Kareiva, Lalasz and Marvier 
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put it: “Instead of scolding capitalism, conservationists should partner with corporations in a science-
based effort to integrate the value of nature's benefits into their operations and cultures” (2011, p. 
35). Supporting and informing the “right kind of development”, such as ‘development by design’ 
(meaning offsets, see Kiesecker et al., 2009), is expected to “be more effective and far more broadly 
supported, in boardrooms and political chambers, as well as at kitchen tables” (Kareiva et al., 2011, 
p. 36). In this reframing of conservation, development is no longer seen as necessarily incompatible 
with curbing biodiversity loss, and developers can rather be seen as crucial partners in driving 
conservation forward (see also Kumaraswamy & Udayakumar, 2011). 
3.2.3: Financing conservation 
For advocates, the potential role for biodiversity offsets to leverage private finance for conservation 
activity is at the centre of their appeal (e.g. OECD, 2013; eftec & IEEP, 2012; Quintero & Mathur, 
2011). There is a wide perception that the funding required to meet global biodiversity targets cannot 
be met with public resources, which are not only inadequate but declining (Jenkins et al., 2004, p. 34; 
see also Caldecott & Dickie, 2010). By incorporating the polluter pays principle in a manner which 
internalises the costs of biodiversity loss into the development process, offsets are said to offer the 
opportunity of mobilising billions of dollars (Kiesecker et al., 2009, p. 265). Assuming all compensatory 
action is additional, the widespread implementation of biodiversity offsetting would therefore mean 
more conservation (ten Kate et al., 2004, p. 14). 
3.2.4: Conservation planning 
Proponents argue there are considerable advantages afforded by the flexibility offered by offsets as 
opposed to rigid mitigation requirements, and the possibilities for strategic conservation planning to 
create or maintain strong and resilient ecosystems at more appropriate ecological scales, and redress 
habitat fragmentation (McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010, p. 174; White, 2008, p. 34). The flexibility of off-
site compensation means that conservation actions can be targeted at more appropriate areas at the 
landscape scale, where they will be most cost-effective, likely to succeed and unlikely to come under 
development pressure in the medium-term (ten Kate et al., 2004, pp. 18–19). If ‘trading up’ is 
permitted as well as ‘like for like’ compensation, then the offsetting of cumulative low level impacts 
can contribute to high value sites (Darbi, 2010, pp. 9–10), which are more likely to receive protection 
in the future. Strategic conservation planning, especially in the form of banking schemes, could 
involve the aggregation of offsets, augmenting and consolidating the biodiversity value of a particular 
area, or the reconnection of fragmented ecosystems through wildlife corridors (ten Kate et al., 2004, 
p. 16). Through strategic design, it is argued, recreation or restoration projects are more likely to 
succeed and become ecologically robust, while generating cumulative gains and economies of scale 
for conservation, enabled and optimised through the pooling of resources and expertise (eftec et al., 
2010, p. 5; ten Kate & Inbar, 2008, p. 193).  
67 
 
3.3: The economic case 
Undergirding both the business and conservation case is a clear economic rationale, where 
reconciliation between the two is framed in terms of multiple, utilitarian benefits (for instance regarding 
finance, business opportunities and cost savings). There is also a specific economic case made for 
offsetting from the perspective of environmental economics, which advances the role of MBIs over 
command-and-control regulation in driving efficient outcomes. This element promotes banking and 
“market[s] for compensation liabilities” (Caldecott & Dickie, 2010, p. 8) over other kinds of offsets, and 
foregrounds the active role of the state in ensuring strong property rights and adequate levels of 
liquidity through regulatory intervention (Bayon & Jenkins, 2010, p. 185; Bayon, 2004, p. 14).  
3.3.1: Market failure and price 
The first important aspect of the economic case is the framing of biodiversity as a public good, with 
market failure the cause of biodiversity loss (Alvarado-Quesada et al., 2013, p. 3): 
The economic system is not broken. It is doing exactly what it was set up to do: deliver more 
of what people value – or at least more of what imperfect price signals say people value – 
and less of what they don’t (Bayon, 2008, p. 137).  
The purpose of economic instruments like offsets is to “provide ‘correct’ price signals to producers 
and consumers” (OECD, 2013, p. 29) by internalising the externality of biodiversity loss (eftec et al., 
2010, p. 94). 
3.3.2: Financial (dis)incentives and decision-making 
The use of incentives and disincentives is key to the economic case behind offsetting (Rajvanshi, 
2015). Making biodiversity loss visible on the balance sheet, by imposing a significant cost on 
damaging activity, is argued to be the most plausible route to changing the minds of powerful 
decision-makers toward more sustainable practices, appealing directly to businesses’ self-interest 
(OECD, 2013, p. 68). As Bayon and Jenkins put it: “[i]mposing a price is by far the most effective way 
of forcing businesses to develop without damaging nature” (2010, p. 184). The other side of this part 
of the argument is the crucial creation of an incentive for landowners to carry out positive conservation 
activities (Jenkins et al., 2004, p. 35). It is the ability to sell endangered biodiversity as offsets that is 
said to “give it a value” and allows liabilities to be turned into assets (ten Kate et al., 2004, p. 20), 
enabled by the enforceable property rights of an offsetting regime (Alvarado-Quesada et al., 2013, p. 
3) and the imposition of no net loss (Bayon & Jenkins, 2010, p. 185). 
3.3.3: Efficient outcomes 
Lastly, economic theory is used to forward the idea that offsets should provide a flexible and low cost 
route to no net loss (Coggan, Buitelaar, S. Whitten, et al., 2013, p. 223; see also Bräuer et al., 2006, 
pp. 28–30). Efficient land use and allocation of resources is central to the economic case (eftec et al., 
2010, pp. 94–7), where “market forces work in favor of biodiversity conservation” and business 
(TEEB, 2010a, p. 159; see also Bayon, 2004, p. 20; Jenkins et al., 2004, p. 36). Conservation is said 
to be incentivised on land where there are low opportunity costs, while competition is expected to 
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both drive costs down and quality up. More liquid markets meanwhile are seen as offering significant 
advantages, by reducing complexity and the transaction costs usually associated with compensation 
agreements (Caldecott & Dickie, 2010, p. 10), as well as savings through economies of scale (eftec 
et al., 2010, p. 5).  
3.4: The regulatory case 
The final piece of the case in favour of offsetting pertains to its overall benefits as a regulatory 
approach. The regulatory case could equally be described as the governance case, since it goes 
beyond the specific advantages for regulators, and encompasses the offsetting’s purported ability to 
satisfactorily resolve a number of competing demands for policymakers.  
3.4.1: Resolving conflict in meeting competing policy goals 
While offsets offer significant new sources of finance for conservation, flexibility for planners to direct 
ecological restoration strategically, and to do so in an efficient and cost-effective way, it is important 
to note that they promise to do so without impeding development or economic growth in the process 
(TEEB, 2010a, p. 157). If designed well, they should make environmental compliance simpler, quicker 
and more certain for business. By appealing to multiple stakeholders and interests, advocates argue, 
offsetting can provide an effective and far less politically antagonistic way of governing biodiversity 
loss with respect to development pressures. In support of such claims, proponents point to the 
success of other tradeable rights and permitting programmes around the world governing industrial 
air and water pollution, and managing common pool resources such as fisheries and water resources 
effectively at low cost (ten Kate et al., 2004, p. 21; see also Bayon, 2004). Supporters also suggest 
there are encouraging results according to various measures, especially finance leveraged and 
volume of restoration projects promised, in places where offsetting and banking schemes are well-
established, relative to previous regulatory regimes (Duke & ten Kate, 2014). 
3.4.2: Capacity and resources 
Limited resources and capacity among regulatory agencies should make offsetting particularly 
appealing for policymakers and among regulators. Beyond the need for private funding for 
conservation activity itself, the capacity for regulating environmental impact is under serious and 
increasing strain in most parts of the world, with government agencies responsible for administering 
permitting and planning rules expected to process applications as quickly as possible, to allow 
development to be delivered in line with growth imperatives and other social needs (White, 2008, pp. 
39–40). Again drawing on the experience of existing programmes, advocates argue offsetting and 
especially banking systems offer simple and objective tools for making decisions, which can both 
significantly reduce approval time and administrative costs for regulators (ten Kate et al., 2004, pp. 
22–31). On top of this, when it comes to monitoring and enforcement, the preferable option of a 
market system creates far greater incentives for offset suppliers, where the liabilities are legally 
transferred to a third party provider (Kormos et al., 2015, pp. 10–14).  
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3.4.3: Standardisation  
Most importantly, the regulatory case turns on the advantages attributed to offsetting as a policy tool 
bringing standardisation to the governance of development impact. The clarity and certainty afforded 
by standardised regulatory rules and forms of measurement should make processing applications 
significantly simpler for bureaucratic decision-makers, while reducing time and resources spent on 
both deliberation and verification, increasing the transparency of the process and limiting the scope 
for appeals and/or further negotiation with developers (Hawdon et al., 2015, p. 7). The main argument 
here is that no net loss and offsets should be significantly simpler and cheaper to audit than prevailing 
approaches. Most promoters of biodiversity offsetting argue for a mandatory system as a result, 
where the rules and metrics are clear and consistent, since this is essential in constructing a level 
playing field for business to operate on, as well as creating the necessary demand (and competition) 
for an offset market to emerge (ten Kate et al., 2004, p. 36). Though some short term costs are 
expected in setting up the system, and continued oversight is necessary, the anticipation is that these 
will fall in the medium to long run, as market efficiencies kick in (Bayon, 2004, pp. 14–15). 
 
4: Key themes in the development of offsetting 
Chapter 4 now moves on to reviewing the ongoing academic debates around biodiversity offsetting 
in detail, addressing technical and institutional issues around design and implementation, as well as 
perspectives from more critical literature. Together, Chapters 3 and 4 provide important reference 
points for debates which took place in the UK between 2010 and 2015, and helps hone the specific 
research questions laid out in Chapter 5. Before moving on, however, it is worth briefly highlighting 
certain motifs on which the thesis pivots, and came into view in Chapter 3. As will become clear, there 
were striking parallels in the story of the English policy’s emergence, and the historical account of 
offsetting’s development told in Section 2. Offsetting was proposed by the UK government in a 
moment of backlash against environmental regulation, intersecting with a reform programme aimed 
at liberalising the planning system, constructed as a relic of the command-and-control era which was 
impeding development. At the same time, UK conservation policy was being part-driven, mediated 
and constrained by legally binding biodiversity conventions and governance regimes on higher 
international scales, both European and global. In pulling through other themes, the English 
programme was heavily backed by a green business coalition, mobilising very similar arguments to 
those outlined in Section 3. Other environmental interests, meanwhile, were attracted on the basis of 
the evidential and abject failures of the prevailing mitigation regime, as they were in the US. Part of 
the appeal was the possibility of at least being able to standardise and maybe consolidate the 
process. In analysing the English experience, what is most interesting is why the process broke down, 
what was different and what the implications might be. For now though, the thesis turns to the key 
academic debates about offsetting. 
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Chapter 4: Biodiversity offsetting in theory and practice: 
technical, institutional and critical debates 
 
Introduction 
This final chapter before moving onto the methodology and empirical analysis reviews the existing 
academic literature on biodiversity offsetting. It provides more specific conceptual tools to analyse 
biodiversity offsetting as a multifaceted, complex, and contentious policy tool. Offsets require the 
successful alignment and enrolment of a range of actors from different fields and sectors. Questions 
relating to the political economy and political ecology of environmental policies need to be asked with 
reference to a range of ongoing debates around offsetting outside these fields, including 
environmental science and ecology, conservation, planning and law. Though the coverage of these 
issues is somewhat limited by the author’s lack of expertise in these disciplines, an overview is 
nevertheless necessary to get to grips with the nature of the controversies and frictions analysed later 
in the thesis. Together with Chapter 3, this chapter introduces many of the concepts and debates 
referred to in the oral and written data collected during fieldwork. It should be noted that many of the 
divisions, positions and debates laid out in Chapter 3, Section 3 and those in Chapter 4 are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, but porous and overlapping.  
The chapter explores the core debates relating to successful design and implementation of 
biodiversity offsets, discussions over its appropriate scope and use as a conservation tool, along with 
critical perspectives on the policy. It does so in three parts. Section 1 reviews scientific and technical 
issues, focusing on: (i) the limits of ecological science; (ii) measurement, biodiversity currencies and 
notions of ecological equivalence; (iii) techniques of accounting for biodiversity loss and gain; and (iv) 
offsets as avoided loss and ecological restoration. Section 2 covers governance and institutional 
challenges, looking at: (i) implementation and compliance; and (ii) perverse outcomes and unintended 
consequences. Sections 1 and 2 provide an overview of literature which is broadly supportive of 
biodiversity offsetting in principle, but contingent on a variety of factors to be considered justified and 
effective in practice. While recognising and identifying limitations and dangers to offsetting, the 
literature surveyed in this section is largely not of a ‘critical’ political register, as defined at the 
beginning of Chapter 1. These two sections look most carefully at the pragmatics of offsetting, and 
debates over how best to operationalise and make the policy ‘work’ in meeting its stated objectives. 
It should be noted that though not of a critical political register, the issues discussed are highly 
contested and there is little overall consensus. Some authors are very critical of offsetting itself, 
concluding that various technical and institutional issues are ultimately intractable, such that its 
potential efficacy and coherence are compromised as a result. 
Section 3 reviews the most critical literature on biodiversity offsetting. The work reviewed here tends 
to be highly sceptical of offsetting’s potential success on its own terms, and critical too of its likely or 
observed consequences for people and the rest of nature. It suggests that resolution of the dilemmas 
identified in the opening sections are more heavily mediated and conditioned by political economic 
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and socio-ecological contradictions than is generally recognised. Importantly, this section brings 
biodiversity offsetting into sharper focus with respect to the critical perspectives outlined in Chapter 
2, linking the broader framework of analysis to the empirical case, adding meat to the conceptual 
bones in the process. For the most part, work reviewed here is to some extent theoretically grounded 
in the literatures on the neoliberalisation of nature and conservation, but draws too from other parts 
of critical environmental studies. In terms of content, it looks at: (i) offsetting as commodification and 
marketisation; (ii) offsetting as neoliberal environmental governance; and (iii) environmental and 
social consequences of (and resistance to) offsetting. The section and chapter concludes with a 
reassessment of biodiversity offsetting as an example of the neoliberalisation of nature and 
conservation, in light of the literature reviewed in this chapter, and provides three possible frames of 
analysis to take forward. 
 
1: Scientific and technical debates 
1.1: The limits of ecological science 
There is agreement across the spectrum that biodiversity offsetting is an exceptionally difficult 
mechanism to design and put into practice. In the first place, the very nature of ‘biodiversity’ is widely 
recognised as inherently difficult, perhaps impossible, to fully know, measure and value in all its 
complexity (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015; ten Kate et al., 2004; Purvis & Hector, 2000; Salzman 
& Ruhl, 2000; but see Pereira et al., 2013). Tools which have been developed always measure one 
or a variety of proxies, which only offer partial representation of (particular aspects or components of) 
biodiversity (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). The many ways in which biodiversity is defined and 
valued consist of components which are themselves tough to isolate and measure, and require 
different methodological approaches often in tension with one another (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 
2015). There are clearly political dimensions to these difficulties too which relate to biodiversity’s 
curious social construction and historical assembly (e.g. Vadrot, 2014; Takacs, 1996). One of 
offsetting’s most intractable problems is the incorporation of explicitly socially and culturally 
determined values, framed as ecosystem services, into ‘scientific’ forms of measurement. These 
issues will be returned to in more detail later in the chapter, but in this section the focus remains 
largely on the biophysical characteristics which create dilemmas for offsetting.  
In biophysical terms, biodiversity is widely understood to be composed of a series of dynamic, 
interpenetrating and often nonlinear ecosystemic processes operating at every temporal and spatial 
scale (Zimmerer, 2009). How these spatio-temporal dynamics play out, and the cumulative impacts 
of various forms of environmental and socially-induced change, tend to be highly contingent and 
specific (Bull, Suttle, Singh, et al., 2013; Kujala et al., 2013). Non-equilibrium ecology (e.g. Zimmerer, 
2000) suggests that trajectories of biodiversity change are both uncertain and unpredictable, and 
frequently exhibit the emergent properties of complex systems (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015). 
Biodiversity is also by definition endlessly heterogeneous across time and space, and always context-
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specific. This creates problems with abstracting, commensurating and quantifying biodiversity’s 
ecological value (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013), while biodiversity’s unpredictability makes 
engineering conservation gain a highly challenging and uncertain endeavour (Maron et al., 2012; 
Bekessy et al., 2010). 
Under these circumstances, the use of ‘sound science’ is seen as paramount for offsetting’s 
successful roll out (IUCN, 2014, p. 12). However, the scientific foundations of biodiversity offsetting – 
i.e. the tools for understanding and dealing with biodiversity’s complexity and unpredictability – are 
generally considered to be immature. As Burgin points out, relative to physics, chemistry and 
mathematics: “ecological, biological and restoration sciences are underdeveloped, and much more 
imprecise and complex” (2010, p. 53). Furthermore, the tools employed rarely draw from the latest 
scientific developments (Calvet et al., 2015; see also Bull, Suttle, Singh, et al., 2013), and their 
adaptability to rapidly changing environmental contexts (e.g. in the face of climate change) is 
regarded as a particular challenge. The instruments used in practice are rather inexact, and often 
require subjective interpretation and judgement (Wotherspoon & Burgin, 2009, p. 68; see also 
Robertson, 2006a), exacerbated by large gaps in available, standardised and useful data. A number 
of potential sources of bias have also been identified in the literature. At the operational level, it is 
often not clear how to interpret guidance and manuals (see also Kelly et al., 2011; Clare et al., 2011), 
and though quantitative biodiversity offset metrics aim to provide objective, hard numbers, it is 
generally recognised that there is still considerable room for error, misinterpretation and difference of 
opinion (e.g. Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2011; Cook et al., 2010; McCarthy et al., 
2004).  
Some authors characterise the risk of bias running deeper, with subjective judgements built into every 
stage of the offsetting process (Wotherspoon & Burgin, 2009). Kujala, Burgman and Moilanen (2013) 
argue that as well as the frequently covered epistemic uncertainties of conservation, stemming from 
lack of knowledge and natural variation, bias is possible as a result of the under-examined categories 
of linguistic and human decision uncertainty. Linguistic uncertainty refers to the vagueness, 
ambiguity, context dependency and under-specificity and indeterminacy of key theoretical concepts 
and procedural terms. Human decision uncertainty meanwhile points to both the significant degree 
of subjective judgements involved in decision-making, and the role of values and interests (such as 
the preferences and ontological viewpoints of individuals) in influencing them, especially in situations 
where policy objectives are defined in socio-political terms, which may conflict with strictly scientific 
recommendations. These factors may have significant effects, but are frequently absent from 
discussion in the literature (Kujala et al., 2013; Regan et al., 2005, 2002b).  
Whether offsetting is scientifically based and supported by evidence remains something of an open 
question. Fallding is one of many authors to emphasise that limitations like those mentioned above 
“do not appear to have been effectively recognised in policy approaches to date” (2014, p. 17). Most 
of the literature surveyed here accepts that biodiversity will always remain unknowable to some 
degree, however sophisticated the biological and ecological sciences become. Some believe such 
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obstacles to be largely an issue of comprehensive data, which can be overcome via coordination 
between ecological researchers and consultants (Hill & Arnold, 2012; see also BBOP, 2009a, p. 14), 
but others see these limitations as potentially fatal for offsetting’s success (e.g. Moreno-Mateos, 
Maris, et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2009). In any case, the combination of biodiversity’s biophysical 
nature and the immaturity of its underpinning scientific disciplines present particular, interpenetrating 
challenges for offsetting. One is epistemological, in terms of whether no net loss can be satisfactorily 
and objectively verified: a problem of assessment and measurement. The other is practical, and 
concerns the effectiveness of conservation actions: a problem of outcome. These dilemmas feature 
prominently in the debates I now discuss in more detail. 
1.2: Measurement: currencies and equivalence 
The premise of no net loss revolves around the notion that loss can be compensated for by at least 
an equal quantum of biodiversity gain. In order to demonstrate and achieve this, offsets require 
consistent currencies, capable of measuring loss and gain as fungible units (i.e. in equivalent and 
substitutable terms) which facilitate trade or exchange (ICMM & IUCN, 2013, p. 23). However, since 
there is “no single metric that objectively captures the full extent of biodiversity, which itself has no 
universal, unambiguous definition” (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013, p. 373; see also Gardner et al., 
2013; BBOP, 2012a), currencies have to rely on proxies instead – with the proviso that they represent 
biodiversity as commensurable across time and space, and at the same time reflect ecological reality. 
A decision needs to be made at the design stage over what aspect of biodiversity is to be 
compensated (BBOP, 2012a, pp. 27–8): no net loss of what? The currency may denote equivalence 
of some ecological value, such as ecosystem function, structure or composition (including particular 
species or habitats), relate to instrumental values derived as ecosystem services beneficial to human 
well-being, or non-instrumental values such as cultural and non-anthropocentric values (Moreno-
Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015, pp. 554–5; see also Calvet et al., 2015, p. 7363; Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). 
They may focus on individual attributes and encourage ‘like for like’ exchanges, which aim for 
instance to preserve endangered species or other conservation priorities, but often use compound 
metrics combining multiple attributes.  
No common currency has emerged, and according to BBOP (2009a, p. 14), there are over 100 
biodiversity metrics in operation around the world today. These take a multiplicity of different forms, 
as laid out in by ICF Consulting and IEEP (2014, pp. 6–35; but see also Clarke & Bradford, 2014; 
Quétier & Lavorel, 2011; BBOP, 2009b) and Table 2 below.  
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Table 2: Types of biodiversity metrics and currencies 
Metric type Description, features and advantages Disadvantages and 
criticisms 
Area-based • Simple area-based metrics originally used in US 
wetlands mitigation, and still in use in some places 
• Now largely discredited  
 
• Very simplistic, 
unreflective of ecological 
value 
Habitat-based • Early habitat-based metrics combine area with ecological 
values in calculation; more common today and used 
widely in Germany 
• Numerically score the ecological value of a site, 
according to significance of various features present, 
such as naturalness, species richness and diversity, rare 
species, etc. 
• May also incorporate a site’s potential to provide certain 
ecosystem services positively related to biodiversity 
• First generation habitat-
based metrics viewed as 
overly simplistic 
• Usually require further 
specification and 
differentiation when 
implemented on local 
level 
Habitat 
Hectares 
• Developed in Victoria, Australia; have become widely 
adopted 
• Considered more sophisticated in determining actual 
quality of a site’s biodiversity against certain 
benchmarks, using a different key variable and 
integrating condition assessments into calculation 
• Condition assessments may take into account factors like 
age, connectivity to other habitats, integrity of species 
communities present or ecological processes such as 
nutrients cycles, soil type and structure, hydrology and so 
on  
• More recent metrics have combined both habitat-based 
approaches, calculating value according to area, 
standard values and condition; now common in offsetting 
schemes in the US; English metric broadly based on this 
model 
• Habitat Hectares has 
been criticised for failing 
to account for dynamic 
processes, and presenting 
too static a snapshot of a 
site’s value;  identified as 
a particular problem when 
evaluating semi-natural 
habitats 
• Despite increased 
complexity of newer 
models, still regarded as 
too simplistic 
Species-based • Aim to either protect species of high conservation value 
(e.g. protected or endangered species), or use presence 
and viability of certain indicator species as basis for 
approximating biodiversity value  
• Indicator species might either be a signal of the health of 
an ecosystem or the species most sensitive to 
disturbance 
• In guise of habitat suitability assessments (originally 
developed by the US Fish and Wildlife Service), species-
based metrics have been employed in the US under 
ESA, and widely across Europe as part of mitigation 
requirements of the Habitats and Birds Directives 
• Generally viewed as encompassing the most refined and 
rigorous metrics; some now utilise genetic analysis 
techniques across landscapes 
• Highly particular and 
complex, needing to 
account for very specific 
ecological needs of target 
populations; process 
becomes even more 
complicated when several 
species are involved, 
requiring significant 
expertise and extremely 
good data 
Replacement 
cost 
• Developed in Germany, used largely to aggregate in-lieu 
payments for small scale offsets, where developers pay 
fee calculated according to the average cost of replacing 
the affected habitat multiplied by the area of impact 
• Payments go to public agency which uses them to 
directly fund offset measures of equivalent cost 
• Generally seen as only 
suitable for low value 
biodiversity 
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Ecosystem 
services 
• Aim to offset and deliver no net loss of ecosystem 
services, as set out by the CBD commitments, IFC 
standards and under development in the EU 
• Generally focus on localised impacts for people and 
communities (sometimes attempting to utilise local 
knowledge), other than where loss of carbon 
sequestration services is a concern; look to mitigate and 
compensate losses of cultural and amenity values, flood 
prevention and other regulatory services 
• Some suggestion of possibility of separating biodiversity 
and ecosystem service metrics, as well as 
disaggregating the latter into simpler, singular units for 
specific services 
• Yet to be widely operationalised in offsetting schemes 
because of these difficulties, though some have been 
partially incorporated into existing metrics in both 
Germany and US wetlands mitigation 
• Context-specific nature of 
ecosystem services make 
precise quantification and 
commensuration 
particularly problematic 
• High number of services, 
measured using different 
units, means great 
difficulties when 
attempting to meaningfully 
combine data 
Sources: ICF Consulting and IEEP (2014); Gardner et al. (2013); Briggs et al. (2009); Gibbons and 
Lindenmayer (2007); McCarthy et al. (2004); Parkes et al. (2003) 
 
1.2.1: Simplicity versus complexity? 
Biodiversity currencies necessarily capture different values, and those which are not accounted for 
are not compensated for (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015, p. 554), or at least not counted (for 
comparative impacts of different metrics on no net loss calculations, see Bull, Milner-Gulland, et al., 
2014). Simplistic metrics have a number of drawbacks. On the one hand, relative to many other 
tradeable environmental credit systems, such as sulphur dioxide or carbon emissions, biodiversity is 
exceptionally difficult to simplify and measure (Salzman & Ruhl, 2005, p. 9). As a result, ‘crude’ 
metrics (Brownlie et al., 2013, p. 27) are often criticised for using poor surrogates which fail to capture 
enough of biodiversity’s multi-dimensional values, leading to unmeasured biodiversity loss. As Walker 
et al put it: “Unavoidably, simple biodiversity currencies are inadequate; they facilitate nominal 
biodiversity accounting, but omit, obscure, or conceal biodiversity features and 
noninterchangeabilities” (2009, p. 151). Conversely, simple metrics can end up being overly 
restrictive, especially with rules specifying in-kind compensation, which can inhibit the supply of 
appropriate offsets (Habib et al., 2013; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007, p. 28). In this sense, simple 
metrics might be not fungible enough to enable market liquidity. The use of compound metrics is often 
put forward as a way of better reflecting the full complexity of biodiversity as well as facilitating more 
trading (see for example Gonçalves et al., 2015; IUCN, 2014; Brownlie et al., 2013; Quétier & Lavorel, 
2011; BBOP, 2009a). Compound metrics however do not necessarily help (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et 
al., 2013), as they can instead add further scope for inaccuracies, and arbitrary judgement calls in 
the face of knowledge and data gaps, while making offsets less transparent in the process (ICF 
Consulting & IEEP, 2014, pp. iii–iv).  
At the same time, adding further levels of complexity can equally lead to further restrictions on trades, 
if compensation is demanded that meets multidimensional criteria (Calvet et al., 2015, p. 7369). The 
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more ecological values incorporated into biodiversity currencies, the less fungible they become 
(Salzman & Ruhl, 2005) – a consequence of how biodiversity is rendered equivalent according to 
specific attributes which cannot be necessarily be superimposed upon each other (see e.g. Brownlie 
et al., 2013, p. 29). This is partly a practical concern. In different places, different values may or may 
not be compatible with each other. Compensating for one does not mean an equal gain in the other, 
since the units are not the same, will not map onto one another and may be mutually exclusive. The 
relationships between biodiversity, ecosystem functions and ecosystem services for instance are 
uneven, and there are significant gaps in understanding how they interact (Robertson et al., 2014; 
Palmer & Filoso, 2009). The dilemma of which currencies to use has led to some to suggest greater 
use of disaggregated metrics. However, unbundling (and the reverse process of credit ‘stacking’) and 
compensating for different aspects of biodiversity and ecosystem services is fraught with its own 
conceptual and practical difficulties, in terms of measuring and accounting for multiple values 
simultaneously (see Robertson et al., 2014). 
1.2.2: Ecological equivalence: type, location, temporal 
At the heart of the problems outlined above is the issue of ecological equivalence, from which 
biodiversity currencies are derived, and what can and cannot be rendered commensurable and 
substitutable (Calvet et al., 2015, p. 7363). The question of ecological equivalence remains a topic of 
significant debate within the offsetting literature, most commonly focusing on equivalence in three 
intersecting registers: type, location and temporality. Others add ecological or landscape context and 
ecological complexity as further concepts which need to be taken into account (Quétier & Lavorel, 
2011, p. 2994; see e.g. van Teeffelen et al., 2014; Salzman & Ruhl, 2005; Bruggeman et al., 2005). 
Each generates problems for the creation of standardised currencies and metrics (though see 
Gonçalves et al., 2015). The stipulation that loss and gain be equivalent ultimately means various 
restrictions on exchanges, and tiered systems of allowable trading need to be put in place, according 
to how ‘offsetable’ biodiversity values are judged to be in different contexts. 
Equivalence in type refers to the question of whether no net loss demands that offsets must be of the 
same kind (Walker et al., 2009; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000). Should an offset replace the same type of 
habitat, with the same functions, as is being lost at the impact site? It is widely agreed that in-kind 
offsets make it far easier to show equivalence between loss and gain than out-of-kind exchanges – 
though some argue that socially engineered habitats (i.e. a restoration offsets) cannot be considered 
equivalent to a naturally occurring habitats, even if both are of the same kind and are treated as such 
in practice (Moreno-Mateos et al., 2012; see also Mossman et al., 2012). Others note how 
replacement of in-kind habitat will not necessarily result in replacement of functional values, meaning 
functions themselves need to be measured and offset alongside diversity (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 
2013). Most metrics require in-kind or like-for-like exchanges (Quétier et al., 2014), though ‘kind’ may 
be defined according to different classification systems, from the level of species or habitat to those 
of ecological communities or ecosystem type. 
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Location is another significant challenge when trying to commensurate loss and gain. The further 
away an offset is the less similar it is likely to be, due to geographical variation (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, 
et al., 2013). A site’s geology, geomorphology, hydrology and climate, as well as its connectivity with 
surrounding areas, all heavily influence the geographical specificity of biodiversity values (Moreno-
Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2009). Limited knowledge and data regarding how these 
intersecting processes operate (together with ecological and landscape contexts and interactions) 
make predicting future equivalence of an offset in a different spatial context fraught with difficulty 
(Quétier & Lavorel, 2011; Walker et al., 2009; but also see Kujala et al., 2015; van Teeffelen et al., 
2014). Ecosystems serve dissimilar functions in different contexts, and as already mentioned, the 
value of ecosystem services tends to be highly dependent on location. Flood prevention services or 
amenity values of a forest are no use to a community if replanted 500 miles away. Spatial equivalence 
is one of the main reasons offset markets remain operational only at the subnational level, and 
international biodiversity offsets are rarely contemplated.  
Temporal equivalence can be understood in two ways. The first intersects with spatial equivalence in 
terms of the ecological and landscape context of offsets, with Moreno-Mateos et al. (2015) making 
the case that a site’s uniqueness is partly down to particular and contingent historical events. The 
legacy of fires, human disturbances, invasive species, co-evolutionary processes and so forth have 
profound short and long term effects on biodiversity. These are conditions which cannot realistically 
be replicated, and the dynamic change ecosystems will undergo in the future remains too 
unpredictable or unknowable to claim equivalence over time. The second and more common issue 
identified in the literature is the temporal lag between impact and the delivery of compensation 
(Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 2007). There is a question mark over whether conservation gain, realised 
in the future, can make up for loss of functions and services in the intervening period, especially when 
restoration or recreation offsets often take decades or even centuries to reach full maturity (Evans et 
al., 2015; Moreno-Mateos et al., 2012; Moilanen et al., 2009). At the same time, the further into the 
future offsets are projected, the less certain the outcome, in terms of whether restoration is successful 
in delivering equivalent gain at all. 
For some authors, biodiversity’s incommensurability is one of the greatest barriers to operationalising 
meaningful offsetting policies (e.g. Walker et al., 2009). While Ives and Bekessy (2015) point to the 
irreconcilable dissimilarities between scientific equivalence and value equivalence, Moreno-Mateos 
et al. (2015) make the case that biodiversity is, by definition, nearly always non-substitutable in any 
meaningful sense. Most authors are not so pessimistic and take a less absolute approach, while 
recognising the limits to ecological equivalence, and the need for certain restrictions and regimes of 
adaptive management (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). 
Nearly all offset currencies and metrics incorporate ratios and multipliers to counterbalance and 
hedge against problems of non-equivalence, while time discounting is also used sometimes to deal 
with time lags (Overton et al., 2012; Pouzols et al., 2012; Bekessy et al., 2010; Moilanen et al., 2009). 
For instance, metrics often require proportionately more conservation gain to be delivered the longer 
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the expected time lag between impact and offset maturity, the riskier the restoration project, or the 
further away an offset is located from impact. This aims to disincentivise less desirable offsets which 
are less likely to be equivalent, or at least raise the possibility of delivering enough equivalent gain. 
The scientific integrity of multipliers however is generally regarded as questionable and the ratios 
somewhat arbitrary (Moilanen et al., 2009; Regan et al., 2002a), in part due to lack of useful data to 
predict levels of risk (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011; but see Laitila et al., 2014; Pouzols et al., 2012). 
Studies have suggested existing ratios for restoration offsets are almost invariably inadequate, and 
given levels of uncertainty, long time lags and expected failure rates, most currencies would 
realistically range from 10:1 up to and beyond 100:1 (Curran et al., 2013; Pickett et al., 2013; Maron 
et al., 2012; Moreno-Mateos et al., 2012). Such ratios are viewed as largely impractical, given the 
costs involved and limited availability of land.  
Banking systems are often presented as the most promising solution, or even prerequisite, to tackling 
issues of time lags and uncertainty, by having offsets in place prior to impact (Bekessy et al., 2010). 
Banks however, which consolidate conservation gains in one site, by definition require large areas 
and tend to be located far from impact sites. This tends to undermine spatial equivalence and 
frequently, by extension, equivalence of type as well (Calvet et al., 2015, pp. 7265–6; Ruhl & 
Salzman, 2006). On top of this it is difficult to predict well in advance which types of offsets will be 
required in the future. There are also other practical concerns, particularly relating to raising enough 
capital to deliver offsets years or decades in advance of payment (Salzman & Ruhl, 2005), especially 
when future demand cannot be assumed. Banks are moreover not immune to the technical difficulties 
surrounding restoration offsets, and frequently fail to deliver on their initial objectives. 
The final set of measures widely used to alleviate concerns over non-equivalence is the use of 
exchange restrictions, and designating certain areas as strictly non-offsettable (Gordon et al., 2011). 
In terms of the problem of spatial equivalence, offset systems tend to deploy rule-of-thumb restrictions 
on the proximity of offsets to impacted areas (ten Kate et al., 2004; Salzman & Ruhl, 2000). As well 
as the use of multipliers, this includes absolute limits, where offsets cannot be located outside a 
predefined geographical area, or beyond a maximum distance from impact. In order to satisfy 
ecological equivalence of type, in-kind compensation is usually specified, though out-of-kind offsets 
are employed in various systems (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). However, as some note, offsets located 
in close proximity to developed areas engender their own set of problems and uncertainties (e.g. 
Latimer & Hill, 2007). Landscape-level conservation planning is seen a crucial tool here. Even though 
it is much harder to demonstrate equivalence, many in the literature argue out-of-kind trading should 
be acceptable in some circumstances, especially where impacts on low value sites can be ‘traded up’ 
– otherwise known as ‘like-for-like or better’ – for gains in high value habitats and species (Bull et al., 
2015; Pilgrim, Brownlie, Ekstrom, Gardner, von Hase, ten Kate, Savy, Theo Stephens, Temple, 
Treweek, & Ussher, 2013; Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Levrel et al., 2012; ten Kate et al., 2004). 
Though this approach somewhat elides the issue of strict equivalence, many authors suggest 
excluding various high value species and habitats from trade altogether. This involves the 
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identification of thresholds, over which some habitats and species are deemed irreplaceable to all 
intents and purposes, because they are too unique, valuable or rare, or near-impossible to re-
establish within acceptable timeframes or degrees of certainty (Vanderduys et al., 2016; Pilgrim, 
Brownlie, Ekstrom, Gardner, von Hase, ten Kate, Savy, Theo Stephens, Temple, Treweek, Ussher, 
et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2010). There is much debate over the boundaries of such exclusions, but 
even the more optimistic authors believe that if no net loss is a serious and non-negotiable proposal, 
then offsetting should only encapsulate the most common species and easy-to-replicate habitats 
(Curran et al., 2015; Quétier et al., 2015; Regnery et al., 2013). 
1.3: Accounting for no net loss: baselines, scale and longevity, additionality 
Beyond decisions over what to measure, and the scope of exchange restrictions, there are a variety 
of questions surrounding the accounting procedures and rules involved in defining and delivering no 
net loss (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). Most significantly, these relate to the specification of the 
baselines against which loss and gain are calculated; the spatial scale to which no net loss refers; 
the longevity of offsets; and how additional conservation actions are to be distinguished. None of 
these factors are trivial and can have profound implications for the meaning of no net loss and the 
likelihood of success in meeting those objectives, as discussed at length in the literature (Bull & 
Brownlie, 2015; Thébaud et al., 2015; Gordon et al., 2011). 
Defining biodiversity baselines at both the sites of impact and compensation is a crucial matter for 
offsets (Gordon et al., 2011; eftec et al., 2010). Though it is often assumed that baselines simply 
denote the state of a site at a particular moment in time, biodiversity is rarely static (Bull, Suttle, 
Gordon, et al., 2013). Prevailing trends and anthropogenic or non-anthropogenic impacts mean that 
counterfactual scenarios should be taken into account, in which the condition of biodiversity could be 
expected to improve or be degraded over time without the presumed action (Bull, Gordon, et al., 
2014). For instance, in circumstances where biodiversity is declining regardless of the specific 
development-related loss, an offset should not be expected to reverse that trend. Rather, the 
requirement should be that development does not make things worse, since no net loss only 
stipulates impact neutrality. Dynamic baselines also enable the use of ‘averted loss’ offsets, through 
which halting expected loss (e.g. protecting an area under development pressure, or controlling an 
invasive species on an existing site) can be categorised as a conservation gain (Moilanen & Laitila, 
2016). There are, however, several risks associated with using dynamic baselines. Predicting and 
confirming future trends and the supposed impacts of counterfactuals is far from straightforward. Lack 
of data and ecological uncertainty are exacerbated the further into the future offsets are projected 
(Bull & Brownlie, 2015). Inaccurate baselines can underestimate the loss caused by a development, 
or exaggerate the gains resulting from conservation actions (Gordon et al., 2015). Some authors insist 
that baselines and objectives should be adapted and updated regularly to correct for errors and 
change, while others argue compensation requirements should always be based on the worst case 
scenario (Bull, Gordon, et al., 2014; Bull, Suttle, Singh, et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is increasingly 
recognised that the use of dynamic baselines to calculate no net loss will frequently ‘lock in’ 
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trajectories of decline (Maron, Bull, et al., 2015; Gordon et al., 2015). Though possibly justifiable at 
the project level, the cumulative impacts could be very dangerous at the landscape scale. There is a 
related concern with averted loss offsets, which several authors observe necessarily involve overall 
loss, since loss is never replaced by new biodiversity (Moilanen & Laitila, 2016; Curran et al., 2015, 
2013). In these contexts there is an overriding concern that no net loss is something of a misleading 
term, especially when it is so rarely explicitly specified (Maron, Bull, et al., 2015), and risks being 
inappropriate and counterproductive for conservation efforts (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015; 
Gordon et al., 2015).  
The second accounting issue applies to the spatial scale at which no net loss is measured. The 
distinction between no net loss at project and landscape level is highlighted in the literature by several 
authors (e.g. Bull et al., 2015; van Teeffelen et al., 2014), and increasingly recognised as a major 
policy issue (BBOP, 2012a). Though many authors point to the importance of landscape level 
planning in designing offset schemes and programmes, no net loss at this scale is very rarely an 
objective of offsetting (Fitzsimons et al., 2014). Moreover, authors have noted that most policies do 
not specify their project level focus, with the consequence that offsets are commonly assumed to aim 
for no net loss at a landscape scale when they are not (Quétier et al., 2014; Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et 
al., 2013). Delivering at this higher scale through offsets is widely recognised far more ambitious, 
requiring different forms of measurement and further consideration of cumulative impacts (Curran et 
al., 2015); ‘leakage’ and the dilemmas of using restoration or avoided loss offsets (Moilanen & Laitila, 
2016; BBOP, 2012a); and other factors which make achieving no net loss far more difficult in practice 
(Bull, Gordon, et al., 2014). 
A third issue relates to the temporal scale of offsets. As already discussed, the time lag between 
impact and offset maturity introduces one problem. Duration of offsets presents another, which has 
become increasingly prominent in recent years, especially in light of conditions regarding longevity 
not being met (Gonçalves et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2014). Question marks surround how long offsets 
should last, and the ecological, economic and regulatory practicalities of maintaining sites in the long 
term, in the context of dynamic environments and changing political and economic circumstances 
(Norton & Warburton, 2015; Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). The general consensus says that 
offsets should last at least as long as the development impacts (Quétier et al., 2014; Pilgrim, Brownlie, 
Ekstrom, Gardner, von Hase, ten Kate, Savy, Theo Stephens, Temple, Treweek, Ussher, et al., 
2013), assuming onsite impacts are reversible (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; BBOP, 2012b). If 
impacts are considered irreversible, offsets should be secured and protected in perpetuity (Bos et al., 
2014; Gardner et al., 2013; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010; Godden et al., 2003). However, as Bull et 
al. (2013) explain, ‘in perpetuity’ rarely means forever, and around 30 years is a typical outcome of 
negotiations in practice. Since full maturity of restoration projects can often take over 100 years 
(Maron et al., 2012), this remains a significant point of contention for the coherence of no net loss 
beyond very quick and easy-to-replicate habitats. 
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The fourth problem identified is the condition of additionality, which says that conservation gain can 
only be counted if the activities would not have happened anyway (e.g. Brown et al., 2014; Maron et 
al., 2013; McKenney & Kiesecker, 2010). Demonstrating additionality necessitates plausible 
counterfactuals arrived at in a transparent way (Maron, Bull, et al., 2015). On one level, the problem 
is clearly philosophical. However, additionality is more concretely identified as dependent on factors 
such as the strength and effectiveness of other protective conservation measures at various scales, 
and context-specific vulnerabilities of particular habitats and species (Brown et al., 2014). More 
problematically, as will shortly be discussed, additionality is one of several issues germane to 
concerns around perverse outcomes of offsetting, in undermining wider conservation strategies 
(Gordon et al., 2015). Most recent debates have centred on whether offsets which contribute to 
protected areas can legitimately be considered additional, given that governments are already 
technically obliged to fund them as part of existing conservation commitments, even if they are failing 
to do so (Githiru et al., 2015; Pilgrim & Bennun, 2014). For Maron, Gordon, Mackey, Possingham and 
Watson (2015) for instance, offsets in protected areas must either be invalid, or an admission must 
be made that there is no intention to meet CBD targets. As with many other issues outlined in this 
section, there is no obvious resolution to the dilemma, beyond suggestions of more transparent 
presentation of the trade-offs involved in decision-making. 
1.4: Conservation gain: restoration offsets and avoided loss 
The final part of the literature focused on the more technical issues around offsetting regard the 
delivery of conservation gain, through averted risk (or avoided loss) offsets, or restoration offsets 
(including recreation and enhancement activities, see BBOP, 2012c). As should be clear from the 
preceding pages, there is significant and continuing debate over which approach is more appropriate, 
depending on the circumstances and priorities of an offset scheme or policy. Off-site compensation 
is most typically associated with restoration offsets, as the most intuitive form of conservation gain 
(Maron et al., 2012). This involves the recreation, restoration or enhancement of an area of land to a 
higher quality or condition of biodiversity, measured against a crediting baseline, using the techniques 
of restoration ecology. However, as previously indicated, restoration science remains a relatively 
undeveloped field and imprecise practice. As frequently referenced in the offsets literature, the 
scientific integrity of ecological restoration remains questionable (Evans et al., 2015). In practice, it 
requires the simplification of vastly complex systems and faith in a series of ‘myths’, including the 
validity of certain methodologies, the idea of ‘end points’ for restoration, and the ability to control, 
accelerate and replicate ecosystemic processes (Hilderbrand et al., 2005). The reality is that there is 
still uncertainty over whether physical and biological interventions into ecosystems work at all as 
intended (Moreno-Mateos, Meli, et al., 2015; Hobbs et al., 2011), and restoration remains highly 
variable, unpredictable and risky by definition. As Aronson, Clewell and Moreno-Mateos (2016) put 
it, the aim is not about creating a product, but rather helping processes re-establish themselves on a 
trajectory. As such, restoration ecology is partly about embracing uncertainty, rather than meeting set 
criteria. 
82 
 
Many of the problems identified in this part of the literature mirror others already touched upon, 
particularly around measurement, unpredictability and lack of data. Palmer and Filoso (2009) for 
instance stress how simplified valuation and measurement techniques may end up accelerating 
degradation and loss. Halme et al. (2013) raise the problem of maintaining connectivity in time and 
space, as well as the challenge of assessing functionality. Bullock et al. (2011) note the conflicts 
which can arise between competing objectives focusing on biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
Restoration is also a very slow process. Time lags can be very long (Maron et al., 2012), far longer 
than the duration offsets are expected to last, generating risk of bottleneck effects (Gardner et al., 
2013). Moreover, based on the limited data available, many have observed that the empirical picture 
for restoration over the long term is at best mixed (Maron et al., 2012; Suding, 2011). Many projects 
fail altogether, often for unknown reasons, after restoration activities and monitoring have ceased 
(Curran et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2012). Even those perceived to succeed rarely result in the full 
restoration of structure and function (Burgin, 2008), as highlighted in the case of wetlands restoration 
(Moreno-Mateos et al., 2012). 
While not necessarily insurmountable, the challenges relating to restoration ecology have major 
implications for offsets and the goal of no net loss. Failure to recognise its limitations leads to 
unrealistic offsetting proposals and frequent failure (Treweek & ten Kate, 2014), and there remains a 
substantial gap between the rhetoric and reality of no net loss (Maron et al., 2012). Consequently, 
some suggest no net loss through restoration offsets may be feasible only in very limited 
circumstances (Pilgrim, Brownlie, Ekstrom, Gardner, von Hase, ten Kate, Savy, Theo Stephens, 
Temple, Treweek, & Ussher, 2013; Pilgrim, Brownlie, Ekstrom, Gardner, von Hase, ten Kate, Savy, 
Theo Stephens, Temple, Treweek, Ussher, et al., 2013; Regnery et al., 2013). In light of this, it is not 
obvious that robust offsets will be any more flexible than command-and control-regulation (Gibbons 
et al., 2015). Some authors suggest there are promising avenues and opportunities for improving the 
predictability of the speed and success of different restoration practices (Suding, 2011), such as 
greater use of computer modelling (Bullock et al., 2011). This is seen as a key priority (Halme et al., 
2013), in the setting of performance standards for instance (Matthews & Endress, 2008). Many 
authors make the point that the existing use of multipliers is wholly inadequate from an ecological 
perspective (Curran et al., 2015; Maron et al., 2010; Moilanen et al., 2009). However, the deployment 
of very high offset ratios is widely accepted as equally unrealistic.  
Some see it as vital that a more diversified range of tools is utilised to sufficiently deal with the risks 
of loss, delays, uncertainties and failure rates associated with restoration offsets (Gardner et al., 
2013). Time discounting and conservation banks provide two options, as discussed earlier. Another 
is to allow the use of avoided loss offsets, where the definition of conservation gain turns on averting 
a plausible risk to existing biodiversity (Moilanen & Laitila, 2016). This risk, upon which a declining 
baseline rests, might include development pressure, the presence of invasive species which need to 
be managed, or financial uncertainty surrounding an existing management scheme. The offset could 
involve money to purchase the land and put in under protection, funding for continued management 
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and so on. Avoided loss offsets are widely used, though aggregated information is sparse (Maron, 
Bull, et al., 2015). While they lack the unpredictability of future success associated with restoration 
offsets, and can contribute to conservation objectives (Brownlie & Botha, 2009), they are not immune 
to problems of uncertainty. In particular, limited data feeds into the considerable epistemological 
difficulty of verifying counterfactuals and baseline trends (Maron, Bull, et al., 2015). As discussed at 
the beginning of this subsection, inaccurate baselines can lead to significant losses beyond existing 
rates of decline. More importantly perhaps, the use of averted risk offsets in general is viewed by 
many as stretching the definition of no net loss to the limits of its coherence (Maron, Gordon, et al., 
2015; Curran et al., 2015). In practical terms, they necessarily lock in trends of decline, as a 
consequence of assuming trends of decline to be already determined (Maron, Bull, et al., 2015), while 
at scales higher than the project level they may prove fatal for no net loss through direct and indirect 
leakage (Moilanen & Laitila, 2016) – one of several potential unintended consequences of offsetting. 
 
2: Governance and institutional debates 
2.1: Implementation and compliance: oversight and regulatory integrity 
Institutional and regulatory questions have also been central to debates around the effectiveness of 
offsets. Though voluntary offsets have become popular among certain corporate actors, most offset 
activities are the result of governmental policies and legislation (eftec et al., 2010). These include 
habitat and species legislation, specific no net loss and biodiversity offset programmes, planning and 
permitting regimes, and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (see Doswald et al., 2012; ten Kate 
et al., 2004). Public sector agencies at the very least set the basic rules governing offsets (eftec et 
al., 2010), but it is widely acknowledged that functioning systems require strong regulatory 
commitment on the part of local and national government (Santos et al., 2015). Since it is the 
imposition of mitigation measures and no net loss requirements which drives demand for offsets (Fox 
& Nino-Murcia, 2005), mandatory systems – in which developers are required to follow official offset 
procedures to obtain development rights – are overwhelmingly favoured in the literature over 
voluntarist approaches (IUCN, 2014). Effective regulation is also seen as essential in what is far from 
a competitive marketplace (Santos et al., 2015), with long-term outcomes dependent on ensuring 
compliance through the verification and ongoing monitoring and enforcement of offset conditions (ICF 
Consulting & IEEP, 2014; eftec et al., 2010; Fox & Nino-Murcia, 2005). Securing long-term 
compliance and outcomes meanwhile rests on a number of legal instruments, binding contractual 
agreements and permitting conditions. These include mechanisms to secure offset finance; stipulate 
long-term management and monitoring plans (which specify actions and performance standards); 
secure rights over and long-term use of land for conservation purposes (such as land purchase or 
lease as well as conservation covenants or easements) (ICF Consulting & IEEP, 2014; IUCN, 2014; 
Brown et al., 2014).  
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Establishing and overseeing an offset programme requires significant technical and legal expertise, 
as well as the capacity to gather and process information, and verify and enforce conditions when 
necessary (Brownlie et al., 2013). Though many of the components outlined above may be 
substantively dealt with and overseen by non-state actors, responsibility ultimately rests with the state 
and public agencies. There are many potential issues to be managed. As described earlier in the 
chapter, there are several moments within the process where the subjectivity of the tools and 
mechanisms, combined with conflicting objectives of different actors, tend to lead to disputes over 
the validity of particular offsets (Wotherspoon & Burgin, 2009). Developers are generally expected to 
resist the imposition of offsets, since they imply further costs (Walker et al., 2009; Salzman & Ruhl, 
2000). However, if planning and permitting procedures do require compensation, developers will aim 
for the most part aim for offsets which are cheap (both in terms of the price of credits and transaction 
costs), and granted as quickly as possible (and thus favour simple and predictable compliance 
procedures). In short, developers have incentives to minimise their compensation commitments as 
far as possible, in a manner which risks undermining the goal of no net loss.  
As Hill and Arnold (2012) note, it will usually be the job of consultant ecologists to ensure developers 
comply with regulatory requirements. These actors are in a unique position, arising from their 
possession of particular skills and knowledges. However, as Wotherspoon and Burgin (2009) make 
clear, their impartiality and independence is crucial yet should not be assumed. Their position is 
potentially open to abuse, and they sit at the centre of an array of conflicting interests, including the 
developers who pay for their services. Consultants play an increasingly important role in offsets, partly 
as a result of the relative decline of public funds available for conservation activities and regulation 
(Wotherspoon & Burgin, 2009). As a result, implementation by third party providers, who are not 
directly beholden to the developers control, is almost universally favoured in the literature (e.g. Bos 
et al., 2014), a feature which simultaneously aims to promote competition. However, offset providers 
are observed to have financial interests of their own, in obtaining verification of their restoration 
projects, so that they can sell credits, while they also have incentives to exaggerate the biodiversity 
value of those projects (Walker et al., 2009). Like developers, they benefit from simple currencies 
which allow for fast processing and high frequency trading. This tends to run contrary to the robust 
and restrictive exchanges much of the techincal literature sees as necessary to ensuring no net loss, 
because these add risk and require heavy investment in data gathering, monitoring and so on. In light 
of these broadly acknowledged risks, the independence and impartiality of those who verify and 
regulate offsets is seen as crucial to successful programmes (Fitzsimons et al., 2014; eftec et al., 
2010), as is comprehensive monitoring and enforcement of permit conditions. 
Among the regulatory challenges for offsetting, the combined issues of compliance, monitoring and 
enforcement are widely discussed in the literature, and remain ongoing difficulties for offsets, even in 
the most developed systems (Bull, Gordon, et al., 2014). Non-compliance with offset requirements is 
one of the most enduring problems for achieving no net loss, and appears to be the norm (Treweek 
& ten Kate, 2014; Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2009; Gibbons & Lindenmayer, 
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2007), based on existing studies of offsets and other compensation regimes (Brown, 2014; Burgin, 
2011; Norton, 2008; Matthews & Endress, 2008; Quigley & Harper, 2006). Compliance usually relates 
to actions required by offsets rather than outcomes (Treweek & ten Kate, 2014), and does not 
necessarily correlate with successful restoration (Matthews & Endress, 2008). However, offsets are 
still potentially sensitive to even very low levels on non-compliance (Bull, Gordon, et al., 2014), 
leading to net loss (Quigley & Harper, 2006). In terms of persitent areas of non-compliance, a variety 
have been identified and discussed. It is commonly observed that there is an unwillingness on the 
part of traders (i.e. developers and offset providers) to comply with conditions (Habib et al., 2013; 
Walker et al., 2009). The setting of appropriate performance standards is regarded as tricky, with 
conditions often defined too leniently by regulators, but are also sometimes too difficult to achieve 
(Matthews & Endress, 2008), while Bull et al. (2013) make the observation that subsequent and 
frequent revision of regulation creates uncertainty in compliance more generally. In the case of fish 
habitat offsets in Canada, Quigley and Harper (2006) show how impact is frequently higher than 
authorised by permits, while compensation delivered falls short (Habib et al., 2013; see also Bull, 
Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). Brown (2014) meanwhile notes how administrative conditions are more 
likely to be met than action-based requirements in New Zealand, and that public sector bodies are 
more likely to comply than those in the private sector.  
Inadequate monitoring of offsets is seen as another significant issue yet to be resolved. Without long-
term and comprehensive monitoring, it is impossible to know if no net loss has been achieved (Bull, 
Gordon, et al., 2014; Pickett et al., 2013), or whether failure and non-compliance is being under-
reported (Treweek & ten Kate, 2014; Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). Lack of monitoring makes it 
very difficult to evaluate success, deploy adaptive management techniques and build evidence-based 
conservation policy in the future (Bos et al., 2014). Again, evidence suggests that monitoring is 
uncommon (Villarroya et al., 2014; Burgin, 2011), and there is often ambiguity over who the burden 
of proof should fall on (Bull, Gordon, et al., 2014). When it does take place, outcomes are rarely 
measured for long enough (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, et al., 2013). Drayson and Thompson (2013) say 
there has been little improvement in monitoring techniques in the last 15 years, and that information 
is frequently too vague to make meaningful evaluations. In addition, enforcement of conditions by 
regulators is routinely lacking. Several authors note that both monitoring and enforcement are 
hindered by a significant limited capacity, expertise and experience among regulators in particular, 
but also private and third sector actors (Wotherspoon & Burgin, 2009; Norton, 2008). Treweek and 
ten Kate (2014) highlight the availability of trained staff, data and comprehensive guidelines as 
significant challenges for assessing, delivering and regulating offsets effectively.  
Failure to follow the mitigation hierarchy is another area highlighted by various authors (Clare et al., 
2011; Burgin, 2011), though as both Treweek and ten Kate (2014) observe, there is little evidence to 
suggest that formalised offsetting makes this worse. Despite ‘avoidance’ being universally recognised 
as the most important step in achieving no net loss, Clare et al. (2011) argue that the mitigation 
hierarchy is systematically ignored for several reasons, including: vagueness in policy guidance over 
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how avoidance and minimisation should be interpreted; developers deliberately finding loopholes and 
workarounds, or defining project purpose so narrowly that alternative sites are impossible; and a 
presumption that permits will always be granted, combined with a lack of credible enforcement of 
conditions (see also Hough & Robertson, 2009; Pittman & Waite, 2009). Application of the mitigation 
hierarchy is hindered further by a shortage of comprehensive data at the landscape scale, meaning 
regulators lack the information as to which areas should be avoided before applications are made.  
A number of strategies are promoted to ameliorate these problems. There is some consensus that it 
is regulators or accredited third parties who should be carrying out monitoring and verification of 
offsets to ensure public confidence, though these activities should be paid for by the developer (e.g. 
eftec et al., 2010). The formalisation and standardisation of clear rules is a recurrent theme in the 
policy literature (Brown, 2014; IUCN, 2014; eftec et al., 2010); so are calls for greater transparency 
(Santos et al., 2015; IUCN, 2014), such as making monitoring information publicly available (Bos et 
al., 2014). Cost effectiveness often seems to take precedence over the use of more comprehensive 
survey methods and data collection (Cook et al., 2010), with Habib et al. (2013) for example arguing 
that simplicity is the key to improving auditing processes. Fox and Nino-Murcia (2005) make the case 
that conservation banks make for more straightforward oversight by amalgamating offsets in single 
sites. In order to alleviate the strains on regulatory capacity, various authors suggest NGOs should 
be engaged more readily to support regulators, along with community and citizen-based monitoring 
schemes, which are deemed good for engendering transparency and legitimacy too (Santos et al., 
2015; IUCN, 2014; Clare et al., 2011). A larger role for intermediaries and brokers has also emerged 
in the literature in recent years, where they are presented as potentially independent actors capable 
of consolidating and reducing high transaction costs (Santos et al., 2015; Coggan, Buitelaar, S. M. 
Whitten, et al., 2013; Coggan, Buitelaar, S. Whitten, et al., 2013).  
Despite increasing consensus around the design of ideal-type offsets and standards in the policy 
literature (IUCN, 2014; see for example BBOP, 2012b), some authors remain sceptical that long-
running regulatory problems can be resolved (Maron et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2009). For instance, 
simplifying bureaucratic audit procedures can be said to elide rather than confront regulatory 
problems associated with ecological complexity and uncertainty. They aim to streamline compliance 
processes and increase trading, rather than improve environmental outcomes per se, even if they 
benefit buyers, sellers and regulators. Walker et al. (2009) argue that the consistently evidenced 
failures of offsets are politically and administratively systemic rather than contingent. For them, offsets 
reflect and reproduce existing inequalities in power between development and environmental 
protection interests. The case-by-case nature of offsets favours resource-rich developers. This is 
reinforced by information asymmetry, whereby those vested interests in favour of offsets tend to 
benefit from greater access to information than those opposing them, and can exploit the ambiguous 
(and often opaque) nature of survey data in negotiations.  
Moreover, Walker et al. (2009) claim, regulators are far from neutral. Instead, their interests tend to 
coincide with those of developers over environmental interests, and they are generally reluctant to 
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accept the financial and political costs of opposing more powerful actors (see also Pittman & Waite, 
2009). Clare et al.’s (2011) findings place such institutional issues at the heart of wetlands mitigation 
failure as a whole, with Clare and Krogman (2013) elsewhere arguing that ‘bureaucratic slippage’ and 
‘agency capture’ are among the most intractable challenges faced by offsets. Though most of the 
literature takes a less critical stance, there is frequent acknowledgements that political and economic 
pragmatism restrict the effective scope of offsets in practice (Gibbons et al., 2015; e.g. Curran et al., 
2013; Maron et al., 2012; Moilanen et al., 2009). For Walker et al. (2009), this suggests no net loss 
is used as something of a ‘symbolic policy’ constructed by policymakers, which acts as a discursive 
trick to legitimise the status quo and diffuse opposition through its promissory claims, while 
guaranteeing little in terms of environmental outcomes. 
2.2: Perverse outcomes and unintended consequences 
In recent years, more authors have begun questioning some of the policy’s broader implications, in 
light of its rising popularity, and growing evidence from the more established systems. These include 
both some of the perverse incentives and outcomes of certain design features as briefly mentioned 
before (e.g. Maron et al., 2016), as well as more far-reaching consequences for the nature of 
biodiversity conservation and the biodiversity policy landscape. As will become clear, the issues 
discussed suggest some movement beyond debates about offsetting’s technical feasibility and 
coherence, and are beginning to open up more normative questions about the social, political and 
ethical effects of offsetting and market-orientated environmental policy more generally. As previously 
touched upon, perverse incentives and outcomes are now increasingly recognised as presenting 
significant risks to the delivery of no net loss. Bull et al. (2015) for instance note how offsets which 
allow out-of-kind exchanges and focus on funding conservation activities for rare species or habitats, 
could unintentionally lead to heavy losses in those more common and less valuable, threatening their 
conservation status over time. There is too growing concern that offsets can entrench or even 
exacerbate trends of decline (Maron, Bull, et al., 2015; Gordon et al., 2015). This happens because 
baselines are set according to ‘business as usual’ scenarios, and no net loss in reference to declining 
trends actually ‘locks in’ those scenarios of decline into the future. Moreover, as offsetting becomes 
more prevalent, embedded baselines of decline are increasingly likely to influence and cement the 
background, business as usual trajectory. Decline may even be exacerbated if the baseline is 
incorrect, and as Maron et al. (2015) indicate, there is always a political dimension to establishing 
counterfactuals, and incentives for various actors to exaggerate or even manipulate them. 
Indirect leakage is another unanticipated consequence of offsetting gaining attention (Moilanen & 
Laitila, 2016). Direct leakage refers to the phenomenon whereby losses on a higher scale are not 
actually avoided via averted risk offsets, but simply displaced to another location (i.e. pressure on 
biodiversity is concentrated somewhere else in the region or locality), though this should be subject 
to offsets in turn. However, indirect leakage occurs when development pressures become 
geographically reconfigured and emerge more strongly outside the programme area, which is almost 
impossible to trace and account for through local or regional no net loss policies. Moilanen and Laitila 
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(2016) point out this is mediated and aggravated by market forces, through which development 
pressures in general intensify in places where environmental protection is weaker – a problem of 
large multinationals being able to exploit uneven regulatory geographies.  
I have already highlighted debates related to interactions between offsets and funding for protected 
areas, and the question of additionality (e.g. Githiru et al., 2015). Again, authors have begun warning 
of the perverse incentive for governments to use the private money levered through offsets as a 
substitute for public spending on conservation more generally, especially in times of constrained 
public finances (Pilgrim & Bennun, 2014). This could lead to a ‘crowding out’ effect, through which 
governments champion and facilitate wider use of offsets while gradually reducing their own 
commitments to conservation actions and protections (Maron, Gordon, et al., 2015) – commitments 
which tend to be more certain and longer-term than private equivalents (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et 
al., 2015). Crowding out of voluntary conservation work is seen as another risk, whereby volunteer 
work either gets sucked into offset projects, or declines if people become unwilling to give their time 
for the benefit of developers (Gordon et al., 2015).  
The risk that offsets can weaken existing regulation if ‘done badly’ is widely recognised (e.g. Gardner 
et al., 2013), but there appear to be growing doubts over whether this is merely contingent. 
Generating a well-functioning (i.e. large and liquid) market may actually be in conflict with strong 
regulatory protections (Gordon et al., 2015). As Walker et al. (2009) assert, offsets give regulators 
discretion over whether strict protections can be circumvented, and the overwhelming focus on the 
final stage of the mitigation hierarchy in policy guidance can motivate them to readily skip avoidance 
and minimisation (see also Hough & Robertson, 2009). Offsets are said to blur the line over what is 
acceptable and what is not, while encouraging the perception that strong protections can be 
(legitimately) bypassed if you have enough money (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015; see also Ives 
& Bekessy, 2015). Especially in the context of regulatory retreat offsetting often accompanies, this 
feeds into concerns regarding regulatory capture, and the problematic nature of case-by-case 
negotiations between developers and regulators, as their capacity gets eroded (Moreno-Mateos, 
Maris, et al., 2015; Clare & Krogman, 2013).  
Beyond the issues covered above, more questions are being raised over the social and political 
implications of biodiversity offsets. The idea of no net loss as a symbolic policy (Walker et al., 2009) 
was discussed in previous subsection, and speaks to fears that offsetting has become something of 
a misleading concept, which risks generating complacency among the general public over the 
successes of conservation policy (e.g. Gordon et al., 2015). According to some of the most critical 
voices in the mainstream literature, the win-win narrative deployed in favour of offsets is highly 
spurious, but acts to substantially depoliticise the arena of biodiversity conservation, neutralising 
criticism. As argued by these critics, offsetting both symbolically elides the general incompatibility 
between perpetual development-fuelled growth and ecological sustainability (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, 
et al., 2015), while postponing longer-term social and legislative change into the future (Curran et al., 
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2015), through focus on short-term procedures which quickly become ends in themselves (Walker et 
al., 2009). 
While the academic literature tends to be more sanguine over the mechanism’s overall prospects, 
Moreno-Mateos et al. (2015) make the point that offsetting is usually defended as ‘better than 
nothing’. Either way, Curran et al. (2015) claim, a false choice is laid out between offsetting or 
business as usual. First, however, they note offsets are not necessarily better than nothing, since 
they have involved modifying existing policies, as part of a wider process generally seen as 
weakening protections (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015). At the same time, they emerged partly 
in response to calls for more effective regulation from environmentalists, which would have seen 
alternatives arise. Though a focus on strengthening regulatory muscle and enforcement could have 
been one approach (Walker et al., 2009), Moreno-Mateos et al. (2015) suggest looking towards more 
democratic models such as Multi-Criteria Evaluation (see Martinez-Alier et al., 1998), an alternative 
approach designed to deal with complex decision-making involving incommensurable trade-offs, 
through deliberative public participation, which combines top-down with bottom-up knowledge.  
Finally, several authors have recently begun questioning the ethical implications of offsetting on the 
wider conservation landscape. According to Ives and Bekessy (2015), offsetting represents 
something of an alteration in the ethical foundations of and motivation for conservation, in a manner 
which remains largely unexamined. For them, the transactional basis of protection shepherded in by 
offsetting, where biodiversity is treated as a commodity, is in danger of counterproductively eroding 
ethical barriers, based on moral objections, to the destruction of nature. As Ives and Bekessy (2015) 
see it, offsetting involves a move in the direction of a more utilitarian logic, which they argue is an 
ethical framework dominated by economic and technical arguments, to the neglect the multiple, but 
often unique and place-specific values that people tend to attach to biodiversity. Moreno-Mateos et 
al. (2015) are in agreement, and raise concerns that offsetting shifts nature protection away from 
special moral responsibility towards institutionalising it as an increasingly technocratic problem of 
accounting. This tends to omit important ethical questions over the value equivalence between natural 
and ‘artificial’ landscapes, or the social and political implications of strongly anthropocentric narratives 
grounded on the replaceability of biodiversity by technological means (Moreno-Mateos, Maris, et al., 
2015).  
 
3: Biodiversity offsetting as the neoliberalisation of nature: critical debates 
This final section brings the framework developed in the first two chapters to reflect on the material 
covered so far in Chapters 3 and 4. Here I introduce more critical work on biodiversity offsets, which 
largely positions itself in conversation with literature on the neoliberalisation of nature. In this section 
I make the preliminary argument can biodiversity offsetting can be characterised in terms of the 
neoliberalisation of nature, based on the historical, rhetorical and technical-institutional picture built 
thus far. I construct this case in four registers, roughly following themes of the Chapter 2. First, I 
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reflect on biodiversity offsetting as a case of the commodification of nature, and of marketisation. 
Second, I look at offsets as exemplifying shifts from government to governance in environmental 
policymaking, as well as aspects of neoliberal governmentality identified by certain authors. Third, I 
focus on particular critiques which challenge offsetting on grounds of environmental effectiveness, 
social inequity and injustice, and also highlight resistance to offsets. Fourth, I consider the implications 
of offsets in reconfiguring nature-society relations. 
Together these aspects give shape to biodiversity offsets as a specifically neoliberal set of 
environmental policy devices. However, they also highlight the great variation and indeterminacy of 
policies and practices which take place under the broad definition of biodiversity offsetting introduced 
at the beginning of Chapter 3. As a result, offsetting elides a formulaic, singular description or 
interpretation. Instead, I go on to offer several (overlapping) propositions or lines of enquiry, from the 
perspective of the neoliberalisation of nature. I open up questions regarding biodiversity offsets as: 
(i) an accumulation strategy; (ii) environmental market-making; and (iii) the economisation of nature. 
These will be carried forward to inform the research questions in Chapter 5. In taking the thesis 
forward, part of the purpose of this final section of Chapter 4 then is to orientate the thesis again, and 
ask exactly what type of environmental policy it was that the UK government had abandoned by 2015. 
3.1: Biodiversity offsetting as commodification and marketisation 
Theoretical overviews and reviews of neoliberal conservation have tended to depict biodiversity 
offsetting as a prime example of market-based conservation, where biodiversity is increasingly 
constructed and treated as a commodity (e.g. Arsel & Büscher, 2012; Büscher et al., 2012). Though 
this specification is rarely elaborated upon, studies focused directly on the subject have approached 
offsetting as a process of commodification in itself, through which biodiversity comes to bear capitalist 
value, from several angles. They have also described the difficulties frequently encountered, and 
constitutive moments of political struggle in the construction of commodities. At the same time, 
offsetting’s general status as a market-based instrument meanwhile has been increasingly 
challenged, through critical examination of actually existing institutional and legal arrangements of 
operational systems. 
3.1.1: Offsetting as commodification 
Many authors have pinpointed the construction and exchange of simplified, saleable units in their 
analysis of offsetting. Drawing on Harvey (1996) for instance, Robertson’s (2000) early work on 
wetlands mitigation banking in the US argues the establishment of ‘no net loss’ involved four 
constitutive moments amounting to a core (albeit incomplete) commodification process: functional 
abstraction, monetary valuation, spatial abstraction, and exchange. Similarly, Pawliczek and Sullivan 
(2011) describe three stages of marketisation using Kosoy and Corbera’s (2010) framework in their 
survey of US conservation banking: reduction of natural processes to standardised units of exchange, 
the assigning of single exchange values to those units, and the linking of buyers and sellers through 
a market or market-like exchanges.  
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Other writers have put more emphasis on the performative aspects involved in commodification 
(drawing on e.g. Callon, 2007; Callon & Muniesa, 2005). Looking at the English case, both Sullivan 
(2013a) and Carver (2015) highlight the role of the biodiversity metric as a ‘calculative device’ critical 
to symbolically remaking biodiversity into a commensurable and exchangeable object. Carver pays 
special attention to how this moment in the construction of value is necessarily preceded by particular 
discourses, assembled through institutional networks, which act to shift the ideational and normative 
framing of nature, such that it can be valued economically. This aspect of the critical literature will be 
returned to shortly (Boisvert, 2015; see also Benabou, 2014), but for now it is important to note how 
abstraction plays a vital role for these authors in the creation of simplified biodiversity units, necessary 
for offsetting, which can be measured in equivalent terms across type, space and time (see also 
Hannis & Sullivan, 2012; Robertson, 2004). Abstraction of this kind helps reconstruct biodiversity as 
a specifically capitalist nature, which can be broken up into quantifiable and exchangeable parts, but 
would not usually be considered sufficient for its commodification (see e.g. Castree, 2003).  
Dauguet (2015) makes precisely this claim however from a more conventional Marxist perspective, 
using French no net loss policy to demonstrate his point. Leaving aside the institutional structure of 
offsets, he argues, it is the core process of functional abstraction which constitutes commodification, 
since it is designed – through definition, qualification, and quantification – to produce 
‘commensuration space’ and exchangeability between sites. Functionality in the abstract, Dauguet 
shows, is the actual substance of biodiversity credits, conjured as “natural labour-power” (2015, p. 
536), where a variety of functionalities are made equivalent through standardised condition 
assessments. Impact assessments then grade functionalities in numerical form, expressing 
Functionality in a commensurable way, on a scale of impact intensity. The accounting method uses 
an equation to compute the previous assessment stages into singular units of loss and expected gain, 
whereby functionalities are made mathematically equal, even though the functions and habitats 
assessed are qualitatively different. This process, driven towards exchange accounting, which 
displaces scientific ecological language, Dauguet says, is common to all offsetting systems, and 
signifies an ontological shift where biodiversity value is always expressed as an exchange value, 
rather than something of physical or material quality. Robertson makes a similar case, but argues the 
commodification of ecosystem services – through the stages of classification, categorisation, 
unbundling and stacking of services – in the creation of wetland mitigation credits in the US represents 
something even more profound: the attempted definition of what he calls ‘abstract social nature’ 
(2012, p. 389). Robertson goes further than Dauguet, and describes the measuring and making of 
nature as commodity as a socially necessary abstraction, comparable to the transformation of human 
labourers into (abstract) social labour, whereby nature becomes a value-bearing participant in the 
labour process. According to Robertson, the goal is to recast nature as services, a pre-existing 
commodity where money does not merely represent value, but becomes ‘the real community’ (2012, 
p. 397).  
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None of these authors present the commodification processes they describe as straightforward or 
complete. As the review of the technical literature showed, deciding what to measure and finding 
standardised methods to do so has proved exceedingly difficult, due to the ecological variation, 
complexity and uncertainty of biodiversity, as well as it subjection to political contestation. From a 
political ecological perspective, relational and situated nature-as-biodiversity elides simplification, 
individuation and alienation. Biodiversity can only be exchanged in credit form, which ultimately only 
involves the conservation of an abstraction (Hannis & Sullivan, 2012; see also Apostolopoulou & 
Adams, 2015; Ghosh, 2015). While the environmental implications of these “anti-ecological” 
abstractions (Sullivan, 2013a, p. 95) will be returned to, this is not necessarily where the main barriers 
to (and crisis tendencies of) commodification are identified. For Dauguet (2015), the crucial 
contradiction in offsetting is internal to commodification, resting in the definition of ‘special qualities’ 
which make particular sites valuable. Impact sites must have certain ecological qualities which make 
them important or scarce enough to offset, but not too unique that they are considered irreplaceable. 
It is planners, he says, who must ultimately define these special qualities in such a way to overcome 
the contradiction. However, as we have seen, this is scientifically contested, and ultimately politically 
mediated since there is no recourse to any intrinsic or natural qualities of biodiversity. Rather, it is 
about defining socially recognised standards of measurement, or as Robertson and Wainwright put 
it: “there is no transcendental value, there is only a struggle over the terms of substance and measure, 
unique to each historical moment” (2013, p. 900). 
Robertson (2012, 2006a) has drawn attention more specifically to the moment of measurement and 
pivotal role of ecological science in determining the stability of these necessary abstractions. He  
argues that ecological science is increasingly called upon to act as a ‘metrical technology’ in wetlands 
banking markets, capable of rendering stable representations of commodity value in the ‘articulation’ 
between science, capital and the state (Robertson, 2006a). The degree to which ecological science 
and its tools are capable of doing this uncontroversially however is limited, yet the pressure of 
translating ecological information into a form ‘legible’ to capital tends to outweigh accuracy and 
scientific integrity. This problem cannot be resolved by more data or better science, Robertson says, 
since adding more layers of complexity tends to heighten the scope for controversies and difficulties 
in articulation, as the ecological coherence of individuated services becomes harder to sustain. If 
unchecked, this could reach crisis point where scientists even withdraw their consent as to the 
adequacy of these social abstractions as bearers of value (Robertson, 2012), leading to the possible 
breakdown of the capitalisation process. Such a tendency, moreover is likely to be fomented by 
ecosystem service entrepreneurs pushing for the expansion and differentiation of service definitions 
to grow the value of their assets. As Robertson concludes: “it is in attempting to capture the 
proliferation of ecological distinctions that capital is potentially destabilized” (2006a, p. 384), though 
ecological scientists and the state could always pull back from the brink. Consequently, it is the 
moment of measurement which is located as potentially the most critical site of ontological instability, 
political struggle and mediation – an issue which will be revisited in a subsequent section.  
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3.1.2: Offsetting as marketisation? 
While many have focused on the moments of measurement and quantification, there has also been 
significant work looking too at exchange and trading, or the marketisation of biodiversity through 
offsetting. These studies have been inclined to challenge the market status commonly attributed to 
offsets, while critically examining the nature of market-based instruments (MBIs) used in conservation 
policy more broadly (Vatn, 2015; Boisvert et al., 2013; Pirard, 2012). Chapter 3, Section 3 drew 
attention to the ways in which certain market-based tropes around efficiency, incentives, flexibility 
and so on have been mobilised in rhetorical support of offsetting, which will be reviewed shortly. Here 
however I dwell briefly on studies of the institutional and governance arrangements of actually existing 
offset schemes and programmes. 
There is some consensus across this part of the literature that offsets do not constitute ‘markets’ for 
biodiversity in any conventional sense. As some authors have observed, it is not biodiversity which is 
traded at all, but rather paper representations of abstractions, or certificates, which promise the 
fulflilment of certain obligations, but only have value if validated by the requisite environmental 
authorities (Kill, 2014; see also Ghosh, 2015). While market exchanges are usually expected to 
involve the transfer of private property rights, this is not the case with offsets where the actual 
commodity is not well defined. This is attested by Boisvert (2015) in her examination of conservation 
banking, where she shows for instance that no net loss is not actually stipulated by the ESA, and 
offsets would more accurately identified as tradeable development rights (see also Vaissière & Levrel, 
2015, in relation to wetlands banking).  
Offsets also rarely involve free voluntary exchange, a feature usually attributed to markets (Boisvert, 
2015). Supply and demand for credits is entirely created and controlled by state directive (Robertson, 
2007), and like other MBIs modelled on cap and trade systems, offsets are paradoxically dependent 
on command-and-control mechanisms while purportedly trying to escape their rigidity (Vatn, 2015). 
Hahn et al. (2015) suggest it is the regulatory and safeguarding aspects of offsets which are their 
most prominent features. As Hackett (2015b) makes clear in the case of forest offsets in Alberta, 
Canada, the state has if anything moved to limit the extent of free market trading to avoid uncertain 
outcomes. Especially with conservation banking, exchanges tend to be negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis. The market is very small and concentrated, due in part to the constraints which result from 
spatial incommensurability. Each transaction is unique, and though trading platforms such as 
SpeciesBanking.com have made some progress as information clearing houses, there is little market 
transparency, nor opportunities for price discovery (Boisvert, 2015; Pawliczek & Sullivan, 2011). 
If biodiversity offsets cannot be thought of strictly as markets, they are nevertheless usually described 
as MBIs, displaying some common market-like traits. What this means however is subject to some 
debate. Hahn et al. (2015) argue that what underpins economic instruments (which they counterpose 
to MBIs) is an instrumental, or utilitarian logic. Similarly, Pawliczek and Sullivan (2011) highlight the 
incentive structure or profit-driven motives of offsets. Historically, offsetting was developed to 
introduce flexibility into environmental compliance (Boisvert et al., 2013). Though the mobilisation of 
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price signals is often identified as the defining feature of these kinds of market devices, Boisvert 
(2015) says there is little which binds the various mechanisms together, other than being defined in 
general opposition to command-and-control regulation, however tenuous that might be in practice. 
What is clear from the varying accounts in the literature is the difficulty in satisfactorily classifying and 
defining biodiversity offsets as environmental markets or MBIs. They are increasingly characterised 
as hybrid arrangements, situated somewhere between market systems and command-and-control 
regulation (Froger et al., 2015; Vaissière & Levrel, 2015) – as a result of institutional renovation rather 
than overhaul (Hrabanski, 2015). If anything, offsets are marked most prominently by their institutional 
heterogeneity in different contexts, rather than market-orientated homogenisation or convergence 
(Froger et al., 2015; Hrabanski, 2015; Lapeyre et al., 2015). Consequently, this makes evaluation of 
biodiversity offsets as environmental markets somewhat tricky. On the one hand, it clearly unsettles 
the market foundations and assumptions upon which claims for offsetting’s efficiency are based 
(Hahn et al., 2015), as well as pointing to the importance of uneven regulatory roll out, and the need 
to pay attention to historical, geographical and institutional particularities. On the other, it creates 
difficulties in the making of evidence-based conclusions about offsets, their efficacy and socio-
ecological ramifications, based on their identification as market devices (e.g. Pirard & Lapeyre, 2014).  
3.2: Offsetting as neoliberal environmental governance 
The issues outlined above resonate with much of the literature on the neoliberalisation of nature. 
They reject a simple story of state retreat and market takeover. Whether considered a market 
mechanism or not, offsetting involves considerable intervention and reregulation. The state has 
always been essential in terms of commodity definition and validation, the imposition of regulatory 
directives requiring no net loss and so on. The state has also taken up a central enabling role in the 
recomposition of governance arrangements and articulation of regulatory markets, a process which 
authors have observed as taking place together with shifts from government to governance, and 
reconfigurations and rescaling of state-civil society and ecological relations (e.g. Apostolopoulou, 
2016; Sullivan, 2013a; Robertson, 2006a, 2004). The nature and implications of this shift has 
garnered significant attention in the critical literature too. Authors have pinpointed the expanded role 
of business interests, connected with an increasingly economic and technical rationality, identified at 
multiple scales, taking place through the rise of offsetting. This in turn is seen as significant in 
reconfiguring both material relations of power, and the discursive framing of biodiversity conservation 
and its relationship with development.  
Many authors have identified a distinct constituency, exemplified in the membership of BBOP, which 
has developed around offsetting, involving oil, gas and mining companies, NGOs, financial 
institutions, international organisations and various government departments and consultancies 
(Mann & Simons, 2015; Benabou, 2014; Sullivan, 2013a). As explained in Chapter 3, this community 
has been influential in shaping standards and regulations around offsets, and has a particular political 
orientation, described by Mann (2015) as expert-driven, elitist and business-led. This constituency 
has been particularly important in the mutation of transnational governance, through the development 
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of standards, and consolidating power as experts at the interface between national experience and 
global governance through forums such as the CBD (Penca, 2015). At the national level, authors 
have shone light on the crucial discursive role played by this transnational policy community, in 
enabling and legitimising offsetting, even if practices on the ground are quite divergent from the 
rhetorical frames they call upon (see Brock, 2015; Seagle, 2012; and also Carver, 2015; Mann & 
Simons, 2015).  
Questions about the rhetorical, discursive and performative work of biodiversity offsetting are also 
commonly raised in the critical literature (e.g. Benabou, 2014). Boisvert (2015) for instance contends 
that conservation banking is an example of the ‘economisation’ of nature, rather than its 
commodification or capitalisation per se, with the performative effects of increased market rhetoric 
and logic (incentives, price signals etc.), in shaping behaviours, institutions and so on, as the goal 
rather than starting point for these policies. The result is that existing regulatory regimes are not so 
much revolutionised, but have become associated with new expectations and representations 
(Boisvert et al., 2013). The other symbolic work emphasised by various writers has been the policy’s 
framing as a techno-managerial solution to conflicts between conservation and development, with 
Brock (2015) for instance problematising how offsetting gets constructed as anti-political as a result 
of this shift. Both Sullivan (2013a) and Carver (2015) stress the role played by the ‘calculative 
rationality’ of biodiversity metrics in the depoliticisation of planning processes, by rendering values in 
strictly technical terms, while others note how the dominance of technical expertise in practice – often 
combined with commercial confidentiality – is used to the exclusion of public deliberation in decision-
making, shutting out local communities and dissenting voices (Spash, 2015; Apostolopoulou & 
Adams, 2015). For all of these authors, offsetting is far from neutral, but its technical framing obscures 
deeply contentious realities, and the politically loaded nature of its conceptual and practical tools 
(Neimark & Wilson, 2015; for discussions on the political nature of scientific knowledge production 
and data in relation to offsets, see Lave, 2012). According to Mann (2015), the problems and 
dilemmas of design and implementation of offsets (as outlined in Sections 1 and 2) are political as 
much as they are technical, and reflect conflicts over values, worldviews, cultural needs and so on 
(Sullivan & Hannis, 2015; see also Mann et al., 2014). In the context of offsets in parts of the global 
south, Brock (2015) and Seagle (2012) also underline the disciplinary aspect of such approaches, 
where these narratives paint poor and subsistence-based communities as backward and anti-
progress, and as the real culprits behind continuing ecological degradation, in contradistinction to the 
modern rational state and business-as-saviour (see also Tregidga, 2013, for a take on the role of 
accounting in biodiversity offsetting as a form of governmentality).  
Another important critique of the discursive shifts connected to the rise of offsetting concerns the 
repositioning of development activity as necessary driver of conservation. As Sullivan (2013a; Hannis 
& Sullivan, 2012; Pawliczek & Sullivan, 2011) in particular has argued, conservation-as-offsets is 
entirely development-led, where demand and investment are dependent on environmental harm. In 
critiquing what they call the “circular logic of ‘unavoidability’”, and the reinterpretation of conservation 
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as development-led, Hannis and Sullivan warn that offsetting may “serve to obscure the key issues 
of who decides what development, and what environmental damage, is unavoidable where, and why” 
(2012, p. 8). By tying conservation to land development and impact, environmental damage is always 
implicitly accepted, and debates around offsetting are moved on to questions of how to optimise 
biodiversity conservation and achieve the least bad outcome of inevitable harm, eliding the particular 
political choices made along the way (Spash, 2015; Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015).  
How these broadly-defined rhetorical and governance shifts have played out on the ground is 
generally observed to be rather complicated and context-specific, mediated by geographical 
particularities and constellations of power. Vatn (2015) highlights the implications of power being 
ceded to intermediaries in certain systems, whose income rests on transaction costs and frequent 
exchanges, while Mann and Simons (2015) note the disruptive influence profit-maximising banking 
interests have had on the environmental functioning of conservation banking. Pawliczek and Sullivan 
(2011) emphasise the significance of the movement of institutional domains from the public sphere 
to privatised exchange platforms in that same marketplace. However, experiences differ 
considerably. Taking another approach which combines perspectives from the regulation school and 
institutional political economy with post-structuralist political ecology, Robertson (2004) frames the 
development of wetlands banking as an attempt by the state to regulate ecological relations, but in a 
way which would also stabilise relations of power and accumulation. Robertson highlights how the 
contradiction between the differentiation and homogenisation of wetlands commodities has played 
out in the contingent and stubbornly uneven geographical development of market governance in the 
US, as different institutional arrangements have cohered in different places and subsequent 
standardisation has proved difficult. 
Hackett (2015b, 2016) observes different forces at play again in Alberta, Canada. Here, the state has 
not created or facilitated a formalised market, but retains significant control over voluntary offsets 
involving industry and NGOs. According to Hackett (2015b), the state’s intention in Alberta appears 
to be to stabilise existing patterns of resource use, shoring up a somewhat undiversified local political 
economy and powerful interests, including the state itself. It does this by restricting the potentially 
destabilising effects of market forces rather than ceding power to the private sector. While offsets are 
mobilised by oil sands companies and other extractive interests to help maintain their license to 
operate, the state is able meet certain objectives to extend public access to forests, by shaping the 
parameters of these exchanges. This, Hackett (2016) says amounts to a deliberate reordering of the 
landscape, through which an expanded public realm created through offsets lubricates private wealth 
generation and accumulation through extraction elsewhere. There appear to be some similarities in 
the case of biodiversity banking in Borneo, Malaysia, where Brock (2015) recounts how the state has 
used the policy in a particularly instrumental way to regain control over its forests and conservation 
policy, and where offsets became viewed as a way to ‘get things done’ by a particular coalition of 
interests. While the offsetting has little to do with marketisation or environmental objectives here, it 
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could be mobilised in a manner which did not threaten dominant interests, and at the same time 
facilitated the continued expansion of palm oil production on the island.  
The specificities of these cases give credence to Mann and Simons’ (2015) claim that offsetting tends 
to be difficult to operationalise across different cultural and socio-ecological settings. For Mann and 
Absher (2014), it is important to dwell on the instability of many of the coalitions and institutional 
arrangements around offsets, and how the coherence of the overarching ‘market logic’ is frequently 
disrupted by ever-changing circumstances and unanticipated events. As they explain, these 
disturbances often lead to policy adjustments which play out as politically-mediated conflicts rather 
than functional recalibrations. Returning to Hackett’s (2015a) work however, these contingencies 
allow for ambiguity of outcome, as exemplified by the way First Nation communities in Alberta have 
been able to appropriate offsets to some extent for progressive ends, in securing greater control over 
traditional territories and alternative forms of social and cultural sustainability.  
3.3: Environmental and social consequences of (and resistance to) offsetting 
Much of the critical literature discusses the difficulties and risks raised in the mainstream technical 
and policy literature, and the lack of evidence of offsets’ effectiveness on the ground. There is 
widespread scepticism about whether these technical and institutional barriers are surmountable, and 
authors emphasise the irreversible damage legitimised in exchange for uncertain and unlikely gains. 
In short, there is doubt that offsetting presents a viable option for curbing biodiversity loss, or for 
reconciling growth and conservation in the manner proposed by advocates. The effects of offsetting 
are instead expected to be largely negative, both environmentally and socially, while concealing and 
depoliticising more antagonistic nature-society relations beneath. As Chapter 3, Section 3 showed, 
the notion of market efficiencies plays a crucial role in offsets’ purported ability to create win-wins and 
resolve conflicts between development and conservation. As Robertson (2007) among others has 
demonstrated, the assumptions underpinning this logic do not hold in these types of environmental 
markets, and as indicated in Section 3.1, the heterogeneous and hybrid institutional arrangements of 
actually existing offset policies and schemes make them hard to evaluate on such terms (e.g. Vatn, 
2015).  
The attraction of offsets nevertheless persists, with green economy advocates in the policymaking, 
business and NGO communities committed to using economic instruments and markets to make 
nature’s value visible. Sullivan (2013a) is one author who suggests a perverse logic at play in a model 
whereby conservation value is only made visible by the threat of biodiversity’s destruction, via 
development permits being issued. Among critics of environmental economics, Spash (2015) has 
most comprehensively attempted to detail the theoretical flaws in the economic model on which 
biodiversity offsetting rests. As he explains, offsetting is based on a neoclassical market model which 
looks to assign economic value to biodiversity on a piece of land (its conservation value mediated by 
the cost of its replacement in this case), such that its marginal benefits are made explicitly visible in 
a cost-benefit analysis, against the opportunity cost of leaving the land undeveloped. The purpose is 
to incentivise land development in areas of least marginal benefits, resulting in an efficient allocation 
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of resources and maximum societal benefit. Increased efficiency and higher profits from development 
can then be used to support conservation in areas with lower opportunity costs through offsets. 
First, Spash claims that this model is consistent with what he calls ‘optimal species extinction’, since 
it provides a method which remakes biodiversity as perfectly substitutable with other types of capital. 
This creates a situation where ‘bulldozing biodiversity’ can be viewed as the economically efficient 
and rational thing to do, in places where there is a supposed ‘over-allocation’ of habitats and species 
(resonating, in a sense, with the problems of the Lauderdale Paradox discussed in Chapter 1). 
Second, Spash argues that the model is problematically static, failing to account for how economic 
growth pressures will necessarily increase the opportunity costs of leaving land undeveloped, and 
that this is unlikely to be corrected because of well-recognised flaws in the valuation methods of 
environmental economics, and related metrical techniques of biodiversity offsets, as determinants of 
welfare maximisation. Though advocates respond that a regulatory approach can be separated from 
the model of optimal supply on which it is based, Spash suggests the effects of this particular 
economic logic are more insidious than is realised, in undermining direct regulation, legal restrictions, 
planning, public participation and so forth, and in empowering development interests more generally. 
Third, he maintains the win-win logic is based on a basic accounting error, since the growth 
opportunities created for business in nature conservation are in fact production costs, rather than final 
products. As a result, maximising welfare could only result from economic activity which created 
something of substantial extra value, over and above the costs of environmental repair. For Spash, 
these fundamental flaws should raise difficult questions for conservationists who continue to support 
a policy mechanism which appears to be neutral at best, on a theoretical level, but rarely achieves its 
environmental objectives in practice given its technical limitations and governance problems. 
For other authors, offsetting’s environmental failures can be theoretically explained according to 
irreconcilable tensions between its economic rationale and the realities of ecology. I have already 
noted the epistemological tensions involved in translating ecological data into the ‘nature that capital 
can see’ (see Robertson, 2006a). A central element of this critique stresses the questionable scientific 
integrity of the metrical technologies employed in the service of capital, designed to calculate 
ecological value as quickly and uncontroversially as possible (see also Lave, 2014). For Sullivan 
(2013a), one of offsetting’s more irresolvable problems is the ‘anti-ecological’ premise underpinning 
biodiversity metric, or as Apostolopoulou and Adams (2015) put it, the dominance of financial over 
ecological logic. In attempting to represent biodiversity in the form of exchange values, they argue 
that biodiversity is reconstructed as discrete and divisible units, interchangeable in time and space 
(see also Brock, 2015; Carver, 2015; Robertson, 2012). From such an angle, this deeply 
deterritorialising logic removes biodiversity from its specific and complex ecological, cultural, social 
and historical contexts, severing its relations and values associated with particular places, which will 
always be incommensurable and their loss irreplaceable. Returning again to the groundwork 
prepared in Chapter 1, it is possible to read Polanyian-inflected critiques in opposition to offsets, 
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suggestive of how nature’s value is always produced outside relations of exchange, and cannot be 
captured adequately in that framework.  
Some have also highlighted offsetting’s contribution to deepening the nature-culture divide, both 
conceptually and spatially (Spash, 2015; Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015; Hannis & Sullivan, 2012). 
That is, human and nonhuman life are not conceived of capable of coexistence. Rather, ‘nature’ is 
seen as needing to be moved away from human activity if it is to be protected, but also something to 
be controlled and rationally administered by experts. While abstraction and the construction of 
exchangeability might be seen as acts of largely symbolic violence on the ontological status of nature, 
they nevertheless have very real material effects, with the manifest and unsolvable tensions between 
commodity and ecology visibly playing out in the instability of institutions, and failures to achieve no 
net loss on the ground (Carver, 2015; Robertson, 2012; Vatn et al., 2011).  
Though the long-term material outcomes are to some extent unknown, there are clear indications that 
they will be socially and geographically uneven, and likely to be regressive. These raise significant 
questions regarding the social equity and the socio-spatial consequences of offsets (Apostolopoulou, 
2016; Apostolopoulou & Adams, 2015; Benabou, 2014; Robertson & Hayden, 2008). Authors have 
highlighted the heightened concentration of wealth in monopolistic and privatised conservation banks 
(Pawliczek & Sullivan, 2011), and common concerns that offsetting works in favour of a further 
consolidation of corporate power (Spash, 2015). There is also criticism of how the broader trend of 
privatisation of conservation is likely to restrict access to land on which local communities depend, 
and increasingly connections are being made between offsets and accumulation by dispossession 
through ‘green grabbing’ (Kill & Franchi, 2016; Brock, 2015; Ghosh, 2015; Sullivan, 2013a; Seagle, 
2012). 
In reconsidering themes from Chapter 2, the issue of resistance to offsetting is interestingly 
underexplored in the literature, though Hackett’s (2015a) account of First Nations’ appropriation and 
redirection of offsets for their own purposes tangentially speaks to this (see also Brock, 2015). On the 
other hand, there is something of an implicit connection to be made between biodiversity’s 
unpredictability as frequently talked about in the critical literature, based on the insights of nonlinear 
and non-equilibrium ecology, and the notion of the nonhuman world resisting neoliberalisation, 
requiring reregulation and constant interventions. Clearly too, this is not merely a natural 
phenomenon, as these aspects of offsets intersect with the politicised scientific disputes discussed 
in Section 3.1.1, over biodiversity value’s social determination. Moreover, it is struggles over the 
value(s) of biodiversity in the design of offsets, which have been more readily identified by critical 
scholars in terms of resistance and conflict, and as sites where multiple and irreconcilable worldviews 
collide (Sullivan & Hannis, 2015; see also Mann et al., 2014). 
3.4: Biodiversity offsetting as the neoliberalisation of nature? 
In taking the work done over the first four chapters forward, I now introduce three possible conceptual 
frames with which to analyse and understand the abandoned national offsetting programme in 
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England. Each approaches the overarching topic from a different angle or vantage point, as a series 
of question marks. They are pitched as overlapping rather than mutually exclusive analytical 
viewpoints, but may offer both complementary and competing interpretations. They animate different 
agendas and ideas, illuminate the roles of different actors, and are able to calibrate their analytical 
focus at different levels and scales, emphasising either the more concrete or the more abstract. 
Though the frames below are only outlined briefly, they will be explored and expanded upon as the 
thesis goes on. 
3.4.1 Offsetting as accumulation strategy? 
This frame looks at offsetting as a project of capital accumulation, along two lines of enquiry. First, it 
queries the extent to which offsets can be understood as avenues for direct accumulation. From this 
perspective, biodiversity offsetting can be explained as a state and capital led commodification 
project, aimed at enabling land-based wealth accumulation through the capitalisation and 
privatisation of nature, and extraction of rent. This sees biodiversity offsetting as a prime example of 
a stretching and deepening of commodification taking place in the green economy (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2 and Chapter 2, Section 2.1; and also comments on ‘green grabbing’ in Section 3.3 of this 
chapter). Alternatively, it raises the possibility of offsetting as an indirect accumulation strategy, of a 
different order, whereby offsets essentially act as proxy instruments aimed at facilitating accumulation 
elsewhere. This draws on the conclusions reached by Hackett (2016) in his case study of Alberta, 
Canada, where he describes the governance of voluntary offsets and reordering of the landscape as 
crucial to lubricating oil sands extraction. From this perspective, offsets are inscribed with the core 
purpose of removing environmental barriers to accumulation. In particular, it considers the logic of 
capital, the role of land development interests and the green business sector in driving offsets. 
3.4.2 Offsetting as environmental market-making? 
This second approach has clear connections with the first, but is less concerned with accumulation 
per se, and more with the process of market-making. Accepting the limitations of defining biodiversity 
offsets as environmental markets, market-making is used here in the rhetorical sense as advanced 
by offsetting’s advocates, and also refers to the hybrid institutional arrangements described 
throughout this chapter and the last. The purpose of this perspective is to refocus attention on the 
various tensions and dilemmas encountered through the twin processes of deregulation and 
reregulation (see Chapter 2, also Castree, 2008b), and the specific technical, biophysical and 
institutional difficulties associated with building and articulating these kinds of ‘market’ devices 
identified in this chapter. It gives particular consideration to the role of the state, and its efforts to enrol 
the actors required to cohere a governance regime and national offsetting programme.  
3.4.3: Offsetting as the economisation of nature? 
The final frame takes forward the notion of neoliberalism as the “disenchantment of politics by 
economics” (Davies, 2014, p. 4) from Chapter 2, Section 1, and dovetails with Boisvert’s (2015) 
description of conservation banking as the economisation of nature in Section 3.2 of this chapter, and 
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offsetting’s place within conceptual world of ecosystem services and natural capital. This last 
viewpoint characterises the widespread introduction of biodiversity offsetting as designed to 
depoliticise the growing imperative to curb biodiversity loss, much akin to Felli’s (2015) discussion of 
the development of environmental markets more generally (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). 
Economisation is used deliberately, and is less concerned with the market status or novelty of 
offsetting, but rather its reframing as a techno-managerial issue, where the goal of efficiency becomes 
central. Efficiency here is specifically framed according to market-based principles and evaluation 
techniques, mobilising the power of quantification and rational accounting, transparent audit, 
economic incentives, price signals and so on. 
The economisation approach is concerned with the implications of this reframing, and sees offsetting 
partly in terms of governmentality, as a tool of control with clear disciplinary functions, capable of 
reconfiguring relations of power around land development and nature conservation. This analytical 
framework helps pinpoint the presence (or absence) of specific narratives and practices of offsetting, 
the exclusion of certain interests, ideas and values. This is not to imply that offsetting is not resisted. 
Rather, it raises questions as to why it comes to be accepted, rejected or mobilised by different groups 
and interests, in particular contexts and circumstances, in ways which frequently deviate from the 
surficial objectives or initial intentions behind the policy, in ways that may ultimately be difficult to 
reconcile. 
These three frames are now taken forward into the research aims, objectives and questions in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
 
Before proceeding with the methodology in the next chapter, I reintroduce the research aim and 
objectives from the Introduction, and lay out the detailed research questions which inform the rest of 
the thesis. 
1: Research Aim 
The aim of the thesis is to critically examine the ultimately failed moves to develop and implement a 
national biodiversity offsetting programme, in the land use planning system in England, between 2010 
and 2015. The thesis looks to shed light on important political questions of contemporary nature 
conservation and biodiversity offsetting in particular, orientated by the broader theoretical lens of the 
neoliberalisation of nature. 
 
2: Research Objectives 
The research has five interrelated and overlapping objectives, in order to realise the overall aim of 
the research project: 
I. To explain the motivations and theoretical underpinnings of moves to introduce biodiversity 
offsetting into the England planning system, as a response to biodiversity loss and 
development pressure. 
II. To identify the various actors and interests involved in the policymaking process, and their 
specific roles in the policy’s design, implementation and contestation. 
III. To assess the key moments of consensus and conflict around the establishment of 
biodiversity offsetting in England, and uncover the tensions, dilemmas and deep 
contradictions which emerged during the policymaking process. 
IV. To analyse the reasons for the government’s eventual retreat, paying close attention to 
political economic and ecological factors as well as technical and institutional challenges 
faced, and to reflect on the wider implications of this failure for biodiversity conservation in 
England. 
V. To discuss the implications for the increasingly popular use of programmes and tools known 
as biodiversity offsets around the world, and similar attempts to reconcile economic and 
environmental goals through developing neoliberal environmental policies and market-based 
instruments for nature conservation. 
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3: Research Questions 
In order to meet these objectives, the thesis will answer the following questions with regard to the 
English biodiversity offsetting programme: 
1. What was the policymaking history of the construction of, and subsequent retreat from, 
developing a national biodiversity offsetting system in England? 
a) Who was involved in the construction of policy, its design and implementation? 
b) What was the sequence of events, and how did the policymaking process unfold, during 
the period 2010-2015? 
c) How were the plans to introduce biodiversity offsetting mobilised and contested for 
different purposes during this period? 
d) How did the policymaking process play out, and what were the outcomes? 
 
2. Why did biodiversity offsetting emerge in England in 2011, as a flagship government policy 
aimed at reconciling conflicts between nature conservation and land development? 
a) What were the historical and political conditions, at different geographical scales, which 
underpinned biodiversity offsetting’s appearance in England in 2011? 
b) What were the government objectives for a national biodiversity offsetting policy, and 
what was the theoretical case made upon which the policy was built? 
c) How were the various non-state actors enrolled, how did they frame the need for an 
offsetting policy, and what were their objectives and criteria for a successful system? 
d) Which technical-ecological and governance themes emerged during the policymaking 
process? 
e) What were the areas of agreement, and how did they form the basis for potential 
consensus, alliance-building and articulation of different interests? 
 
3. Empirically, why did the national policy never come to fruition? 
a) What sources of tension, disagreement and controversy arose during the policymaking 
process, and what problems did these create for operationalising offsetting? 
b) What were the underlying political economic and political ecological causes of these 
tensions, and what were the deep contradictions that proved irresolvable in this particular 
case? 
c) What are the implications for the future of biodiversity offsetting, nature conservation and 
environmental markets in England? 
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4. How can we theorise the English experience, and what are the implications for academic 
debates around the neoliberalisation of nature and conservation? 
a) What does the empirical study reveal about the difficulties around biodiversity offsetting 
and environmental market-making in general? 
b) How well does the existing literature explain the failure of the English programme? 
c) What other factors were at play which could either supplement or challenge conventional 
accounts of the neoliberalisation of nature and environmental market-making? 
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Chapter 6: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the overall strategy, and description and justifications of the methods used to 
meet the objectives. It explains, with reference to the conceptual framework and literature reviewed 
in the first four chapters, the philosophical reasoning behind the use of qualitative methods in the 
study, the research design and the particular forms of data collection employed. The chapter provides 
an overview of how the data was collected over the course of the study, in the form of key 
documentation, in-depth interviews and participant observation, as well as a summary of the sources. 
There follows a section on how the data was analysed in order to meet the objectives and answer the 
research questions. The chapter concludes with a reflection on some of the methodological difficulties 
encountered during the course of the project, and limitations to the overall thesis. 
 
1: Philosophical foundations of the research methods 
The methods used in this thesis reflect ontological and epistemological implications of the framework 
explained in Chapters 1 and 2, and calibrated further in light of the specific research topic, in Chapters 
3 and 4. To briefly recapitulate, Chapters 1 and 2 sought to develop an approach to the 
neoliberalisation of nature, based on an eco-Marxist inflected reading of critical political ecology. This 
focused on the historical production of capitalist natures, mobilised through modern Cartesian 
development of abstract time, abstract space and external nature, and their enduring contradictions. 
The bases for these tensions and contradictions are understood to originate in the violent abstractions 
of capitalist production and Cartesian thought, which act to impose specific symbolic and material 
orders upon all aspects of the complex, heterogeneous and interwoven social and natural (or socio-
natural) worlds. The larger conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2 argues that the 
neoliberalisation of nature works to unevenly intensify these processes as strategies of accumulation 
and control, and as a response to the historical and geographical playing out of contradiction and 
crisis explored in Chapter 1. This was posited to take place through the increasing privatisation and 
commodification of nature, and the subjection and regulation of human and nonhuman natures to 
economic and market-like logics and techniques, but which tend to meet some kind of resistance or 
redirection. The approach taken suggests that other, more just socio-environmental realities and 
assemblages are possible, and the socio-ecological conditions of possibility can be, and continually 
are, shifted, according to political design, though unpredicted and unintended consequences are 
inevitable. 
1.1: Ontological issues 
The framework developed in the early chapters suggests that a qualitative or mixed methods 
approach might be appropriate for several reasons. The political ecological critiques of the 
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capitalisation and neoliberalisation of nature, both conceptually and practically, are based partly on 
ontological grounds. It challenges the premise that ‘nature’ can be coherently simplified, separated 
out into divisible component parts, abstracted and valued in equivalent and purely quantitative, 
exchangeable terms. Drawing on insights from ecology and the natural sciences, there is a 
presumption that organisms cannot be meaningfully separated from their environments, which are 
mutually constitutive and entangled at different spatial and temporal scales. Added to this, the 
material properties and qualities of the nonhuman world are heterogeneous and not meaningfully 
commensurable, and the processes through which different components interact and interpenetrate 
are unpredictable and nonlinear, frequently creating friction with the ‘flat’ ontologies and artificial 
boundaries of capitalisation and neoliberalisation. Qualitative methods were therefore required in part 
to apprehend the role distinct biophysical qualities of particular nonhuman natures play, in particular 
contexts and through geographical variation in regimes of environmental regulation. 
As well as ecological context, the conceptual framework highlights the role of biogeographical, 
historical, social and cultural factors in the constitution of place-specific natures, which elide 
quantitative forms of analysis. Such methods are viewed be inadequate for unearthing and explaining 
the particular textures and peculiarities at play, and the manner in which nonhuman natures are 
socially and well as ecologically embedded. This expanded ontological premise is also germane for 
an investigation where value and values play such a pivotal role. In more radically non-
anthropocentric accounts, nature is sometimes understood to have its own inherent or intrinsic values, 
which are necessarily irreplaceable and cannot be expressed through exchange-value and monetary 
valuation. In the more materialist accounts, nature is often conceptualised as embodying 
incommensurable use-values, which are historical, socially mediated and culturally produced. Again, 
these kinds of values are not truly commensurable and cannot be fully captured quantitatively, yet 
this tends to be obscured and hidden by capitalist modes of measurement and organisation, and 
requires careful unveiling. The task of this thesis, and how these methodological premises are taken 
forward, was to uncover and explore how these tensions and peculiarities mediated and were dealt 
with through human decision-making processes and conflicts in a particular socio-ecological context. 
Revealing and exploring how these relationships, hidden values and contingent events played out 
could only be effectively carried out through a deep and qualitative approach. 
Building on these ideas of nature as socially embedded and mediated, the political ecological reading 
of nature-society relations is based on the premise that hard distinctions between the social and 
natural world are ontologically misleading, including the Cartesian notion of an abstract, external 
nature. The boundaries between the social and the natural are explicitly unclear within the 
approaches employed in this thesis. Socio-nature is an ontological concept which is relational and 
historicised, through which human and nonhuman worlds are intertwined through socio-ecological 
processes and internal dialectical relations, as explained in the first chapter. Social and environmental 
change are understood as co-determinate processes. While the natural nonhuman environment is 
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clearly transformed in important ways by human activity for instance, socio-spatial processes too are 
predicated on the metabolism and circulation of physical, chemical, or biological components.  
Of particular methodological importance here was a presumption that socio-environmental change 
and assemblages are never socially or ecologically neutral, but materially and discursively contested 
and contestable terrain. They unfold unevenly across time and space, and questions of ecological 
regulation are always fundamentally political, mediated through relations of class, race, gender and 
so on, hence the wording of project’s overall aim and its objectives. Identifying, tracing and unpacking 
the political nature and the power relations at the heart of the antagonisms and contingencies of 
capitalist and neoliberal natures in a particular time and place is delicate work. It requires the careful 
piecing together of a complicated and multidimensional story, possible only through a qualitative 
approach. To be clear, the focus on qualitative methods here is not a rejection of quantitative 
methods, but presents a foundational philosophical and ontological claim that they are insufficient for 
analysing the nature of complex and politically-mediated socio-natural entanglements, such as the 
subject matter of this thesis, in serious depth. This is why a mixed methods approach was necessary, 
though quantitative data was only used from secondary sources. 
1.2: Epistemological implications 
The ontological framework of the thesis had several important epistemological implications which 
needed to be taken into account. The materialist basis of Marxist political ecologies conceptualise 
objective reality as existing prior to social development. Matter and first nature preceded human 
history (Smith, 2010b), so while thought and knowledge are intimately related to this material reality, 
they are never identical. The material world cannot be reduced to human perception of it, but nor can 
nature be separated as an external object. Rather, the ontological premise that humanity lives in 
differentiated unity with the rest of nature means that knowledge cannot be produced from outside 
those relations. Since these relations are inherently political, when people produce and mobilise 
knowledge, they implicitly do so from political positions and standpoints. This must of course include 
the researcher’s positionality, and acknowledged in the explicitly normative dimension of the 
conceptual framework. 
Epistemologically, the premise that people cannot step outside their positionalities and knowledge is 
never politically neutral had important methodological implications for the thesis. Qualitative methods 
were essential for untangling the variously constituted political positions of people and groups 
involved in the policymaking process, and its implementation on the ground. As well be detailed 
shortly, this was achieved through careful triangulation, piecing together of contextual constraints, 
dominant and marginalised ideas and narratives, assumptions, frames and so on. Desk-based 
research and documentary analysis was crucial in assembling the complex historical and 
geographical context, at multiple scales, of the construction of policy. It also provided evidence of the 
broad theoretical assumptions made by different parties. However, uncovering the deeper political 
motivations and positions of various actors, and the struggles taking place on the contested terrain 
of policymaking and implementation, through lobbying, negotiation and the mobilisation of different 
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arguments and discourses, as well as the undocumented experiences of implementation, called for 
more in-depth methods, including qualitative interviews.  
This is not to imply that quantitative methods have no place in the understanding of nature and 
society. It does not deny the usefulness of the natural and physical sciences, nor posit scientific 
knowledge as nothing more than a social construction with no objective material substance. A special 
point should be made here about the natural sciences, since conservation biology and ecological 
science (and conservationists and ecologists) sit at such an important intersection of this topic. As 
should be clear, the conceptual framework draws on insights from the natural sciences in challenging 
the possibility of adequately expressing and valuing nature in wholly uncontroversial, quantifiable and 
commensurable terms. Political ecology retains a critical stance towards scientific knowledge 
however, stressing the problems with the predominant methodological treatment of nature as external 
object, and insisting on recognition of the social and political components of reality. With this in mind, 
qualitative methods were vital in revealing how environmental knowledge was positioned, mobilised 
and mediated, and how certain ecological issues were privileged over others. 
 
2: Research design and methods 
The main purpose of the thesis was to critically examine the construction and attempted rolling out of 
biodiversity offsetting in England, as a way of balancing conservation commitments with the pressures 
of land development. At the most basic level, the research was concerned with both the content and 
impact of policy. At a deeper level, it proffered to explore the theoretical underpinnings and 
justifications of biodiversity offsetting as a policy; and the interests and political motivations of the 
various social actors involved; and how their unequal levels of power and influence affected the 
policymaking process, in its creation, contestation and abandonment. Furthermore, the study was 
designed to interrogate the integrity of the theoretical approach on which the policy is based, and say 
something about the contingencies which shaped its geographical specificity.   
2.1: The research design and case study approach 
Reflecting on the theoretical framework developed in the first two chapters and its philosophical 
foundations, using a case study approach was particularly appropriate. It enabled the interrogation of 
context and particularity, crucial aspects of a conceptual approach which highlights the importance of 
geographical unevenness, variation and contingency. According to Yin (2003), using a case study 
approach is useful for empirical research in which ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions feature prominently, as 
with this thesis. Case studies can be described broadly as those, firstly, which examine a 
contemporary phenomenon where the boundaries of both phenomenon and context are unclear; and 
secondly, where the variables of the research are many and complex, require multiple sources of 
data for triangulation, and which benefit from prior theoretical development in order to inform and 
guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003, pp. 13–14). 
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The subject matter, biodiversity offsetting, was a contemporary phenomenon which was being tested, 
rolled out and modified in England during the period of study. It was also part of a wider national 
nature conservation strategy which was only in an initial phase of a much longer-term trajectory. As 
such, the research was not simply a history of biodiversity offsetting in England, though some of the 
same techniques were used, including documentary review and analysis. There was an ongoing 
national policymaking process between 2010 and 2015, as well as six two-year pilots, ending in early 
2014, and a number of independent supplementary projects happening at the local level. Its 
contemporary and ongoing nature allowed for a wider variety of data collection, in the form of direct 
observation and interviews with people involved in the events, crucial for case study research (Yin, 
2003, pp. 5-9). The importance of these types of data collection in this study will be expanded upon 
shortly.  
The case itself was made up of a number of components. These included, but were not limited to, the 
formal policymaking process in government; its political, legal and institutional context at multiple 
scales; wider socio-ecological processes and environmental change; actors, both public and private, 
from government and civil society playing different roles and with divergent interests; the playing out 
of tensions, conflicts and negotiation through the design and implementation of policy at different 
scales; and the concrete piloting and implementation of policy in material planning practices. 
Untangling the complexities of these processes and ordering them thematically for data collection 
and analysis required considerable prior theorisation, as developed in the first four chapters. As the 
variety of issues above demonstrates, the case study model was the most appropriate strategy for 
this particular topic and study, where disentangling and understanding the complex relations was 
crucial (Stake, 2000).  
2.2: The research methods 
There were several factors which shaped and constrained the direction of the thesis, specific to the 
actual case. The study was of an ongoing policymaking process, the piloting of which was announced 
as part of a new national nature conservation strategy in mid-2011. Local trials ran from March 2012 
for two years, with offsetting integrated into local planning policy and tested a discretionary tool to be 
applied during development control, where land development was expected to cause residual 
biodiversity loss. Technical papers and guidance were written for the pilots, including the 
establishment of a habitat-based metric to measure biodiversity loss and gain, together with guidance 
for local authorities, developers and offset providers. The most advanced national proposals came in 
the form of a consultative Green Paper released in September 2013, though it was widely recognised 
that the policy had been dropped towards the end of 2014, with a General Election only months away. 
Given the programme was abandoned three years after it was announced, and due to the timescales 
involved in land use planning and offsetting processes, there was very little happening ‘on the ground’, 
even during the two-year local pilots. Only a handful of offsets had been preliminarily agreed, and I 
am only aware of one case where work on an offset site had commenced. The scope to investigate 
the social and environmental effects of actual offsets in England was therefore limited. As a result, 
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the richer data was to be found by focusing on the live debates, conflicts and negotiations around 
policy design on a national level and through the pilots, and the manner in which the government and 
other key actors positioned themselves, in relation to the ongoing efforts to test and recalibrate 
potential tools and governance mechanisms, and in response to unfolding events. This had 
implications in terms of who was targeted as research participants and the nature of the interviews, 
and what other data was collected, as explained below.  
Briefly, however, from early 2013 I started reviewing the academic and policy literature. At the same 
time, I began collecting the documentary data detailed in the next section, and undertook some initial 
analysis, which continued throughout the period of study. Interview preparation begun in mid-2013, 
with interviews themselves taking place between October 2013 and March 2015. A handful of these 
were followed up in early 2016 during analysis, for further clarifications and updates. Transcription 
and analysis began immediately. The first event attended for participant observation took place in 
December 2013, and the last in June 2014. I now explore in detail the methods employed. 
2.2.1: Documentary data 
There was a very large amount which could have been collected and analysed, especially after the 
UK government released a consultative Green Paper on its plans in September 2013. This required 
a selective approach. Much of the actual data compiled for analysis took the form of documentation. 
This data came from a wide range of sources, and included government policy documents and 
guidance, technical manuals, commissioned and non-commissioned reports and papers from non-
state actors, and a variety of news stories, blog posts and other material published online. An 
overview of the key documentation is presented below in Table 3.  
There were clear advantages to using documentary evidence with the case study approach. In 
general, the use of documentary data is consistent with the ontological and epistemological premises 
of the case study approach described above, where contextualisation and the piecing together of 
complex, partial positions is necessary (Mason, 2002). In a practical sense, as Yin (2003, pp. 85-8) 
writes, documentation is stable and can be repeatedly reviewed; it is unobtrusive and is not created 
as a result of the study; it tends to be exact, in terms of names, references and details of events; and 
finally it provides broad coverage over time, of many events and many settings. Added to this must 
be the high level of digitalisation of documentary material in the UK, which made access to the 
majority of data both cheap and simple. These are clear benefits for Mason (2002), who also points 
out that the data contained in documentation may not be available elsewhere.  
For the thesis, documentary data provided evidence of the socially constituted and politically 
contested nature of the policymaking process. It was possible to gather official government policy 
proposals, aims and objectives, and the reports and research documents that underpinned them. 
Added to this were the intersecting policies, laws, commitments and so on, which gave indication of 
the relation between offsetting and other official objectives and constraints. There was also evidence 
that could be drawn from the ongoing evaluation of piloting and experimentation, and evolution of 
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policy ideas in government. Finally, there was considerable documentation emanating from non-state 
actors in reports, position papers, consultation responses, articles and so on, as well as ongoing 
media coverage of the policy’s development.  
Much of the documentary evidence outlined above was used to build the preliminary policymaking 
history and context for its emergence, laid out in Chapter 7. It provided data with which to ascertain 
who were the principal people, organisations and networks, and the nature of relationships among 
them, as well as evidence of significant events, controversies, and alternative pathways abandoned. 
Using documentation to identify who was prominent in, and who was being excluded from, the central 
debates, gave a sense of the ways numerous groups were being enrolled, the sorts of expertise and 
resources drawn upon, and the rough distribution of power in the policymaking process. Furthermore, 
it was possible to map out key technical, institutional and political themes being discussed and 
disputed; the ways in which the policy was narrated and conceptually situated by different groups; 
and the kinds of environmental, social, economic and scientific arguments mobilised to justify distinct 
positions.  
Part of the goal was to build up a picture of the areas of consensus and disagreement, alignment and 
tension between assorted social groups, and inconsistencies and omissions prevalent in the 
literature. Beyond this however, the documentary data contained a substantial amount of technical 
and institutional detail surrounding the policy, and a large quantity of primary and secondary empirical 
research used to back up the varied positions of different actors. Together, the many aspects drawn 
from the documentary data provided a springboard for the interviews, including names, topics and 
reference points for interview questions. The documentary evidence was also later used to triangulate 
and corroborate data obtained from the interviews themselves, and the four policy-focused events 
attended during fieldwork. 
In terms of data collection, a number of techniques were employed. To begin with, online searches 
with keywords were used, after which promising references within the first set of documents were 
followed up in the same way, as were others mentioned in interviews and public events at later points 
in the research. Subsequently, a more systematic approach was put in place. This took the form of 
setting up a Google Alert service for new online material with relevant keywords, along with fortnightly 
searches of Twitter. Gradually, subscriptions were set up to relevant mailing lists and RSS feeds of 
organisations, media outlets and other websites publishing content about or related to biodiversity 
offsets.  
Most of this material was freely downloadable online as PDF or Word documents, though much was 
picked up in hardcopy form at events as well. There were some which were either unavailable or 
prohibitively expensive, which was obtained by email request or in person from individuals when 
possible. In particular, a significant number of written consultation responses were not available 
online, nor was there an accessible database of the submissions. It was reasonably easy to guess 
however, through familiarisation with the policymaking history, which organisations would have 
submitted to this, and who to approach for a copy. Online articles and webpages were saved, 
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categorised and tagged using the programme Evernote, while downloaded documents were kept in 
similarly labelled folders, as were paper copies of documents. In terms of categorisation, documentary 
evidence was organised according to sectoral relationship to policy (e.g. government and state; 
environmental NGOs), and subcategorised as specific organisations or bodies (e.g. Defra, Natural 
England, Environmental Audit Committee). Media coverage was labelled with respect to the aspect 
of policy reported on (e.g. local offset proposal, national policymaking development or controversy). 
The following table gives a list of documentary data collected, reviewed and analysed during the 
course of the research project, giving information on when it was published and by whom, as well as 
some additional notes. The list is non-exhaustive, and other documentary evidence was collected 
and analysed. However, though not all the literature is referenced in the empirical chapters following 
the methodology, it all does inform the thesis as a whole. 
Table 3: Documentary data 
Category Author(s) Document(s) Notes 
Key policy 
documents 
ODPM (Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister) 
and Defra (Department of 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs) 
Planning Policy Statement 9: 
Biodiversity and Geological 
Conservation (PPS9) (2005) and 
guidance  
Previous planning policy 
and guidance on 
biodiversity conservation 
and land development, 
requiring compensation 
in some circumstances 
 Defra Biodiversity Offsetting: 
Discussion Material (2010) 
Published after the 2010 
General Election 
 Defra Natural Environment White 
Paper: The Natural Choice: 
securing the value of nature 
(NEWP) (2011) 
National nature 
conservation policy 
document, built on 
concepts of ecosystem 
services and natural 
capital 
Announces piloting of 
biodiversity offsetting  
 Defra Biodiversity 2020: A strategy for 
England’s wildlife and ecosystem 
services (2011) 
National biodiversity 
strategy 
 DCLG (Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government) 
National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF) (2012) 
Planning reform and 
new national guidance 
Includes replacement of 
PPS9 
 Defra Guidance for offsetting pilots, 
aimed at local planning 
authorities, developers, and 
offset providers, as well as 
technical paper (2012) 
Four documents 
 Defra Biodiversity Offsetting Green 
Paper (2013) together with 
impact assessment and public 
consultation document 
Most advanced 
proposals of national 
programme 
 Various  Pilot scheme offset plans, 
guidance, and supplementary 
material 
Mainly local planning 
documents, but also 
online information on 
local authority and 
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partner organisation 
websites 
 Defra Government summaries and 
responses to various other 
reports – e.g. Green Paper 
consultation (2014)*, 
Environmental Audit Committee 
report (2014) (see below), pilots 
evaluation (2016) (see below)  
*Publicly released in 
2016 
 DCLG Online planning guidance for 
biodiversity and ecosystems 
National planning 
guidance which shows 
how to apply biodiversity 
offsets 
    
Government-
commissioned 
reports and 
research 
Jo Treweek (Treweek 
Environmental 
Consultants) et al. 
Scoping study for the design and 
use of biodiversity offsets in an 
English Context (2009) 
Research commissioned 
under the previous 
Labour government into 
biodiversity offsetting 
 John Lawton et al. ‘Making Space for Nature’: a 
review of England’s wildlife sites 
(2010) 
Commissioned under 
previous government, 
but published after 
General Election 
Basis for NEWP 
strategy, known as the 
‘Lawton Review’  
 UK NEA (National 
Ecosystem Assessment) 
UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment (2011) and 
supplementary material 
Commissioned under 
previous government, 
published alongside 
NEWP 
Second major document 
underpinning NEWP, 
modelled on global 
Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 
 GHK and eftec Costing potential actions to offset 
the impact of development on 
biodiversity (2011) 
 
 Ecosystem Markets Task 
Force (EMTF) 
Ecosystem Markets Task Force 
Interim Report (2012) 
Realising nature’s value: The 
Final Report of the Ecosystem 
Markets Task Force (2013) and 
underpinning research reports 
Set up out of NEWP to 
explore business 
opportunities in the 
green economy 
 David Tyldesley and 
Associates 
Planning Policy and Biodiversity 
Offsets: Report on Phase II 
research - Effectiveness of the 
application of current planning 
policy in the town and country 
planning system (2012) 
Planning Policy and Biodiversity 
Offsets: Report on Phase III 
research - application of a new 
biodiversity offsetting metric to 
an existing sample of real-life 
historic cases (2012) 
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 Collingwood 
Environmental Planning 
and The Institute for 
European Environmental 
Policy (IEEP) 
Evaluation of the Biodiversity 
Offsetting Pilot Phase: Interim 
Report (2013) 
Indicative Costs of Current 
Compensation Arrangements for 
Biodiversity Loss: Illustrative 
Case Studies (2013)* 
A review of recent biodiversity 
offsetting practice in Germany 
(2014)* 
Evaluation of the Biodiversity 
Offsetting Pilot Programme 
(2014)* 
*Publicly released in 
2016 
 Forest Trends Exploring lessons learned from 
biodiversity offsetting markets in 
other countries that could inform 
appraisal of options for delivering 
offsets in England. Final report to 
Defra (2014)* 
*Publicly released in 
2016 
    
Other reports, 
research and 
non-
government-
commissioned 
material 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Committee  
Natural Environment White 
Paper: Fourth Report of Session 
2012-13 (2013) 
Annual reports on Defra’s 
performance 
All-party Parliamentary 
Committee reviewing 
Defra’s activities 
 Environmental Audit 
Committee (EAC) 
Biodiversity Offsetting: Sixth 
Report of Session 2013-14 
(2013) and all transcribed oral 
evidence 
All-party Parliamentary 
Committee public inquiry 
on biodiversity offsetting 
 Association of Local 
Government Ecologists 
(ALGE) 
Ecological Capacity and 
Competence in Local Planning 
Authorities: What is needed to 
deliver statutory obligations for 
biodiversity? (2013) 
 
 British Ecological Society 
(BES) 
Biodiversity Offsetting - What 
Does the Science Say? (2013) 
 
 Policy Exchange Nurturing nature: policy to protect 
and improve biodiversity (2012) 
 
 Country Land and 
Business Association 
(CLA) 
Private Solutions to Public 
Problems: Developing 
Environmental Markets (2009) 
 
 Environment Bank Various reports and material, 
including position papers, advice 
and information for offset 
stakeholders, press releases, 
articles, guides and technical 
papers 
Offset broker 
 Natural Capital Initiative 
(NCI) 
Towards no net loss, and 
beyond: Addressing practical 
challenges for biodiversity 
offsetting in the UK (2010) 
Towards no net loss and beyond: 
Addressing scientific knowledge 
and environmental information 
Workshop reports 
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challenges for biodiversity 
offsetting in the UK (2010) 
 Aldersgate Group Pricing the Priceless: The 
business case for action on 
biodiversity (2011) 
 
 eftec and Climate 
Change Capital 
Habitat banking: scaling up 
private investment in the 
protection and restoration of our 
natural world (2010) 
 
 BBOP To No Net Loss of Biodiversity 
and Beyond: A Summary of 
Discussions at the Conference, 
3-4 June 2014 (2014) and BBOP 
literature relevant to the English 
case 
 
 Various – e.g. Royal 
Society for the Protection 
of Birds (RSPB), Friends 
of the Earth (FoE), 
FERN, Valuing Nature 
Network, Grantham 
Institute, Institute of 
Coastal Engineers, eftec, 
GHK Consulting, IEEP, 
Aldersgate Group, Crown 
Estate, Natural England, 
Natural Capital 
Committee 
Other technical and policy 
reports, position papers, 
research studies etc. – focusing 
on biodiversity offsets, nature 
conservation and environmental 
policy and regulation 
By NGOs, academic and 
scientific bodies, professional 
organisations, policy consultants, 
business groups and public 
bodies 
 
    
Written 
evidence for 
consultations 
and public 
inquires 
Various Green Paper consultation (2013) 
responses from:  
Energy UK; Aldersgate Group; 
Home Builders Federation 
(HBF); British Property 
Federation; Linden Homes; 
Lafarge Tarmac; Minerals 
Products Association (MPA); 
ALGE; BES; Chartered Institute 
of Ecology and Environmental 
Management (CIEEM); Institute 
of Environmental Management 
and Assessment (IEMA); 
Environment Bank; Campaign to 
Protect Rural England; FERN; 
FoE; National Trust; RSPB; The 
Wildlife Trusts (TWT); Woodland 
Trust; Bat Conservation Trust; 
Friends of the Lake District; 
Berkshire Local Nature 
Partnership; Cotswolds 
Conservation Trust; National 
Parks England; Wildlife and 
Countryside Link; CLA; National 
Union of Farmers (NFU); The 
Land Trust; Royal Town Planning 
33 in total 
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In order to construct the policymaking history, a timeline of events was built up over the course of the 
research, comprising major publications, controversies, public statements, news stories and so on. 
Institute; Policy Exchange; 
Natural England  
 Various Written evidence to the EAC 
public inquiry: 
Renewables UK; Aldersgate 
Group; HBF; Lafarge Tarmac; 
MPA; IEMA; Chartered Institution 
of Water and Environmental 
Management; Field Studies 
Council; Yorkshire and Humber 
Ecological Data Trust; 
Northwessex Downs Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty Unit; 
Bexley Natural Environment 
Forum; Environment Bank; 
Buglife; FoE; National Trust; 
RSPB; TWT; Woodland Trust; 
Amphibian and Reptile 
Conservation Trust; CLA; NFU; 
Policy Exchange; Michael Hannis 
and Sian Sullivan; Professor 
Colin T. Reid 
26 in total 
    
Other reports 
and material 
Various Papers presented and other 
material from events attended 
(see Table 3) 
 
 Various Material produced with regard to 
the EU/European Commission’s 
‘No Net Loss Initiative’, including 
research and policy papers, 
consultation submissions and 
responses  
 
    
Other sources Various Specialist websites and 
publications (e.g. ENDS Report, 
Ecosystem Marketplace, 
SpeciesBanking.com, In 
Practice) 
 
 Various Professional and personal blogs 
(e.g. ecologists, conservationists 
and environmentalists, 
campaigners, scientists, 
planners) 
 
 Various Planning applications with offset 
proposals 
 
 Various Other online material (e.g. press 
releases and public statements, 
webpages of organisations 
engaged with offsetting, 
campaign websites and 
Facebook groups) 
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This was partly done through systematic familiarisation with documentation. The first stage involved 
a quick reading, which helped filter out documents which were substantive copies of one another. 
Then a deep reading of the more important material was carried out, extracting key information, 
themes, quotes and so on relevant to the research questions, annotating printed copies of documents 
and then consolidating and organising descriptive and reflective notes on Evernote. This process was 
frequently repeated with some of the key documents, since initial perceptions and interpretations 
needed to be re-examined, as new information and insights came to light through other sources. As 
particular themes emerged, comparative analysis was undertaken between and among categories 
(together with data from interviews and events), with further notes made on distinct themes and 
issues, highlighting points of consensus, disagreement, instability, variation and so on. Through this 
kind of analysis, it was possible to reconstruct the policymaking process around key themes, revolving 
around interpenetration of a series technical-ecological, institutional and political issues, which could 
then be examined and analysed further, orientated by the conceptual framework and research 
objectives and questions. 
There are of course limitations to the use of documentary data collection and analysis as a research 
method. As Yin (2003) is careful to point out, “every document was written for some specific purpose 
other than those of the case study being done” (p. 87). Documents are likely to be biased in some 
way, may be inaccurate and should not be taken as literal recordings of events, but as constructions 
based on selected information. Given these drawbacks, documentary evidence could only be used 
to augment evidence and corroborate information from other sources. As Mason (2002, p. 108) notes, 
documents are never “directly or straightforwardly ‘evidential’ or ‘representational’”, and should be 
used “alongside several other methods of data generation”. In the case of biodiversity offsets in 
England, the fact that most of the accessible documentary evidence was written with public 
consumption in mind signalled one limitation. There was clearly much which was omitted and 
concealed from official reports. To give one example, the roles played by the UK Treasury and large 
developers were not particularly visible from documentation. As became clear through the interviews, 
their influence was either implicit or exerted through unrecorded interventions and conversations. 
Other useful documents were also inaccessible, such as negotiations going on at the local level 
between planning authorities and developers, for reasons of commercial confidentiality. While the 
absence of certain actors and information from documentation was itself significant, other methods 
were required to assemble a more comprehensive picture. 
2.2.2: Semi-structured interviews 
The second major source of data was collected through 36 in-depth interviews. Interviewees came 
from a wide range of expert and non-expert backgrounds, but were targeted in light of their having 
some kind of engagement with, or relevant knowledge about, the biodiversity offsetting policy in 
England. Among them were policymakers, planners, public sector and private sector ecologists, 
policy consultants, developers, conservationists, landowners, farmers, scientists, researchers, 
practitioners, local and central government officials, NGO workers, brokers, green business 
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representatives, economists, local community activists, pilot leaders, and think tank employees. An 
overview of those interviewed is presented in Table 4.  
There were numerous reasons qualitative interviews were particularly useful for this research. 
Returning to the ontological and epistemological framework, it is understood that people’s mental 
conceptions of the world are reflections, even though necessarily incomplete, of social and material 
reality. As explained, people have inescapably political and contextual positions, in and through the 
ways the social and material world is produced. Using qualitative interviews was a way of excavating 
and generating data about people’s positionalities and accounts of the policymaking process, through 
conversational (re)construction (see Mason, 2002, pp. 63–4). On a practical level, in combination with 
documentary evidence, they were also used to corroborate evidence relating to the policymaking 
history, such as chronologies of events, the participation of particular actors and so on. Interviewees 
held information otherwise unavailable, and conversations opened new avenues of enquiry, such as 
documentation, actors and events not on the public record, or examples of the policy in practice which 
had not been reported (Yin, 2003, p. 90; see Mason, 2002, p. 66).  
With the right techniques and questions, it was possible to yield the more nuanced positions of human 
actors, rather than those solely in line with the dominant discourse. For example, it enabled probing 
at the mood in different camps relating to the government’s proposals, and the degree to which public 
statements were accurate portrayals of people’s thoughts. As Mason puts it succinctly, it is a method 
which involves:  
an understanding of depth and complexity in, say, people’s situated or contextual accounts 
and experiences, rather than a more superficial analysis of surface comparability between 
accounts of large numbers of people [through formal surveys and one-size-fits-all structured 
interviews]  (2002, p. 65). 
Semi-structured interviews could be designed specifically with respect those interviewed, with each 
conversation expected to be more fluid and self-reflexive (Yin 2003, p. 89). This meant seeking out 
and incorporating the biases of respondents, and trying to unravel socially constituted political 
positions, bases of knowledge, constraints on action, and so on. 
Looking specifically at the research case study, using interviews enabled access to the in-depth 
knowledge and expertise of key groups of actors, such as ecologists, planners, and land managers. 
It granted access to developments and experience of efforts to implement offsets at the local level, 
and of existing policy practices, which tended to be less well documented. Crucially, interviews meant 
talking to people about the nature of relationships between different actors and groups, and the kinds 
of discussions taking place within networks that were largely unrecorded. The interviews also gave 
clearer insight into how people actually interpreted written policy and guidance, and were a tool to 
gauge relative levels of engagement and familiarity with the policy proposals, and the degree of 
understanding distinct players had of the detail. 
In-depth interviews were used to try to unearth hidden motives, nuances and tensions, and ask 
specifically about issues absent from official discourses and documentation, such as conflicts, 
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constraints, personal predictions and other more explicitly subjective opinions. Through this, it was 
possible to dig too at the ways technical, institutional and political issues intersected and blurred. This 
was partly because interview data tended to be relatively raw and unfiltered at its best, but also 
because the nature of conversation enabled dwelling on certain things, reflexive follow-up questions, 
and delving further into the ideas undergirding various standpoints beyond those explicitly 
acknowledged.  
In order to generate this kind of data, open-ended questions covered a variety of topics. These 
included participants’ professional lives, expertise, and histories, and how they or their organisations 
had come to engage with biodiversity offsets. Interviewees were asked about their perspectives on 
offsets and the policy in general, particular moments and narratives, and to reflect on events and 
policy developments they had knowledge or experience of. More stylised questions interrogated 
specific statements they or their organisations had made publicly. They were asked to talk about their 
own experiences relevant to the policy’s design and implementation, and how they viewed other 
actors’ motives, objectives and actions. They were asked too about their own predictions and worries 
about the plans, particular problems they had encountered or envisaged, and possible alternatives. 
Other questions covered technical and governance aspects of the proposals, and their interpretation 
of policies, guidance and key terminology.  
The initial stage of preparation for the interviews involved gathering possible names and contact 
details. This was done through identifying authors of reports, articles and so on, the names of people 
mentioned or listed in those documents, and those writing or making public statements. On top of this 
online searches were used to find relevant personnel in key organisations, such as those responsible 
for policy work, biodiversity conservation, planning or environmental compliance. This enabled the 
building of a substantial database of potential participants, which was used for an initial wave of 
interviews. After this, interviewees and others were asked to suggest other people to approach, while 
new names appearing in conversations and at events were also added to the database, which was 
used to keep a record of names, organisations, email addresses and phone numbers, and details of 
any previous contact. Contact details were gathered either through documents, online searches, or 
requested from other interviewees or organisations. Some were contacted first using Twitter, where 
they were asked to contact me if they were willing, while others were approached in person at public 
events. 
In terms of approaching participants, a first email was sent either directly or via a central 
organisational address if individual contact details could not be found. This email contained an 
information sheet and consent form, and explained the purpose of the research, why they specifically 
had been identified and some broad parameters of what the conversation would cover and entail. A 
reminder email was sent two weeks later if there had been no response. Except for a handful of 
particularly important individuals, no more emails would be sent if there was still no reply, but the 
success rate was remarkably high, and many could also be approached in person at policy-focused 
events. If the response was positive or asked for further information, I persisted by email or phone 
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until an interview could be suitably arranged, preferably face-to-face, but alternatively by phone or via 
Skype, unless they became obviously unresponsive. Overall around half those contacted agreed to 
be interviewed. 
In total, 20 interviews were conducted face-to-face in mutually agreed settings, while the other 16 
were done over the phone or Skype. Informed consent forms were always signed prior to interview, 
and stored as hard copies by both the participant and researcher. The interviews lasted between 20 
and 120 minutes, averaging 40-80 minutes. A digital audio recording of each was made and stored 
with permission, along with handwritten notes during the conversation. In terms of content, the 
interviews involved between five and fifteen questions, both general and individually tailored. Most 
were semi-open ended, though some were precise about, for instance, a specific event or statement 
with which they were associated. The questions however acted more as a rough guide, and there 
was considerable scope to go off-script.  
Immediately post-interview, handwritten reflections were made on paper. This included notes on what 
went well in the interview, unexpected difficulties, the general tone of the conversation and what could 
be improved upon next time. It was also used to mark particular tropes which had been apparent, 
responses which had stuck out as well as surprising oversights, points which needed clarifying, 
following up or which had opened potentially new avenues of enquiry. These notes were later copied 
onto a single file on the computer, to be revisited during more comprehensive analysis. Over time, 
each interview was listened to again and fully transcribed, and the transcriptions read twice on paper, 
on which annotations were made. Consolidated notes were then transferred into one large table, 
where interviews were categorised according to sectoral or individual engagement with the policy. 
This table contained two main substantive columns. The first was a bullet-pointed description of the 
interview, consisting of topics, arguments, claims made and so on. The second contained my own 
analytical notes in line with the research questions, highlighting major themes and framings, internal 
inconsistencies and discrepancies with other sources, unexpected or striking elements of the 
conversation, links to other data, the post-interview reflections and further questions. The singular 
table was then used as the basic point of reference for the interviews, which could then be reviewed 
again in detail as required, and analysed, compared and triangulated with other data. 
Table 4 provides a broad summary of the 36 individuals who were interviewed as part of the research, 
and their roles in the policy’s design and implementation. For simplicity, to avoid double-counting and 
for ease of anonymity, they have been categorised according to the primary roles about which they 
were interviewed.  
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Table 4: Interview participants 
Primary role Number of 
interviewees 
Key roles and forms of engagement with offsetting 
programme 
Interview 
codes 
Central 
government 
officials 
2 
• Policymakers and civil servants 
• National level policymaking, support with pilots, public 
engagement and consultation 
 
Interviews 1a, 
1b 
Local 
government 
ecologists 
5 
• Official and supplementary pilot scheme leaders 
• Part of local planning authorities with ecological expertise, 
creating strategic local offset plans, and negotiating 
offsets with developers and providers 
• Local level trialling, feeding into national policymaking 
Interviews 2a, 
2b, 2c, 2d, 2e 
Planners 1 
• Officer at national level association 
• Involved in lobbying on behalf of professional planners, 
expected to have central oversight and strategic planning 
role in offsetting programme at local level 
Interview 3a 
Ecologists and 
natural 
scientists 
5 
• Private freelance and consultancy ecologists and 
members of professional associations 
• Practitioners and researchers with expertise in ecological 
science and other relevant fields 
• Professional experience with offsets, development and 
infrastructure projects, ecological restoration and 
management 
• Private consultants working for clients such as 
developers, utilities companies and planning authorities, 
would be asked to use offset metrics and advise 
developers, regulators and providers 
• Public sector academics/researcher involved in providing 
scientific advice to government 
• Key stakeholders as experts and practitioners 
Interviews 4a, 
4b, 4c, 4d, 4e  
Environmental 
NGOs and 
conservationists 
7 
• Third sector membership organisations committed to 
nature conservation as a core aim, either through land 
management activities and/or lobbying and campaigning 
• Frequently involved as stakeholders in planning process, 
commenting on applications; sometimes campaigning 
against particular developments 
• Some potential offset providers as landowners with 
experience and expertise in ecological restoration and 
management 
• Operating at national level, many at local level as well, as 
key stakeholders in nature conservation and 
environmental policymaking 
Interviews 5a, 
5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 
5f, 5g 
Green business 2 
• Individuals and representatives of ‘green economy’ sector 
• Includes commercial interests in development, extraction, 
consultancy, finance, accountancy and brokering 
• National level lobbying 
Interviews 6a, 
6b 
Developers 5 
• Developers of housing, energy and extractive sectors 
• Officers of individual developers and associations, with 
responsibilities for environmental compliance 
Interviews 7a, 
7b, 7c, 7d, 7e 
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• Key stakeholders in local and national level policy with 
regard land development regulation and environmental 
compliance, involved in consultation and lobbying 
Landowners and 
potential offset 
providers 
1 
• Rural landowners and managers, including farmers, 
expected to act as private sector offset providers 
• Experience of land-based nature conservation policy and 
management 
• Key stakeholders as actual and potential offset providers 
at local level 
• Involved in national level consultation and lobbying 
Interview 8a 
Policy 
consultants 
3 
• Staff members of professional consultancies 
• Researchers and authors of commissioned reports into 
offsetting 
• Operating and national and European/global level 
Interviews 9a, 
9b, 9c 
Think tanks 1 
• Policy officer at independent think tank 
• Author of non-commissioned report on public 
policymaking with regard to biodiversity conservation and 
offsets 
• National level lobbying 
Interview 10a 
Local 
campaigners 
4 
• Local community activists and NGO officers, involved in 
campaigning against particular developments with 
offsetting proposals 
• Local level campaigning 
Interviews 11a, 
11b, 11c, 11d 
Total 36   
 
There are several further observations to be made about those who were interviewed. Despite the 
manner in which they are classified in the table of the previous section, there was a certain fluidity 
about interviewees’ individual positionalities within the process, because there was considerable 
overlap of various registers. First, organisations and their members fulfilled different functions 
simultaneously. For instance, an NGO could at once be a local campaigner, a landowner and potential 
offset provider, and a conservation organisation operating at a national level. A consultant ecologist 
could be part of the green business lobby as well as an individual practitioner or researcher. Second, 
individuals could have roles at different organisations at the same time. Industry representatives 
worked as policy consultants and vice versa, for instance. Many participants had also formerly worked 
for other organisations. NGO officers had been local government planners in the past, policy 
consultants had previously been officers of environmental organisations. Third, there was significant 
overlap in terms of expertise, which partly explained why so many had held similar posts in each 
other’s organisations. Most participants were trained or had professional experience in one or more 
of the following: planning, ecology and environmental management, (environmental) economics, and 
policy work. 
In practical terms, this meant conversations frequently moved to participants’ roles and experiences 
in other professional capacities, though this was not the case for the non-NGO local campaigners 
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and for very few of the developers. As such, though there is only one interviewee who has primarily 
interviewed as a ‘planner’, there were nine – including the local government ecologists – who talked 
about their current or previous experiences as professional planners, in either the public or private 
sector.  
As with documentary evidence, interview data has its own risks and drawbacks. Though a crucial 
form of data gathering, interviewing is “hard, creative, active work” (Mason 2002, p. 67), and requires 
thorough planning. Restrictions on resources also needed to be considered. Finding, approaching, 
gaining informed consent, confirming access to secure and quiet locations and preparing for 
interviews took considerable time, while face-to-face interviews involved significant travel costs 
relative to limited funds. Preparation time was also substantial, since this involved researching 
individuals’ engagement as far as possible, and constructing comprehensive interview protocols, as 
advised by Creswell (2007, p. 133). 
Another matter to consider, following Mason (2002), was taking into account the ethical issues 
attached to research. The safety of myself and interviewees, was paramount, despite the relatively 
straightforward nature of this project from that perspective. Basic steps were taken to ensure ethical 
conditions were met. Informed consent, which incorporated guarantees for the secure storage and 
confidentiality of data was a prerequisite. Participants’ wishes to remain anonymous were respected 
and honestly appraised. Any information given ‘off the record’ was treated as such, and any related 
secondary evidence found was only used if no potential harm could come to the original source 
(following Creswell, 2007, pp. 141–3). Interviews did not attempt to glean private or personal 
information, and questions were not about traumas, tragedies or illegal activities. They were also 
designed with care to avoid accusation, confrontation or discomfort to respondents. They did however 
relate to matters of public policy and politics, and everyday experiences and relations in workplaces. 
It was important to be aware of and sensitive to the potential harm caused to respondents’ comments 
being made public through publication, and to be wary of any personal or private information divulged 
about other parties who have not given informed consent. Informed consent was explicitly open to 
renegotiation during the interview process, as the respondent became more aware of what precisely 
they were consenting to. This made as clear as possible without compromising the research 
objectives, as advised by Mason (2002, pp. 79–82). Though the actual research project did not throw 
up significant difficulties in this regard, ethical considerations did occasionally restrict the use of 
interview data collected, including off the record comments and information which could have risked 
anonymity. 
It was crucial too, as the researcher, to be aware of my own active and self-reflexive role as the 
interviewer, and the challenges this posed in terms of generating further bias or stunting the fluidity 
of the conservations (Mason 2002, p. 66). This for instance meant finding ways to simplify questions 
or have back-ups, so as to avoid situations where the participant might lose confidence. Sure-
footedness and dexterity were critical, since the interviews by their nature were somewhat 
unpredictable, and various techniques were needed to open up some conversations and bring others 
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back on topic. This needed as balanced and careful an approach as possible, avoiding leading 
questions and so forth, and employing questions framed as ‘how’ rather than ‘why’, as a way of 
producing more open and less defensive responses from participants (Yin 2003, p. 90). Nevertheless, 
as Yin warns, interviews “should always be considered verbal reports only” (2003, p. 92). While 
uncovering the political positionalities of different actors was central to the research objectives, 
unchecked bias could have easily resulted in misleading data, as could respondents’ fallibilities in 
terms of accurate memory and articulation of events, names and so forth. As anticipated (see Mason, 
2002, p. 65), interviewees tended to interpret questions differently, and sometimes they 
misunderstood them completely, on more than one occasion because of misplaced assumptions on 
the researcher’s part about levels of technical knowledge. 
Bearing these many factors in mind, it was important not to be over-reliant on interviews in general 
or individual respondents in particular, which is why the research made use of as many different 
sources and types of information as possible. Some of the difficulties encountered and limitations of 
the data gathered are further reflected upon in Section 3. 
2.2.3: Direct and participant observation 
A final set of data was collected through participant observation, at four policy-focused events about 
biodiversity offsetting. These comprised two major conferences, a county level meeting of local 
government ecologists, and a public meeting and workshop put on by activists opposed to biodiversity 
offsetting. As detailed in Table 5, the events encompassed a wide range of actors engaged with the 
policymaking process in some way, operating at a variety of geographical scales. 
This method was useful on a number of fronts. Returning again to the ontological underpinnings of 
the research, which stipulate the centrality of relationships in understanding complex social 
phenomena, participant observation proved to be a valuable tool. As Mason notes, participant 
observation can add “depth, complexity, roundness and multidimensionality in data” (2002, p. 86). 
Attending and observing events meant access to unique data, where key actors engaged were 
debating offsets and interacting directly with each other, as a policy community, in different settings 
and contexts. This was data which would otherwise have been difficult to collect (Yin, 2003, p. 94). 
Through direct observation, with limited active participation, it was possible to observe certain 
conversations, behaviours, narratives, conflicts, the ways people acted, reacted and so forth, and 
gain some sense of the power dynamics at play in the room. It made it easier to pick up which issues 
animated different groups, which discussions were absent or shut down, and indeed which actors 
were not there. Furthermore, relatively passive observation meant that data was not being generated 
by the researcher, in the way interview data was heavily mediated by the specific relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee, and the specific questions asked. 
By attending public events and meetings set up with distinct purposes, based on different premises 
about offsetting, it was also possible to learn something about the shared perspectives of different 
groups of actors. The starting point for discussions among local government ecologists deviated 
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significantly from that of the activist-led public meeting, as did the physical settings, the demographic 
make-up of attendees and the mood of discussions. For example, an internal meeting of local 
government ecologists revealed concerns and opinions not shared in multi-stakeholder events or 
public forums. While this might appear obvious, it added layers of texture to the nature of the parallel 
debates which would have been difficult to pick up through other methods. Finally, attendance at 
events provided a useful way of meeting future interview participants, and reference points for 
reflection in those conversations. 
Finding out about relevant events was fairly straightforward. As with identifying documentation, online 
approaches proved fruitful: online searches, Google Alerts, RSS feeds, signing up to newsletters and 
so on. On top of this, details of each event were passed on by interview participants and other 
contacts. In the case of the county level ALGE meeting, an invite to attend was extended by an 
interviewee who would also be present, as a prelude to the interview. With the two conferences, 
registration and attendance fees were both necessary. 
In terms of data collection, all events were attended in person. The three public events (i.e. the two 
conferences and activist meeting) largely revolved around pre-planned talks, panels and workshops, 
including question and answer sessions and general discussion. The ALGE meeting was a roundtable 
meeting, discussing regular business relating to local issues, experience of new policy and guidance, 
and so on. For the most part, this meant listening and watching others speak and interact. Each event 
involved refreshments during which attendees engaged in networking and other interaction with 
acquaintances and colleagues, where it was possible to engage in conversations with other 
participants. In the case of the two conferences, this included meals as well. These allowed for the 
generation as well as collection of data, outside a formal interview setting. 
Handwritten fieldnotes were made wherever possible, with explicit permission in the case of the ALGE 
meeting, since it was not a public event. Descriptive notes were taken on who was there, the physical 
settings, what was talked about, said and asked, particular themes which dominated, the observed 
tone of discussions and how different groups interacted, areas of agreement, tension and so forth. 
Immediate reflections were written when the events ended too, and at the end of each day for the 
two-day conference. These notes were later written up on Word, and organised according to themes, 
and, if applicable, compared to official summaries of events published at later dates. Added to this, 
material available at the events (e.g. programmes, hand-outs, booklets) was collected for later 
analysis. The data collected was then analysed alongside documentary and interview data, for 
purposes of corroboration and so on.  
An overview of the data collected through participant observation is presented in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5: Events attended for participatory observation 
Event Date Purpose Attendees Codes 
County level 
meeting of the 
Association of 
Local Government 
Ecologists (ALGE) 
– unnamed 
English county 
December 
2013 
• Two-hour meeting of local 
government ecologists 
from local planning 
authorities across the 
county 
• Discussing, among other 
things, the implementation 
of biodiversity offsets on a 
local level, including some 
recent planning 
applications 
Approximately 10 people 
(local) 
Local government  
Local government 
ecologists from the county 
and district planning 
authorities, local 
conservation NGO 
representatives 
PO1 
Chartered Institute 
for Ecology and 
Environmental 
Management 
(CIEEM) Spring 
conference: 
‘Biodiversity 
Offsetting’ – 
Birmingham, UK 
March 
2014 
• Day-long practitioner 
conference focused on 
biodiversity offsetting 
proposals in England 
• Presentations from people 
actively involved in 
policymaking and 
implementation process in 
England, and people with 
practical experience of 
restoration, compensation, 
offsetting, policymaking 
etc. from England and 
abroad (e.g. Australia, US) 
Approximately 250 people 
(almost all UK-based) 
Civil society, government, 
business 
CIEEM members 
(professional ecologists; 
private and public sector; 
practitioners and 
researchers) 
Other UK-based 
biodiversity offsetting 
stakeholders (e.g. 
developers, NGOs, 
government officials) 
PO2 
2nd Forum on the 
Natural Commons 
(Nature Not for 
Sale) – London, 
UK 
June 
2014 
• Evening meeting 
preceding BBOP 
conference above, 
organised by Nature Not 
for Sale group 
• Designed to challenge 
BBOP and biodiversity 
offsetting in England and 
abroad, bringing together 
critical academics and 
researchers, campaign 
organisations and NGOs, 
local campaigners 
• Presentations and panel 
discussions focusing on 
failures and injustices of 
offsetting and similar 
nature conservation 
policies, framed critically 
as commodification, 
privatisation, land 
grabbing, ‘license to trash’, 
etc. 
Approximately 80 people 
(international presenters, 
but mostly UK-based 
audience) 
Civil society 
Critical academics and 
researchers; global justice-
campaigning NGOs (e.g. 
World Rainforest 
Movement, Transnational 
Institute, Friends of the 
Earth International); 
conservation NGOs; 
ecologists; local 
campaigners and 
community activists, 
members of the public 
PO3 
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Business and 
Biodiversity 
Offsets 
Programme’s 
(BBOP) 
international 
summit: ‘To No 
Net Loss and 
Beyond’ – London, 
UK 
June 
2014 
• First international BBOP 
summit, celebrating 10-
year anniversary, co-
organised with Defra and 
the London Zoological 
Society 
• Two-day conference 
bringing together 
stakeholders in mitigation 
and offsetting from across 
the world, discussing key 
developments in policy 
and practice, and key 
challenges (technical and 
governance) – e.g. tools, 
finance, standards 
• Large plenary sessions 
and several dozen smaller 
workshops, focused 
towards knowledge-
sharing, advice, 
collaboration, capacity-
building, lobbying, etc. 
280 (international) 
Business, national and 
local government, global 
governance, civil society 
BBOP staff, members and 
partners; government 
officials and policymakers, 
regulators; global 
governance bodies (e.g. 
CBD, World Bank, 
European Commission); 
business leaders, extractive 
and energy companies, 
infrastructure, retail, 
forestry, agriculture, banks 
(i.e. financial institutions) 
and investors; 
consultancies and small 
businesses (e.g. 
conservation banks); 
ecologists and 
practitioners; NGOs 
(supportive and critical); 
academics and 
researchers, think tanks 
and policy consultants 
PO4 
 
There were of course drawbacks with this method. In a practical sense, the cost of attendance was 
generally high, especially for the two fee-paying conferences. This meant a limited amount of data 
could be collected in this way, as more would have been beyond the research budget. In terms of 
collecting the data, there were certain difficulties associated with the form of note-taking required. 
Keeping comprehensive and accurate notes throughout an event was not easy, and required high 
levels of concentration. It was easy to make mistakes or miss important information, while taking too 
many notes presented risks of recording too much ‘noise’, and also restricted the participation 
element of the exercise, presenting something of a dilemma (Creswell, 2007, p. 139). Though in the 
case of the BBOP conference much was videoed and later uploaded to YouTube, this was not the 
case for any of the other events. 
The risk of bias in this data was another concern. Bias could be induced where other participants 
were particularly aware that they were under observation by the researcher (Yin, 2003). In most cases 
the presence of multiple researchers was well-known, and a common and expected occurrence at 
such events, which may have had some limited impact on behaviour of participants. However, in the 
small county level meeting of local government ecologists, I was particularly ‘visible’ to those 
attending as a participant observer, even though I had only planned to be, and tried to remain, an 
observer during the meeting. In this case, participants’ behaviour certainly was affected, and on 
several occasions I was treated as an expert in the room. For the participant observer, this was related 
to another risk of bias through becoming too much of an ‘insider’ within the policy community itself 
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(Yin, 2003, pp. 94–6). Given that the participative dimension of this method was very restricted, this 
did not prove a significant issue, though there is more to say on this more generally in the final section. 
 
3: Reflections, difficulties and limitations 
There are several things worth dwelling and reflecting upon, since the research project came to an 
end, such as unexpected events which occurred, problems encountered and related limitations to the 
findings and conclusions. The most obvious challenge was the abandonment of the policy during the 
thesis. Though never officially announced, it became clear at the very end of fieldwork that 
implementation was not going to be pursued on a national level. This changed the aim of the research 
and central questions quite significantly, from a focus on how the policy’s implementation might play 
out, to one which questioned why it had been aborted. Though this did not render the data collected 
useless, it did present challenges, since questions about the policy’s non-implementation had clearly 
not been asked of interviewees, while evidence of its demise was only apparent by the lack of activity 
and secession of public statements made by the government. 
The controversial nature of the policy at large created opportunities and risks. Debates were live and 
developments were happening all the time, which had some impact on interview data, discussed 
shortly. Throughout the period of fieldwork though, the main challenge had been in keeping on top of 
the proliferating data, and academic literature, which was being published in ever-increasing volume. 
Getting up to speed with the key terminology, and the frameworks with which different expert groups 
interpreted that terminology, was demanding too. Not only did I need to understand language directly 
about biodiversity offsets, I needed knowledge of key terms and ideas around planning, ecology, 
economics and the law, none which I have expertise in, in order to engage in meaningful 
conversations with different interviewees.  
Unsurprisingly, the all-consuming nature of the research frequently meant biodiversity offsetting often 
felt like a ‘bigger’ policy issue than was really the case, and this perception needed to be kept in 
check. More unexpected were my own changing sensitivities to the policy and the community of 
actors promoting it. As explained in the Introduction, my feelings towards biodiversity offsetting and 
many of those advocating for it softened considerably, and became increasingly nuanced, during 
fieldwork. As should be clear, I retain deep scepticism over its practical and political implications for 
a variety of reasons. However, by spending so much time ‘inside’ the topic, and among a community 
of accommodating and committed people, it was sometimes difficult to keep hold of that critical 
perspective and wider context, when the parameters of debates and conversations were difficult to 
puncture. In this, attending the critical activist workshop in June 2014 was extremely helpful, as were 
subsequent academic conferences with fellow political ecologists. 
There are of course limitations to this thesis, and some additional notes are necessary on the 
comprehensiveness and quality of the data. In order to keep the project manageable, decisions had 
to be made over what was beyond the reasonable scope of the project. Early on, I decided that what 
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was going on in the pilots would not be my central focus, due to the lack of activity in most of them. 
On the national level, I chose to largely bracket out part of the legal debates around the policy, and 
specifically discussions about Conservation Covenants, a mechanism proposed to secure land for 
offsets. In part this was something of an arbitrary move, but it was also a result of the lack of attention 
given to it in both documentation and interviews. This might, however, have been the result of another 
limitation with the data: the under-representation of landowners and managers among interview 
participants. 
In general people were very receptive to being interviewed, but others were harder to reach, as 
reflected in the make-up of interviewees in Table 4. Getting hold of the relevant people to speak to in 
large development organisations was tricky, but not impossible. The same was the case for local 
campaigners. I did meet many dead ends however, particularly among landowners and farmers, and 
non-ecological planners. In part this appeared to reflect how much interest these actors had in the 
topic, and meant there was something of a risk that the ‘expert’ bias of the sample could detract from 
the actual context in which they were operating, with too much weight given to the shared 
assumptions of relatively small groups of ‘insiders’ and their actions. Furthermore, several potential 
participants who I expected to have some unique insights declined or never responded to requests, 
including individuals in key government departments and agencies, politicians and a couple of pilot 
leaders.  
In terms of data quality, some interviews were better than others, and interference on one recording 
made parts impossible to transcribe. Though some were forthright, other participants were cagey, 
and there was a level of tangible concealment in certain cases. On occasion this was due to poor 
interview preparation or technique. There also appeared though to be an element of individuals being 
wary of what they said about other organisations or people from a relatively self-contained policy 
community (excluding most of the developers and local non-NGO campaigners), where there were 
many personal and professional connections (even if this made life easy in other ways as a 
researcher). In light of these various issues, there are certainly gaps in the data and diversity of 
perspectives, though this was mitigated in part by the fortuitousness of many interviewees’ previous 
professional experiences.  
The final point returns to the first, that of the abandonment of the national programme. Between the 
changing situation and a necessary reconceptualisation of the research problem, much of the content 
of the interviews turned out to be less important than first thought, particularly focus on 
commodification per se. Interestingly, as other themes emerged after fieldwork had come to a close, 
much of the easy conversation at the beginning of interviews, designed to settle participants, became 
more obviously useful in addressing new questions. 
Bearing in mind these methodological issues and limitations, the thesis now turns to analysis of the 
empirical research, with a long chapter on the history of the English proposals and the context in 
which they emerged. 
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Chapter 7: Biodiversity offsetting in England – a policymaking 
history 
 
Introduction 
This chapter tells the story of the development and abandonment of the national biodiversity 
programme in England. It mostly covers events between 2010 and 2015, the only parliamentary term 
of the Conservative-led coalition government, during which the rollout of a formal national policy was 
explicitly under consideration, but also some of the important contextual factors from the preceding 
years. The purpose is partly to construct a policymaking history as a reference point for the deeper 
analysis of the remaining chapters, giving an impression of key actors, moments, and the trajectory 
and flow of events during that period. More importantly however, the chapter highlights many of the 
intersecting factors which contributed to the particularities of the experience in England.  
The first section focuses on the events before the official announcement of offsetting’s local piloting 
in 2011. It includes the experience of existing planning mechanisms concerned with biodiversity, and 
offsetting’s take-up by the Conservative party in opposition. Section 2 outlines how the policy was 
expected to operate in relation to new approaches to nature conservation and reform of the land-use 
planning system, in the context of fiscal austerity in the years after the global banking crisis of 2008. 
Section 3 tells the story of the national policymaking process in the run-up to the launch of the local 
pilots, as more detail was added to the government’s initial ideas. Section 4 takes a closer look at 
what happened with the pilots themselves, which ran for two years until April 2014. The fifth section 
of the chapter returns to the national level, describing the fast-moving events between the start of the 
pilots and the point where it became clear the policy had been dropped, towards the end of 2014 in 
the run-up to a new General Election. A final summing up is made in Section 6, highlighting certain 
themes germane to the overall analysis. 
 
1: Biodiversity offsetting in England before the Natural Environment White 
Paper 
In June 2011 the Conservative-led coalition government, which had come to power the previous year 
following a post-General Election agreement with the Liberal Democrat party, released its Natural 
Environment White Paper (NEWP) (Defra, 2011a). Titled The Natural Choice: Securing the Value of 
Nature, the White Paper was the first of its kind in over 20 years, setting out a long-term vision for 
nature conservation for England29. The framing, content and objectives of the NEWP will be returned 
                                                     
29 The nature of devolved powers to the nations of the UK meant that the strategy itself only applied to English 
territory, though various aspects of the proposals and institutions set up as a result of the White Paper applied 
to the UK as a whole. For clarity, from this point on, (national) government refers to the UK Conservative-led 
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to shortly, but it is mentioned here since its publication marked the moment the local piloting of a 
voluntary approach to offsetting was first officially announced in a governmental policy document, 
with a view to nationwide rollout into the planning system. Biodiversity offsets were defined in the 
White Paper as “conservation activities designed to deliver biodiversity benefits in compensation for 
losses in a measurable way”, where the developer offsets residual biodiversity loss by “secur[ing] 
habitat expansion or restoration elsewhere” (Defra, 2011a, p. 22). Its purpose was to “improve the 
implementation of the requirements of the planning system for biodiversity” (p. 22), through the 
pooling of resources for higher quality compensation, and making the process of managing 
biodiversity impacts more straightforward and cost-effective. This early statement of intent was thin 
on detail. However, what appeared to delineate biodiversity offsets from the biodiversity 
compensation and mitigation requirements contained in existing planning policy was the proposal of 
a formalised set of procedures for negotiating and delivering compensation, by way of a consistent 
national policy and tools of quantitative measurement.  
1.1: Previous and existing policy 
Prior to the publication of the White Paper, compensation for adverse biodiversity impact from land 
development stemmed from both domestic implementation of European legislation and other 
international conventions ratified by UK governments, and national nature conservation policy relating 
to land use planning (Rundcrantz & Skärbäck, 2003; Cowell, 1997). Under the Ramsar Convention 
of 1971, damage done to designated Wetlands of International Importance development deemed in 
the “urgent national interest” (Ramsar Bureau, 1973 Article 4.2; quoted in Cowell, 1997, p. 303) has 
long required compensation, following adherence to the mitigation hierarchy (described in Chapter 
3). Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) and Special Protection Areas (SPAs), which form the 
Natura 2000 network of sites under the legally binding European Habitats (1992) and Birds (1979) 
Directives respectively, were similarly bound to strict adherence of the mitigation hierarchy, in line 
with agreements to maintain internationally protected species and habitats. In cases where 
development is of “overriding public interest”, the member state is required to “take all compensatory 
measures necessary to ensure the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is protected” (in Treweek, 2009, 
p. 53; European Commission, 1992). Both the European Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Directive (1985) and Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (2001) have been viewed as 
more ambiguous, yet still oblige, “where possible”, demonstration during the pre-development phase 
of the measures of prevention, mitigation and compensation to be taken (see Treweek, 2009, pp. 53–
4). 
On the national level, the most important policy which biodiversity offsets would affect was the 
national Planning Policy Statement 9: Biodiversity and Geological Conservation (PPS9) (ODPM, 
2005), and its related guidance. PPS9 had superseded the 1994 Planning Policy Guidance 9: Nature 
                                                     
coalition government (2010-15), though references to land-use and conservation policy are assumed to be 
applicable only at the scale of England (not Scotland, Northern Ireland or Wales), unless stated otherwise. 
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Conservation, which had institutionalised the UK’s biodiversity commitments through the CBD, in the 
form of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP) (UK Biodiversity Action Plan Steering Group, 1994), 
and European legislation into planning. PPS9 covered planning obligations relating to English sites 
“of biodiversity and geological conservation value” (ODPM, 2005, p. 5). These included the 
international sites outlined above (i.e. SPAs, SACs and Ramsar sites), as well as a whole tranche of 
nationally designated areas, from heavily protected Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), 
designated under the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981), to non-statutory local wildlife sites30 (see 
also ODPM & Defra, 2005). Among other things, it required ‘material consideration’ of biodiversity 
impacts from land development, and made concrete in planning the government’s Biodiversity Duty. 
This duty, written into the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act (2006)31, obliged public 
authorities to consider biodiversity conservation as far as possible alongside other functions. Though 
there were no standard mitigation requirements emanating from the Biodiversity Duty on developers 
or planning authorities, PPS9 made clear planning authorities should in principle aim to “maintain, 
restore or add to biodiversity” in line with national conservation targets, and that planning permissions 
should be refused if “significant harm cannot be prevented, adequately mitigated against, or 
compensated for” (ODPM, 2005, p. 3). Supplementary documents gave ‘good practice’ guidance on 
implementing and enforcing the mitigation hierarchy as part of development control and planning 
conditions, and how PPS9 should be integrated into the Regional Spatial Strategies and Local 
Development Frameworks32 (see ODPM et al., 2005). 
1.2: Towards a formal biodiversity offsetting system in England 
By the mid-to-late 2000s, it was widely recognised among the UK nature conservation community 
that existing policy was failing to adequately slow biodiversity loss, and the CBD target to halt this 
trend by 2010 would be missed (Defra, 2010a; EAC [House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Committee], 2008). Despite what appeared a significant volume of legislation, policy and guidance 
aimed at reducing and compensating for biodiversity loss resulting from land development, 
conservation measures were not being effectively implemented through planning, especially in the 
cases of non-international sites. Various causes were frequently highlighted as undermining a 
successful regime: ambiguous, complicated and caveated policy statements and guidance, which 
allowed biodiversity to be demoted relative to competing planning objectives and functions; non-
compliance and poor practice on the part of planning authorities and developers; weak or non-existent 
enforcement and monitoring; and lack of ecological expertise in local authorities (e.g. Drayson & 
                                                     
30 PPS9 also explicitly covered regional and local sites (Regionally Important Geological Sites, Local Nature 
Reserves and Local Sites); ancient woodland, veteran trees and other important natural habitats; networks of 
natural habitats (i.e. stepping stones and wildlife corridors); previously developed land; and biodiversity within 
developments, as well as protected species identified under European and national legislation. 
31 The Biodiversity Duty had originated in statutory law in the Countryside and Rights of Way Act (2000), and 
had been updated by the NERC Act (2006). NERC also established Natural England as the new statutory agency 
with general purpose of ensuring nature conservation and the goals of sustainable development. 
32 These were the major strategic subnational spatial planning documents at the time, which would all become 
void by 2012, together with PPS9. 
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Thompson, 2013; Atley & Morad, 2009; Treweek, 2009; Latimer & Hill, 2007; Treweek & Thompson, 
1997). Compensation, on the rare occasions when it was made a condition of planning consent, 
tended to be done on an ad hoc basis, often negotiated through Section 106 agreements33. 
Among those concerned with the state of conservation policy were a number of individuals and 
organisations pushing for a formal and standardised biodiversity offsets or habitat banking 
programme, drawing on many of the arguments outlined in Chapter 3. The suggestion that such a 
system might be appropriate and effective in the English context was first mooted by government in 
2007 (see Defra, 2007, p. 13), under the Labour administration. Defra subsequently commissioned a 
major scoping study led by well-regarded consultant ecologist and expert on offsets, Jo Treweek 
(2009). The study, produced in collaboration with other experts, many of whom were associated with 
BBOP, provided a very comprehensive overview of how an offsetting system could operate in the 
English context, including the steps to be taken and the risks and limitations which would need 
addressing.  
It is worth noting that interest in offsetting coincided with a shift in thinking at Defra (2007), where 
chief scientist Bob Watson, a co-chair of the international Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), 
was a key figure in pushing for the department to embed a modern ecosystem approach into nature 
conservation policy (interview 1a; and see Lawton & Rudd, 2016, 2014). In 2007, the government 
took up the parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee’s recommendation for the UK to undertake 
its own comprehensive National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA). Using the same model as the 
international study, it was designed to “enable the identification and development of effective policy 
responses to ecosystem service degradation” (UK NEA, n.d.). Commencing in March 2009, the NEA 
was completed under the Conservative-led administration in June 2011. Another study initiated by 
Defra and adopting an ecosystem approach, was set up in late 2009. Chaired by another notable 
figure, Professor John Lawton, it was charged with reviewing England’s wildlife and ecological 
network, and the possibilities for a landscape-level restoration strategy. The Lawton review, as it 
became known, reported to Defra after the new coalition government came to power, and included 
biodiversity offsetting as one of many mechanisms to consider. However, it appears there was little 
appetite or capacity to move forward with any concrete proposals for offsetting from the Labour 
government at the time, who were more concerned by this point with the ongoing political fallout of 
the global economic crisis, following the banking crash and large-scale bailouts of 2008.  
It was in this context that the Conservative party, in opposition, became interested in biodiversity 
offsets, at around the same time in 2009. One of the most vocal advocates of offsets and critics of 
existing arrangements at the time was David Hill, deputy chair of Natural England, the non-
departmental state agency and regulator responsible for nature conservation. Hill was an enthusiastic 
                                                     
33 Section 106 agreements refer to a mechanism under the Town and Country Planning Act (1990) for imposing 
legally enforceable planning obligations on developments, which would not otherwise be granted consent. They 
are designed to ensure mitigation of adverse, site-specific impacts (including environmental impact), such that 
the development is acceptable in planning terms. 
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proponent of a market-based approach based on the Australian and US systems (e.g. Hill & Gillespie, 
2009; Briggs et al., 2009; Latimer & Hill, 2007), and had co-founded an offset brokering business 
called the Environment Bank in 2007. According to Hill himself, having spent two unsuccessful years 
pressing policymakers to consider an offsetting or banking system, he found a receptive audience in 
the Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Nick Herbert. A meeting was quickly arranged 
with the Conservative shadow planning ministers, after which Hill said they were “pushing at an open 
door” (Kenny, 2010). 
In April 2009, the Conservative party’s leader and future prime minister David Cameron proposed a 
national ‘bio-banking’ system and the use of ‘conservation credits’ in a speech in Oxfordshire (Gray, 
2009a). Herbert, who was driving the agenda at this point placed the mechanism explicitly in the 
context of “limitations on public spending and … [looking for ways] to secure new forms of investment 
in conservation” (quoted in Gray, 2009b). The next month saw publication of Private Solutions to 
Public Problems by the Country Land and Business Association (CLA, 2009), a powerful lobbying 
organisation acting on behalf of landowners, traditionally influential over the Conservative party. 
Launched at a conference attended by Hill, Herbert (with whom the CLA had been in discussions) 
and other shadow planning ministers (Hodge, 2009), the report called for the establishment of 
environmental markets, including biodiversity offsetting, which could mobilise “the creativity, energy 
and resourcefulness of private enterprise” (CLA, 2009, p. 2) in a time of strained public resources: 
Properly regulated and with the right legal structures in place, self-interest – the powerful 
driving force behind markets – can be harnessed to create new markets to support the 
delivery of environmental outcomes (p. 3). 
Other meetings to discuss the potential for offsets, convened by Herbert, took place around this time 
too, bringing together many of the NGOs, the Environment Bank, Policy Exchange and others 
(interviews 4f; 5b). A year later, following the General Election of 2010, the Conservatives formed the 
coalition, which Cameron (2010a) later promised would be the ‘greenest government ever’. Concrete 
policy proposals for a national offsetting system began soon after, in line with the pledge made in the 
Conservative party manifesto. 
1.3: Towards the Natural Environment White Paper 
Following the General Election, offsetting’s early champion Nick Herbert did not become the 
government’s Environment Secretary, but was given ministerial positions in the Home Office and 
Ministry of Justice. Instead, Caroline Spelman was appointed as Defra’s new Secretary of State, 
whose opinions on offsets were known to be less supportive (interviews 6a; 9a). Nevertheless, under 
her leadership Defra officially started the process of developing policy options for a national system, 
which would form part of the Natural Environment Paper White the following year, to be integrated 
with forthcoming planning reforms.  
Having publicly announced its intentions in its November business plan, Defra produced a discussion 
paper the next month (Defra, 2010b). This launched the first consultative phase of the policymaking 
135 
 
process, responded to by a cross-sectoral group of interests34. It outlined the government’s objectives 
for a national programme, the parameters and context in which it would be expected to operate, while 
raising some early questions regarding design. The discussion paper explained that offsets would 
first be trialled at a local level, and called for an expression of interest from local planning authorities. 
It also presented roughly how the policy was envisaged to form part of the government’s White Paper, 
which would be published six months later. In addition, it described how the proposals would be 
consistent with the strategy laid out in the recently published Lawton review (Lawton et al., 2010), 
which would inform the broader nature conservation strategy under development. While some level 
of support was clear at this stage (see e.g. RSPB, 2010), a number of concerns emerged too, many 
of which would persist and never be resolved35. In particular, there was significant scepticism among 
moderately and strongly supportive practitioners and experts at Defra’s plan for a voluntary rather 
than mandatory system36, which was viewed as likely to be inadequate (ENDS Report, 2011b). 
An early costing study was also commissioned to GHK Consulting and the Economics for the 
Environment Consultancy (eftec), modelled on some basic assumptions about existing trends and 
various iterations of rules and multipliers. The report (Rayment et al., 2011), which would later be 
used in Defra’s (2011b, 2013b) two impact assessments, was published in March 2011, and 
estimated an annual cost of between £50m and £400m for developers by 2015, though the authors 
and the Environment Bank believed this to be somewhat conservative. Around the same time, articles 
reporting on offsets and discussing the instrument’s merits and possible scope in England and the 
UK started appearing more frequently, in specialist magazines such as the ENDS Report and the 
Chartered Institute for Ecology and Environmental Management’s (CIEEM) In Practice. Alongside the 
government’s own work meanwhile, other bodies began engaging in offsets too, in order to inform 
and influence the impending policy discussions. The Natural Capital Initiative, a partnership formed 
in 2009 between a number of research institutes, the Society of Biology and the British Ecological 
Society, held three workshops aimed at tackling various practical, scientific and design issues 
between June and December 2010, bringing together a cross-section of interested stakeholders (see 
NCI, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Adding to the burgeoning literature, eftec and Climate Change Capital 
produced a report on habitat banking in the UK (Caldecott & Dickie, 2010), making the economic 
case for a strong regulatory market to lever private finance for conservation.  
In June 2011, the UK government published its White Paper (Defra, 2011a), at the same time as the 
launch of the UK NEA (2011). As will be discussed shortly, the NEA, together with the Lawton review, 
provided the conceptual framework for the government’s overall nature conservation strategy. Defra 
(2011c) also published a response to Lawton, highlighting the recommendations within it regarding 
                                                     
34 Those who participated included local government actors, NGOs, developers, consultants, academics, 
landowners and managers, professional associations from relevant fields, and some who worked with offsets 
professionally (see Defra, 2011e). 
35 These issues will be dealt with in detail in subsequent chapters. 
36 As a voluntary system, offsetting could be used at the discretion of planning authorities or developers to meet 
planning requirements, but developers would never to obligated to use the mechanism. 
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the use of biodiversity offsetting. The White Paper pledged to launch six voluntary-based two-year 
local biodiversity offset pilots, beginning in Spring 2012, which would be overseen by Natural England 
for quality assurance. Local testing would be carried out with a view to a full rollout of consistent, 
national policy, posited as a strategy which could make managing the effects of development both 
simple and cost effective through planning, while at the same time helping to expand and restore 
England’s ecological network in line with Lawton’s recommendations. 
Before proceeding, Table 6 provides an overview of the regulatory and legislative landscape with 
respect to biodiversity in England around 2012, emanating from laws and policies operating at 
different geographical scales, which would require compliance or consideration in planning. 
Table 6: Major nature conservation laws, policies and strategies relevant to the English 
planning system in April 2012 
Scale Convention, 
legislation or policy 
framework 
Notes 
International 
conventions 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
(CBD) (1992) 
▪ Framework for UK Biodiversity Action Plan (1994) and local 
BAPs, and later Conserving Biodiversity – the UK Approach 
(2007)  
▪ Aichi Targets adopted at Nagoya 2010, aim to halt global 
biodiversity loss by 2020 – embedded in EU Biodiversity 
Strategy; UK/England through Natural Environment White 
Paper and Biodiversity 2020 
 Ramsar (1971) ▪ Protecting internationally important wetlands, ratified by UK in 
1976 
▪ Usually designated as SSSIs under Wildlife and Countryside 
Act 1981 (as amended) 
 Bonn (1979) ▪ Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals, ratified by UK in 1982 
▪ Strict species protections legislated under Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1981 (as amended) 
 Bern (1979) ▪ The Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and 
Natural Habitats, UK ratified in 1982 
▪ Basis for EU Habitats and Birds Directives 
▪ Legal obligations transposed onto Wildlife and Countryside Act 
1981 (as amended) 
European 
legislation 
EC Habitats (1992) 
and Wild Birds (1979) 
Directives 
▪ Twin directives enacting Bern Convention into European law – 
requiring UK as member state to implement 
▪ Basis for Natura 2000 network of highly protected Special 
Areas of Conservation and Special Protection Areas 
respectively 
▪ Transposed into UK law as The Conservation (Natural Habitats, 
&c.) Regulations 1994; later Conservation of Habitats and 
Species Regulations 2010  
 EU Water Framework 
Directive (2000) 
▪ Protection of rivers, lakes and estuaries and their ecosystems, 
required to be meeting ‘good status’ by 2015 
▪ In UK law as The Water Environment (Water Framework 
Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2003 
 EU Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive 
(2008) 
▪ Outline legislative framework for taking ecosystem approach 
aims to achieve ‘Good Environmental Status’ of marine 
environments by 2020 
▪ Has led to publication of UK Marine Strategy Part One (2012) 
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 Environmental Impact 
Assessment Directive 
(1985) 
▪ Mandatory EIA applies to various public and private 
development projects screened as having significant 
environmental effects; discretionary below certain impact 
thresholds; legislation instructs observance of mitigation 
hierarchy 
▪ Legal status in UK under Town and Country Planning 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 
 Strategic 
Environmental 
Assessment Directive 
(2001) 
▪ Requires all plan-making (e.g. local plans) to undertake SEA – 
assesses and consult relevant bodies on likely environmental 
impact of strategic plan-making; obliging use of mitigation 
hierarchy at strategic plan-making stage 
▪ Passed into UK law as Environmental Assessment of Plans and 
Programmes Regulations 2004 
 Environmental 
Liability Directive 
(2004) 
▪ Aims to make those causing damage to environment (including 
nature) legally and financially responsible for that damage – 
includes adherence to mitigation hierarchy 
▪ Transposed into UK law as Environmental Damage 
Regulations, Preventing and Remedying Environmental 
Damage 2009 
European 
biodiversity 
strategies 
EU Biodiversity 
Strategy (2011) 
▪ EU strategy for meeting Aichi targets of halting biodiversity loss 
by 2020 
▪ Feeds into UK/English biodiversity strategies 
UK 
legislation 
Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 
(1981) 
▪ Puts into UK law major international conventions and European 
legislation – periodically amended, updated and consolidated 
▪ Establishes designation and protection of Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest, limestone pavements, national nature 
reserves, marine nature reserves, national parks and 
countryside; contains most protected species and habitat 
designation 
 Natural Environment 
and Rural 
Communities Act 
(2006) 
▪ Amended Wildlife and Countryside Act 
▪ Includes Biodiversity Duty as statutory obligation on all public 
bodies, initially established in Countryside and Rights of Way 
Act (2000), which also amended Wildlife and Countryside Act 
UK/English 
biodiversity 
strategies 
Natural Environment 
White Paper (2011) 
▪ National strategy for England for implementing UK and EU 
international commitments relating to natural environment 
▪ Informed by National Ecosystem Assessment and Lawton 
review 
 Biodiversity 2020 
(2011) 
▪ National strategy for England specifically relating to biodiversity 
in deliver Aichi targets by 2020 
▪ Part of UK Post-2010 Biodiversity Framework, which replaced 
UK BAP (1994) 
English 
planning 
policy and 
guidance 
National Planning 
Policy Framework 
(2012) 
▪ Sets framework for local planning policy 
▪ Replaces PPS9 as guidance on how local planning documents 
and functions should implement and give consideration to 
national environmental laws and policies 
Local 
planning 
documents 
Local plans ▪ Local authorities’ strategic planning documents, based on 
framework set by NPPF, and complying with all above national 
environmental laws and planning duties, as well as 
demonstrating conformity with various directives, frameworks 
and strategies 
▪ Document designating local site allocation; basis for 
determination of planning applications and development control 
procedures 
Sources: www.jncc.defra.gov.uk; www.gov.uk; www.planningguidance.communities.gov.uk; 
www.ec.europa.eu 
138 
 
2: Biodiversity offsetting in context: the green economy, deregulation and 
fiscal austerity in England 
Before continuing with the story, some more context is necessary with respect to the particular 
historical juncture in which biodiversity offsetting emerged, in the form it did. This part of the chapter 
therefore elaborates on the government’s wider nature conservation strategy, and its intersection with 
other policies in a time of turbulent political economic uncertainty and change. It looks first at how 
offsetting was positioned as a key policy mechanism within a broader ecosystem services framework, 
which was orientated heavily towards valuation of nature and growing a national green economy. 
Second, it concentrates on how this changing ecological regime was situated in, and conditioned by, 
the government’s political agenda in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, bank bailouts and 
recession – the stated objectives of which revolved largely around cutting the state’s budget deficit 
through rounds of deep fiscal austerity, while pursuing economic growth through a strategy of 
deregulation, including significant reform and liberalisation of the land use planning system. 
2.1: An ecosystem approach and growing the green economy 
In her introductory remarks, Spelman wrote that the White Paper was a new, 50-year natural 
environment strategy, which placed “the value of nature at the centre of the choices our nation must 
make: to enhance our environment, economic growth and personal well-being” (Defra, 2011a, p. 2). 
Underpinning this statement was the conceptual framework of ecosystem services, which, since the 
publication of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005), had grown to become the 
dominant nature conservation paradigm in international and domestic arenas, in conjunction with the 
increasingly synonymous association of sustainable development with the green economy. The 
novelty of the NEWP, the first of its kind since 1990 in the UK, was using this approach as the 
foundation for an entire integrated natural environment strategy, foregrounding a number of core 
concepts in its opening pages: ecosystem services (Defra, 2011a, p. 8); the role of biodiversity (p. 9); 
natural capital (p. 11); and market failure (p. 11). 
The White Paper drew on a substantial evidence base animated by this conceptual framework (see 
Defra, 2011d). While heavily referencing the high profile international studies, the MEA and The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB, 2010b), its national premise rested on the findings 
of the Lawton review and NEA – which, as discussed, preceded the coalition government. Each of 
these studies had deployed an ecosystem approach, and made recommendations on the basis of 
reversing the decline of natural capital and ecosystem services (for discussion, see Lawton & Rudd, 
2013). Lawton’s report, titled Making Space for Nature: A review of England’s Wildlife Sites and 
Ecological Network, had analysed the state of the country’s natural environment and its ecological 
functioning in the face of pressures such as demographic change, economic growth, regulatory shifts, 
and climate change. It argued nature in England had become highly fragmented, and needed 
rebuilding if the provision of ecosystem services vital to social and economic life was to be maintained. 
Its core recommendations centred on the (re)construction of a resilient ecological network, delivered 
by strategic conservation planning at a landscape scale (Lawton et al., 2010). The report discussed 
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a range of possible policy mechanisms, including biodiversity offsetting and payment for ecosystem 
services (both explicitly market-orientated), as well as other incentive schemes, rewilding, and the 
creation of large-scale Ecological Restoration Zones, all designed to contribute to a ‘bigger, better 
and more joined up’ ecological network. According to the study, achieving this goal would require 
between £600m and £1.2bn of investment per year.  
The NEA meanwhile found over 30 percent of ecosystem services provided by the UK’s natural 
environment were in decline. It expected such trends to continue if unchecked, citing similar drivers 
to Lawton, while identifying land-use change as one of the major causes of biodiversity loss. Bringing 
together 500 natural scientists, social scientists and economists, the critical contention of the NEA 
was that the UK’s natural environment was systemically under-valued in measures of national wealth. 
Specifically, economic invisibility was postulated as a central cause of degradation, since its economic 
cost of lost ecosystem services was not accounted for in decision-making processes:  
The values of most ecosystem services are currently omitted from national economic 
frameworks and local decision making. Failure to include the valuation of non-market goods 
in decision making results in a less efficient resource allocation (UK NEA, 2011, p. 13).  
These economic norms, it was argued, were detrimental to the generation and maintenance of 
societal wealth and human well-being. Though it did not attempt any kind of economic valuation itself, 
the NEA made strong recommendations that policies should be orientated towards embedding such 
an approach across the whole of social life.  
In terms of content, the White Paper was divided into four themes, through which the government 
would aim to “mainstream” the value of nature across society (Defra, 2011a, p. 3). The first, 
‘Protecting and improving our natural environment’, focused primarily on conservation and the state 
of England’s ecosystems. It set out the government’s ambition by 2020, following commitments made 
through the Nagoya Protocol37, to “halt overall biodiversity loss, support healthy well-functioning 
ecosystems and establish coherent ecological networks, with more and better places for nature for 
the benefit of wildlife and people” (p. 17)38. Biodiversity 2020, a strategic vision for achieving this goal, 
was to be published two months later (see Defra, 2011h), while the NEWP described the policy 
mechanisms it would use to build a resilient ecological network, through ecologically coherent 
planning at a landscape scale. Institutionally, this would mean the creation of Local Nature 
Partnerships (LNPs), populated by people from business, the public sector and civil society, to provide 
leadership and influence an ecosystem approach to local governance at a strategic scale39. 12 initial 
Nature Improvement Areas (NIAs) were also to be identified for piloting through a competitive bidding 
process, which would be expected to operate as analogous to Lawton’s Ecological Restoration 
                                                     
37 The Nagoya Protocol was an international agreement signed at the 10th conference of the parties meeting of 
the CBD, which took place in Nagoya, Japan, in 2010. 
38 It should be noted that this was not any kind of legally binding commitment, but rather a policy objective, with 
significant caveats. 
39 The idea of LNPs was that they embody the government’s ‘localism agenda’, discussed in the next subsection. 
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Zones. A pot of £1m would be accessible for establishing the 50 intended LNPs, while £7.5m was to 
be extended to the NIAs over the next five years40. On top of these institutions, the government’s 
planning reforms, including the testing of biodiversity offsets, were touted as the most important lever 
for protecting ‘natural value’ and meeting the stated objective of no net loss of biodiversity. 
Significantly, encouraging innovative green design and ecologically coherent planning was said to be 
primarily dependent on making planning and decision-making more flexible, in contrast to the existing 
state of overly centralised and bureaucratic procedures (Defra, 2011a, pp. 21–2). 
The second, most eye-catching theme, was titled ‘Growing a green economy’. It set out the 
government’s ambition to fuel growth in the green economy, particularly through exploiting the 
business opportunities present in the UK’s natural capital and ecosystem services. Taking its lead 
from TEEB and the NEA, this section was built on the conviction that economic growth and 
sustainability were mutually compatible and dependent, rather than in opposition, and that ecosystem 
services are fundamental to any sustainable economy. The corollary case made was that maintaining 
sustainable growth is only feasible if the economic system could properly capture the value of the 
“stocks and flows of natural capital” (Defra, 2011a, p. 34). In practical terms, a number of measures 
and policy instruments were promised, along with new public-private sector initiatives. An 
independent Natural Capital Committee would be inaugurated to advise government on the state of 
the nation’s natural capital, and recommend evidence-based priorities for its protection and 
enhancement in relation to economic planning. The Office for National Statistics would also be 
instructed to “fully include natural capital in the UK Environmental Accounts” over the next few years, 
in order, ultimately, to “move from measuring the value of the physical stocks to systematically valuing 
the services they provide” (Defra, 2011a, p. 36). Much of the green economy theme was devoted to 
the establishment and expansion of new markets, highlighting the supposedly vast business 
opportunities available in economically valuable natural capital. For instance, the further trialling and 
expansion of PES schemes announced as another green market with great potential. However, 
though the state would play an important enabling role, and be central to developing new modes of 
environmental audit and performance indicators, it was made clear green growth was expected to be 
largely driven and financed by private enterprise. Of particular relevance on the topic of biodiversity 
offsetting, it would later turn out, was the establishment of an independent, business-led Ecosystem 
Markets Task Force (EMTF): “to review the opportunities for UK business from expanding green 
goods, services, products, investment vehicles and markets which value and protect nature’s 
services” (Defra, 2011a, p. 40). 
The third theme, ‘Reconnecting people with nature’, promoted the mutually beneficial relationship 
between a high-quality natural environment, public health and social cohesion, suggesting action 
which is good for nature is good for people. Though less directly relevant to the topic of the thesis, 
this section was largely framed in terms of people’s consumptive relationship with the natural 
                                                     
40 This was all the new money to be made available by the government before 2015. 
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environment, and the benefits for personal well-being. It described how government policy could 
facilitate ‘access to nature’ through various policy levers, and encourage voluntary activity among the 
population, tied in with its localism agenda, to achieve the objectives of the overall strategy. The final 
theme, headed ‘International and EU leadership’, highlighted how the White Paper was constructed 
in relation to nature conservation regimes and institutions at higher scales. This included the 
government’s commitments to the CBD, its role in pushing the green economy agenda at ‘Rio+20’, 
the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, and the government’s connected work in the 
sphere of international development. The last section also covered the UK’s place in the EU, and the 
government’s part in developing European-wide strategies for biodiversity conservation, resource-
efficient growth and becoming the world’s largest green economy and market. 
2.2: Austerity, planning reform and environmental deregulation post-2008 
2.2.1 Austerity and state restructuring 
The articulation of a market-orientated ecosystem services policy framework for conservation in 
England, and biodiversity offsetting’s place within it, was constituted at a particular historical moment 
which is crucial for unravelling much of what happened over the next four years. The Conservative-
led coalition came to power after 13 years of Labour rule in the wake of the global financial crisis of 
2008, the bailing out of British banks by the government, and the deepest domestic recession since 
the Second World War. Though the UK economy appeared to be growing steadily by the time of the 
General Election of 2010, the Conservative party won the largest share of the vote, on a platform of 
tackling the state’s growing budget deficit and rebalancing the economy. Led by Cameron, they were 
largely successful in painting the country’s ongoing problems as the result of years of profligate public 
spending under the premierships of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Fiscal austerity was subsequently 
the centrepiece of economic planning for the new government, with substantial cuts implemented 
across nearly all aspects of state expenditure. 
Ecological regulation and nature conservation were heavily impacted by these cuts. Resources were 
withdrawn from central government departments and attached state agencies, while block grants to 
local authorities, which accounted for approximately three quarters of municipal expenditure, were 
considerably reduced too. These were the key centres of policymaking and regulatory oversight at 
different scales, as well as institutions which allocated funds for non-state actors engaging in 
conservation activities. The limited availability of public money was one major attraction to offsetting, 
since it would ostensibly be financed by private means. Furthermore, in the so-called ‘bonfire of the 
quangos’, a number of other government-funded environmental and advisory bodies were abolished, 
including the independent Sustainable Development Commission (Vaughan, 2010). While the extent 
of public spending cuts in general was substantial, the environmental components of state capacities 
were hit particularly hard. Over the course of the 2010-15 parliament, spending at Defra was to be 
reduced by around 30 percent, the highest of any government department (Marshall, 2013c; Jowit, 
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2010)41. These cuts extended to all of the state regulatory agencies under Defra’s remit, most 
significantly Natural England and the Environment Agency (Marshall, 2013b; ENDS Report, 2011a; 
McCarthy, 2010). Between them, Defra and the agencies were expected to lose a comparable 
proportion of jobs, with up to 8,000 of a total 30,000 staff to be made redundant (Jowit, 2010).  
In terms of subnational regulation, some estimates put central government cuts to local authority 
budgets at equally high levels as those at Defra (Johnstone, 2014). The majority were overseen by 
the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), and were implemented unevenly 
both between and within local authorities. While the poorer areas of the country were hit by the largest 
cuts (Cadman, 2015), planning departments and their environmental units, where offsetting would be 
largely administered and overseen, were disproportionately impacted upon (interviews). According to 
data collected by the Association of Local Government Ecologists (ALGE), 10 of 13 areas of local 
biodiversity work were undergoing “at least a 60% budget cut” in 2011/12 (EFRA Committee, 2012a, 
p. 116). Like Defra and its agencies, local planning authorities underwent restructuring aimed at 
saving money. While some local government ecologists were laid off, others were moved into external 
trusts, run on a commercial basis through service level agreements (interview 2a; see also e.g. Local 
Government Association & English Heritage, 2013).  
The overall effect on capacity was to put considerable strain on the delivery of core obligations of 
planning and ecological regulation, while Defra recorded some of the lowest levels of staff morale 
and confidence in departmental leadership across government (Kaminski, 2015c; Marshall, 2014). 
Locally, understaffing was reportedly slowing down the processing of planning applications in general 
(Carpenter, 2015), and environmental functions appeared to be at the sharp end. As part of a public 
inquiry into the prospects for the White Paper strategy soon after publication, ALGE expressed 
concern:  
over the apparent ‘mis-match’ between the aspirations and expectation expressed in the 
Natural Environment White Paper, when weighed against diminishing availability of 
resources within local government to actually engage with and undertake the sorts of 
biodiversity initiatives outlined (EFRA Committee, 2012b, p. 116). 
This was seen as potentially aggravating a state of affairs where biodiversity was already critically 
undervalued in planning. ALGE’s figures from 2004 had shown only 35 percent of local authorities 
employed an in-house ecologist, while a more recent survey found 74 percent of planners had only a 
basic understanding of the mitigation hierarchy. ALGE concluded many planning authorities: 
do not currently have either the capacity or the competence to undertake the effective, and 
in some cases necessarily lawful, assessment of planning applications where biodiversity is 
a material condition (Oxford, 2013, p. ii).  
                                                     
41 A further 30 percent agreed for the 2015-20 period (Howard, 2015), under a new majority Conservative 
government elected in May 2015. However, following the resignation of David Cameron after the EU referendum 
of June 2016, and the sacking of his chancellor, George Osborne, by new Conservative Prime Minister Theresa 
May, the fate of these plans was somewhat uncertain at the time of writing.  
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Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) frequently relied on the state agencies for expert advice on 
planning applications, but cuts to the Environment Agency meant it was forced to stop commenting 
on biodiversity matters altogether in 2014, and Natural England was unable to pick up the slack 
(Branson, 2014) – though it purportedly did improve the speed at which it responded to requests 
(Donnelly, 2014). 
2.2.2: Environmental deregulation 
In a period of economic uncertainty and fiscal contraction, the UK government embarked on a national 
growth strategy centred on deregulation, arguing that private sector investment was being hamstrung 
by overbearing and costly bureaucracy (e.g. Wheeler, 2011; Cameron, 2010b). In April 2011, the 
government launched the Red Tape Challenge (RTC). Jointly led by the Cabinet Office and the Better 
Regulation Executive within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the purpose of 
the RTC was to reduce excessive regulatory burden on business, and fast-track mechanisms to do 
so42. This led to a number of deregulatory obligations on all government department. Concretely, 
according to the government’s Principles of Regulation, all domestic policy measures introduced from 
January 2011 were subject to a ‘one-in, one-out’, and from January 2013 a ‘one-in, two-out’ rule, 
which stated:  
Any measure which regulates or deregulates business and is expected to result in a direct 
net cost to business must be offset by measures that deregulate business and provide 
savings to business of at least double that amount (BIS, 2013, p. 40).  
Compliance would be overseen by the recently formed and independent Regulatory Policy 
Committee (RPC), which would rule whether measures were ‘fit for purpose’, based on evidence 
submitted in an impact assessment using a specifically designed cost-benefit analysis (see Gibbons 
& Parker, 2012). Defra’s biodiversity offsetting proposals would ultimately have to undergo this 
process, and would fail. 
Environmental regulation was a key target of the deregulatory drive, despite Cameron’s earlier 
pronouncement of his being the ‘greenest government ever’. At the Tory party conference in October 
2011, Chancellor George Osborne made a speech in which he said: “We’re not going to save the 
planet by putting our country out of business”, referring to the UK’s ambitious carbon emissions 
reduction targets (Murray, 2011). Later in the year he would attack green policies, and especially 
those planning laws emanating from EU directives, as a “burden” and “ridiculous cost” on business 
(Harvey, 2011; see also Stratton, 2011). The findings of a review of the Habitats and Birds Directives 
carried out on Osborne’s instructions, published in March the next year, strongly rejected his claims 
(see Defra, 2012a; also BBC, 2012). However, at a moment when the UK was slipping back into 
recession, Cameron had already backed his chancellor’s assertion that ‘gold-plated’ environmental 
                                                     
42 The RTC was superseded by Cutting Red Tape after the General Election of 2015, to be operated along 
similar lines (cutting-red-tape.cabinetoffice.gov.uk). 
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and planning regulations were blocking economic growth, and needed to be tackled (Carrington, 
2012a; Watt, 2012).  
Even after growth returned to the UK, the perceived antagonism towards environmental protections 
did not die down. In 2013 for instance, Cameron was alleged to have been repeatedly telling 
colleagues: “We have to get rid of all this green crap”, when discussing energy policy (Mason, 2013). 
In the eyes of critics, this increasingly hostile narrative was mirrored by key appointments at Defra 
and its agencies. Most notably this included Spelman’s replacement, Owen Paterson, who was 
viewed as being on the hard right of the Conservative party with deep antipathy for environmental 
concerns and their advocates (Cusick, 2013; Carrington, 2012c). The government courted 
controversy on a number of other occasions with regard to its environmental record, notably in relation 
to its aborted sell-off of a large portion of England’s public forests, which ultimately cost Spelman her 
job; ongoing plans to build HS2, an expensive and contentious high-speed rail project which proposes 
to cut through large swathes of the countryside and remaining ancient woodland; an unpopular and 
unsuccessful badger cull, against scientific advice, in an effort to curb the spread of bovine 
tuberculosis; and the continued pursuit of shale gas exploration and ‘fracking’ in the face of 
widespread public opposition and resistance from local communities (Carter & Clements, 2015). 
Defra, meanwhile, was at the forefront of efforts to implement the government’s deregulatory agenda 
(Kaminski, 2015a). In response to the RTC, it began its own Smarter Environmental Regulation 
Review (SERR) (Defra, 2013a; see also ENDS Report, 2012b), convened by a business-led panel, 
before developing strategic plan of action. Though environmental laws themselves looked like they 
would be left mostly intact (ENDS Report, 2012a), at the end of the first phase of SERR the following 
May Defra announced plans for a ‘radical overhaul’ of environmental guidance and reporting 
(Kaminski, 2013). The second phase was launched in April 2014 (Kaminski, 2014b; see also 
Mathiesen, 2014), under the auspices of Defra Better for Business (Defra, 2014a). Soon after Defra 
could point to the results of the government’s Business Perceptions Survey (NAO & BIS, 2014) to 
justify their approach, through which private sectors leaders identified environmental regulation as 
the most burdensome they faced –  though the evidence for this was refuted from various quarters 
(Kaminski, 2015a, 2015b, 2016b, 2016a; Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2014; New Economics Foundation, 
2014; ENDS Report, 2011c). 
The deregulatory drive continued towards the end of the government’s parliamentary term43. In 
August 2014 for example, to some criticism, Defra indicated it would be raising the area threshold at 
which EIAs would be required as part of planning applications (Geoghegan, 2014). The measures, 
mooted as removing unnecessary bureaucracy, were confirmed in January (Sell, 2015). One of the 
most significant developments was the passing of the Deregulation Act of 2015, which put various 
elements of the RTC and related policy goals into legislation (Kaminski, 2014a, 2015a). In terms of 
                                                     
43 It would extend beyond the coalition government too into the Conservative majority administration beginning 
in May 2015 (Kaminski, 2015d) 
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its impact on environmental policy, this new law imposed a ‘growth duty’ on all government regulators. 
This meant Natural England and the Environment Agency would now be legally obliged to give due 
consideration to economic growth objectives while carrying out their regulatory functions. 
Though this section has covered many of the key moments of the national deregulation agenda in 
England and the UK, it should also be briefly noted that a concurrent process was unfolding at the 
EU level, where large parts of UK legislation originated. Under the so-called REFIT platform begun 
in late 2010, the European Commission (n.d.) was at the forefront of moves to make EU law ‘lighter, 
simpler and less costly’, and with leading officials later looking to the UK’s ‘one-in, two-out’ model as 
a potential blueprint for their own reforms (Kaminski, 2014c). As this progressed, the Habitats and 
Birds Directives underwent a controversial ‘fitness check’. This was widely seen in consultation as an 
attempt to water down these strong protections (e.g. Mazza, 2015). The evidence gathered suggested 
the laws remained well-designed and appropriate, while environmental organisations argued their 
main concerns were with poor levels of implementation and enforcement. This was crucial context to 
the Commission’s efforts to construct an EU No Net Loss Strategy, together with consultation on 
biodiversity offsetting, which would play out alongside the development of the English proposals 
(Table 7 below). 
Table 7: EU No Net Loss Initiative and biodiversity offsetting proposals (2010-15) 
Date Key developments 
May 2011 European Commission (2011a) publishes Our life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity 
strategy to 2020, in line with CBD commitments setting EU target of halting the loss of biodiversity 
by 2020 
▪ Action 7 is to ensure no net loss of biodiversity of ecosystem services, aimed at sites not 
covered by existing EU nature legislation – includes proposal for "an initiative to ensure there is 
no net loss of ecosystems and their services (e.g. through compensation or offsetting 
schemes)" by 2015 (European Commission, 2011a, p. 12) 
▪ Reiterated in 50-year Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (European Commission, 2011b) 
April 2012 Resolution by European Parliament for Commission to “develop an effective regulatory framework 
based on the ‘No Net Loss’ initiative, taking into account the past experience of the Member States 
while also utilizing the standards applied by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme” 
(European Parliament, 2013, p. 10) 
▪ Also supported by the European Council of Ministers, in conclusions reached in June 2011 and 
December 2011 
July 2013 Final meeting of the Working Group on No Net Loss of Ecosystems and their Services (2013b, 
2013a) adopts two major documents on scope and objectives and operational principles of initiative 
January 2014 Policy options for the EU No Net Loss Initiative published, with biodiversity offsetting as central 
policy mechanism (Tucker et al., 2013) 
▪ One of a series of major reports commissioned on the No Net Loss Initiative and biodiversity 
offsetting (ICF Consulting & IEEP, 2014; e.g. Conway et al., 2013) 
June 2014 Beginning of a European-wide consultation on the proposals for the EU No Net Loss Initiative, to 
run until October 2015 
▪ Proposals prove controversial, with lines of dispute following similar themes to those which 
emerged in England 
January 2015 Results of the European Commission’s (2015) consultation are released, with little identifiable 
common ground 
▪ No further major developments, initiative appears to have stalled 
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2.2.3: Planning reform 
A substantial part of this deregulatory drive was aimed squarely at supporting economic growth 
through land development, and facilitating major infrastructure projects and housing. Since long 
before the coalition government had come to power, there had been a broad consensus across all 
the major political parties that the UK suffered from a chronic shortage of (affordable) housing, though 
the picture had always been geographically uneven (Tait & Inch, 2016; Cochrane et al., 2015). 
Housebuilding had not kept up with the demands of a growing population and other demographic 
shifts, especially in London and south east England, since the 1970s, when the UK’s political 
economy began to be dramatically restructured along neoliberal lines, resulting in, among other 
things, the virtual secession of the construction of council housing. 
The popular narrative subscribed to by successive governments centred firmly on the planning 
system, widely seen as one of the last vestiges of the post-war social democratic settlement. 
Acquiescing to the critique promulgated by many right-leaning groups and influential think tanks, 
planning came to be viewed as another form of centralised command-and-control, responsible for 
stymying economic growth and housing affordability (Haughton & Allmendinger, 2016). Planning itself 
became viewed primarily as a burden, with planners either seen as imposing damaging costs on 
businesses, or, alternatively, as being complicit in the restriction of supply to the benefit of large 
developers and landowners, intentionally or otherwise (Cochrane et al., 2015; Haughton & 
Allmendinger, 2013). Liberalisation was always presented as the solution, and the Labour 
governments between 1997 and 2010 were particularly active in planning reform in this direction (Lord 
& Tewdwr-Jones, 2014). Their recalibration of the traditional land-use planning system, towards one 
undergirded by spatial planning (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012), was deemed necessary for 
nurturing a ‘competitive’ economy, particularly by the powerful Treasury department (Tait & Inch, 
2016; Lord & Tewdwr-Jones, 2014; Cowell, 2013).  
When the coalition government came to power, planning reform was high on the agenda once again, 
and a new programme of reform was set in motion immediately. Its rationale rested largely on the 
perceived failure of spatial planning under Labour to speed up permitting procedures and deliver 
growth (Tait & Inch, 2016; Lord & Tewdwr-Jones, 2014). Environmental regulations such as the 
Habitats Directive and EIA, meanwhile, were presented as particular obstacles to development. 
Moves to further liberalise and deregulate were widely seen as influenced by Policy Exchange and 
its chief planning commentator Alex Morton (e.g. 2010, 2011), who would later become an advisor to 
Cameron on planning and housing (Haughton & Allmendinger, 2016). The prominent think tank, set 
up by future Conservative planning minister Nick Boles, would also produce an important report in 
favour of biodiversity offsetting in the early years of the parliament (Newey, 2012).   
In July 2010, two months after taking office, the new government announced the abolition of the 
regional development agencies (RDAs) and regional spatial strategies (RSSs), which had been 
introduced by Labour in 1999 as an additional layer of subnational governance, aimed in part to act 
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as conduits through which geographical inequalities in England could be addressed44. Among other 
things, the RSSs had been central to determining housing allocation across the English regions, and 
setting targets for local housing supply, as well as acting as key nodes for strategic conservation 
planning at the subnational level. Under what became known as the coalition’s ‘localism agenda’, the 
RDAs were the first casualties of purported efforts to empower local people, communities and 
businesses, by radically decentralising and liberalising planning processes (Tait & Inch, 2016; Cowell, 
2013). This was all framed as the antidote to the problems of New Labour’s predilections with 
centralised, top-down target-setting, likened in public to Stalinist central planning (Lord & Tewdwr-
Jones, 2014; Haughton & Allmendinger, 2013). 
Alongside a legislative programme passed through the Localism Act of 2011, the new government 
began developing a new National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) in December 2010 (Tait & Inch, 
2016). The NPPF was pitched primarily as a streamlining exercise (Cowell, 2013), which would 
eventually replace thousands of pages of planning policy and guidance down to a 65-page document, 
with supplementary online guidance. A draft version of the framework (DCLG, 2011) was put out to 
consultation in July 2011 just after the NEWP was published. It stoked considerable controversy with 
respect to its clear orientation towards development and growth (Tait & Inch, 2016). At the centre of 
this was the phrase ‘presumption in favour of sustainable development’, which ministers suggested 
meant the default answer to any planning application should be ‘yes’. On a more general level, the 
wording of the draft NPPF appeared to significantly demote sustainability and conservation duties 
relative to the imperative to deliver growth-as-development45. Though international and European 
sites were still well protected, environmental principles were more heavily qualified by concerns with 
project ‘viability’, while rejected applications would require overwhelming proof that loss of 
environmental values outweighed the presumed public good of development (Cowell, 2013). The 
deregulatory message was heavily criticised by green groups in particular, but also by core suburban 
and rural conservative constituencies, backed by the staunchly partisan Daily Telegraph, who saw 
the reforms as a threat to the countryside and green belt designation which partially held back urban 
sprawl (Tait & Inch, 2016). 
By the time the NPPF (DCLG, 2012) was finalised in March 2012, some modifications had been 
made. Further details regarding the definition of ‘sustainable development’ had been put in place to 
placate these interests, in consultation with the National Trust and Campaign for the Protection of 
Rural England (CPRE) (Tait & Inch, 2016). The strong pro-growth mantra of the framework remained 
non-negotiable, however, and alongside this uneasy compromise significant control was maintained 
by the central state, especially with regard to national infrastructure planning, which was deemed vital 
                                                     
44 The inauguration of regional planning was meant in part as a step towards regional government, but this move 
proved unpopular and was quickly abandoned following a heavy defeat in a referendum on the issue in the north 
east. 
45 There was also a concern among environmental NGOs, who had managed to access and lever some influence 
over the RSSs, that they would be spread too thinly to intervene and provide oversight and expertise in the more 
local decisions engendered by the NPPF (Cowell, 2013). 
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enough in the realm of national competitiveness to necessitate special fast-tracked planning 
procedures put in place by Labour (Cowell, 2013). The localism agenda had been initiated on the 
premise that planning was a barrier which needed to be removed to free growth. However, over the 
course of the parliament, the tension between decentralised power and the coalition’s growth 
imperative was increasingly resolved by a more ‘muscular’ approach by central government, much of 
it enabled through the Growth and Infrastructure Act of 2013 (Tait & Inch, 2016). Localism’s 
controversies and fragile coherence meant it gradually became a less pronounced part of the 
government’s core programme, and the central state assumed a more coercive and controlling 
demeanour over planning authorities viewed as failing to deliver, in spite of incentive schemes such 
as the New Homes Bonus (Tait & Inch, 2016; Cowell, 2013). One of the more consequential aspects 
of the whole raft of reforms, relating to the biodiversity compensation regime, was the transfer of 
responsibility of housing supply. This passed to LPAs, who would need to demonstrate how they 
would meet future housing need in their area over five-year periods of ‘local plans’, reconstituted as 
the core strategic planning documents determining local land-use. If they were judged unable to do 
this by the national Planning Inspectorate, an outcome which was highly plausible given existing 
economic and housing market conditions in England, development permission could be granted from 
above, outside the areas and conditions set out in local plans. LPAs could effectively lose their powers 
of development control. 
Returning to the substance of the compensation regime, and to move the story of biodiversity 
offsetting’s passage forward, it is important to note that the NPPF replaced PPS9 and existing 
guidance. Protections relating to international and European sites remained unchanged, as did those 
of SSSIs. For lower or undesignated sites, the use of offsetting was still not mentioned explicitly, as 
it had yet to be tested46. The NPPF did however make reference to the government’s targets of halting 
overall biodiversity loss by 2020, while its definition of sustainable development included “moving 
from a net loss of bio-diversity to achieving net gains for nature” (DCLG, 2012, p. 3). Specifically, in 
relation to determining planning applications, it stated that LPAs “should aim to conserve and enhance 
biodiversity”, observing several principles, including application of the mitigation hierarchy:  
if significant harm resulting from a development cannot be avoided (through locating on an 
alternative site with less harmful impacts), adequately mitigated, or, as a last resort, 
compensated for, then planning permission should be refused (DCLG, 2012, p. 27).  
As isolated statements, little had been changed with respect to compensation requirements in 
planning. Rather, it was the surrounding context of planning reform and apparent moves to loosen 
environmental regulation, and especially the increased weighting given to economic growth in key 
documents and legislation, which would shape how wider use of biodiversity offsets was be 
interpreted in theory and practice. 
                                                     
46 However, in March 2014 the online guidance was updated to reflect a decision by the Planning Inspectorate, 
which deemed biodiversity offsetting, as defined by Defra, to be an appropriate method for delivering 
compensation, and therefore a legitimate option available to LPAs and developers to comply with the NPPF. 
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3: Policymaking and national developments before the pilots 2011-12 
The pilots were launched nine months after the White Paper and soon after the NPPF was finalised, 
in April 2012. The first impact assessment, which accompanied the NEWP proposals, made an 
optimistic economic case for the policy (Defra, 2011b). Based on figures estimating the ecosystem 
service value of delivering the UK BAP (from Christie et al., 2011) and data from the initial costing 
exercise (Rayment et al., 2011), it suggested that the overall social benefits of an offset programme 
to society (i.e. the value of benefits flowing from the investment in conservation via the imposition of 
compensation measures, assuming none was being levied at the time) would outweigh the costs to 
developers if no net loss became the normal requirement.  
On the assumption that a national programme could potentially deliver this outcome, Defra had also 
published two preliminary documents, laying out the parameters for local trials, such that they could 
operate in the context of the imminent draft NPPF and Biodiversity 2020. The first of these was a set 
of guiding principles, which built on the earlier phase of consultation, emphasising that offsetting was 
not intended to undercut existing protections. It affirmed the basic principles of measurable outcomes, 
adherence to the mitigation hierarchy and additionality, acknowledging that some habitats are 
technically irreplaceable and non-offsetable, while reiterating the importance of simplicity and value 
for money (Defra, 2011f). Further detail as to the institutional architecture was given too, partly in 
response to the Lawton review’s specific recommendations on offsets. Banking was mooted as a 
possible longer term option, but simple offsetting would need to come first. Offsetting would be as 
local as possible within a national framework, with LPAs responsible for designing local offset 
strategies, in line with and integrated into local planning policy. If the policy were to be rolled out 
nationally after piloting, it was agreed a national regulatory authority would be required, but that that 
would be a question for a later date. With these principles in place, Defra made a call for expressions 
of interest from LPAs to become pilot areas. 
The second document was a technical paper, where the first iteration of the metric was released, to 
calculate the compensation requirements of a development (Defra, 2011g). The Defra metric was 
modelled on one developed by Jo Treweek and colleagues (Treweek et al., 2010; Treweek, 2009), 
based on the Australian ‘habitat hectares’ approach (see Chapter 4, Section 1.2; and Parkes et al., 
2003), whereby the biodiversity value of a site was calculated by multiplying habitat type, by condition, 
by area in hectares. Habitat types would be classified and scored according to their level of 
distinctiveness: low (2), such as intensive agricultural land; medium (4), mostly semi-natural habitats; 
and high (6), which included all BAP habitats, and a subcategory of ‘very high’ distinctiveness BAP 
habitats, which should only be traded in specific circumstances at the discretion of the LPA. These 
scores would be multiplied against habitat condition, set initially at four levels: poor (1); moderate (2); 
good (3); and optimum (4). This would create the matrix below to ascertain the biodiversity units lost 
from a site, when multiplied by the area of impact (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Defra Biodiversity scoring matrix version 1 
Habitat distinctiveness 
H
a
b
it
a
t 
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
  Low (2) Medium (4) High (6) 
Optimum (4) 8 16 24 
Good (3) 6 12 18 
Moderate (2) 4 8 12 
Poor (1) 2 4 6 
Source: Defra (2011g, p. 6) 
To calculate the compensation requirement in units, the impact would also be subject to several risk-
related multipliers. These pivoted on the risk of failure, according to the supposed difficulty of 
restoration or recreation of the habitat type (Table 9); spatial risk, defined in relation to whether an 
offset was to be located within or linked to a strategic area identified in the local offsetting strategy 
(Table 10); and the expected time lag between impact and reaching of the offset’s target condition 
(Table 11). In terms of trading, the metric allowed for out-of-kind exchanges except in the case of 
high distinctiveness habitats, while ‘trading down’ was prohibited. Trading up would be required for 
low band distinctiveness habitats, and encouraged for medium distinctiveness habitats (Table 12). 
Hedgerows were afforded special status as high distinctiveness linear habitats, which could not be 
meaningfully measured by area. Instead, they would need to be offset in like-for-like trades according 
to length in metres. The technical paper also proposed a system of insurance developers would need 
to pay for in case of offset failure47. 
Table 9: Restoration risk multipliers 
Difficulty of 
restoration/recreation 
Multiplier 
Very high 10 
High 3.0 
Medium 1.5 
Low 1.0 
Source: Defra (2011g, p. 10) 
 
Table 10: Suggested locational risk multipliers 
Locational parameters Suggested 
multiplier 
Offset is directly contributing to a spatially identified (in the 
offsetting strategy) target or objective for the habitat in 
question 
1:1 
Offset is buffering, linking, restoring or expanding a habitat 
outside an area identified in the offsetting strategy 
1:2 
Offset is not making a contribution to the offsetting 
strategy 
1:3 
Source: Defra (2011g, p. 11) 
 
                                                     
47 Chapters 6 and 7 will look at the metric and its use in more detail. 
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Table 11: Time lag multipliers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Defra (2011g, p. 12) 
 
Table 12: Habitat type bands and trading rules 
Habitat type band Distinctiveness Type of habitat Type of offset 
Very high High BAP with ‘no loss’ 
target 
Bespoke; LPA discretion as to 
whether the offsetting 
mechanism can be used 
High High Rest of BAP habitats Like for like 
Medium Medium Semi-natural non-BAP Within band type or trade up 
Low Low Intensive agriculture Trade up 
Source: Defra (2011g, p. 4) 
Between July 2011 and April 2012, however, progress on the policy remained low key. As previously 
noted, Spelman did not view offsetting as a major priority. Despite the positive tenor of the impact 
assessment, Defra remained cautious as to what was achievable in the context of the government’s 
overriding commitments to deregulatory economic growth. The intervening period, during which 
concrete proposals were gradually assembled, was marked more prominently by the government’s 
increasing hostility to environmental regulation and the planning system. Defra erred against advice 
urging for a mandatory system, opting for offsets as voluntary for both LPAs and developers.  
The policy did receive a boost, however, from part of the business community, in the form of the 
Aldersgate Group, an active lobby group and coalition of green-minded corporates, environmental 
professionals and NGOs, and whose chair, Peter Young, sat on both Defra’s ‘Smarter Regulation’ 
committee and the government-convened EMTF. The group’s report, Pricing the Priceless: The 
business case for action on biodiversity (Aldersgate Group, 2011), followed familiar tropes to those 
espoused by BBOP, spelling out the virtues of strong regulation and the establishment of green 
markets for both economy and environment. The Environment Bank, meanwhile, launched its own 
trading platform with US firm Mission Markets, on which offset receptor sites could be registered in 
the UK, in anticipation of an uptake in interest. 
In March 2012, when the NPPF was finalised, offsetting’s supporters were given further 
encouragement, with the publication of some more in-depth research commissioned by Defra. The 
study, undertaken by David Tyldesley and Associates (2012a), called into question the effectiveness 
of existing planning processes at protecting biodiversity, especially with regard to smaller scale 
Years to target 
condition 
Multiplier 
5 1.2 
10 1.4 
15 1.7 
20 2.0 
25 2.4 
30 2.8 
32 3.0 
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developments and non-designated sites48. It found that offsite compensation (as opposed to onsite 
mitigation measures) was rarely required on successful planning applications (findings later backed 
up, see CEP & IEEP, 2013; Newey, 2012), and that biodiversity as material consideration was 
consistently undervalued, sometimes ignored or at least given less weight than economic and 
socially-orientated planning objectives during development control. Though poor practice was given 
as one minor factor, the report suggested there were regulatory and legal barriers to stronger 
implementation of the principles of PPS9. It also highlighted the unevenness of the problems found, 
reflecting interconnected issues such as differential levels of ecological expertise in LPAs and lack of 
local guidance and data. 
In April, Defra announced the six official pilot schemes, out of 12 applications. They would be Devon, 
Doncaster, Greater Norwich, Nottinghamshire, Essex and the combined areas of Warwickshire, 
Coventry and Solihull. In addition, a number of supplementary projects would feed into the process, 
which were already involved in compensation and offset-related activities49. Defra published guidance 
for local authorities (2012b), developers (2012c) and offset providers (2012d), as well as a second 
technical paper on the metric (Defra, 2012e), containing some extra information and a few 
modifications. Significantly, the ‘optimum’ condition level was removed (Table 13), while the ‘very 
high’ subcategory of distinctiveness was no longer differentiated from other BAP habitats (Table 14). 
The trials were launched immediately, and would run until April 2014. 
Table 13: Updated biodiversity matrix 
Habitat distinctiveness 
H
a
b
it
a
t 
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
  Low (2) Medium (4) High (6) 
Good (3) 6 12 18 
Moderate (2) 4 8 12 
Poor (1) 2 4 6 
Source: Defra (2012e, p. 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
48 In the large sample of planning applications reviewed, the study found biodiversity issues were “recognised 
as material considerations in less than 1% (90 out of 10,235) of all types of planning applications determined by 
local planning authorities”, but 29% of 570 statutorily defined ‘major’ planning applications. 8% of those 570 were 
deemed to have overlooked or insufficiently addressed biodiversity issues, while biodiversity was a reason for 
refusal of planning permission in 21 of 136 cases (David Tyldesley and Associates, 2012a, p. i). 
49 These were to include Atkins, Aggregates Industries, Balfour Beatty, Eco Bos and Code 7 consulting, Golder 
Associates, Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council and the Yorkshire Wildlife Trust, The Somerset Biodiversity 
Partnership and Worcestershire County Council. 
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Table 14: Updated habitat type bands and trading rules 
Habitat type band Distinctiveness Broad habitat type covered Type of offset 
High High Priority habitat, as defined in 
Section 41 of the NERC Act 
Same band type, and 
ideally like for like 
Medium Medium Semi-natural Within band type or 
trade up 
Low Low e.g. Intensive agriculture – but 
may still form an important 
part of the ecological network 
in an area 
Trade up 
Source: Defra (2012e, p. 5) 
4: The local pilots 2012-14 
The guidance provided for local authorities participating in the pilots was relatively non-prescriptive, 
other than the use of offsets would be strictly voluntary for LPAs and developers (Defra, 2012b). It 
pointed to relevant national policy, guidance and legislation to be considered and adhered to, 
especially relating to conservation and development control, and the legal methods through which 
offsets could reasonably be secured50. The most significant requirement would be for all pilot areas 
to produce a local offsetting strategy, to be developed with local partners. These should set out local 
priority habitats and target areas for offset providers, in line with the goals of the NEWP and Lawton, 
and established local conservation strategies. Within this framework there was significant flexibility, 
and pilot leaders were encouraged, if appropriate, to adapt Defra’s metric (e.g. move a particular 
habitat into a higher band) to better reflect local context and priorities. The pilots would furthermore 
be required to participate in an ongoing evaluation process commissioned to independent 
consultants, led by Collingwood Environmental Planning (CEP). Natural England would provide 
technical advice to LPAs when needed on the use of offsets locally. 
The six pilots chosen varied substantially, ecologically and according to specific local development 
pressures, and with respect to the institutional and governance arrangements of the localities51 (CEP 
& IEEP, 2014b). The Environment Bank was an official partner in two areas, and other partners 
included state agencies (Natural England and the Environment Agency), LNPs, NGOs and land 
groups, and private sector businesses and associations. Each pilot took a different approach in 
relating offsetting to local planning policy and guidance, though this mostly came in the form of 
additional notes rather than integration into core statements (CEP & IEEP, 2014c). Local offsetting 
strategies meanwhile were developed, with guidance for developers, providers and planning officers, 
such that offsets could be targeted to help realise local objectives, including green infrastructure 
strategies, local BAPs and the maintenance and expansion of local networks of designated sites. As 
                                                     
50 The potential tools were Section 106 planning obligations or planning conditions under the Town and Country 
Planning Act (1990), or the Community Infrastructure Levy established by the Planning Act (2008).  
51 The pilots were made up of a number of different types of local planning authority, including upper tier county 
councils, lower tier district councils and metropolitan borough councils, unitary city councils and national park 
authorities. Most were led and coordinated by county councils, and crossed jurisdictional boundaries between 
lower tier authorities, covering whole or parts of different districts, boroughs and national parks. 
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expressed in Defra’s (2012b) guidance, the use of offsetting was not designed to significantly alter 
local priorities or strategies, but rather to complement and streamline their delivery. 
Setting up the trials involved considerable work at the local level, and there was little to report for 
some time. However, by the midway point, a year into the testing period, problems began to surface 
(Evans, 2013a). Just as developments on the national level of policymaking began to accelerate, it 
became clear the pilots were only going to provide very limited data to analyse (CEP, 2013). As many 
had warned, two years was too short to generate significant evidence of the effectiveness of offsets, 
given the long timescales involved in the English planning system. The planning application process 
frequently takes many years for large and complex projects, while planning permissions last three 
years before they expire. As a result, developers were cautious, given that by the time they 
commenced their project offsets might no longer be relevant in the planning system. Since offsetting 
was voluntary, most simply opted out. Additionally, in a period of economic slowdown, the level of 
construction was very low, and so few planning applications were being made. Together, these 
factors contributed to there being no agreed offsets in any of the pilot areas halfway through the test 
period (CEP, 2013). At the same time, a degree of frustration was reported among several pilot 
leaders, who complained at lack of extra resources and support from Defra (Evans, 2013a). Under 
difficult economic and political conditions, LPAs found the voluntary nature of offset gave them 
insufficient leverage to extract additional compensation, though many agreed that the metric was 
proving useful as a simple communicative device, when negotiating with developers and talking to 
non-experts. Nevertheless, during the second half of the two-year trials, several pilot leaders decided 
to give less priority to offsets, and redirected their limited resources to other activities.  
The pilots officially ended in April 2014, by which point they had largely been branded as a failure 
(Salvidge, 2016, 2014). Very few offsets had been agreed, and the metric had only been deployed 
on less than a dozen occasions in each area, other than one, where some significant progress had 
been made (CEP & IEEP, 2014b). The Warwickshire, Coventry and Solihull pilot was considered to 
have been a success, at least in developing and implementing a comprehensive local approach, 
which they planned to continue with and was lauded by many of the policy’s supporters. No offset 
schemes had been implemented in the Warwickshire pilot, but several planning applications with 
agreements in place had been finalised, and use of the metric had been recorded on 63 separate 
planning applications. However, the fact that significant but limited progress had only been made in 
one case, led by an LPA widely acknowledged as atypical, meant the evidence sought to inform a 
national programme was ultimately inadequate (see also Connor, 2016; Defra, 2016; CEP & IEEP, 
2014d). The supplementary projects, meanwhile, had also produced negligible extra evidence, and 
only four of the original eight were covered in the evaluation reports (CEP & IEEP, 2014e). Though 
the final evaluation highlighted useful and positive lessons about the metric, assessing biodiversity 
impact and quantifying loss, and some evidence as to how offsetting could be institutionally 
operationalised in the planning system, very little could be learned about the processes, experience 
and ecological effectiveness of offset provision and delivery (Salvidge, 2016; CEP & IEEP, 2014f). 
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On top of the challenges surrounding the pilots’ voluntary nature, the evaluation concluded that lack 
of information and certainty on all sides prohibited more meaningful engagement and buy-in. Paucity 
of resources and expertise available in LPAs, together with ambiguous policy and guidance, were 
also reported to have been undermined planners’ ability to implement the mechanism more effectively 
(CEP & IEEP, 2014d). 
 
5: The rise and demise of the mooted national programme 2012-15 
Throughout the piloting period of the programme, developments on a national level followed their own 
trajectory, which I have split into four phases. The first lasted from April to September 2012, during 
which time little happened, and public discussion remained largely muted under Spelman’s continued 
leadership at Defra. The second began after Spelman was replaced, and saw a rapid intensification 
of activity within Defra, driven by new Secretary of State Owen Paterson, who was keen to see a 
national programme operationalised as soon as possible. This culminated in the publication of a 
Green Paper in September 2013, kick-starting a third phase, during which the supposedly imminent 
policy rollout became the topic of significant public debate and media interest, as well as controversy. 
This ‘high point’ in the story ebbed away quickly after July 2014, when Paterson was sacked and the 
programme was seemingly de-prioritised by the government and Paterson’s successor, Liz Truss. By 
May 2015, the time of the General Election and the end of this fourth and final phase, it was clear that 
plans for a national biodiversity offsetting policy had been dropped altogether. 
5.1: From Spelman to Paterson 
The launching of the local pilots marked an important milestone in the prospective policy’s passage 
to implementation, but for the next six months there were few notable signs of movement at the 
national level. With limited impetus coming from the leadership, Defra officials were happy to let the 
trials run their course, and revisit the issue once a full evaluation had been written up, and other 
research had been completed. While a final report commissioned to the David Tyldesley consultants 
was completed, which had retrospectively tested Defra’s metric on past planning applications (David 
Tyldesley and Associates, 2012b), the most significant moment for the policy’s advocates was 
support emerging from Policy Exchange.  
The think tank’s report, Nurturing Nature (Newey, 2012), came out strongly in favour of introducing a 
mandatory biodiversity offsetting mechanism into the planning system. It criticised the prevailing 
conservation regime for failing to value nature economically, for poorly designed and implemented 
regulation, and for not harnessing the potential of MBIs to support both conservation and 
development. Its recommendations revolved largely around making the compensation regime more 
straightforward and competitive, in a bid to generate transparent information about biodiversity value 
and the cost of compensation, to incentivise more efficient decisions and outcomes. Among other 
observations, it cautioned how lack of ecological expertise in LPAs presented a particular challenge, 
which was highlighted again with some concern by various groups during the EFRA Committee’s 
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(2012b, 2012a) public inquiry into the implementation of the White Paper. This inquiry, which took 
place over the first six months of 2012, put the government’s offsetting proposals under the most 
scrutiny to date. Nevertheless, while the early lines of cleavage which had emerged in 2010 remained, 
the debates at the time reflected the limited detail Defra had put on their proposals to date. 
As noted in the introduction to this section, this period of the policymaking process was largely quiet. 
The real turning point occurred in September 2012. In Cameron’s first major cabinet reshuffle since 
coming to power, Spelman was the most high-profile member of the government’s front bench to lose 
their job. Her leadership was widely understood to have been cut short in light of the embarrassing 
climb-down Defra had been forced to make the previous spring, on the back of a vociferous public 
campaign opposing the government’s plans to privatise much of England’s public forest estate 
(Murray, 2012; Carrington, 2012b). In her place came Owen Paterson, whose appointment 
significantly changed the tenor of debate around biodiversity offsetting, which soon moved to the 
centre of Defra’s policy programme. 
5.2: Offsetting moves forward 
Paterson was a controversial choice, particularly for his political associations and stance on green 
issues. According to the liberal Independent newspaper, in a critical profile a little over a year into his 
tenure:  
[T]he Environment Secretary, regarded as part of the Tory’s hard-right countryside 
squirearchy, is linked to an alternative network of leading climate change sceptics that include 
Margaret Thatcher’s former chancellor, Nigel Lawson, his controversial Global Warming 
Policy Foundation, and arch-sceptic Matt Ridley, the nephew of Lord Lawson’s former cabinet 
colleague, Nicolas Ridley. Matt Ridley also happens to be Paterson’s brother-in-law (Cusick, 
2013). 
At the time, the move was seen as part of an effort to placate the right and Euro-sceptic wing of the 
Tory voter base, which was under growing pressure from the hard-right UK Independence Party. It 
was also received as something of a deliberate attempt to antagonise and confront green groups, 
and another example of the government’s increasingly belligerent attitude towards the environment 
(Carrington, 2012c)52.  
Crucially, with regard to offsetting, Paterson arrived with a strong growth mandate from the prime 
minister (interviews 1a; 1b), at a moment when the UK’s post-crisis recovery was under serious threat, 
and the economy was on the edge of a second recession. Not long into the job, the new Secretary of 
State became a vocal supporter of the policy, making it one of his top priorities, under the firm belief 
that it provided a unique opportunity to ‘unblock’ the planning system and reconcile development with 
conservation. In particular, he appeared to be influenced by Policy Exchange, who he later claimed 
                                                     
52 During his time in charge at Defra, Paterson gained notoriety for his views and leadership on climate change 
(Carrington, 2014a; Syal, 2013), an unsuccessful and unpopular badger culling trial aimed at tackling the spread 
of bovine tuberculosis (Carrington, 2014c; BBC, 2014), his apparent lack of deference to official advice and 
scientific evidence (Cusick, 2013), and for the department’s heavily criticised preparation for and response to 
severe flooding in the winter of 2013/14 (Carrington, 2014b; Channel 4 News, 2014). 
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had “put offsetting on the map” (Paterson, 2013). He was further encouraged by subsequent reports 
from the Ecosystem Markets Task Force, who made the immediate establishment of a national offsets 
programme their primary recommendation, out of 22 ‘business opportunities’ for UK firms in the green 
economy which the government should pursue (Defra, 2013c; EMTF, 2013, 2012).  
Under Paterson’s direction, activity around offsetting was accelerated and intensified within Defra, 
while interest from external stakeholders increased in turn (e.g. Cook & Clay, 2013; Evans, 2013b; 
ICE [Institution of Civil Engineers], 2013; Tew, 2013; RGS [Royal Geographical Society], n.d.). In April 
2013, soon after the publication of the Task Force’s final report, the Environment Secretary and a 
team of officials travelled to Australia to observe the system in place in the states of Victoria and New 
South Wales. At a biodiversity offsetting summit hosted by Defra the next month, which consisted of 
a high-profile panel and was attended by over 100 delegates, Paterson expressed his growing 
enthusiasm for the policy, and the positive mark the Australian trip had left on him (BES [British 
Ecological Society], 2013).  
As Defra’s increasingly growth-oriented plans gathered pace, existing points of friction became more 
visible (Marshall, 2013a; Pearce, 2013; King, 2013a; Monbiot, 2012). One year in, the voluntary pilots 
made little progress and had produced nothing meaningful to evaluate (CEP [Collingwood 
Environmental Planning], 2013; Evans, 2013), yet Defra was pushing forward regardless. Defra’s 
chief scientist, Ian Boyd, had reportedly been unimpressed with what they had seen in Australia, while 
Dieter Helm, chair of the government’s Natural Capital Committee, had urged caution in proceeding 
before a clear framework and strong evidence of success were in place (BES, 2013a; Evans, 2013c). 
In a public open letter addressed to Paterson meanwhile, representatives of three of the largest green 
professional bodies had also called for Defra to resist the ‘massively premature’ recommendations of 
the EMTF, reflecting rising anxieties among many environmental specialists (Hayns et al., 2013). In 
it, they expressed concerns that ecologists’ and conservationists’ worries had yet to be addressed, a 
growing fear that plans were being rushed forward at the behest of the business and development 
lobby, and doubts that the pilots could provide adequate evidence within their short timeframe to 
move forward with any confidence.  
Despite these warnings, Paterson ordered his officials to press ahead and draw up a draft policy 
framework as soon as possible. Though delayed until after the summer (McGrath, 2013), an outline 
Green Paper was published at the beginning of September (Defra, 2013d). Though it had initially 
been billed as a White Paper, due to Paterson’s confidence that the policy would be seen as beneficial 
by all, it was later downgraded to a Green Paper on the insistence of his Cabinet colleagues, who 
rightly guessed it would be controversial (interview 5c). The Green Paper therefore was also intended 
as a public consultation document, and started a nine-week period, during which responses could be 
submitted. A more concrete policy document was promised for the New Year, but ultimately never 
materialised. Instead, the months following the release of the Green Paper were marked by 
heightened levels of contention, public debate and polarisation, which would only settle after 
Paterson’s eventual dismissal in July 2014. 
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5.3: The Green Paper and increasing polarisation of debate 
The 2013 Green Paper laid out Defra’s furthermost and detailed plans to date. Just as importantly, 
its overall tenor underscored the government’s position regarding offsets, which would elicit as much 
reaction as the fine detail of the proposals over the next six months. Invoking the mantra of the UK’s 
need to compete in the ‘global race’, Paterson’s foreword very much set the tone: “Our economy 
cannot afford planning processes that deal with biodiversity expensively and inefficiently or block the 
housing and infrastructure our economy needs to grow” (Defra, 2013d, p. 1). The introductory pages 
laid out the parameters offsetting would need to operate in, making clear that no programme would 
be rolled out unless it was demonstrably “quicker, cheaper and more certain for developers”, and in 
line with the RTC (p. 8). While the conventional environmental goals and criteria of biodiversity offsets 
were present in the text, the whole framework was caveated by this non-negotiable commitment to 
accelerate land development without additional costs being imposed on developers. To ensure this, 
the Green Paper also made clear the government remained in favour of a voluntary system, so that 
regulatory burden could not be imposed on businesses. 
In terms of topics for consultation, the government’s questions were wide-ranging, tackling many of 
the challenges described in Chapter 4, and presenting possible options on almost every aspect of the 
proposals. They covered technical components, such as Defra’s metric, spatial and temporal factors, 
risk, and how offsets could be integrated into the planning system, as well as more detailed 
considerations regarding the scope and scale of the policy, and kinds of trades to be permitted. 
Institutional and governance arrangements were examined, including how to secure long-term 
management and protection of offsets, the distribution of implementation and oversight duties 
between different actors and bodies, and how to engender consistent application of appropriate 
standards while accounting for geographical variation of needs across the country. 
On top of the actual options exhibited in the Green Paper, Defra (2013b) published a second impact 
assessment, for submission to the Regulatory Policy Committee. On Paterson’s instruction, the 
economic constraints placed on the proposals had been substantially modified (interview 1a). Rather 
than a relatively simple calculation comparing the cost to business against the overall benefits to 
society, the Secretary of State demanded that both sides of the equation come out positive – i.e. 
offsets would have to save developers money, relative to current outlays on compensation. In 
October, the impact assessment was rejected by the RPC (2013) as ‘not fit for purpose’, citing lack 
of evidence for Defra’s claims, and a judgement that even a fully voluntary scheme would incur 
administrative costs for developers getting to know the new system, meaning it would be subject to 
the ‘one-in, two-out’ rule of the Red Tape Challenge. 
In public, meanwhile, reactions to the Green Paper were mixed. Developers and landowner groups 
welcomed the proposals with some caution, but were concerned about the system being overly 
complex, costly and restrictive (e.g. CLA, 2013b; HBF, 2013a). Others were openly hostile, accusing 
the government of efforts to privatise and ‘put a price on nature’, while giving developers a ‘license to 
trash’ (Carrington, 2013; Rincon, 2013). Following a first meeting of the Nature Not for Sale group, 
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convened in opposition to the first World Forum on Natural Capital held in Edinburgh, biodiversity 
offsetting was denounced in a statement signed by 140 local and international NGOs (Dearden, 2013; 
Mowat, 2013). Even the mainstream environmental sector, and professional ecologist groups who 
were broadly supportive of biodiversity offsets in principle, expressed a degree of alarm at the pro-
development tone of the Green Paper, the speed with which Defra was now moving, and the 
department’s apparent disregard for its own pilots (e.g. CIEEM, 2013; RSPB, 2013; TWT, 2013). 
Some were also concerned by the apparent influence of the Environment Bank, as a vested interest, 
in the policymaking process (Salvidge, 2014; Marshall, 2013a). 
Over the coming weeks and months, a high volume of material was produced on the proposals, 
including technical and position papers (e.g. BES, 2013c; Howard et al., 2013), articles and blogposts 
(e.g. Avery, 2014; Mathiesen, 2013; Brennan, 2013; Howarth, 2013; Hill, 2013; Pape & Tyldesley, 
2013), online petitions and so on, while expert debate took place in a variety of public forums (e.g. 
The Royal Society, 2013). Defra held roundtable discussions at its headquarters (interviews). In 
November in Parliament, the All-party Parliamentary Group on Biodiversity (APPGB) dedicated a 
session to offsets (King, 2013b), while the Environmental Audit Committee  held a public inquiry (EAC, 
2013b), inviting witnesses and written evidence on the issue at the same time as the Defra 
consultation. Speaking before the committee, Paterson reaffirmed his commitments to have concrete 
plans written up by the end of 2013, with necessary legislation in place before the next General 
Election. However, in reflecting on the findings of the inquiry, the EAC warned that the policy 
appeared open to abuse, that the metric was too simple, and that the government should wait until 
the pilots had been evaluated before making its next move. At the end of the year, the EFRA 
Committee (2013) added its voice to those calling for a slowdown and further deliberation on certain 
elements of the proposals. In part, this reflected growing worries about the impacts cuts were having 
on central and local government’s biodiversity functions, as raised in ALGE’s report on capacity and 
competencies in local authorities (Oxford, 2013; see also Early, 2013). As time went on, the debate 
failed to die down (e.g. Betts, 2014; Everard, 2014; Monbiot, 2014; Mowat & Anderson, 2014; Newey, 
2014). By the end of the nine weeks, the consultation had garnered an unprecedented 500 
submissions, highly unusual for a topic so highly technical, located in a somewhat obscure corner of 
land-use planning. It was clear at the time, and later confirmed in Defra’s (2016) summary, that there 
was very little consensus, either at the level of broad objectives or fine-grain detail. 
Apart from the problem of polarising disagreements between key stakeholders the government 
needed on board, Paterson was facing rising levels of criticism over his leadership as major flooding 
hit England (Carrington, 2014b) and low staff morale continued at Defra (EFRA Committee, 2013). 
Many of offsetting’s advocates privately thought the Environment Minister a liability to the cause given 
his reputation and hostility to green groups. Specifically regarding offsets, Paterson had been 
attacked for appointing Andrew Sells, a former housebuilder, treasurer of Policy Exchange and strong 
supporter of offsetting as the new chair of Natural England, despite having no professional experience 
in the environmental sector (Monbiot, 2013; King, 2013c). In January 2014, he faced heavy criticism 
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after allegedly suggesting, in an interview with The Times, that ancient woodland could be offset using 
very high multipliers, despite Defra’s own documents putting the habitat off limits as technically 
irreplaceable (Jivanda, 2014; see also Juniper, 2014). Meanwhile a steady trickle of controversial 
local cases, where developers had mooted use of offsets in their planning applications, had begun 
making their way into the national press, including the tabloids (Spencer, 2014; Marshall, 2013a).  
By the start of 2014, there was no sign of the next stage of proposals promised in the Green Paper. 
The release of the results of the consultation was delayed too, which Defra said was due to the 
unexpectedly high volume of responses. Though the public debate and engagement went on, very 
few announcements came out of Defra on the topic, and it was not until March that an official response 
was made to the EAC inquiry (see EAC, 2014). While rejecting most of the committee’s criticisms, 
Defra conceded that it should await the full evaluation of the pilots before taking any further steps 
(Evans, 2014). At the time, the policy was still widely anticipated to go ahead. At the CIEEM (2014) 
spring conference on offsetting for instance, a divided crowd of 200 practitioners from around the 
country gathered to consider the implications and challenges of the impending new system, where 
worries about regulatory capacity and expertise dominated discussions (PO2). The next month, the 
pilots officially came to an end, though nearly all had been recognised as failures long before 
(Salvidge, 2016). In May 2014, the evaluation was supposed to be published, but was then delayed 
(Salvidge, 2014). 
5.4: The abandonment of the national level policy framework 
At the beginning of June 2014, Defra hosted, together with the London Zoological Society, BBOP’s 
‘To No Net Loss and Beyond’ summit. Celebrating 10 years since the organisation’s birth, the two-
day event brought together 300 high-profile delegates from around the world (Vidal, 2014; BBOP, 
2014), and  coincided with the release of the European Commission’s own biodiversity offsetting 
consultation. Holding the main event in London was partly meant to showcase the UK government’s 
plans and commitment to developing a state-of-the-art offsetting system, with Paterson billed to give 
a keynote speech. Questions remained around both English and EU policies however, and over the 
longer-term prospects for offsetting worldwide, given the limited success evidenced on the ground 
(PO4). The event was preceded by a second ‘Nature Not for Sale’ counter-summit, bringing together 
local and international campaigners, activists and academics (PO3; and see FERN, 2014; Bell, 2014). 
On the first day of the BBOP conference, it was announced the Environment Secretary would be 
unable to attend (PO4). The next month Paterson was acrimoniously removed from his role in another 
cabinet reshuffle (Sparrow, 2014). Following his dismissal, the now former Secretary of State wrote 
a widely-read piece in the Daily Telegraph, in which he attacked what he called the self-serving and 
bureaucratic ‘green blob’, a “mutually supportive network of environmental pressure groups, 
renewable energy companies and some public officials” he claimed had undermined his leadership 
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at every turn and destroyed his reputation, for standing up to them in his efforts to improve the natural 
environment and grow the rural economy (Paterson, 2014)53.  
Activity on biodiversity offsetting had already slowed down considerably, and with Paterson gone 
rumours began circulating that the policy had been blocked by the Conservative party leadership and 
the Treasury, and unofficially shelved (Carrington, 2014d). In her early speeches, Liz Truss, the third 
and final Environment Secretary under the coalition government, offsets were never mentioned. The 
publication of the results of the Green Paper consultation and evaluation of the pilots remained on 
hold. Defra’s only public engagement on the subject came in the form of a response to the EU 
consultation in December, which warned against any kind of standardised European approach, noted 
the technical and governance challenges of offsetting, and reiterated the UK government’s concerns 
about regulatory burden on businesses (Defra, 2014b).  
Questioned on the slow progress of the proposals by the EFRA Committee (2015) in the same month 
of December 2014, Truss said she was still waiting for the final evaluation of the pilots. The report 
had in fact been finalised by June (CEP & IEEP, 2014d), but was only eventually released in February 
2016, along with a summary of the Green Paper consultation (Defra, 2016) and several other pieces 
of Defra-commissioned research completed by early 2014 (Duke & ten Kate, 2014; CEP & IEEP, 
2013, 2014a). With the General Election of May 2015 fast approaching, it became clear that offsetting 
had been dropped altogether as a national policy (Bawden, 2015). As expected, biodiversity offsets 
were not part of the Conservative party’s election manifesto, and the policy was not reignited following 
their somewhat unexpected return to power as a majority government. 
As a final note on the policymaking history of offsets, it should be reiterated that although the rolling 
out of a national policy was abandoned in 2015, it did not mean the end of biodiversity offsetting in 
England. Biodiversity offsetting, as developed by Defra and the local pilots, was officially confirmed 
by the Planning Inspectorate as an appropriate tool of planning in 2014, consistent with national law 
and policy. As a result, the framework remains in online guidance attached to the NPPF, which means 
it can be written into local policy by LPAs, so long as it is interpreted to be in line with national 
documents, and used voluntarily by planning authorities and developers. Several of the pilot areas 
continue to use offsets as an option, and many others have since made moves to develop their own 
local programmes similar to the ongoing Warwickshire model (Environment Bank, 2016). 
 
6: Themes of the policymaking history 
In moving the thesis onwards to the in-depth analysis, it is necessary to highlight some key themes, 
moments and context which animate the case study, and mediate the dilemmas and tensions 
explored hereafter. The first is that the coalition government’s moves to introduce offsetting were 
                                                     
53 Paterson’s removal was met with anger by many from the Conservative’s traditional rural base (Cash, 2014; 
e.g. Booker, 2014). 
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overlaid onto a complex regulatory landscape of laws, policies and institutions at multiple scales. At 
the same time, that landscape was shifting. Under the previous Labour government, Defra was 
already firmly in the process of institutionalising an ecosystem approach into its policies and activities. 
The UK was widely recognised as a leading example of efforts to reconfigure nature conservation in 
this way, which emphasised the use of economic valuation and MBIs to meet ecological challenges. 
The attempted formalisation of an offsetting programme and broader natural capital agenda pursued 
by the subsequent Conservative-led government should be understood in this context, and seen as 
an acceleration of this process, under changing political and economic conditions. 
Secondly, the narratives and rationales which emerged in favour of offsets by the Conservative party 
from 2009 resonated with many of those explored in Chapter 3. The attacks on the inefficiencies of a 
command-and-control planning system and overly bureaucratic environmental protections as 
impeding economic recovery and social prosperity, propagated by right-leaning think tanks and 
commentators, mirrored the right-leaning environmental backlash in the US during the 1980s. 
Similarly, the mobilisation of offsets as flexible solutions to these problems by proponents, with the 
promise of win-win market efficiencies in a time of squeezed public resources was crucial, while 
evidence of the compliance failures of the prevailing regime provided the environmental rationale for 
the policy proposals.  
Thirdly, it is important to carry forward the implications of the combined programmes of planning 
reform, spending cuts and environmental deregulation as context for offsetting’s development. The 
avidly pro-development tone of shifts in policy and guidance, together with the additional leverage 
given to developers, and retained by DCLG, over planning authorities, heavily conditioned what 
offsets could realistically achieve in practice. In particular, it is worth highlighting that the concept of 
no net loss would not easily translate into a requirement of planning consent, where competing 
obligations and duties would constrain what might be ruled as ‘reasonable’ in planning terms. Finally, 
Paterson’s role should be emphasised, since it was his growth mandate, mediated by the strong arm 
of the Treasury in constraining the parameters of environmental policy, which accelerated and 
sharpened the underlying tensions and frictions of the policy, generating increasing levels of 
controversy and opposition from civil society. 
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Chapter 8: The policymaking landscape and appeal of offsets 
 
Introduction 
This chapter lays out the policymaking terrain and conditional consensus on which the UK 
government tried to establish its proposed biodiversity offsetting system in England. The government 
had, in a broad sense, some clear objectives it believed to be realisable. Its position was that a 
formalised offsetting programme could reconcile the demands of land development with nature 
conservation, by setting up a market in offsets. By bringing market forces to bear on mitigation and 
compensation for environmental harm, it was seen as plausible that efficiencies and absolute benefits 
could be generated in both domains simultaneously: accelerated land development combined with 
the delivery of more, higher quality conservation. By promising multiple benefits over simple trade-
offs, the government was able to contingently attract interest from multiple, usually conflicting 
quarters. In constructing this win-win narrative, championed most enthusiastically by Paterson, the 
government was also able to draw active support from the business-led green economy lobby, 
together with other influential business-oriented groups keen to materially influence the creation of 
green markets and increased use of environmental economics in public policy.  
To stimulate such a market, various options were open to the government. For offsetting’s more 
conversant advocates, and in line with most of the policy literature reviewed in Chapter 4, the case 
for a strongly regulated compulsory system was compelling, as the most straightforward route to 
promulgating demand, simplifying enforcement of effective compliance, and ensuring consistency. 
However, the strictly discretionary approach taken by Defra reflected the government’s unwillingness 
to regulate, as well as its distrustful attitude towards planning authorities. As shown in Chapter 7, the 
government was extremely reticent about imposing a mandatory system on developers, or to afford 
local authorities additional regulatory power over land use, on the basis that both were unacceptable 
burdens on business and impediments to economic growth. Given the parameters of the 
government’s chosen path, and its determination to avoid giving too much control to local planning 
authorities, it needed to enrol and encourage meaningful participation from a range of groups with 
divergent interests. From the policymaking history constructed in Chapter 7, it was clear that the most 
important groups needed to operationalise offsetting were developers, landowners, conservation 
NGOs and professional ecologists.  
The purpose of this short chapter is to give a broad picture of the positions these different groups 
occupied in relation to offsetting at the outset, as well as those of the government, the green business 
sector and local government planners and ecologists. This is done schematically through the table 
presented in Section 1, which attempts to synthesise, as far as possible, the roles and complex 
positions of the most important actors. It should be seen as a reference point for the deeper analysis 
of the subsequent chapters. Section 2 highlights some of the important overlaps evident from the 
table, as the basis for certain alliances to be formed, and the general – if fragile – agreement that 
developing a national programme was desirable in principle. Chapter 9 and 10 then provides in-depth 
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analysis of how this consensus fractured as the policymaking process progressed, revealing major 
fault-lines which ultimately proved irresolvable.  
 
1: Hopes and fears in the nascent policymaking landscape 
As illustrated by the 500 responses to the government’s Green Paper consultation, a very wide range 
of groups engaged with the mooted introduction of offsetting, inputting in one way or another. A full 
overview is clearly impossible, and not necessarily helpful in distilling the reasons for the policy’s 
demise. Focus instead is warranted on those groups the government moved to actively enrol, for the 
purposes of operationalising a national but voluntary system. The rough synthesis of these group’s 
positions is laid out in Table 15, which draws from the various data detailed in Chapter 6. Each group 
is of course internally heterogeneous, and their positions complex and frequently rife with internal 
tensions and differences, some of which are noted in the third column. However, the overview below 
is an important starting point from which to analyse the areas of overlapping objectives and scope for 
policy articulation, on which implementation rested. 
 
Table 15: Synthesised positions of core groups needed to implement the English 
biodiversity offsetting system 
Group Synthesised position on biodiversity offsets 
 
Internal tensions, contingencies 
and differentiation  
Central 
government 
Role and interests in design and implementation 
Driving force behind national level proposals, with 
ability to make policy, pass legislation and impose 
regulation upon English planning system (though 
constrained by European and international laws as 
explained in Chapter 7) 
Led by Defra, but formally a government initiative, 
with significant input came from DCLG (housing); 
the Department for Transport and Department for 
Energy and Climate Change (infrastructure); the 
Treasury (economy); the Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills (business regulation); and the 
Cabinet Office (government leadership) 
Overall position 
Biodiversity offsetting an opportunity to reconcile 
economic growth with environmental law in the 
arena of land use planning, conventionally seen as 
trade-off between land development and nature 
conservation 
Accelerating land development by simplifying, 
speeding up and reducing costs of negotiation and 
compliance, as well as increasing net developable 
 
Proposals pulled in different 
directions by competing objectives 
and priorities of interested 
government departments 
Natural England another arm of 
central government with a core 
interest in offsetting, as state 
regulator responsible for nature 
conservation – able to push 
different position due to semi-
autonomous status, publicly in 
favour of a mandatory system with 
increased resources for expert 
oversight in public bodies 
Position given political impetus 
and presented most forcefully 
during Paterson’s tenure as 
Secretary of State at Defra  
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area and unlocking land for much-needed housing 
and infrastructure development 
Meeting internationally agreed targets and national 
policy to halt biodiversity loss, by levering private 
finance for conservation activities and allocating 
resources strategically and effectively 
Economic growth as non-negotiable, and policy 
must categorically not impose additional costs or 
‘regulatory burden’ on developers; biodiversity 
offsets will be voluntary 
Nevertheless, both economic and ecological 
objectives can be simultaneously achieved as a 
win-win by mobilising market efficiencies – as 
evidenced by established systems in US and 
Australia 
Offsetting constitutes one component of a ‘natural 
capital agenda’, led by Defra to mainstream nature’s 
value at all levels of decision-making, aimed at 
making environmental policy more economically 
relevant and legible in economic appraisals, impact 
assessments and so on 
 
Green 
business 
lobby and 
think tanks 
Role and interests in design and implementation 
Business-orientated lobby group providing 
intellectual and evidential support for government 
policymaking, influential as advisors presenting the 
‘business case’ for biodiversity offsetting 
Material interests (commercial and political) in 
‘green economy’ and wider use of environmental 
economics in public policy; influential but minority 
fraction of business sector 
Overall position 
Biodiversity offsetting significant opportunity for 
‘green economy’ imagined in NEWP, and part of 
wider and transformative TEEB-inspired agenda to 
mainstream sustainability across all aspects of 
social and economic life and decision-making 
Offsets one of several financial mechanisms key to 
leveraging private investment for nature 
conservation, needed to meet biodiversity targets 
Failure of planning system partially result of overly 
complex rules and rigid bureaucracy; biodiversity 
loss also example of market failure – not valued 
because no price attached 
Offsetting an effective economic instrument for 
changing behaviour, by making nature’s value 
visible and sending price signals to developers and 
businesses; flexibility enabled by MBI can 
accelerate economic development, increase net 
developable area and stimulate commercial activity 
 
Includes lobby organisations, think 
tanks and policy consultants, with 
differing opinions on strictness of 
rules and necessary level of 
planning and regulatory oversight, 
and degree to which market needs 
to be shaped/restricted 
Largely populated by corporate 
and small-scale businesspeople, 
policy consultants, environmental 
economists, qualified ecologists; 
includes many former NGO 
officers and economists – many 
overlaps and partnerships with 
NGO and professional bodies 
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in the countryside and green economy; additional 
cost of immediate compliance difficult to avoid, but 
not enough to affect level of development activity 
Audit and use of hard numbers will create much 
more transparent system, enabling more 
straightforward monitoring, evaluation and auditing, 
even in context of strained regulatory capacity 
Mandatory programme necessary to generate 
demand and supply for sizeable regulatory market 
and achieve benefits; simplicity, flexibility and right 
incentives key to efficient outcomes over strict or 
complex rules; certainty/risk most important aspect 
for businesses over immediate costs, clear 
objectives and level playing field created by 
regulation crucial for stimulating competition and 
innovation 
Construct offsetting as significant opportunity for 
win-win outcome through efficiency of MBIs and 
mainstreaming ‘nature’s value’ in decision-making; 
yet critical of government’s ‘growth at all costs’ 
stance and narrow methods of economic appraisal; 
frame position as enlightened consensus view of 
environmentally-minded actors across civil society 
(business, NGOs, professional associations, 
individuals) 
 
Local 
planning 
authorities 
Role and interests in design and implementation 
Downscale from national policymaking, 
responsibility for local development and frontline 
implementation of offsetting; local government 
ecologists members of planning teams with main 
remit overseeing offsets, with requisite expertise 
and previous experience implementing PPS9 
regime, though non-expert planners would also 
need to know the system 
Writing offset policies into local plans, consistent 
with NPPF and local conservation priorities, and in 
line with any national rules and guidance; creating 
strategic local offset plans; determination of 
planning applications through development control, 
where offsets would be negotiated and agreed; 
ultimate responsibility for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance 
Overall position 
Possibility of leveraging additional private finance to 
fill gaps in funding for existing and future local 
nature conservation strategies and activities, 
especially in moment of severe resource constraints 
and budgetary cuts 
Chance to consolidate and simplify bureaucratic 
processes relating to mitigation and compensation, 
 
Includes all LPAs in England 
which offsetting would apply to, 
consisting of single tier and two-
tier authorities, national park 
authorities, etc. 
Views across LPAs far from 
uniform, contingent on various 
factors such as local priorities, 
uneven institutional make-up and 
access to ecological expertise and 
resources, biophysical and 
environmental contexts, etc.  
Trained ecologists with very good 
technical knowledge; other 
planners lack basic understanding 
of mitigation policy 
Most see merits in offsetting in 
principle, but many opposed to 
government’s specific proposals; 
divergent views on degree of 
simplicity most appropriate; 
internal tensions around proximity 
of offsets to impact 
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through use of consistent and objective (i.e. 
quantitative) methods of impact assessment, 
allowing for streamlined auditing procedures 
Opportunity to reassert some control over local land 
use through ecological regulation, in context of 
planning reform and environmental deregulation 
programme, weakening bargaining power in relation 
to developers, and pressures from central 
government to deliver housing, infrastructure and 
growth 
Highlight bureaucratic strain offsetting would put on 
LPAs, in light of uneven levels of technical expertise 
and wider capacity problems; also stress complexity 
of articulating offsets with various and often 
competing economic, social and environmental 
policies, priorities and laws; potential misuse as 
‘license to trash’ 
Effective system would need to be compulsory, 
adequately resourced at local level, with clear 
national rules, safeguards and guidance; offsetting 
should be plan-led, with local flexibility allowing for 
configuration to local context 
Offsetting constructed less as potential win-win, but 
as one regulatory tool which could tackle 
developers ‘getting away with’ insufficient mitigation 
measures; yet constrained by overriding economic 
development imperatives and need for balancing 
with other planning duties 
 
Developers Role and interests in design and implementation 
Subject of any formal regime as potential buyers of 
offsets, legally responsible for impact on biodiversity 
through land development 
Commercially interested and politically powerful 
group, exerting influence over DCLG and the 
Treasury, particularly through the Home Builders 
Federation and other trade associations; respective 
though less prominent lobbying of DfT and DECC 
by transport and energy infrastructure developers  
Overall position 
Biodiversity offsetting as opportunity in some 
circumstances to increase speed and certainty of 
planning consent, enabling acceleration of 
development projects and realisation of 
development value 
Main concerns with current regime costly delays 
due to bureaucracy of compliance with European 
legislation, particularly protected species, and 
uncertainty over decisions; also inflexible command-
 
Includes a variety of developers, 
but most prominent in debates 
were large-scale housebuilders, 
energy and utilities companies, 
and mining and quarrying firms, 
with sector-specific positions on 
detail of offsetting system 
Variation of views among 
developers, some opposed 
altogether  
Most with very limited technical 
understanding of ecology or 
offsetting, tend to have no in-
house expertise – offsetting 
viewed as very marginal issue 
relative to other areas of 
development compliance 
Mining and quarrying industry 
(represented by the Mineral 
Products Association) had unique 
outlier position, as more 
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and-control approach taken by LPAs and Natural 
England 
Cautiously in favour of an optional and flexible 
system, to be used if and when offsetting could be 
cost effective and/or accelerate planning consents 
Worried about additional (and existing) 
bureaucracy, regulatory burden and cost without 
addressing main planning issues – offsets giving 
LPAs another tool to ‘hold over’ developers during 
planning process to dictate terms and extract 
planning gain or tax 
Construct offsetting as potentially useful tool to 
streamline land development, but with limited 
potential; possible burden on overly regulated 
development industry needed to deliver housing 
and infrastructure for society, whose commercial 
interests are to reduce and mitigate impact and 
improve green space onsite since it adds value to 
development 
 
stringently regulated sector with 
respect to environmental impact of 
‘temporary’ development – viewed 
themselves as potentially exempt, 
and/or as possible offset providers 
as owners of rehabilitated and 
enhanced former extraction sites 
 
Landowners 
and farmers 
Role and interests in design and implementation 
Needed as the primary suppliers in an offset 
market, providing receptor sites for ecological 
recreation, restoration and long-term management, 
for sale as credits to developers; experience with 
conservation activities on land through agri-
environment schemes (yet very limited technical 
knowledge of offsetting) 
Principally large private landowners and farmers, 
but also including public (e.g. Crown Estate) and 
third sector landowners; politically represented most 
prominently through powerful landowning and 
farming lobby (Country Land and Business 
Association and National Farmers Union) with 
strong connections to Conservative party and 
considerable influence over Defra 
Overall position 
Biodiversity offsets as a significant opportunity for 
additional land-based income stream, potentially on 
marginal land alongside other farming and business 
activities 
Generation of private finance specific opening for 
conservation in period of fiscal austerity to replace 
declining levels of state funding 
Primary concerns regard private property rights, 
longevity of offsets and legal arrangements; also 
level of income and commercial viability of offsets; 
overly complex conservation work and bureaucracy 
of schemes, and articulation of offsets with existing 
agri-environment schemes 
 
Extremely variegated opinions 
among landowners, with large 
proportion uninterested or 
opposed to offsetting – position 
here those of major representative 
bodies lobbying for a system 
which would appeal to relatively 
small section of membership 
Divided opinion between CLA and 
NFU whether offsetting should be 
compulsory – both opposed to 
additional regulation and cost, but 
CLA position that mandatory 
system necessary to create 
demand 
Conservation NGOs not included 
in this group, though some major 
landowners themselves 
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Wary and divided over whether offsetting should be 
mandatory, but strongly opposed to any compulsion 
on landowners to become providers 
Rhetorically highly in favour of environmental 
markets and commercialisation of conservation, 
presenting landowners as willing private providers 
of public goods by improving countryside, but in 
need of compensation and incentives to absorb 
opportunity costs 
 
Environmental 
NGOS 
Role and interests in design and implementation 
Multiple roles: Large non-profit membership groups, 
centred on general and specific environmental (and 
social) objectives; many conservation NGOs 
potential providers of high quality offsets as large 
landowners and managers with substantial 
conservation interests, expertise and experience; 
also key stakeholders commenting on planning 
applications with impact on natural environment, 
and in local partnerships involved in conservation 
planning 
Lack insider political influence on national level, but 
wield influence as ‘environmental voice’, expert 
stakeholders and government partners in nature 
conservation, and through public campaigning and 
lobbying, with implications for policy credibility and 
legitimacy; also partners in various green economy 
and green business coalitions 
Overall position 
Biodiversity offsets could help meet material 
organisational interests in funding for core 
environmental work during difficult economic period 
and declining state subsidies and spending for 
conservation 
Well implemented system could improve 
biodiversity outcomes of badly failing regime, 
through formalisation and standardisation of 
processes; metric could capture low level harm 
currently ignored 
Reservations over government intentions, 
regulatory capacity and effects of 
planning/environmental reforms, and declining 
sectoral influence in planning; technical limitations 
of tools also major concern 
Clear risks and limitations with offsetting, yet 
cautious support for strong mandatory system with 
strong standards and safeguards, based on 
strategic planning; but voluntary offsetting 
potentially disastrous in eroding existing protections  
Present NGOs as supportive of sustainable and 
appropriate development to meet social need, not 
 
Varied opinions among 
environmental NGOs – most 
conservation NGOs in favour, 
some with less direct material 
interests more suspicious and 
opposed in principle to 
government proposals, painting 
offsetting more squarely as 
‘license to trash’ or ‘putting a price 
on nature’; yet acquiescence and 
participation of 
landowning/managing NGOs more 
important to government 
Some differentiation clear within 
large conservation NGOs 
(including membership) over 
principles and details of 
biodiversity offsetting proposals 
NGOs frequently interested in 
pulling metric in different 
directions, to more 
comprehensively account for 
specific aspects of biodiversity 
(e.g. particular species, transient 
populations, woodlands, 
brownfield habitat, insects, etc.) 
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‘anti-development’; offsetting framed less as win-
win, but regulatory tool with some limited potential, 
where design choices have significant trade-offs 
and risks, and process complex and full of 
dilemmas 
 
Professional 
ecologists 
Role and interests in design and implementation 
Technical operators of offsets, undertaking 
biodiversity assessments, using the metric and 
carrying out environmental restoration and 
management; professionals working commercially 
as contracted consultants, ecologists working in-
house for large construction/engineering firms, 
government departments and agencies, local 
government or third sector NGOs; academic 
researchers and natural scientists 
Not politically influential, but perspective 
represented and pushed by professional bodies 
(e.g. CIEEM and IEMA); also important for 
credibility of policy as technical experts and 
stakeholders with experience necessary for 
implementation; constrained by commercial 
interests and relationships with clients in many 
cases, with work dependent on construction activity 
Overall position 
Well-designed system could make contribution to 
addressing long-term biodiversity loss and habitat 
fragmentation – opportunity for standardisation and 
improvement of existing practices and assessment 
tools around impact mitigation and compensation 
Emphasise complexity of offsetting and need for 
ecological science to be at centre of policy design, 
and careful development of sophisticated tools and 
methods for counteracting uncertainties and risks; 
concerned about issues of technical feasibility of 
offsets and scientific, evidence-based integrity of 
any formalised programme, especially regarding 
uncertainties and limitations of restoration ecology 
and measuring biodiversity value (metric) 
Monitoring and enforcement crucial to address, 
connected to problem of limited institutional capacity 
and expertise; must be fully costed and resourced, 
impartially regulated with aid of trained ecologists 
and be based on rigorous assessments 
Some suspicion over government rhetoric around 
ease, effectiveness and speed of progress; 
reservations relating to past experiences of poor 
policy implementation 
Support a mandatory system, with strict rules, 
safeguards and consistent standards developed in 
collaboration with ecologists; suggest offsetting will 
 
Wide range of opinion across 
sector for and against offsetting, 
with significant cleavages over 
technical feasibility (some see 
deep conceptual flaws), effective 
safeguards and trust in 
government intentions 
Ecologists working for developers 
most important, but differing 
experiences from professionals 
working with or for other 
stakeholder groups (central 
government, local government, 
landowners, and NGOs) 
Many connected to parts of green 
business lobby, mediated by 
professional bodies 
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require iterative improvement over time, but 
environmental outcomes must be priority; voluntary 
system extremely risky and open to exploitation 
Constructed as potentially useful technical and 
procedural device for mitigating environmental 
impact; framed as highly risky, with main focus on 
scientific integrity and precautionary approach over 
economic efficacy, and trade-offs likely over win-win 
results 
 
Sources: documentary, interview and participant observation data overviewed in Chapter 6 
 
2: Overlap, potential alliances and a fragile consensus 
2.1: Overlapping interests and the promise of win-win 
Having surveyed the policymaking landscape outlined above, it is clear that there were considerable 
overlaps in the interests and goals of all main players needed to implement the policy, and scope for 
practical alliance-building in favour of offsets. For instance, the government’s aim for offsetting to 
accelerate development was consistent with core objectives of developers and green economy 
advocates, constituting a potentially strong coalition from different and influential elements of the 
business community. There was also substantial agreement between green economy advocates, the 
professional ecologist bodies and many NGOs. These groups, already well networked through 
existing partnerships, were of the view that done well, a formal offsetting system could potentially 
improve the environmental outcomes of a mitigation regime which was evidently failing. The 
generation of finance meanwhile appealed to NGOs and landowners seeking sources of income for 
conservation work, as well as to local government, in the context of constrained or declining state 
(and private) spending at different scales. On this basis, the government had some confidence that it 
could articulate a broad consensus around the desirability of implementing offsetting, through which 
it could enrol the relevant market actors, technical expertise and the participation of conservation 
organisations. The active presence of these latter groups would furnish the programme with both 
quality assurance and legitimacy, and help neutralise their reservations and possible opposition. In 
doing so, it hoped a functioning market could be established in which all the major groups had a stake 
– a formalised system which would benefit from an incentive-based structure and flexibility, while 
effectively devolving responsibility away from national and local government. 
If the government was willing to simply impose a new system, with rules it deemed sufficient and 
appropriate to meet its aims, operationalising offsetting could have been relatively straightforward. 
The necessary market actors, technicians and regulators could be enrolled through a mixture of 
placation and coercion. However, since there was an acute reluctance to regulate business or devolve 
more power to local authorities, persuasion and a considerable level of consent would be required to 
articulate the system in practice:  
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The system must improve the process of considering biodiversity and be attractive to 
developers and offset providers so they are encouraged to participate. At the same it must 
be easy for the public to understand so that they have confidence it is protecting biodiversity 
(Defra, 2013d, p. 8).  
While recognising potential costs of entry and setup, Defra hoped to stimulate a sufficiently sized 
market to “encourage competition and bring in offset providers which would be expected to drive 
down costs” (p. 14). In creating the necessary incentives, the government relied heavily on the idea, 
backed by its business-orientated allies (see for instance Environment Bank, 2013a; Newey, 2012; 
Caldecott & Dickie, 2010), that conventional trade-offs could be reconciled through market 
efficiencies. As one representative put it: “we've got all this fuss about not building enough houses. 
The biggest economic benefit is that actually, there will be more people building houses as a result 
of this policy” (interview 6b). The EMTF were among the most influential: 
We need a system in which unavoidable net impacts on biodiversity of new development are 
more than compensated by restored and created habitats elsewhere through an efficient 
market. Designed correctly, a nationwide system of biodiversity offsetting would save 
developers time and money through reduced risk and uncertainty and a more streamlined 
planning approval process, as well as offering reputational benefits and more efficient and 
valuable net developable areas (2013, p. 10).  
The Aldersgate Group struck a similar note: 
The proposed system of offsets can increase the value of land use in the UK in two ways. 
Firstly by ensuring the biodiversity costs of land use are taken into account it can encourage 
more efficient use of land and avoid damage to more precious natural environmental features; 
and secondly, through offsets that increase the biodiversity value of the land used to 
compensate for the residual damage. The end result will be higher-value uses of land (per 
ha) for development, and higher value to society from remaining areas of natural habitats 
(2011, p. 15). 
According to one official, when offsetting was advanced under Paterson from late 2012, it was on this 
terrain that offsets were positioned:  
He saw offsets as a potential instrument in that space, in that if offsetting could help planning 
decisions around biodiversity happen more efficiently and more quickly, then you might be 
able to bring development forward more quickly, but also get an environmental gain. … [O]ur 
reports from America say [offsite compensation] tends to be of higher quality, better 
managed, better connected as well, because you're not just devoting a small corner of a 
developed site to compensation. It looked like, to him at least, a potential win-win (interview 
1a). 
When Defra released the Green Paper, the government’s ambition in this regard was laid out 
according to strict criteria offsetting would demonstrably have to meet. While claiming in the foreword 
that use of the instrument “guarantees” no net loss of biodiversity (Defra, 2013d, p. 1), it was clearly 
stated the proposals would not go ahead unless compliance was made “quicker, cheaper and more 
certain for developers”, in line with the government’s commitments “not to increase net burdens on 
housing developers over the Spending Review 2010 period; and to one-in, two-out on all regulatory 
burdens” (p. 8). It was under these stipulations that Defra had to either create the incentives, or hard 
sell the idea that with stakeholder acquiescence and active participation, biodiversity offsetting could 
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enable more, cheaper and faster land development on the one hand, and generate more, higher 
quality compensation on the other. Though sceptical the necessary economies of scale would be 
possible through a voluntary approach, offsetting’s business supporters were confident the 
advantages would nonetheless soon become tangible once a consistent and accepted framework 
was in place, leading to a material convergence of interests on which a stronger system could be built 
(interviews 6a; 6a). 
Yet the question remained whether such an accepted framework could be constructed on a voluntary 
basis, and configured in such a way to induce a critical mass of active participation to test whether 
the presumed benefits would emerge. 
2.2: Benefits for all? 
Of the major groups detailed in the table, it is clear that there was little opposition, in principle, to a 
national offsetting programme. Among those who would be required to implement and participate in 
any reconfigured compliance regime, each viewed offsets as a tool which could be mobilised to meet 
certain sectoral objectives, and was willing to engage in the policymaking process for one reason or 
another. As explained in the previous chapter, the CLA (2009) had, on an organisational level, already 
demonstrated enthusiasm for the wider use of environmental markets, including offsets, as an income 
stream for the provision of public goods on private land, in a context of constrained public resources: 
Even if the budget for the new CAP is only marginally less than the current one, it is unlikely 
that there will be sufficient public funds to meet all of society’s aspirations in the long term. 
One of the most straightforward ways of levering in more funding is through ecosystems 
markets by which those who benefit from the provision of environmental services contribute 
to the costs (CLA, 2013a, p. 1). 
Farmers and landowners had some experience with receiving money for conservation through agri-
environment programmes, and were open to other income-generating schemes if they were equally 
or more attractive from a commercial perspective, and would not involve large opportunity costs 
(interview 8a). NGOs and local government were enticed to varying degrees by the prospect of new 
income and funding streams, frequently citing ongoing pressures on public, but also private, sources 
of conservation finance: 
my view is very much that biodiversity currently is not treated well, and if there was an 
opportunity to get money from developers which we currently haven't got, it is something that 
should be considered (interview 2c). 
Offsetting’s more ardent advocates pushed the point forcefully with regard to national conservation 
commitments:  
If you look at the work from the Lawton report, all the Biodiversity 2020 targets, we need 
£600m a year just to deliver those; a year. And actually, to go beyond that, you know, stitching 
the countryside back together, you need about £1.2bn. Offsetting is the only financial 
opportunity to do that (interview 6a). 
The EMTF argued offsetting would: 
174 
 
revolutionise conservation in England by delivering restoration, creation and long-term 
management, of in excess of 300,000 hectares of habitat over 20 years; … [and] stimulate 
the competitive growth of businesses, especially rural SMEs, in delivering and restoring 
natural habitats; and also of various intermediary services, estimated to be worth at least 
£500m p.a. (2013, p. 10).  
Though views in the sector differed, conservation NGOs had been constructively involved in talks 
with Conservative shadow ministers since 2009. Some saw offsets as one possible mechanism for 
filling existing and future resource gaps, as illustrated in the RSPB’s (2010) Financing nature in an 
age of austerity report, published soon after the new government took power. Together, there seemed 
ample scope for enrolling groups who would offer receptor sites or actively facilitate the process. 
For many local government ecologists, consultant ecologists and conservationists, concerned with 
environmental outcomes but whose experience of the existing compliance regime was of persistent 
failure and dysfunctionality, the promise of standardised procedures and assessment methods, and 
simplified audit was enough. One pro-offsetting ecologist typified the appeal to many across these 
groups:  
in the absence of [my dream outcome] at least if you have a requirement for certain 
developments to use a metric to show what you've done and so on, that brings some 
transparency in (interview 4a).  
An NGO officer explained their view that: “if we got the structures in place, we would protect a lot of 
other things [currently ignored]. Without those structures, some of these really bad decisions will keep 
going” (interview 5c). The benefits of quantification, with which transparency was generally 
associated, appeared to be the feature of offsets seen from across the spectrum as offering a 
concrete improvement on the status quo (see also CEP & IEEP, 2014d). The establishment of new 
standards of measurement had considerable pull for local government ecologists, ecological 
practitioners and conservationists, to both support offsetting politically and involve themselves in 
helping the government refine the mechanism’s design and calibration. 
Among actors more sceptical or resistant – primarily developers but a significant portion of other 
stakeholders too – there was a wide expectation that some kind of formalised offsetting system would 
be rolled out regardless of their objections. They therefore felt either the need or obligation to 
influence the process with their own interests and goals in mind. Developers wanted to minimise 
offsetting’s regulatory impact on their projects and push the government to “do it in a way that doesn’t 
inhibit the supply of housing” (interview 7d), but also saw in offsetting an opening to push for reform 
of protected species regulation and environmental assessment more widely (interviews 7a; 7c). Some 
conservationists initially viewed their participation in part as necessary damage limitation, both in the 
system’s design and implementation (interviews 5c; 5d). For ecologists, according to a senior officer 
of one of the major professional bodies:  
I think the mood of our members and profession is: 'Well, if it's going to work, surely we're 
the best placed to make it work'. And it's no good really just saying we don't like it, so we're 
not going to be involved in the debate. We really need to be in there, influencing (interview 
4b).  
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Once the programme was established, consultant ecologists would in any case face substantial 
commercial pressure to offer offsetting services, while local authorities would be compelled to put 
policy or guidance in place. Regardless of their motivations, actors in almost every group perceived 
some kind of pressure to engage in the policymaking process, such that implementation would not 
cause them more problems or lost opportunities in the future.  
2.3: Divisions and fault-lines 
Though the various factors outlined above offered extensive scope to enrol different groups, the 
challenge the government faced was building a broad consensus among them. Despite a seeming 
willingness, if not enthusiasm, of all the main parties to be involved, there were also significant 
cleavages under the surface, clearly shown in Table 15, surrounding questions of scope and 
strictness, the longevity of offsets, its cost to developers, the need to invest in regulatory capacity, 
and so on. It was clear different stakeholders held quite entrenched views on certain aspects of 
biodiversity offsets, which if unaddressed, would fatally compromise the stated goals and appeal of 
the policy from their perspective. In addition, there were significant internal frictions and tensions to 
play out, and a wider set of perspectives and forces to account for. It is worth noting too that there 
was active opposition to the policy from different quarters at a relatively early stage. This came from 
many developers who were hostile to what they saw as the inevitable costs of additional compliance 
requirements (interview 7d), as well as some environmental interests disputing the principle and/or 
technical feasibility of ‘trading’ biodiversity (Betts, 2014; FERN, 2013; King, 2013a). Though not an 
immediate problem for the government in terms of progressing the policy’s design, these contrasting 
positions would come to frame an increasingly polarised public discourse around offsetting, 
increasing the risk of reputational damage for those participating, and shifting the dynamics of the 
policymaking landscape. Friends of the Earth was the most high-profile NGO opposed to the 
government’s proposals (FoE, 2014), but it was clear through attendance of policy-focused events 
(PO1; PO2; PO3; PO4) conservationists and trained ecologists were deeply divided on the issue. At 
the 2014 CIEEM spring conference for instance, a show of hands split those present in half, between 
those for and against offsetting. By delving further into the detail of these differences, as they unfolded 
in certain moments of contention in the policymaking process, the next two chapters reveal the depth 
and growing entrenchment of these fault lines. The final chapter then reflects more deeply and 
theoretically on why these disputes proved so hard to resolve.  
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Chapter 9: Political calculations – valuing biodiversity and 
determining equivalent gain under the English offsetting 
proposals 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the debates which animated efforts to construct 
appropriate technical instruments for use in the government’s proposed system. As shown in Chapter 
4’s literature review, a variety of technical questions have frequently been at the centre of conceptual 
debates about biodiversity offsetting, with much contestation over the merits and limitations of 
particular forms of measurement, and the feasibility of delivering and demonstrating equivalence of 
loss and gain. The issues discussed in that chapter were ever-present in the English case. So were 
familiar tropes regarding the virtues and difficulties of quantification, as well as the dangers of 
commodification. As shown in Chapter 8, the promise of a consistent system of quantifying 
biodiversity impacts was the single most unifying component of a formalised offsetting programme 
among core stakeholders. However, as explored in this chapter, deliberations over the precise 
technical aspects of offsets revealed deeper fault-lines and dilemmas under this discursive optimism. 
Even if quantification was viewed as desirable, exactly what should be counted, and by which 
methods, were considerably trickier subjects. Political questions always bubbled under the surface, 
since it was recognised that what was measured would necessarily mediate whose interests were 
served. As will be shown too, design-stage disputes over what would be ecologically and 
economically feasible in terms of conservation gain demonstrated the role of power even more starkly, 
in arbitrating whether no net loss was a reasonable or realistic objective for offsetting. 
Chapter 9 proceeds in three parts. Section 1 explores debates around the metric Defra created for 
the pilots, later approved by the planning inspectorate as an appropriate tool under NPPF. It looks at 
how certain interests pushed for other aspects of biodiversity to be measured as the government tried 
to secure consent, various complaints over the metric’s crudeness, and the pushback from the 
government and its green business allies against measures which might undermine market liquidity. 
Section 2 follows on by considering calls from ecological experts for the standardisation of more 
precise assessment techniques, to improve the accuracy of information underpinning the metric’s 
calculations, and the government’s reticence to impose methods which might prove costly to operate. 
Section 3 then examines how conservationists and ecologists in particular pressed, with little success, 
for a more precautionary approach to offsetting, fearing that the government was being overly 
optimistic about the ease with which restoration could deliver equivalent ecological gains. Section 4 
then concludes the chapter, highlighting how the more-than-technical dilemmas over design, and 
tensions between ecological and economic concerns, were deeply entwined with questions of power, 
and could only be resolved through political and institutional means. Chapter 10 then considers the 
institutional and political economic challenges which would mediate these trade-offs through 
planning. 
177 
 
 
1: The metric and measuring biodiversity 
1.1: The power of numbers: communication and simplicity 
The centrepiece on which Defra’s proposals turned was the creation of a standardised metric for 
measuring biodiversity value. For some, it was quantified measurement which fundamentally defined 
offsets and made the policy worth pursuing, far more importantly than any market element the 
government hoped to operationalise. Even if it was just a single component, it was widely recognised 
that without a metric “that everyone would agree to gather around … it would be really hard to get 
anything off the ground” (interview 4a). It would also be essential for market functionality, as 
highlighted in a report produced by eftec and Climate Change Capital: 
The creation of a common unit of account or ‘currency’, with established equivalences or 
‘exchange rates', for biodiversity credits will be essential for attracting investment by creating 
a deeper and more liquid market than would otherwise have been in the case (Caldecott & 
Dickie, 2010, p. 6). 
Helpfully for those in favour of offsets, quantification, as enabled by the metric, was viewed across 
the spectrum as a positive innovation. Interestingly, few saw the metric as an uncontroversial and 
complete measure of biodiversity value, but rather an improvement on the status quo. The 
Environment Bank’s chief executive Tom Tew, for instance, questioned as part of the EAC (2013a) 
public inquiry, explained his organisation’s position: 
no one is making even the crudest value judgments at the moment, and that is where the 
system is failing. Much of our environment’s death by a thousand cuts is happening because 
planners do not have the tools to make even simple value judgments. The offsetting metrics 
are simply a tool to allow planners to do that (p. 17; see also Hill, 2013). 
This of course spoke to the environmental rationale of offsets, with the metric enabling low level 
biodiversity loss to be counted. In terms of conservation, one of the major benefits regularly identified 
with consistent quantification was in providing “a basis for monitoring follow-up, which might be quite 
difficult to define otherwise” (interview 4a). Going forward, a standard metric was envisaged as 
“allow[ing] offset schemes across the country to be compared and evaluated, and improvements 
made to the offsetting metric over time” (BES, 2013b, p. 2). Typically, pilot leaders saw quantification 
as aiding their negotiating position with developers:  
the metric is quite simplistic and mechanistic, but it allows you, in black and white, to plug 
some numbers in at the start and get a figure out at the end, which should hopefully remove 
[some of the] uncertainty and the subjectivity. … [I]n terms of being able to say, 'Well the 
habitat and site is worth this, and your mitigation is worth this, and therefore there's a shortfall 
of that, which you therefore have to provide compensation for,' potentially through offsetting, 
I think would be very useful (interview 2b). 
The metric gave something consistent, but equally appealing was the communicative power of 
numbers: “You can't design a perfect metric, but at least you will have something that will mean a 
clearer part of the discussion” (interview 10a). Another LGE drew similar benefits: 
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because we had the option of offsetting, we could run the metric. I think what it gave us, was 
that we could show developers what impacts their masterplans might have on biodiversity. I 
think that did in some case mean that the applicant – the developer – did change what they 
were doing onsite. They did change their masterplans to reduce the impact on biodiversity. I 
think that was actually a useful outcome of being part of the pilot (interview 2c). 
Though it was widely agreed that the metric was superior to the highly subjective qualitative 
environmental statements of the prevailing system, the advantage from quantification tended to be 
viewed in terms of the simplicity of numbers over their precision. Defra’s hope was that the metric 
would provide “a framework nonexperts can use” (2013d, p. 3), and was one of the things the 
evaluation concluded had been successful during the pilots (CEP & IEEP, 2014d). 
As explained in the previous chapter, the presumed benefits of quantification were a crucial point of 
consensus, where both development and conservation interests appeared to cohere. For the 
government, development and green business interests, who wanted to accelerate and reduce 
transaction costs during the planning process, clarity and consistency were key, and the supposition 
was that quantification would engender a more objective, and therefore quicker and smoother, 
negotiation process. The government hoped the metric could make compliance procedures “less of 
an administrative burden” (interview 1a), since it would allow “the compensation requirement to be 
quickly calculated, rather than expensively negotiated on a case-by-case basis” (Defra, 2013d, p. 3; 
see also EMTF, 2013, p. 10). John Slaughter, a senior officer at the Home Builders Federation (HBF), 
explained that developers saw potentially how: 
an agreed national approach and metric that all parties can use where relevant would actually 
bring real advantages in terms of clarity. … We are looking very much at the potential for this 
both to add consistency and to speed up the process, which would bring cost benefits for the 
industry if we can achieve that (EAC, 2013a, p. 4). 
Whether this was a reasonable assumption was another matter, and the experience of the pilots 
suggested that the metric itself had no noticeable effect on the speed of planning consents (CEP & 
IEEP, 2014d).  
1.2: Too crude? 
Despite the common ground, the design of the metric did prove contentious. As outlined in Chapter 
7, Defra (2012e) opted for a metric modelled on the habitat hectares methodology used in the state 
of Victoria, Australia, using a matrix which involved multiplying habitat distinctiveness by condition by 
area to calculate a site’s value. As shown in Chapter 4, the choice of currency necessarily excludes 
certain aspects of biodiversity, and the metric’s simplicity was heavily criticised in subsequent 
discussions. At one end of the spectrum, some viewed the metric as fundamentally flawed. One 
critical consultant ecologist was far from untypical in warning: 
[W]hen I see something that is inherently complex, being reduced to something … [that] 
simple, I get very worried. Because inherent complexity means that really if you start making 
it simple, you're going to take important pieces out of the whole model (interview 4d). 
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While sceptical ecologists were joined by NGOs opposed to offsetting in general arguing for instance 
that: “the current metric would undervalue important sites or allow inappropriate trading of habitats” 
(FoE, 2013, p. 5; see also FERN, 2013), the substance of their criticism was widespread even among 
supportive groups. It was also borne out in practice. One pilot leader, whose initial attraction to the 
scheme had been partly motivated by local development pressure on arable land on the urban fringe, 
quickly became aware that: “While [the metric] works in some areas and some habitats, it doesn't 
work terribly well for farmland species and habitats, which was an issue for us” (interview 2c; also 2b; 
2e). There was broad agreement among groups with ecological expertise that the metric required 
considerable refinement, if it was to avoid certain perverse outcomes and controversies when 
implemented. CIEEM identified several limitations in their consultation response: 
In particular we would be keen to see the metric take account of: mosaic habitats that are 
valuable because of the heterogeneity that they provide; habitat connectivity; and ecosystem 
services including … social and cultural aspects (2013, pp. 4–5). 
Recognising that offsetting would only value what it measured, different actors attempted to pull the 
metric in different directions to meet particular interests or challenges they considered important.  
The absence of a way to account for species animated many of the debates. Developers for instance 
were insistent that this needed to be addressed. One industry representative explained how part of 
the impetus behind offsetting come from various developers “bending the Treasury’s ear”, and 
Osborne’s subsequent intervention into the implementation of the Habitats Regulations (interview 
7e). As one housebuilder put it, if the policy’s purpose was to accelerate land development, there was 
no point to it unless it put a clear value on protected species such as newts, bats and badgers: 
“everything else is secondary” (interview 7a). Apparently at the behest of Paterson (interview 9c), 
Defra obliged: 
Developers often face particular challenges in dealing with protected species especially when 
they are found unexpectedly on a site late in the development process, often leading to long 
and expensive delays. … The Government therefore intends to apply offsetting to protected 
species as part of any wider biodiversity offsetting system (2013d, p. 18). 
Though the move piqued the interest of developers (interview 1a), the manner it was framed to tackle 
specific species, which developers found troublesome in moving their projects forward, such as great-
crested newts, proved extremely divisive (interview 9c). Nevertheless, while several ecologists 
expressed scepticism about the scope for practical incorporation of species in the metric (interviews 
4a; 4c), other environmental interests did see the habitat-based metric as inadequate: 
What people term as habitat – and basically by that they mean vegetation cover – is a proxy. 
It's a sort of indicator for a lot of species … but it doesn't embody everything. … I'm convinced 
there do need to be some additional safeguards for species … and it's a question of looking 
for the species which aren't going to be safeguarded by the habitat, and working out what 
you'll do with them. So it is essential that it's done (interview 4e). 
The RSPB (2013) was particularly robust in its response on the issue of species, as were other NGOs 
such as Buglife, which emphasised its worries regarding invertebrates: 
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species require specific and particular habitat conditions, often at a very fine scale. These 
can be created though aspect, geographical location, soil biology, past uses of the site etc. 
For some species, such as invertebrates, a formula based simply on habitats will not 
automatically assess the original habitat’s complexity or structure and translate it into the new 
area of habitat (2013, para. 5.1). 
For conservation NGOs in particular, the integration of species was not about making offsets more 
fungible, but rather more complex. If the government and developers wanted to incorporate protected 
species, they were only likely to receive consent from environmental interests if the metric was made 
far more sensitive and detailed, such as the use of habitat suitability assessments (see Howard et al., 
2013). 
The case of species was illustrative, but several other debates around the metric’s design followed 
similar patterns. Its inability to measure and protect very high ‘potential value’, related to complex 
hydrology or soil composition, was criticised (interview 5d; see also BES, 2013c). The matter of 
ecosystem services was regularly raised, though they were widely regarded as impractical to 
incorporate, at least in the medium term. Yet it did raise questions over how social considerations, 
values and equity would be dealt with under the proposed system, including locational proximity of 
offsets to impact and access to nature for local communities. However, by dismissing these 
challenges from discussions about the metric’s design on the basis of simplicity, they were simply 
displaced to the realm of planning, which the government wanted to avoid as far as possible. 
Ecological concerns were also raised over the metric’s lack of sensitivity to context. While the 
government claimed ‘net gain’ could be achieved through consolidated offsets adding to the 
ecological network (Defra, 2013d, p. 3), LGEs noted the metric had no way of measuring the 
fragmenting effects of development impact on the connectivity of existing networks, which would 
ultimately lead to cumulative losses (interviews 2b; 2c). As one ecologist explained:  
The other thing that's missing from the metric – and they know this perfectly well – is that 
spatial configuration is really important. Things like hedgerows, or whether your nice chalk-
land field is next to another one, or just surrounded in a sea of arable, is going to make a big 
difference to how important somewhere is for biodiversity. So you've got to somehow factor 
in those spatial aspects, which currently the metric doesn't do. You could quantify it and put 
it in a metric, but probably you would just set conditions around what constitutes a suitable 
context based on the context that's been lost. So it would be a step in the logic and the 
decision-making, and around the design of the offset (interview 4a). 
Comments like these highlighted the need for either more complex metrics, or at least for its validation 
to be mediated by more proactive ecological planning on a larger spatial scale, with comprehensive 
data about the surrounding area. 
The dilemma for policymakers in moving the proposals forward was apparent in the findings of the 
Environmental Audit Committee’s in late 2013. One of its main recommendations was that the metric 
needed to more adequately reflect ecological complexity (EAC, 2013b), based on the evidence it had 
gathered from key stakeholders through its public inquiry. For offsetting to do what developers 
wanted, they said the metric needed to be simple and understandable, but also to produce 
“unambiguous results” (interview 7a):  
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We support the use of a metric in principle, but cannot accept the proposed Defra metric and 
procedures until they have been tested more thoroughly in the pilot projects. We consider it 
likely that the pilot metric is overly simplistic for the determination of no net loss (Energy UK, 
2013, p. 2). 
Given the difficulties of quantifying ecological value uncontroversially, this presented a considerable 
challenge. While the government wanted the metric to be kept as simple as possible, it was clear 
there was substantial disagreement over the appropriateness of its detailed features. Without 
widespread consent, its validity was likely to be challenged in practice, whenever its design limitations 
produced results unacceptable to one group or another. Since its publication in guidance, and despite 
its infrequent use, the metric proved controversial on a number of occasions and resulted in disputes 
in practice as well as theory (see for instance the case study in Carver, 2015). One housebuilder 
found their one experience with the metric particularly egregious. Having been told they would need 
to pay for offsite compensation for one development, they claimed that despite proving the initial 
calculation had been incorrect, when it was rerun the numbers were changed to produce the same 
result: 
the credits were open to manipulation, and the whole thing felt very sour to us … we walked 
away feeling that the money was pre-decided, to pay a private company to do work on land 
we had no control of, and calculation was manipulative (interview 7c). 
Across the spectrum, interviewees seemed to suggest that the metric actually concealed the 
subjectivity of underlying data, which did not provide enough precision to significantly reduce the risk 
of frequent poor judgements and disagreements in planning. In the end, Defra largely dismissed the 
committee’s suggestion, defending the metric’s integrity (see EAC, 2014). Yet its reluctance to 
‘overcomplicate’ was heavily mediated by its desire for the metric to facilitate trading to realise 
efficiency goals: 
[Biodiversity] is not so readily tradable and exchangeable, so you need to have slightly 
arbitrary rules where you decide what's comparable in biodiversity terms, to try and keep your 
market as simple as fluid as possible. … The less fungible you make your credits the tighter 
your market becomes, and the more risky your market becomes, because there's greater 
chance that it won't be able to meet demand (interview 1a). 
This revealed a further cleavage between different groups’ understanding of the purpose of 
quantification and simplicity. While nearly all the main groups agreed that quantification was a useful 
tool for translating and communicating value, environmental interests tended to be more sceptical of 
its mobilisation as a device which showed the underlying commensurability of different habitats, and 
enabled out-of-kind trading. Such reservations were only heightened by the government’s apparent 
overriding objective of lubricating the planning system through offsetting first, and much more hands-
off attitude to addressing environmental challenges in the medium to long-term, once the market was 
established. 
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2: Ecological assessment and data 
2.1: Outdated assessment techniques and poor quality data 
Many of those with ecological expertise who had doubts over the robustness of the metric were 
informed too by their experience, either as consultants, in local authorities or as third party 
stakeholders working on planning applications. They suggested that more attention needed to be 
given to the quality of information inputted into Defra’s calculative matrix, which at present remained 
highly subjective, because of the imprecision and subjectivity of assessment methods used in 
practice. One pilot leader described some of the problems encountered in practice in generating and 
validating objective data about a site:  
it’s sometimes surprisingly difficult to categorically state what an area of habitat is and what 
condition it’s in, especially if it’s sort of a mosaic of habitats, which is often the case on a 
development sites where perhaps it’s a piece of land which has effectively been abandoned 
for the last ten years. … [Y]ou can’t just say it’s a piece of meadow, because it’s scrubbed 
over in places, and perhaps there’s some damp depressions in other places and that sort of 
thing, so it’s not always black and white (interview 2b). 
The metric’s condition assessments were even more problematic: 
we’re using the Higher Level Stewardship … Farming Environment Handbook, which is 
obviously related to agri-environment schemes. It allows the assessment of condition for 
habitats which you would expect to find on farmland, but, for example, it doesn’t cover things 
like open mosaic habitat on previously developed land, which is a UK BAP habitat … and 
obviously post-industrial habitat tends to be under quite a lot of pressure from development. 
… I would hope if offsetting is rolled out more widely, they will develop a bespoke condition 
assessment tool for all the habitats you might expect to come across in a development 
context (interview 2b). 
Several ecologists talked about the limitations of outdated yet prevailing methods of data collection 
methods. One consultant went into detail about the ambiguities of the entire process, which could 
easily lead to inaccurate valuation: 
[I]n principle, it still comes down to a basic formula, which is, you know, area of habitat x is 
considered to be distinctiveness y, times by condition z, gives you your habitat hectares … 
and you can fiddle with it, or if you can't fiddle with it, you can make those numbers fit what 
you want. The way that we record habitat condition is very woolly, and you end up with three 
grades or whatever it might be. Well, one grade on habitat condition, if it's not very rigorously 
recorded, can make an enormous difference to how much you recreate. And it's the same 
with area. Habitat areas are quite difficult. I mean, an area is an area. It's what it is on the 
map, but actually the boundaries of individual habitats are very woolly. And some of the 
systems we use for habitat classification are really flaky, past their best. So Phase 1, the sort 
of basic standard of habitat survey that we use, developed by JNCC in the 80s, early 90s 
maybe; you're meant to go around colouring bits in with your pencils, and you overlay scrub 
with bits of grassland... and anyway, it just doesn't work now. To my mind it just isn't fit for 
purpose for offsetting, because it's just not accurate enough. You can end up with about six 
different types of grassland, with a different person on a different day. If it's windy and rainy 
in October, you go to a really nice grassland and only record five species of grass, and end 
up demoting it from something really quite good, to something quite poor. The same 
ecologist, on the same patch of ground, on a different day, might record it as a completely 
different habitat. So that's where... I suppose it's unfair to say that you would fiddle with the 
numbers in a kind of... it's not cheating necessarily. I don't mean directly manipulating the 
figures to suit what you need. I mean more that the systems we have for recording habitats 
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and habitat condition are so subjective, that that subjectivity means that you can end up with 
a lot of error. In theory you're meant to account for that by being precautionary. As in, if you 
have subjectivity in your approach, or your baseline surveys are constrained in any way, then 
you're meant to overcompensate, but there's kind of no mechanism for overcompensating. 
It's not in a developer's interest to overcompensate for something (interview 4c).  
While some LGEs interviewed (2a; 2c; 2e) had access to good quality and regularly updated local 
environmental records, they all noted this was highly unusual in England. The vast majority of 
planning authorities would mostly have to rely on data provided by developers and their consultants. 
The quality of this data was frequently noted as poor by LGEs and conservationists involved in 
planning, and consultants themselves admitted how commonly they were under direct or indirect 
pressure (for instance through restricted access or time) from clients to minimise the magnitude of 
likely impact in their reports (interviews 4a; 4b; 4c). Even if there was widespread agreement that 
quantification was a good thing, it did not translate to consensus over what was needed to generate 
credible and unambiguous numbers.  
2.2: Standardising advanced assessment methods? 
The adequacy of survey methods remained on the fringes of the public debate around offsetting. Yet 
it was clear that in many ecological experts’ minds, the issue influenced a lack of confidence in the 
robustness of the metric, since the entry of subjective, possibly skewed data into a crude metric would 
be to amplify inaccuracies. To tackle the ambiguities underlying the metric’s quantitative calculation, 
there was some consensus among these groups that more advanced assessments and complex 
analysis of sites would be necessary. This, they said, would better reflect ecological complexity, while 
reducing the subjectivity and variation of assessment data, and therefore, scope for disputes and 
poor decisions: 
It's the in and out stuff. What I was really keen to see was the subjective nature of some of 
the quality assessments getting removed. Because it is too subjective. Again, years of 
experience … [y]our condition analysis is not my condition analysis. … [W]e could reduce the 
level of subjectivity that goes in, by making it a more complex analysis, rather than going in 
and doing a Phase 1 survey. A lot of EIAs do Phase 1s only, rather than doing Enhanced 
Phase 1, Phase 2 or really proper NVC [National Vegetation Classification] (interview 5c).  
Many possible methods, both existing and emerging, were suggested by interviewees, which were 
said to be more detailed, precise and appropriate than Phase 1 surveys and the HLS condition 
assessments54. CIEEM (2013, pp. 12–13) expressed its desire to be actively involved in establishing 
more rigorous and standardised tools for offsetting, and there was ongoing discussion on the pages 
of its in-house magazine In Practice over the development of new instruments for offsets (Edmonds 
et al., 2015; Temple et al., 2010). This intersected with a wider conversation about adapting the 
                                                     
54 Other possible options mentioned by interviewees, as well as those quoted above, included the Broad 
Habitat Classification for UK BAP and the European EUNIS system, as well as the Integrated Habitat System, 
which could translate between some different types of assessment. The RSPB called for the SSSI Common 
Standards Monitoring methods to be used, which they considered “a more appropriate base from which to 
build the actual criteria for [condition] assessment” than the HLS handbook (2013, para. 29), while others 
talked about favourable condition assessments for European sites.  
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techniques of ecological assessment and management in line with the new British Standard 
Biodiversity - Code of practice for planning and development (see British Standards Institution, 2013), 
and growing demands for methods which would readily conform to the increasingly quantitative 
frameworks underpinning nature conservation policy.  
Despite much intellectual work, there was not an automatically straightforward choice to be made and 
pushed for. Different assessment tools would do different things, and the data generated by each 
would not necessarily be useful, or be straightforwardly comparable and translatable. One academic 
researcher working on knowledge exchange for offsetting explained: 
Biodiversity offsetting will have particular needs. It will need to be informed by science in 
particular ways, but the scientific research machine is going on for other reasons, to fulfil 
other people's agendas, and it's evolved over many decades … when you suddenly put out 
these questions to do with offsetting, that big machine, it's not very nimble. You look into this 
resource of environmental data and expertise, and it's often not quite what you want 
(interview 4e). 
Yet reaching consensus among ecological experts on this issue was not the substantial obstacle to 
progress on this front. While it was accepted that more appropriate condition assessments would 
probably be necessary, the more significant problem from the government’s perspective was that 
advanced assessment techniques would be substantially more involved and complex. As one 
ecologist explained with regard to NVC methods: 
[It] is very detailed; you've got to know constituent species of all the different types, and they 
can vary quite slightly, depending on soil type, wetness, where they are, what part of the 
country they're in, what species you'd expect. A good botanist will probably be able to assign 
a vegetation type to the NVC. But what should be happening is a little bit more investigation 
into species composition and structure, processes and spatial configuration, and packaging 
all that up into the metric (interview 4a). 
It was this call for added complexity which revealed a serious tension, between reducing the costs of 
compliance for developers, and ensuring assessment was robust enough to ensure confidence that 
valuation was comprehensive. 
When expressing their concerns about the potential business costs of offsets, developers pointed to 
environmental assessments as a major factor, explaining that the more complex or sophisticated they 
were, the more expensive compliance would be “at a time when we’re trying to keep a lid on the 
affordability” (interview 7e; also 7c). They had the backing of landowner groups too on this issue, 
mindful of the possible knock on costs as suppliers: 
we are very conscious of the need to avoid placing additional burdens on developers. The 
amount of information a developer is obliged to supply in support of an application is already 
excessive. As such, we suggest a short statement for consideration by the planning authority, 
setting out how he has complied with the hierarchy should be sufficient. If a developer is 
required to spend time and money in obtaining consultants reports it will defeat one of the 
main objectives of offsetting (CLA, 2013a, p. 3). 
The government was equally cognizant of this, given its extremely strict criteria to have “no net impact 
on business” (interview 1a). Under the subtitle ‘Potential savings’, it noted in the Green Paper how 
185 
 
the “Australian experience suggests assessments alone can be half the cost under an offsetting 
system”, immediately followed by: “It has been suggested the pilot metric can be applied to a site in 
as little as 20 minutes” (Defra, 2013d, p. 14). This rather ambiguous statement caused some 
controversy, and though in reality it was probably down to poor wording, Defra failed to ever clarify 
what was meant. Some took it as a sign that the government saw comprehensive assessments as 
essentially superfluous under their proposals, and another opportunity to save developers’ money. 
The chair of the EAC for instance called it “little more than a 20-minute box-ticking exercise” (quoted 
in Evans, 2013d), while the committee’s report criticised the claim, saying: “The speed with which the 
metric can be applied to sites … should not be a priority. The priority should be ensuring rigorous 
protection of the environment” (EAC, 2013b, p. 9). Those attracted to the policy for its potential to 
deliver better conservation outcomes were concerned that the metric and underlying assessments 
needed to be as ecologically robust as possible, to counteract the inherent and well-recognised risks 
of undervaluing sites. However, the government’s non-negotiable position on imposing any measures 
or standards which might not prove cost effective for developers increasingly generated unease 
among environmental groups. They felt a growing sense that the government was largely 
unconcerned with the ecological integrity of its new policy, and was rushing its proposals through 
without serious thought being put into the detail of how environmental objectives were going to be 
achieved (e.g. National Trust, 2013; Hayns et al., 2013). 
 
3: Delivering equivalent ecological gain 
The other main area of technical debate concerned conservation gain at the other end of offset 
transactions. What types of offsets would count as delivering a gain? What criteria would need to be 
met to demonstrate equivalence? Most importantly, how would the limitations and uncertainties of 
restoration ecology be accounted for and risks alleviated? 
3.1: Avoided loss offsets 
In principle, many ecologists and conservationists were wary of avoided loss offsets being used as 
credits to compensate for development impact. The question marks over counterfactuals and 
demonstrating additionality, as explained in Chapter 4, were recognised as carrying risks to the 
legitimacy of the system and its ecological outcomes. CIEEM noted: 
Funding is certainly needed to maintain environmental gains, however we do not see this as 
counting as an offset. There should be more habitat creation rather than recycling of existing 
ones for different reasons. Maintaining an environmental gain for another development is 
effectively an environmental loss and would mean that no new funding is being put into 
reaching our 2020 biodiversity targets (2013, p. 12). 
Nevertheless, some also accepted that closing off this avenue could lead to some perverse outcomes, 
and were not necessarily dismissive of situations like the one raised by this landowner in relation to 
an HLS scheme on their land: 
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Nothing happened for 15-18 years. The grass was topped once a year. Then not quite 
overnight, but over three or four years, they've developed the most wonderful display of 
orchids. … And now the orchids and the other wildflower are now going really well. That's all 
part of an HLS scheme for which I am paid. … [which] runs out in seven years. If there is an 
alternative HLS scheme, then that's fine. … But if there isn't, what I've got are some orchid 
banks which are unfunded and unprotected. Now, what I could do is plough them up and say 
I've got this land available for offsetting. I know that it will produce orchids in due course, we 
can plant some more grass on it and let the orchids come up again. My view is that that is 
really stupid. What you've done is forced me to destroy the wildlife habitat, before trying to 
recreate it (interview 8a). 
Questions of additionality in cases such as this would be quite complex to determine, and The Wildlife 
Trusts were typical in erring against these kinds of avoided loss offsets, identifying the risks of 
introducing “a ‘what-if’ option into a framework which is striving to be solid, quantified and certain and 
as such could be open to unsanctioned abuse” (TWT, 2013, p. 33). As a result, most of the focus of 
debate remained on restoration offsets, and their potential pitfalls – though avoided loss was not ruled 
out. 
3.2: Restoration offsets 
As explained in Chapter 4, there are all kinds of well-recognised challenges and limitations successful 
habitat restoration. As the policymaking process gathered pace in 2013 however, there was much 
criticism that Defra appeared overconfident in the scope for restoration to straightforwardly achieve 
equivalent gains – though the government did restrict marine offsetting from its proposals partly on 
those grounds (Defra, 2013d, p. 11; see also Dickie et al., 2013). Highlighting the lack of attention to 
science in the public debate, the British Ecological Society emphasised significant gaps in knowledge 
in the field of restoration ecology. In an intervention soon after the Green Paper was released, they 
pointed to complex soil structure and hydrology as presenting specific challenges for restoration work 
(BES, 2013c). Such concerns were similarly evident in the interviews: 
There was concern I think around the fact [the proposals] that seemed to suggest that actually 
creating new habitat elsewhere is easy. It isn't. We actually don't know very much about how 
to successfully create and restore natural habitat. We're learning all the time. You can often 
get a good result quickly, … but 10 years later, for reasons we don't perhaps understand, 
and despite what you think the best management for it, it's not doing so well. ... You [might] 
see what's on the surface, but the soils have taken hundreds if not thousands of years to 
form; the hydrological regime [too]. Those are much, much harder to recreate, which is why 
you might get good results quickly, but actually in the long term it's not worked (interview 4b). 
Those with experience in the UK gave examples of the difficulties they had faced. One ecologist 
spoke of the failure of an ongoing project they were part of: 
the no net loss for the project relies on propagation of plants and their reintroduction into the 
wild. The decision's been made and the development's started on the assumption that it will 
be possible, but it's actually it's not proving possible. That could be for soil mycorrhizal 
reasons – [as in] there are associations in the soil that are missing. Who knows? It's often 
not easy to put things back in the wild (interview 4a). 
Conservationists expressed their reservations over how widely applicable the practice could be: 
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If it always worked, there wouldn't really be a problem in doing it, … [but] ecology is very 
complicated, and creating habitats is very complicated, even if you do the best job possible. 
We have massively struggled to do heathland restoration on our own headquarters – and 
we're [a major conservation NGO]. We keep getting things wrong, and things go wrong and 
it's just an indication of how hard it is (interview 5d). 
In light of these kinds of problems, ecologists and conservationists tended to be very cautious about 
what realistic environmental outcomes could be expected from any new system.  
Different groups responded to this predicament in various ways. The most common position of 
conservation NGOs and professional bodies was critical of the government’s apparent over-optimism. 
They argued that uncertainty needed to be addressed more convincingly, by putting appropriate 
safeguards and standards in place, in line with best practice and sound science, and pushed for the 
adoption of more strongly worded precautionary principles in future policy documents, especially in 
relation to the mitigation hierarchy. Otherwise they surmised offsetting would fail badly to meet its 
environmental objectives, and would not be credible in their view, delivering absolute losses for 
uncertain gains (e.g. CIEEM, 2013; RSPB, 2013; TWT, 2013). The challenges were partly 
institutional, relating to how offsets would be secured, managed and monitored, and by whom – 
challenges explored in Chapter 10. Yet they were clearly technical issues too, and concerned which 
types of habitat should be considered irreplaceable and therefore off-limits, though as one pilot leader 
explained: 
We are asking people to define that. Defra didn't define, but I don't think Defra ever will. They 
may give a lot of wording to suggest certain habitats would be irreplaceable, but they don't 
like nailing their colours to the mast, unless it's obvious like ancient woodland (interview 2a). 
Ancient woodland and limestone pavement were suggested as irreplaceable by the Green Paper, 
since recreation was impossible in realistic timeframes. Various actors argued that many others 
should be included too, with many arguing out-of-kind trading could not deliver equivalence, which 
the metric allowed (Defra, 2016, p. 17). For conservationists, the other problematic issue around 
equivalence concerned timescales. If restoration offsets were supposed to deliver no net loss in 
perpetuity, Defra’s costing estimates were seen as extremely questionable: 
An offset, for a medium to large housing development, the idea that £15,000 per hectare 
would be sufficient to support loss of habitat in perpetuity [as cited in the Green Paper's 
impact assessment], is not really feasible for us. … We just don't think that is anywhere near 
– based on our experience of managing places – a realistic figure. It might be in some 
circumstances, but the idea that you can just kind of make a statement like that … [about all 
kinds of habitats] doesn't seem [plausible]. … I think it's based on the Environmental 
Stewardship payments, through the HLS scheme, and we don't think that's an acceptable 
comparison. I think that's because probably because HLS is about something over a set 
timeframe; it's not about securing something in perpetuity. … [W]hat you might get in 
layman's language is cowboy offset providers, say: 'Oh yeah, I can provide those 2.9 units, 
and it'll only cost me £6,000 to do it'. Whereas [we] will build in all the long-term costs, maybe, 
and say: 'That will cost £162,000 or £500,000', or whatever. But we think we would have a 
much greater likelihood of being able to deliver it, because we're being realistic about the 
costs. But if it is up to a developer to choose a scheme, then they're going to choose the one 
which is most likely, unless they're very scrupulous, they're going to choose the one that ticks 
the box and say: ‘Oh yeah we've provided our offset’, but there's no guarantee that that offset 
will be provided in the long-term (interview 5a). 
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The ramifications of this particular criticism, and the deep divisions over the appropriate longevity of 
offsets, are explored in the next chapter. It highlighted another area where environmental interests 
expressed serious reservations about the evidence underpinning Defra’s policy proposals, which they 
felt were being fast-tracked at the behest of business interests (e.g. Hayns et al., 2013; interviews 4a; 
4b; 5d; 9c, 11a). 
Others took what they framed as a more pragmatic perspective. While safeguards were critical, they 
made the point that the proposals were not a radical departure from the status quo, and that the 
challenges of restoration already existed, in a system where compensation was routinely not even 
being asked for. Against this backdrop, offsetting was an opportunity to “claw something back” 
(interview 4a), and success need not be absolute to be legitimate (interview 4c). Pro-offsetting groups 
from the green economy camp however tended to reject the pessimism of the environmental 
organisations: 
Certainly talking to some of the Americans, they seem to say it can be made to work. I think 
that the naysayers are probably the ones who don't want offsetting, and will always point to 
the fact that something doesn't work. Well you can make it work. … I think one of the big 
problems is we've never been realistic about cost (interview 6a).  
Moreover, a formal and consistent system offered some structure, it was argued, through which 
market forces and adjustments would produce innovation and iterative improvements to practice over 
time, driving up standards and the quality of offsets (interview 6b). The government was largely in 
agreement, and expressed frustration with what they thought were conservationists’ unrealistic 
demands for a “perfect system” in one step (interview 1b). 
If these divergent viewpoints were a source of some tension, this was exacerbated by the criticism of 
more entrenched oppositional voices, deeply troubled by the notion of nature being ‘replaceable’ and 
‘tradeable’: 
It is intrinsically problematic to assume that ‘biodiversity’ can be moved around (offset) from 
one place to another – such an assumption is erroneous biologically (indeed, since 
restoration ecology is very much in its infancy, there is little evidence that ecosystems can 
ever be recreated to a specific state) (FERN, 2013, p. 2). 
By constructing biodiversity as replicable and fungible, they held the view that the government’s 
proposals set a dangerous precedent. Combined with the supposed over-simplification embodied in 
the metric, they considered the mechanism as a whole to be an anti-ecological techno-fix based on 
false equivalence. Such an approach they argued, was at least unwise and likely to exacerbate 
biodiversity loss, if not made in bad faith to erode environmental protections to facilitate development 
(interviews 4d; 4f; 5e; 5f). While the pragmatist position certainly held sway over some, many 
conservationists and ecologists were equally being pulled in the other direction, by those for whom 
the technical limits of restoration were viewed as a fundamental flaw in the government’s policy: 
In the Green Paper there’s this kind of amazing claim that offsetting will ‘guarantee’ no net 
loss, and yet I’m not aware of any academic paper or report from any other country with 
offsetting which can state that. … It seemed to be the only example the Secretary of State 
and the officials at the Environmental Audit Committee … could draw on was their own trip 
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to Australia. It seemed almost as though they were basing a whole policy on a trip to Australia 
where they were told it was working well! (interview 5e). 
As the government showed continued unwillingness to address more supportive environmental 
groups’ concerns over time, and other debates became more fractious, these oppositional views 
found increasing resonance in the wider public discourse (e.g. Mathiesen, 2013; Howarth, 2013). 
 
4: Complexity and ecological integrity versus simplicity and cost 
effectiveness 
The government faced a series of dilemmas as it tried to reach a consensus around the definition of 
the commodity around which a market could cohere. As has been shown, disputes erupted over the 
comprehensiveness and objectivity of the methods of measurement, and the ecological integrity or 
feasibility of what offsetting proffered as equivalent gain. Addressing these questions was not only 
technically complex, but politically so too. Underlying the dilemmas encountered were tensions 
common to all offsetting market systems, reviewed in Chapter 4. Adding further complexity, precision 
and restrictions to the metric would have undermined the fungibility of offsets, which the government 
and its business allies saw as necessary to establish a fluid market capable of generating win-win 
benefits. Most importantly for the government and developers was that offsets be liquid enough to 
lubricate the planning system to accelerate development. Yet by rejecting the imposition of more 
complicated forms of measurement, the widespread consent needed to stabilise the commodity and 
reduce disputes in practice was weakened. Furthermore, the government’s reluctance to impose 
stricter standards or rules which might affect the cost effectiveness of either applying the metric or 
delivering offsets starkly revealed the political constraints on environmental outcomes. The openly 
pro-development attitude of the government only fed the far more critical narrative that offsetting was 
designed to facilitate the bulldozing of biodiversity to make way to profitable development.  
None of this is to say that the technical complexities themselves were fatal for the policy, but that they 
were deeply entwined with political questions over how they could be effectively and satisfactorily 
resolved. Social and ecological issues were inseparable and co-constitutive. This mattered, because 
if offsetting was to truly get off the ground as Defra hoped, its use would need to be taken up widely 
and voluntarily. As the tenor of these criticisms rose, those groups the government needed to enrol 
became increasingly wary of putting their reputations on the line for offsets. Moreover, quantification 
was not the straightforward solution some had hoped. No net loss was more of a symbolic goal than 
an absolute condition, and what would be measured, lost and gained under its auspices would be 
contingent on what was considered ‘reasonable’ in planning. As environmental groups were all too 
aware, what really mattered was the strength of policy, institutions and the balance of power in the 
planning system. The metric was roundly accepted as a superior way of measuring what was being 
lost than what came before (see CEP & IEEP, 2014d, pp. 32–6), yet most acknowledged that to 
seriously start redressing biodiversity loss through land development, it would require planning 
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authorities being able to mobilise the metric in a context of strengthened powers of ecological 
regulation. As Chapter 7 showed, the shifting political terrain and its material implications did not 
favour their calls for the more intensive and extensive intervention they believed necessary. In 
planning terms, project viability was far less negotiable than no net loss of biodiversity, and the 
unwillingness to countenance deeper levels of intervention to achieve those outcomes reflected this. 
What Chapter 10 now goes on to show is that not only were meaningful environmental outcomes 
unlikely through the government’s proposals, but that the combined technical and institutional 
tensions were so sharp that the system looked largely unworkable – so heavily was planning stacked 
in developers’ favour, backed by government policy. 
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Chapter 10: Regulating offsets – tensions, disputes, and the 
fracturing of consensus 
 
Introduction 
This final empirical chapter considers the institutional and regulatory questions which emerged and 
became hotly debated during the policymaking process. Many of the themes discussed in Chapter 4 
were present, including the challenges of effective regulatory oversight, proper adherence to the 
mitigation hierarchy, dilemmas over how far to restrict the types and location of offsets, issues around 
supply and long-term monitoring and management, and of course whether offsetting would be 
compulsory. In addition, given the government’s reluctance to impose extra burdens on business, 
there were disputes over the scope of offsets, and when use of the metric could be triggered. Chapter 
10 also reveals more about the particular limits of offsetting as an instrument of planning in England, 
overlaid onto a complex social and regulatory landscape of competing concerns and objectives, many 
of which would override biodiversity considerations in practice. 
The chapter is split into four sections. The first looks in detail at tensions and divisions which arose 
around the mooted regulatory rules and scope of the policy, including the strength of the mitigation 
hierarchy, locational and other restrictions on suitable offsets, the level at which planning applications 
should be screened before becoming subject to the mitigation hierarchy and offsets, and issues 
around longevity and the supply and costs of offset credits. Section 2 analyses the institutional 
architecture and possible roles of different groups would undertake in the governance and oversight 
of offsets. In particular, it focuses on the problem of regulatory capacity and ecological expertise in 
local authorities, and the pressures local government ecologists and planners would likely face trying 
to implement offsetting in the context of severe resource constraints, exacerbated by the 
government’s austerity measures. It also considers offsetting’s mobilisation as a techno-managerial 
and economic instrument, seen by some groups as a way to partially circumvent the problems of 
understaffing in planning authorities. Section 3 then examines the most fractious of all the disputes 
around the government’s proposed system: whether offsetting would be a voluntary or compulsory 
instrument to be used as part of development control – the issue which ultimately shattered the fragile 
consensus described in Chapter 8. Section 4 then reflects on the findings of Chapter 10, identifying 
the deep fault-lines tensions which prevented the possibility of the policy’s national implementation. 
 
1: Regulatory rules and scope 
Debates over technical matters always necessarily spilled over into discussion about the institutional 
framework of rules in which the metric needed to be embedded. Chapters 3 and 4 made clear how 
offsetting policies or markets depend heavily on a complex architecture of regulation for their 
application, coherence and legitimacy. It was these debates which revealed some of the deeper 
political fault-lines which needed to be bridged in England, and the challenges faced by the 
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government as it attempted to enrol the core stakeholders needed to operationalise its preferred, 
voluntary system. This first section examines four of the more contentious examples, beginning with 
questions about the strictness of the mitigation hierarchy and possible restrictions on the type and 
location of offsets permitted. It then moves onto some of the most divisive debates over the scope of 
offsets, and what circumstances they would be applicable to, in terms of the size of development and 
significance of environmental harm. It also deals with the length of time offsets would need to be 
secured and managed. These were issues which threatened to derail the policy, with developers and 
landowners respectively, resisting the imposition of what they argued to be unjustified regulation and 
intervention over land use, which environmental interests deemed necessary if no net loss was to be 
meaningful. 
1.1: The mitigation hierarchy 
1.1.1: Strong policy? 
The beginning of Chapter 3 explained how important adherence to the mitigation hierarchy is deemed 
to be in definitions and standards for biodiversity offsetting, with compensation or offsets only 
defensible as a last resort. Across the spectrum, conservationists, consultant and local government 
ecologists and green business groups were agreed on this basic principle (e.g. Nottinghamshire 
County Council, 2013; Aldersgate Group, 2013; CIEEM, 2013; TWT, 2013). Heeding such a 
precautionary approach was largely based on the technical challenges identified in Chapter 9. 
Developers, though critical of rigid rules, often explained their desire to meet all their compliance 
conditions onsite, because they argued green and open space added value to their developments 
(interviews 7a; 7b; 7d). However, this was partly down to a doubtful claim, given the evidence, that 
they only very rarely caused residual damage to biodiversity, and that the imposition of the final stage 
of compensation or offsets would be unfair and additional. Government officials, for their part, argued 
that observance of the mitigation hierarchy was clearly stated in their proposals and part of policy in 
the NPPF, and therefore did not require further elaboration. 
To a large extent, the point of tension here was about the strength of policy, rather than the principle 
itself. While the government contended that the rules were sufficiently clear to proceed, other groups 
argued faith in existing policy and guidance was demonstrably misplaced. As shown in Chapter 7 and 
Section 2 of this chapter, the mitigation hierarchy was not well understood and poorly implemented, 
considered “a far more serious problem for biodiversity than the poor implementation of any 
necessary compensation” (RSPB, 2013, para. 25) for conservationists; while professional ecologist 
bodies too noted:  
There should not be a reliance on current practice being sufficient to guard against this (i.e. 
in relation to the mitigation hierarchy). The development of any biodiversity offsetting scheme 
or requirement will necessitate a renewed focus on the mitigation hierarchy (itself overdue) 
(IEMA, 2013, p. 10). 
One industry representative heavily involved in discussions at a national level made the point in detail: 
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generally the mitigation hierarchy only applies to SSSIs and above. It doesn't necessarily 
apply to BAP habitat, and doesn't necessarily apply to low value habitat. Now Defra … said 
[to us] compensation is required as a matter of course for loss of biodiversity. And we said: 
‘No it isn't’. They said: ‘Well it is, because national policy requires it’, and we asked what they 
meant by that. They said the NPPF. What the NPPF says is we should move from net loss 
to net gain. It doesn't say no net loss. There should be a move from net loss to net gain. 
‘Should’, you know, strengthen ecological networks, delivering biodiversity enhancement. It 
doesn't talk about no net loss; it doesn't talk about offsetting. And as I thought, that isn't being 
applied to require compensation for non-designated habitats generally. Planning authorities 
aren't doing that. … So, you've been losing biodiversity – low value, low grade, low quality, 
condition and distinctiveness biodiversity – and no one's accounting for that. What the metric 
is starting to do is to account for it, and where possible … replace some of that loss. Not 
necessarily through offsetting; not necessarily 100 percent compensation. It's not necessarily 
net gain or no net loss. But it's lessening the loss that would have occurred otherwise. … The 
mitigation hierarchy is being applied, but it kicks in when you get SSSIs or protected species. 
It doesn't generally apply for low value habitats (interview 7b). 
It was clear too, from statements made by actors across the spectrum, that the steps of the mitigation 
hierarchy were not well defined, and open to considerably different interpretations. The ‘fuzziness’ of 
key terms was highlighted in commissioned research into existing practice (CEP & IEEP, 2013, pp. 
13–18). In addition to the resourcing issues, which are discussed in Section 2, the RSPB was far from 
alone in making the case that: “LPAs need better guidance on how to avoid and mitigate harm, and 
it is crucial that a single guidance document covering each stage of the mitigation hierarchy is 
published” (2013, para. 26). To their frustration however, and as pointed out by LGEs, the government 
was resistant to providing such comprehensive guidance, which it saw as overly rigid and 
bureaucratic. As explained in Chapter 7, reducing the volume of guidance was central to the ongoing 
programme of planning and regulatory reform. Instead, strength of policy and guidance would depend 
on the wording of local plans, where offsetting would theoretically get adopted. Contingent on a whole 
host of local political, institutional and geographical factors, this would necessarily lead to a highly 
uneven regulatory landscape, as was clear from the way the pilot authorities approached offsets (CEP 
& IEEP, 2014c, 2014b). 
1.1.2: Offsets as last resort of first option? 
The second concern around the implementation of the mitigation hierarchy, in the context of 
ambiguities in practice, was about the implications of a perceived overemphasis on offsets. One pilot 
leader foresaw a “temptation that you jump straight to the compensation stage, because it's there as 
a tool to be used” (interview 2b). This was one reason professional ecologists were so split over their 
support for offsetting:  
the concern that people had … was: we have a mitigation hierarchy. Is this effectively saying, 
as an alternative to the mitigation hierarchy, you can offset your impacts, so the mitigation 
hierarchy would not be followed? … [T]here needs to be a lot more reassurance from the 
government, and from the policy (interview 4b). 
Conservationists shared similar worries: 
They're not putting in place any measures or any proposals to get local authorities to avoid 
harm more, to mitigate harm more. All the focus is on offsetting. That's where you focus 
people's minds, that's where you're likely to end up. I think there's a real danger … it becomes 
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a default option rather than the last option. … Even if they don't mean to do that, you've got 
to think ultimately decisions are made by people, and it will influence the kind of prism through 
which they look at proposals (interview 5d). 
Though the government denied the claim, there was a widespread feeling that the proposals were 
actually designed to short-circuit the mitigation hierarchy, which, in the words of the RSPB, was 
“undermined and contradicted [in the Green Paper] by the explicit desire for offsetting to free up more 
land on site for development (because mitigation will no longer be necessary)” (2013, para. 24). 
Again, the drive towards creating an offset market was deemed problematic and in tension with 
precautionary conservation principles: 
We are concerned … it would make compensation for damage much more the norm. Some 
of the language in the consultation is … that for it to work, we need to create an adequate 
market; … it actually talks about it in terms of generating a lot of offsetting opportunities. It 
just seems to me that that's a total contradiction with it being a last resort. … Colleagues in 
Germany have said that, … even though there's a much more robust system in place there 
for no net loss, there is still a concern that that's what developers now do. They kind of skip 
the avoidance … and go straight to thinking: 'We've got this offsetting system in place, 
therefore we go straight to that' (interview 5e). 
IEMA warned if the mitigation hierarchy was not followed strictly, there was a danger offsets would 
be “a perceived easy option, with risks of misselling [sic] and concerns of developers being potentially 
fast tracked to an offset solution” (2013, p. 3). This intersected with the worries covered in Chapter 9 
about the government’s perceived over-optimism in ecological restoration. The policy’s more 
enthusiastic supporters certainly did little to dispel these kinds of apprehensions, with their own views 
on how strictly the hierarchy should be implemented:  
obviously avoidance is the key, and then mitigating onsite what you can. But I've seen so 
much mitigation onsite that's such a total waste of time and money. … I want to see a lot of 
that moved, because I just think it's a waste of time. It's no good for biodiversity (interview 
6a). 
As will be explained in Section 2, many saw the mechanism as an economic instrument where the 
pricing of compensation, generated by the market, was crucial to its utility: “offsets are a regulated 
market that reveal value … the price signals currently aren't there, and that's what offsets can change, 
and that's sort of the biggest potential influence” (interview 9a). For them, the focus on offsets was 
therefore entirely warranted, in providing the incentives for better and more flexible decision-making. 
1.1.3: Strategic planning and early intervention 
For others, this logic was upside down. Instead of thinking of offsets as a financial disincentive, some 
saw the mechanism and the application of the mitigation hierarchy as inseparable from strategic 
planning, based on countywide data mapping: 
I firmly believe that biodiversity should be planned, like transport … so you avoid sites that 
are more sensitive in the first place, thereby reducing the need for biodiversity offsetting.… 
There seems to be a development control emphasis on it. ... I've had several cases in the 
past where we'd get a site coming forward which shouldn't be coming forward … and you 
end up compromising.  … You can apply the mitigation hierarchy at the pre-application stage, 
before the site allocation document comes out. You can do it at that stage, but by the time of 
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a planning application comes around you can't really do it. … [O]n the bigger sites … we look 
at it at the pre-application stage, so we're using it to inform the master-planning of a site, so 
that we get enough mitigation built into the design of the site. … [Otherwise] it's too late 
basically (interview 2e). 
This LGE had unusual conviction in this interpretation of offsets, yet the desire to root the policy firmly 
in this kind of strategic approach was strong among planners, LGEs and conservationists. One 
leading planner, whose knowledge of offsetting was limited, nevertheless made a pointed critique of 
its framing as mitigation for harm through “private transactions” agreed in development control, as 
opposed to a strategic, deliberative and plan-led view of space, biodiversity and public good (interview 
3a; see also Town and Country Planning Association, 2004). It was also reflected in a common 
aversion to introducing the possibility of offsets too early. The Woodland Trust argued a biodiversity 
assessment should always be included as part of a planning application, providing all necessary 
information to determine fulfilment of the mitigation hierarchy, but “should not include proposals for 
offsetting; when a planning authority is balancing the benefits of a development against the dis-
benefits … offsetting should not be part of the decision-making process” (2013, p. 7). However, such 
early interventionist approaches clashed with developers’ ideas about what would make the 
application process more certain and therefore less costly for them, one of whom talked about their 
efforts to lobby government for the removal of pre-application environmental assessments (interview 
7c). 
1.2: Locational and other restrictions on offsets 
The more explicit desire from some quarters for offsetting to be subordinated to strategic ecological 
planning on a local scale dovetailed with another of the more contentious debates: that of the location 
and proximity of offsets relative to development impact. When the government released its most 
concrete proposals in the Green Paper, the ambition was for trades to have as few restrictions as 
possible, so that land would be more efficiently allocated from an economic perspective. It suggested 
that: 
letting offsets be provided anywhere in England might lead to a loss in some areas of the 
country (e.g. where there is greatest value in development) with net gain elsewhere (e.g. 
areas where offsets can be secured most cheaply). This would be both economically and 
environmentally beneficial (Defra, 2013d, p. 16). 
The hope was that offsets would be delivered on cheap, marginal agricultural land, while freeing up 
more valuable locations for development (interview 1a) – though this was tempered by spatial 
multipliers integrated into the metric to incentivise offsets in strategically designated parts of the local 
area. This generated some pushback, especially from local planners and conservationists (e.g. 
Nottinghamshire County Council, 2013; FoE, 2013). While spatial context entered some of the 
technical debates about the ecological equivalence of offsets, this was a comparatively marginal 
issue. What concerned local government ecologists and planners was that local people would not 
accept the loss of biodiversity on their doorstep, whether it was the amenity space they valued or the 
closeness of ‘nature’: 
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It relates to what value local communities place on an area of green space, and they're not 
going to be very happy if an area they value is suddenly replaced by one 15 miles away, 
because it's going to have no use for them there. That's a bit of a thorny issue (interview 2b). 
This frequently became mixed up with debates about local ecosystem services, but the salient point 
for planners was that they should have the tools to require compensation for loss to be as local as 
possible: 
Pilot hosts noted that this proximity preference was very strong and it was felt that elected 
members were very unlikely to support biodiversity offsetting if it resulted in the loss of 
biodiversity (and potential income from developments) from their LPA. The importance of this 
issue was supported from discussions with two non-pilot LPAs (Rushcliffe and Southend) 
who said that they did not join the pilot programme because of this concern (CEP & IEEP, 
2014d, p. 29). 
Though there was less consensus among conservationists, many made similar arguments, stressing 
the importance, from a conservation perspective, of people’s access to nature, for both wellbeing and 
nurturing a culture of care and understanding for the natural environment:  
it's not amenity green space, that's not what we're trying to create, but it's that feeling of 
walking through a flowery grassland situation, which will have birds coming in, which is what 
the locals really appreciate. … [I]f we don't take the people with us, we're preserving this little 
bit of green space somewhere for those few members of the NGOs who actually understand 
it, not for the general people who walk through and would love to see an interpretation board 
that says what it is and why it is, and see a name on the bottom and perhaps get involved. 
And the only way – and this is a bigger, broader issue – the only way we're going to save 
biodiversity in the UK is if we get everybody involved. If we stick with it with just those NGO 
members who understand, we'll just end up with a few little jewels across the country, and 
the rest will go (interview 5c).  
Rather than simply a question of economic efficiency, both groups recognised the socio-spatial effects 
offsets would have if not properly regulated, and possible unintended consequences. 
The proximity question became quite heated at times. While the government appeared willing to listen 
to these concerns, Paterson antagonised critics in early 2014 when speaking to The Times 
newspaper. In what several interviewees referred to as a disastrous interview from a public relations 
perspective, at moment when the public debate was already deeply polarised, he stated his view that 
an offset would be acceptable if it was “within an hour’s drive” of the loss of a local nature site (The 
Guardian, 2014). As mentioned above, even the conservation NGOs found it impossible to come to 
a common position on the issue (interview 5c). While many pushed the access to nature agenda, 
others thought this a less serious issue, and thought offsets should only contribute to high value 
reserves, where public access could be restricted to minimise human disturbances. According to one 
consultant, Natural England appeared to share this view, since they were most interested in 
leveraging funding for SSSIs they were responsible for (interview 9c). As one ecologist observed, the 
stated ambition for offsets to contribute to the Lawton vision suggested consolidation of existing 
designated sites was the priority over an approach aimed at weaving human and natural spaces 
together (interview 4a). Disagreements over location reflected the quite different values attached to 
biodiversity and views over what should be protected, mediated by different conceptions about 
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people’s relationship with wildlife and nature, and its relevance to other ideas of place and justice. 
These tensions suggested offsetting was not the easy technocratic fix some seemed to imagine, but 
something that required deep deliberation, compromise and trade-offs. The dilemmas were certainly 
recognised, especially by some conservationists, LGEs and developers (HBF, 2013b; RSPB, 2013). 
The disputes on location were certainly not fatal for the policy. Nonetheless, though Defra seemed to 
acknowledge the concerns arising over location, its laissez faire attitude to such matters was part of 
a more damaging pattern of non-interventionism, which left complex questions unaddressed and a 
perceived lack of necessary strategic vision. As with restrictions of out-of-kind offsets, the government 
proved continually reticent about putting constraints on the liquidity of offset credits. This caution was 
frequently justified by the government, developers, and farming and landowner groups in terms of 
market functionality, and ensuring sufficient supply of allowable receptor sites, to avoid blockages in 
the system and the risk of ‘ransom’. The National Farmers Union expressed members’ reservations 
about prescriptive trades: “Requiring ‘like for like’ or ‘trading up’ makes the market more complex and, 
therefore, delivery more costly. This complexity should be avoided” (NFU, 2013, p. 16). Putting more 
restrictions in place would inhibit supply and risked making the programme uncompetitive, on which 
so much of the Defra’s cost-saving hopes rested: 
A prescriptive metric would reduce choice, add to the costs of offsets for developers and 
could lead to developers being ransom stripped where offset options are limited. Ransom 
stripping would also be a particular risk if offset options were restricted to a small local area. 
This would evidently drive up costs and the render many sites unviable (HBF, 2013b, p. 3). 
Green business actors made similar statements, in this case on the specific issue of location: 
Everyone will say we want the offset habitat next to the development site, or as close as 
possible. Well, that's important, but maybe you want to set a radius of 10 kilometres or 10 
miles, because … if a landowner or farmer knows a developer needs his patch of land 
suddenly the price goes right up, so you need to build choice in. But the market can do all 
that, once you've got the principle of having an offsetting mechanism there (interview 6a). 
Yet this faith in the market arguments failed to convince conservationists and LGEs, whose view was 
that offsets were first and foremost being designed to enable development, and that other social and 
ecological concerns were deemed secondary add-ons.  
Apart from well-recognised pro-development tenor of the Green Paper, highly publicised events on 
the ground, as well as government actions and statements, seemed to add weight to the view that 
developers and government were willing to disregard any restrictions in their application of offsets if 
it suited their interests (Barkham, 2014; FERN & FoE, 2014; Marshall, 2013a). The Department for 
Transport for instance adapted Defra’s metric to ‘offset’ ancient woodland in the line of the planned 
HS2 route. As Chapter 9 explained, ancient woodland had been categorised as irreplaceable in the 
metric’s technical guide and Green Paper, and therefore off-limits: 
they'd basically misrepresented the DEFRA metrics; they'd done it wrong. That was the 
fundamental thing that people were getting upset about. They'd made a few methodological 
errors. … [W]hat they'd done is changed it to include what we call critical habitat – ancient 
woodlands – and they'd just put them into the metric. And the reason why I'm saying they'd 
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made a methodological error there is you're not allowed – offsetting doesn't allow – to offset 
habitats that are not offsettable. You just have to exclude them; you have to just say it can't 
be done (interview 4c). 
Yet other developers too put in speculative applications claiming they would offset their unavoidable 
damage to ancient woodland, which were controversial enough to make the tabloid press (Spencer, 
2014). Paterson, in the same interview with The Times mentioned above, also stated he thought 
ancient woodland could be offset with “very high multipliers”. All these cases generated substantial 
public opposition, and anger among conservationists and ecologists supportive of offsetting in 
principle (e.g. Juniper, 2014). For cautious supporters and critics alike, the government was allowing 
inappropriate precedent to be set in practice, whereby offsets were being constructed as a malleable 
development tool rather than credible conservation mechanism, the precautionary principles of which 
could be quickly overridden to enable large-scale projects or permit them to circumvent tricky 
environmental regulations:  
there's just political motivation isn't there? They might have big infrastructure developments 
that they want to see fast-tracked, that might rely on an offset being in place. … I am nervous 
about the way it looks like it's headed at the moment, unless there's a bit of willingness to 
sort it out properly. The annoying thing is that we have people in this country who know 
enough, and have access to the right international expertise to be able to do a really good 
job of it. The frustration is the lack of willingness really. … They're trying to do a sort of fast-
tracked, possibly disingenuous version of it. That could be very counter-productive. (interview 
4a).  
These were important moments of fracture in the consensus on the desirability of offsets, and signs 
of a rapidly polarising debate. 
1.3: Development thresholds and determining significant harm 
An analogous debate occurred at the other end of the spectrum, concerning the scope of offsets to 
account for low level harm. As explained in Chapters 7 and 8, those groups cohering and forming 
alliances from an environmental viewpoint saw this as a core attraction and opportunity of a 
formalised system. Yet the government’s position was more ambiguous, as noted by one NGO officer: 
from our perspective, what we would want a new system to do is to capture the stuff that's 
currently not avoided. So, it's turning approvals of low-level harm into offsets, yeah? Because 
that's not happening at the moment, which would be brilliant. Clearly where government are 
coming from, is that they want to... there's a danger that government are trying to turn refusals 
of high harm into offsets. So they're very different things, and we're coming at it from very, 
very different angles (interview 5d). 
While the metric had been configured to capture and quantify all impact on biodiversity, its use in 
practice would depend on applicability in the planning system. Screening remained an open question, 
posed in the Green Paper, on the issues of thresholds for offsetting and the definition of ‘significant’ 
harm. The first asked whether developments should be of a certain size before becoming subject to 
the offsetting process. Other than no threshold, the numbers suggested by Defra were for planning 
applications for 10, 25 or 200 housing units. Yet even at the lowest threshold of 10 units, an estimated 
29 per cent of housing development, by area, would be left untouched (Defra, 2013d, p. 15). As was 
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to be expected, developers argued that the threshold should be set high enough to avoid 
disproportionate burden, especially on small-scale developers (e.g. HBF, 2013b). Groups with 
ecological expertise however reacted strongly against the use of thresholds: 
There should not be a threshold. Biodiversity offsetting should be applied in adherence with 
the mitigation hierarchy. With a threshold we would continue to lose small sites and the result 
would be a slow attrition (i.e. death by a thousand cuts) of biodiversity (CIEEM, 2013, p. 6). 
Several noted that size was not a useful way of determining likely ecological impact: 
Habitats and species of importance may occur at any scale, for example, bat roosts and the 
only known breeding site for Jennings Proboscis-worm (which has no statutory protection) 
occur at very small scale. The number of houses is not necessarily related or comparable to 
the ecological impact, because a well located major development may have few impacts, 
indeed it could have potential advantages for wildlife. A small development on a wildlife rich 
site could be disastrous for wildlife but below the threshold (TWT, 2013, p. 15). 
The overall consensus among environmental interests was that developments of all sizes should be 
covered by the metric. Some suggested a tiered or hybrid system, which would allow some smaller 
developments to make simple payments into a pooled conservation fund rather than require the 
administration of many very small offsets (interview 4a). 
The question of significant impact was more complex, and referred to a judgement to be made in 
planning, according to NPPF (DCLG, 2012, para. 118), where the mitigation hierarchy should come 
into effect, subject to the appeal system. On this second question, the government asked whether a 
national approach should be specified – including “excluding low-distinctiveness, low-quality habitats” 
or using a threshold approach “where harm is only considered significant if more than a specified 
number of biodiversity units are lost” – or whether it should be left up to LPAs to interpret on a case-
by-case in line with existing norms (Defra, 2013d, pp. 24–5). Defra had long been unwilling to define 
the term, instead leaving it to be determined locally: 
it is up to planning authorities on a case-by-case basis to decide what is significant. So, if 
they decide that actually, the loss of some woods is not significant, they are complying with 
the mitigation hierarchy as it is set out in our planning guidance. And we, as central 
government, have never provided guidance as to what we think significance means, or where 
that threshold kicks in (interview 1b). 
Local discretion was widely supported among many groups, since geographical difference meant that 
ecological significance tended to be context-specific (Defra, 2016). At the same time, judging 
ecological significance would require substantial expertise. Moreover, decision-making on this matter 
would also be conditioned by a host of other local political and institutional pressures, which, given 
the issues highlighted in Chapter 7, and covered in more detail in Section 2, would mean considerable 
unevenness across the country, and likely poor implementation in many areas. Local variation in 
general unsettled landowners and rural businesses, envisaged as the primary sources of offset 
provision, who viewed: 
a single consistent national system … [to be] essential. To work, offsetting will require a 
nationwide market and that in turn requires one nationwide system. There are already a mass 
of local schemes out there, each with their own exponents. It will make developers and 
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landowners lives difficult if everyone has to get their minds around different schemes in every 
part of the country (CLA, 2013a, p. 5). 
This created another dilemma, because while developers were keen to keep any imposition of offsets 
to a minimum, they were equally pushing for a system which was consistent and easy to predict, 
something the case-by-case approach the government favoured was unlikely to deliver. 
On top of this, it should be reiterated that addressing the repeatedly evidenced inconsistency and 
poor performance of the prevailing regime was central to the environmental case for offsets: 
We would consider the failure of LPAs to avoid and mitigate significant harm from 
development to be a far more serious problem for biodiversity than the poor implementation 
of any necessary compensation. This is largely due to a culture of not valuing biodiversity 
and not giving due weight to policies concerned with biodiversity – a point supported by Defra 
commissioned research into the implementation of PPS9. If the introduction of an offsets 
system, intentionally or otherwise, further encourages a culture of not avoiding or mitigating 
significant harm, it would be a far greater problem for biodiversity than the existing problem 
of poorly implemented compensation (RSPB, 2013, paras 24–5). 
The point being made was that the policy needed to be rolled out in a way which would address the 
problem of biodiversity loss which was getting ignored by the planning system, causing cumulative 
ecological degradation through ‘death by a thousand cuts’. In short, if offsets did not capture and 
compensate for low level residual harm, conservationists asked, what was the point? Yet Defra again 
appeared somewhat ambivalent on the issue: 
I think one of the attractions was that you'd certainly capture more of that, and I think there's 
a question of how far down. … I think one of the things I probably found a little bit frustrating 
in the process is that everyone wanted us to go from where we are now – which is a planning 
system which isn't very efficient at thinking about these things, but also isn't necessarily very 
effective at capturing those environmental externalities – to one which is all singing and all 
dancing, and kind of captures everything. And I think actually, probably, what we were 
thinking about in the Green Paper was probably a little bit too ambitious in how far it went 
(interview 1b). 
However, the reservations coming from conservationists and others were not about perfection. 
Rather, their concerns were about the context – of planning reforms, rhetorical attacks on 
environmental protections as blockages to growth, and very material actions in constricting the scope 
of ecological regulation – in which offsetting was being put forward. As one campaign officer put it: 
“this government seems to have gone through a process of dismantling the planning system bit by 
bit”, and that: 
The message LPAs are getting is build more housing at all costs. Even though the right words 
might be in NPPF, that's not the message the LPAs are actually getting through guidance, or 
the imperative they're being given to provide more housing, without balancing that against 
other issues. We think if you introduce offsetting in that kind of political context, that’s where 
we fear it will become a license to trash (interview 5e). 
Whether or not it would constitute a license to trash, pilot leaders certainly recognised the constraints 
they were under in this regard: 
in lots of cases up until the current time is that developers have effectively got away with 
perhaps not providing sufficient mitigation and compensation, and the reason for that is there 
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is a perceived need for housing and employment land and so on. That always takes a higher 
precedent, and local authorities are under a lot of pressure to deliver housing targets and that 
sort of thing. … My concern is that if offsetting is rolled out and becomes mandatory in one 
form or another, even though it's not really asking them to do anything more than they should 
be doing already, because they're not doing it already, it is basically an additional, I suppose, 
burden on them because they've not done it in the past. … And when they're already saying 
they haven't got enough money to provide affordable houses, school spaces provision and 
that sort of thing, I do worry how additional money is suddenly going to be found to provide 
essential compensation (interview 2b). 
The view was far from untypical, and illustrated how consciously their approach to offsetting was 
mediated by the possibility of getting challenged: 
We're planning ecologists; we apply planning law and planning policy. … We don't want to 
impinge, or be branded as holding up developments, or being unreasonable in planning 
terms, and I believe that's where it's probably going to get challenged if it goes to public 
inquiries. On that level of significance and reasonability – planning law not biodiversity 
philosophy if you get my meaning (interview 2a). 
Furthermore, during the piloting phase of offsetting, developers had successfully challenged offset-
related planning conditions as unreasonable, on the grounds that they constituted additional burden 
which they not previously been subject to (e.g. BSG Ecology, n.d.). Rather than the win-win scenarios 
touted by government officials, politicians and green businesspeople, it appeared offsetting’s eventual 
implementation would play out through a series of conventional trade-offs, with a great deal of 
variation. In a context of severe resource constraints, the financial costs of losing appeals, and the 
levers available to developers, LPAs were likely to take a conservative approach to imposing 
mitigation requirements (interviews 4f; 5d). Given the power relations at play, capacity in LPAs, pro-
growth conditions imposed at various levels of decision-making, and the unwillingness to provide 
strong policy, guidance and restrictions on offsets, critics’ view that these trade-offs would ultimately 
be settled in favour of development interests seemed more than warranted. 
1.4: Longevity, offset supply and costs 
Though the majority of debates around the policy had revolved around the regulation of development 
impact, and the pilots delivered no offsets by the time of their conclusion, one of the most fractious 
concerned the other end of the offsetting process – the long-term securing of conservation gain. As 
covered in Chapter 4’s review of technical debates, the gain created through an offset should match 
the duration of development impact for no net loss to be ecologically meaningful. Given that the UK 
government’s programme was primarily aimed at major infrastructure and housing development, 
damage was effectively expected to be permanent, suggesting offsets would need to be maintained 
in perpetuity. In the Green Paper, Defra referred to the development of conservation covenants by 
the UK Law Commission (2013), as a possible mechanism for securing offsets over the long-term, 
which would: 
place conditions on how the land could be used and could require it to be managed in certain 
ways for the benefit of biodiversity. Most importantly the covenant would be binding on 
whoever owns the land so the biodiversity benefit would be maintained even if it changed 
hands. This would ensure the land was managed for biodiversity gain (Defra, 2013d, p. 22). 
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Though the mechanism was welcomed by environmental groups, a number of conservationists, LGEs 
and other ecologists spoke of their unease at a possible loophole attached to the use of conservation 
covenants, which said the protection could be overridden if there was an overwhelming case for 
development: 
We are deeply concerned by the suggestion that the covenant could be released if the offset 
land was considered developable. This introduces insecurity into the system and will lead to 
a lack of commitment in adhering to any management obligations. It is imperative that 
covenants or other legal mechanisms are used to manage habitats and species in perpetuity 
(Cornwall County Council, 2013, p. 11). 
It was, however, the definition of ‘in perpetuity’ which proved most divisive, seriously threatening the 
viability of the entire policy. In particular, a major cleavage quickly emerged between the two groups 
the government expected to be the main suppliers of offsets: conservation NGOs on the one hand, 
and private landowners and farmers on the other. Pointing to the well-documented technical 
limitations and uncertainties of restoration offsets, as well as the likely permanence of biodiversity 
loss from development, the conservation sector was largely united in arguing that equivalence 
demanded offsets too be permanent “if offsetting is to have a meaningful role in biodiversity 
conservation” (Bat Conservation Trust, 2013, p. 8).  
It is imperative that the covenants are funded and managed in perpetuity if habitats and 
species are even to be conserved at current levels. Biodiversity Offsetting should result in 
the permanent re-establishment of biodiversity-rich habitats which support the greatest 
diversity of species expected by the given habitat, appropriate to the local geology and 
climate (TWT, 2013, p. 26). 
This, they contended, would mean putting in place legal measures, such as conservation covenants, 
to stop offset land’s return to agricultural use or development.  
Developers were certainly worried about the cost implications, and lobbied for perpetuity to be defined 
at the lower end of the scale, but more vociferous opposition came from private sector landowners 
and farmers, overlapping groups represented by the CLA and NFU respectively. The CLA in particular 
had been heavily in favour of a biodiversity offsetting programme in principle, and at the forefront of 
early lobbying efforts, as detailed in Chapter 7 and exemplified in its Private Solutions for Public 
Problems report. However, by the time of detailed policymaking consultation and the demands of 
NGOs, both groups voiced strong opposition to the notion of legal constraints on land use: 
The presumption that offsets should be secured in perpetuity has been a particular cause for 
concern. We think it fundamentally wrong to dictate the use of a particular piece of land for 
ever. … Moreover, we suspect that many landowners will see little that is attractive about 
dedicating land in perpetuity. They might as well sell it (CLA, 2013a, p. 7). 
The NFU made the point repeatedly throughout its consultation response: “We do not believe that 
agreements should automatically exist ‘in perpetuity’ and bind successors in title, as proposed in the 
Law Commission’s recent consultation paper” (NFU, 2013, p. 1). These traditionally conservative 
rural groups built their argument on a narrative of private property rights (NFU, 2013; CLA, 2013b; 
interview 8a). Though used to conservation work through agri-environment schemes, which tended 
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to last around 15 years, the idea of restrictions of land use change for upwards of 25 years caused 
serious pushback. The NFU made the point forcefully: 
it is difficult to see why a farmer would want to enter into a conservation covenant in the 
format proposed (i.e. that would bind successors in title, that would exist in perpetuity, and 
that would be very restrictive in terms of potential future use of land) (2013, p. 13). 
The issue created a major obstacle for government if it wanted enough receptor sites to be offered to 
generate competition. The Environment Bank, which had developed strong links with landowners, 
warned of the risk in its consultation response: 
Blanket enforcement of in perpetuity offset provision will limit land supply – in the Victorian 
system in Australia, the permanent covenant has been a very significant disincentive to the 
majority of landowners (2013c, p. 5). 
Of central consideration, according to one landowning representative and farmer, were the 
implications for intergenerational rural businesses, which were often passed on to younger members 
of the family: 
If you're saying to me like they do in Victoria and New South Wales, you've got to do it in 
perpetuity and we're going to pay you handsomely for the first ten, but nothing after that, then 
I'm not sure I dislike my son and heir enough to lumber him with that. I take the money for it 
for the next ten years, then leave him with all the costs of maintaining it? I think you've really 
got to dislike your successors to lumber them with that (interview 8a). 
Added to this was the matter of how much payment they would receive: 
Landowners generally take a long-term view, and get enormous pleasure out of improving … 
their little environment, wherever they are. They've got to do that of course in the context of 
paying today's bills. … It depends how much money is on offer. I can't get away from the 
grubby business of money. If that works and it's what you want to do, then you've got a 
sporting chance of putting it into operation. If either of those are wrong or don't work, then 
simply nothing's going to happen (interview 8a). 
The NFU too noted how: “Members we have spoken to indicate they would not participate if the 
payments only reflected income forgone” (NFU, 2013, p. 9). Given the government’s non-negotiable 
position on additional costs on developers, and the figures cited from research commissioned by 
Defra, they anticipated the money they would receive as likely to be far too low to compensate for 
lost income on food production or other commercial activities, especially if offsets were going to be 
legally imposed long-term. The organisation remained deeply unconvinced by the figures used in the 
government’s documentation, expressing concern that initial costing projections did “not reflect 
commercial scenarios that face farmers” (2013, p. 9), and that therefore “the actual costs to 
developers will be misleading” (p. 3) in Defra’s analysis. One green business leader expressed their 
agreement and frustration: 
One of the problems is that The Wildlife Trusts often undersell the costs of doing conservation 
work. So, they'll often take £5,000 from a developer to, you know, do a bit of habitat on the 
back of a development going forward. They've been doing that for years, and then wonder 
why they can't get it to work. Well the reason is it's probably costing you £50,000-£500,000. 
That's why (interview 6a). 
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Yet basing the policy on these kinds of cost projections, rather than the much more conservative 
numbers Defra was working with (see Rayment et al., 2011), would most likely have compromised 
any chance of getting offsetting past the Treasury or Regulatory Policy Committee.  
These two opposed and entrenched positions were highly problematic for the government, as it tried 
to enrol both groups simultaneously. Offsetting’s core proponents recognised that the dispute 
threatened to unravel the process completely: 
I think the 'in perpetuity' thing had the potential some time ago to derail the whole offsetting 
thing. I think now people have become more realistic. So, in Warwickshire I think they say 'in 
perpetuity' means 30 years. The RSPB, in some cases wanted 999 years. Well you know, 
it's King Canute time and going back to the Doomsday Book! I don't think we could actually 
orchestrate land management on that timeframe. And 99 years frankly is a bit daft. If you're 
wanting to engage farmers, ... they can just about deal with 25 years, because the 
generational thing. … Maybe 50 years in some exceptional circumstances, but they'd have 
to pay more, because of the cost of a 50-year scheme is much more than that of a 25-year 
scheme (interview 6a). 
Defra officials were frustrated by the demands made by conservation organisations, while the 
government’s political leaders were keen not to alienate landowning interests. Paterson’s own 
appointment as Secretary of State had widely been perceived as a move to appease this 
constituency, given his popularity with traditional rural Conservatives. Moreover, private landowners 
and farmers were envisaged as vital participants if the policy was to get off the ground. As Henry 
Robinson, the then president of the CLA, pointedly told an audience at the BBOP summit in June 
2014, his members owned half of the English countryside, so offsetting needed to work for them 
(PO4). By this point in the policy’s development, it appeared some compromise had been reached 
around the definition of perpetuity. According to policymakers and green business groups, 30 years 
was the maximum length of time landowners would acquiesce to in principle, and claimed the NGOs 
had broadly agreed this to be realistic (interviews 1b; 6a; 6b; 8a). 
Nevertheless, the government still largely failed to persuade a significant portion of private 
landowners of the merits of becoming offset providers. Other than the exceptional case of 
Warwickshire, all the pilots experienced extreme difficulty in generating any sustained interest among 
local landowners and farmers (CEP & IEEP, 2014d; interview 2b; 2c; 2d; see also Watts, 2014). The 
most commonly cited reasons included the risks of signing up to long-term agreements under a policy 
with a very uncertain future, the conditions likely to be attached to agreements or contracts, and most 
important of all, lack of demand – which is returned to in Section 3.The dispute also contributed to 
disaffection among many NGOs, who were the other potentially large-scale providers of offsets. Yet 
they did face something of a dilemma. Apart from the possibility of income that still attracted some 
(interviews 5a; 5b), a significant pull factor was a fear that other suppliers would do a bad job, 
especially in a context where they agreed with private sector groups’ claim that Defra’s costings were 
far too conservative: 
where we for example take money from government to do stuff that they're obliged to do, the 
chances of it working are pretty high, because we're doing it. But that's not going to be the 
case in most of these applications. You're going to have basically businesses who are not 
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motivated by the compensation, they'll be motivated by profit which lies elsewhere. They will 
at every stage try to cut corners. … They won't have the expertise, and they won't put the 
amount of money in that they need to, and the success rate will be much smaller. … They'd 
have to be monitored a lot, they'd have to be enforced – all the things [LPAs] don't have to 
do if we're doing it, because we'll do it (interview 5d). 
In the end, however, the terms on which the policy was being constructed looked to most as ever 
more risky, and unlikely to result in meaningful environmental outcomes:  
I don't know under what circumstances we would actually do offsets. It is possible that in the 
long term we might do. I'm not ruling it out. But nothing we've looked at so far would meet our 
requirements for it (interview 5c). 
Many of the NGOs effectively walked away. Several disengaged from the pilots, while willingness to 
proactively engage in the national policy process waned or became increasingly critical (interview 
9c). While the government clearly viewed private landowners as more important for the system’s 
implementation, having the NGOs on board was nevertheless necessary. If the government seriously 
hoped to use the mechanism to trade up and fund high value conservation projects, the NGOs’ 
expertise, experience and support would be vital. 
 
2: Institutional architecture and regulatory capacity for effective 
implementation 
Of the challenges facing the government in operationalising offsets, reaching consensus over the 
articulation of roles and responsibilities appeared relatively straightforward. Many of the key features 
of a reconfigured system were largely agreed upon. For instance, a nationally consistent framework 
was broadly seen as essential to most actors’ purported goals, though conservationists and ecologists 
favoured a degree of local flexibility as well, so that local policy could be aligned with specific local 
ecologies. There was general consensus on the need for management agreements for the delivery 
of offsets by providers, and a national register of schemes, together with some kind of insurance 
mechanism against offset or provider failure, even if their characteristics needed further specification 
(see Defra, 2016). It was largely unquestioned that local offsetting policy would be developed and 
implemented by LPAs, and offset requirements negotiated through development control, as with the 
pilots. While it was assumed much could simply be overlaid onto the processes of the prevailing 
compliance regime, issues did arise in relation to two aspects of the policy’s implementation: 
regulatory oversight and quality assurance of both assessments and offset provision. For example, 
who would bear responsibility for adherence to the mitigation hierarchy? How would consistent 
application of the metric be ensured, and disputes arbitrated? Who would ultimately be responsible 
for guaranteeing quality and standards? The importance of these issues was heightened because, 
as shown in Chapter 9, ecological uncertainty and limitations of measurement meant application was 
likely to be far from straightforward, and the appropriateness of decisions open to interpretation. Since 
the outcomes would not be neutral, settling questions over how a new permitting regime would be 
governed, and by whom, was always necessarily political. Balancing the power of – and satisfying – 
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different interests was therefore regarded as crucial to the system’s integrity and legitimacy among 
the core groups the government needed to enrol. 
2.1: Impartial operators and overseers? 
Recognition of these issues was illustrated in debates about the independence, objectivity and 
competence of consultant ecologists, brokers, and state bodies. While LPAs would be required to 
sign off on offset proposals and agreements, the government’s stated proviso was that ensuring 
robust use of the metric should not “create unnecessary or expensive red tape”, and was “attracted 
… in principle” to relying primarily on accredited assessors (Defra, 2013d, p. 29). This was an option 
also favoured by many developers. Even with accreditation however, many were sceptical consultant 
ecologists could fulfil this role in a neutral way. Given the nature of their (dependent) relationships as 
contractors to developers, many saw consultants’ interests as too deeply entwined with those of their 
clients to act impartially. LGEs, local NGO officers and consultants all highlighted the variable quality 
of assessments submitted with planning applications. Drawing on their experience dealing with 
planning applications, some alluded to an occasionally active and commercially motivated bias in 
favour of developers among consultants (interviews 4f; 11a). A more frequently cited problem though 
was the power dynamic consultants needed to navigate with their clients. As one ecologist explained, 
they are often viewed as: 
the bringer of bad news, and the environment and ecologist's role is seen as a problem, that 
has to be coped with, managed, got around. … Every delay costs money. Every proposal to 
mitigate or avoid is potentially going to cost money. So, you can come under a lot of pressure 
not to see things, not to find things, perhaps not to do such a thorough job with your survey 
as you should, or not to include it in your report (interview 4b). 
While stopping short of claiming widespread manipulation by developers, several ecologists indicated 
that, under the direct and indirect pressures and constraints of their work, the ambiguities of ecological 
data commonly end up being interpreted in the developers’ favour, leading to impacts frequently being 
downplayed in environmental reports (interviews 4a; 4b; 4c). Even more worrying was lack of industry 
standards. As one LGE noted: “they vary massively. Some are brilliant, and some aren't, and this is 
something that CIEEM are trying to sort out, but there's a long, long, long way to go, in making sure 
that consultants are competent” (interview 2d). A sector representative explained in more detail: 
it's not a protected profession in any way. If someone wanted to do a bat survey because 
they wanted to do a loft conversion, you could go along tomorrow and do it for them. There's 
nothing to stop you. You may do it very well. You may not do it very well. But there's nothing 
to stop you, and as far as the client is concerned, they may not know that you haven't done 
it very well, or they may know and not care. Consequently, one thing that we're seeing is a 
lot of, if you like, other professions, are carrying out, I'd say low-grade or low-level – I don't 
mean that in a derogatory way – but I guess lower value work, that should really be done by 
somebody that's trained to carry out those kinds of surveys and ecological work. And they'll 
often do them very cheap, because you'll turn up and say you'll do a bat survey and do it for 
£50. That's become an increasing problem within the profession (interview 4b). 
As a result of these well-recognised concerns, some kind of independent oversight was favoured by 
many other stakeholder groups, and the professional bodies representing ecologists themselves. 
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The use of brokers was another possibility, as independent intermediaries between developers and 
offset providers. However, the only established broker in the UK was the Environment Bank, whose 
prominent lobbying role in favour of biodiversity offsetting proved controversial, especially given that 
David Hill, its founder and chairman, simultaneously occupied the position of deputy chair at Natural 
England. Though the Bank’s role was seen in a positive light by some, widespread discomfort and 
suspicion at the organisation’s apparent influence over policymaking was more common across the 
spectrum. One conservationist noted the Bank’s interest in “as much offsetting as possible” (interview 
5e), while another summed up the concerns of many when stating:  
We can be very clear that they are in no way independent in any of this. They have a 
commercial interest in this happening and they should never be considered to be 
independent. They cannot replace or be a substitute for local authorities in any way. That's a 
concern, that they've somehow positioned themselves as being independent and impartial in 
this, which they are not at all (interview 5d). 
Following on from this widely held opinion, Hill’s position on the government regulator’s board was 
frequently referred to as a troubling conflict of interest. The main cause of apprehension for 
conservationists and some LGEs was brokers’ vested interest in high frequency trading, and a 
resultant perverse incentive to short-circuit the mitigation hierarchy in making recommendations. In 
relation to this, there was a perception that the Bank seemed to downplay the technical risks of offsets 
in theory and practice. Others highlighted the lack of a strategic planning orientation for brokers, and 
how commercial confidentiality would undermine the transparency of the process, at least until 
decisions had been made and objections were moot. 
In light of lack of confidence in consultant ecologists and commercial brokers, the regulatory oversight 
and strategic planning role of local government, and support from state agencies, came to be seen 
as of increased importance, especially for conservationists and ecological regulatory interests: 
The integrity of, and public faith in, the planning system depends on independent arbitration. 
The decision to approve an application may hinge on matters relating to biodiversity and it 
would be unacceptable for a local planning authority to have to simply accept the developer’s 
recommendation on offsetting – even if the report is written by an ‘accredited’ expert. 
Accredited or otherwise, a consultant is ultimately being paid by a developer, who will have 
a clear vested interest in obtaining planning permission. Likewise, we would not consider a 
broker to be independent, as they would also have vested commercial interests in a 
development proceeding (WCL, 2013, p. 9). 
With regard to monitoring and enforcement of offset providers, one NGO officer and former local 
planner explained: 
In most cases someone has to be making them do it, they have to be checking them. … 
Mostly it will be farmers who've been approached by the Environment Bank and they create 
whatever it is they have to do. They'll get their money and they'll do it, but the developer will 
negotiate the least they can get away with, the farmer will do the least they can get away with 
for the money they've been given. It's this constant siphoning off, and that's how it will work, 
that's how business works. … You have to have legislation which makes local authorities do 
the enforcement, the monitoring, to reduce that risk. You need to reduce the risk, but the risk 
is very much there, and difficult to remove (interview 5d). 
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This is not to say LPAs were viewed as necessarily neutral. As many interviewees pointed out, 
complex planning applications were decided by planning committees made up of local councillors, 
who might be influenced by a host of factors. Planning officers could only advise these elected 
politicians in line with statutory requirements and local policy. Moreover, pilot leaders themselves 
highlighted the considerable constraints they were operating under due to economic and political 
pressures, especially since the advent of the NPPF: 
at the moment, that developers hold all the cards. Local authorities are struggling to get even 
things like social housing and affordable homes included in schemes now, because the 
developers say if they have to deliver those, the scheme's just not viable. … Trying to do 
extra things for biodiversity in that economic climate was very hard, and still is hard. Local 
authorities are also shackled by the five-year housing supply. It means effectively if they can't 
deliver sufficient houses within that five-year period, developers can come forward on other 
sites outside of Local Plans. [They’re] obviously very wary of that, and keen to do deals with 
developers to deliver the necessary housing. All of which means that developers pretty much 
are in the ascendency at the moment (interview 2c). 
Referring to how their decisions were affected by viability assessments in strictly applying no net loss 
to planning applications, another pilot area LGE was careful to indicate the judgements LPAs would 
need to make: 
I need to ensure that the applicant isn't paying too much, or too little. Usually it's the other 
way around actually, paying too much, because I need to work for economic growth in this 
area as well, and therefore I don't want to, again, be charged with being unreasonable 
(interview 2a). 
Attention was drawn too to the difficulties for LPAs in rejecting applications in circumstances where 
resources had been substantially squeezed, with planners seeing the financial cost of losing 
increasingly unfavourable appeal and planning inquiry procedures as too great (interviews 4f; 5d).  
2.2: Offsets as opportunity to consolidate: strengthening and extending local ecological regulation of 
land 
Nevertheless, for conservation groups, LGEs and professional ecologist bodies, the moment of 
regulatory oversight in the planning system would be critical to the success of biodiversity offsetting. 
In line with the policy literature reviewed in Chapter 4, many saw noncompliance as one of the major 
threats, as exemplified in the Woodland Trust’s response to the Green Paper: 
The biggest single source of failure for offsetting schemes around the world is the lack of 
monitoring, evaluation and enforcement. Any offset would require robust long-term 
monitoring to ensure that biodiversity aims are being met, backed up by clear legal and 
financial arrangements and a transparent enforcement regime (2013, pp. 16–17). 
Most worrying, for those hoping offsets could deliver positive biodiversity outcomes, was the lack of 
ecological advice available to non-experts in LPAs, to inform their recommendations and decision-
making. As many groups noted, planners’ understanding of their biodiversity duties was far from 
adequate to oversee something like offsets, pointing to ALGE research (Oxford, 2013) showing less 
than one quarter had anything beyond a basic understanding of the mitigation hierarchy, while only a 
third of local authorities had an in-house ecologist (see also Newey, 2012) – a state of affairs the 
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report claimed was seriously threatening local government’s ability to carry out its statutory 
biodiversity duties. In reference to application of the mitigation hierarchy, one pilot leader described 
part of the issue: 
I'm not clear, given that a lot of local authorities don't have access to ecological advice, how 
they are going to [validate appropriate application by developers]. … The worry will be that 
those authorities which don't … will have to take the metric calculations, etcetera, that have 
been done by the consultant working on behalf of the developer at face value, and accept 
them as they are (interview 2b). 
Another put in more starkly: “It does vary, but capacity is a massive issue. Most districts in [our county] 
don't have ecologists … [and] if you go to another LA who don't have an ecologist there's no chance 
that that will ever happen” (interview 2d). Given the strains on their resources, most pilot leaders said 
they simply did not have the time to administer the trials properly. In fact, since they were offered no 
additional material or financial support from central government for trialling offsets, several soon 
decided their time could better be used elsewhere. In a context where ecological expertise was so 
uneven across the country, they all argued that creating a nationally consistent system with the 
appropriate safeguards would be impossible. Improving this situation by addressing the shortage of 
regulatory capacity and ecological expertise in local government was seen as vital if planning 
decisions involving offsets were to be credible and appropriate: 
I spent hours discussing how it could work and how it could sit with protected species issues 
and European site issues, and it is all quite complicated. … It's all that legal stuff as well. … 
That all just needs to be set out in quite a simple way. But it isn't simple. It takes time. Which 
is why it's not dealt with very well at the moment I guess, because it always just falls off the 
edge, because it's about the capacity of planners to think about and deal with it. … But without 
extra capacity it's quite hard to set up a system which will make life easy (interview 2d). 
Whether through state expenditure or the recovery of costs from developers, this became a central 
demand made by environmental and ecologist groups going forward, if they were to support the 
government’s proposals (e.g. ALGE, 2013; CIEEM, 2013; National Trust, 2013; RSPB, 2013; WCL, 
2013). 
The resulting impasse relating to this demand shed light on one of the major fault lines in the 
establishment of offsets in England. The seriousness with which this issue was treated by a large 
portion of stakeholders, and ambivalence by others, revealed quite divergent understandings of what 
offsets were expected to do, and how they might reconfigure ecological regulation of land use in 
England. The call for improving regulatory capacity and local government expertise was based on 
fairly straightforward logic. The environmental rationale behind a formalised offsetting programme 
was that biodiversity was systemically undervalued within the planning system, and statutory duties 
unfulfilled as a consequence: 
We've aspirational targets around 2020, … but protecting [biodiversity] and ensuring no 
further loss is a legislative requirement. It's difficult to see how that can happen, if you don't 
have … people with the sufficient expertise and experience and knowledge, to be able to 
determine whether proposals, for safeguarding biodiversity are realistic, achievable, sufficient 
and so on. If you don't have that expertise, what you risk is breaking the law, quite frankly. 
And the research which you may well have seen that was done by ALGE about LPAs and 
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their level of confidence and competence to make those kinds of assessments, was really 
quite worrying, in terms of the lack of confidence, and the lack of competence, of planners, 
to make informed decisions about biodiversity-related proposals – mitigation proposals and 
so on – but that is increasingly what they're being asked to do. So it's an area of huge concern 
(interview 4b). 
This failure of planning to properly value biodiversity, as evidenced primarily in two reports (Oxford, 
2013; David Tyldesley and Associates, 2012a) and recognised too through experience, was viewed 
to be both caused and expressed by the chronic underfunding and marginalisation of the ecological 
regulatory functions of the local and national state.One LGE explained how this played out in practice: 
I suppose it isn't seen as essential. A lot of local authorities don't have ecologists; don't have 
good ways of dealing with this. So again it just isn't dealt with as well as it should be. … [And] 
local authorities are being cut. They look at what is statutory, and so biodiversity and 
environmental stuff is something that, you know, can be cut. [With] ecology, there are 
statutory responsibilities, but, they say, maybe we can buy that in or whatever. Really though, 
local authorities need someone in-house to be able to advise on a day-to-day basis, on 
planning applications and strategic planning and other issues (interview 2d). 
Others agreed, and also highlighted the negative implications of the juniority of the post in the 
planning team (if it existed), and excessively high workloads due to under-capacity (interviews 2d; 
4f).  
These conditions, they argued, had played out in the prevailing mitigation and compensation regime 
in terms of poor implementation, bad decisions and lack of follow-up and enforcement, all of which 
provided substantial explanation for the failure of PPS9. For the RSPB, this reflected “a culture of not 
valuing biodiversity and not giving due weight to policies concerned with biodiversity” (2013, para. 
25). CIEEM argued: “Biodiversity offsetting will fail if it is not primed and maintained with the 
appropriate resources, and charged with a measure of impartiality by close involvement of ecologists 
within the public sector” (2013, p. 3), going on to explain: 
local authorities need to be adequately resourced and have access to appropriate ecological 
expertise in order to discharge … [responsibility for the mitigation hierarchy]. There is strong 
evidence to suggest that this is not the case and this is another significant area of risk to 
successful implementation of an offsetting tool. Without access to ecological expertise local 
planning authorities may not be able to make sound decisions, identify opportunities for 
enhancement and may be risk adverse (p. 5). 
For these actors, if offsetting was a genuine attempt to improve outcomes for nature conservation 
through formalisation, it would need to go beyond the deployment of more consistent and 
sophisticated calculative devices, though these were seen as useful tools. It needed to be seen too 
as an opportunity to consolidate, strengthen and extend the scope of mitigation and the wider regime 
of ecological regulation, using strong policy to redress a growing imbalance between development 
and environmental interests. Such objectives could not be met in concrete terms, they surmised, 
unless the government was willing to give planners the material, regulatory resources they needed 
to intervene more strongly in the development process. Many argued that comprehensive local 
datasets would be essential too, for effective and early-stage strategic conservation planning 
(interviews 2a; 2c; 2e; 11a). As with ecological expertise, this was something significantly under-
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resourced, with only some local areas able to maintain them. Though usually not explicitly framed as 
such, these were unquestionably political positions, especially in the context of the government’s 
austerity programme and commitment to deregulation, explained in Chapter 7. 
2.3: Offsets as economic instrument and techno-managerial fix? 
There were others, however, who were far less concerned with the issue of regulatory capacity in 
LPAs. Some took this position on the grounds that it was a political battle which could not be won, 
accepting that efforts to sufficiently resource and empower ecological regulators was a lost cause: 
[For 20 years we’ve been saying] that EIA, until it has a requirement to do mitigation, and 
somebody checks and there's monitoring and follow-up, it will never deliver for biodiversity. 
Well, what's new? We know that, but no one wants to change it. A lot of people say 'Oh no 
it's just a license to trash and they won't use it properly, and people should conserve 
biodiversity, and local authorities should have ecologists'. Yes, I know that's absolutely true, 
but … for as long as I can remember it has not happened. So what are we going to do to 
change? Because it's not happening. It's no use comparing offsetting to this ideal notion of 
how things should be, because it's never going to happen. … But maybe offsetting could, 
and this is why I'm actually pro, because it does introduce some explicit accountability. … It 
gives you a basis for monitoring follow-up, which might be quite difficult to define otherwise 
(interview 4a) 
While some saw this as a failure of political will, others, especially those from green business and 
development communities argued the problem of implementation rested on environmental legislation 
being overly complicated and bureaucratic: 
The problem at the moment is that the environment is seen as a blocker. When a developer 
spots a newt wandering across the site, his heart sinks, because the perception is, ‘Here we 
go. We’ve got six months of surveys, and the thing will be delayed by a year’. It is not a 
constructive engagement with the environment. We do not want to create another massively 
complicated bureaucratic system. We want to give John [Slaughter of the HBF] his 
streamlined, effective system that allows them to get permission efficiently, at the same time 
as taking on their environmental obligations (Tom Tew in EAC, 2013a, p. 20). 
For both these groups, offsetting’s appeal from an environmental perspective was premised on an 
acceptance that the state would or could never intervene effectively in the traditional regulatory 
manner: “Biodiversity offsetting is a new opportunity to make a difference to environmental 
conservation, and as such should not be designed with old fashioned and restrictive mindsets” 
(Environment Bank, 2013b, p. 5). Instead, the policy was constructed as an opportunity to bypass the 
state’s intrinsic inability to meaningfully implement regulation, through a simplified quantification 
device. 
This narrative relied on several techno-managerial qualities of offsets which would supposedly ease 
the need for capacity building for heavily involved oversight, and resonated with the case for offsets 
outlined in Chapter 3, most strongly associated with BBOP. The quantitative dimension was crucial, 
as explained in Chapter 8. Firstly, building on arguments about the advantages of quantified 
measurement, the case was also made that the metric, if operated by suitably certified ecologists 
using standardised and more precise assessment methods, would substantially reduce the level of 
subjectivity and room for ambiguity so often exploited by vested interests in the existing system. 
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Secondly, much credence was placed in the communicative character of the metric. Procedurally, 
offsets provided a simplified expression of biodiversity value, in a language of hard numbers which 
non-experts, including developers, planners and local councillors could “get their head around” 
(interview 1b), requiring little translation. Such a claim resonated strongly with the experience of the 
pilots, despite their other failings (CEP & IEEP, 2014d, see 2014b). As a result, various interviewees 
claimed, decision-making and reporting would also be made significantly more transparent, open to 
audit and public scrutiny (if public registers were to feature), which would incentivise better 
compliance and outcomes (interviews 4c; 6a; 10a). 
Another element of the case was the presumed entry of third party suppliers. According to business-
oriented groups, a sufficiently sized market could be stimulated, competition should regulate 
standards to an extent, encouraging: 
innovation from landowners, farmers, NGOs and others to provide offsets. … Competition 
ought to help the best quality and value offset providers win out, achieving greatest amount 
of biodiversity protection for a particular sum of money (Newey, 2012, p. 54). 
Dedicated independent providers would have significantly more incentive than developers 
themselves to meet compliance standards, as they would be contractually monitored and enforced, 
perhaps via intermediaries (Duke et al., 2012). For some, the hope was that conservation NGOs 
would fill this role, since they had the most organisational motivation and expertise to ensure high 
quality compensation schemes were delivered. The argument for mobilising market efficiencies was 
predominantly presented by the green economy lobby, as part of a narrative of necessary 
modernisation of environmental policymaking (EMTF, 2013; Aldersgate Group, 2011), and an 
“appreciation that traditional regulatory approaches do often lack flexibility” (interview 9a). 
Nevertheless, even if they did so reluctantly, many pro-offsetting ecologists and some 
conservationists acquiesced to this more business-led conservation paradigm. This bled into the 
construction of offsetting as more of a transformative economic instrument, aimed at changing 
behaviour, than the consolidation of the prevailing regime. There was far more deference instead to 
the role of price signals here in incentivising avoidance and mitigation, as illustrated by one consultant 
ecologist: 
it's not properly costed out. I think that's what it comes down to. Developers are simple beings, 
what they care about is the money. If you were to go back to a developer and say it's going 
to cost you x thousand pounds per hectare, for 50 years to compensate for that field, to build 
some houses on it, they would be like: ‘oh, okay, then maybe I'll only build half the number 
of houses on it, and enhance the rest of it, in order that I only have to pay half as much, 
otherwise my profit all goes out of the window’. And they just have to do those sums … and 
offsetting is much better at putting costs on the compensation side that you would have to 
offer, and maybe then they're more likely to go down the road of avoidance (interview 4c). 
The key was viewed as unequivocal and consistent no net less policy (i.e. the state imposing a ‘cap’), 
which was simple to audit and enforce in legal terms, but not prescriptive over how such outcomes 
should be achieved: 
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Once you create a bit of space for people to innovate; my experience through the 
environmental policy side has been fantastic. You know, people do it far better. … You want 
this step back, which says, you know, we want a net gain here, you've got amphibians, you 
need to have a better environment for amphibians at the end; don't care how you do it. You 
can do it onsite or offsite, you know? It's a completely different question (interview 6b). 
Flexibility was central to the case that offsets would incentivise more efficient outcomes without need 
for additional bureaucratic oversight. 
The more techno-managerial vision clearly chimed with the government’s (and developers’) dislike of 
command and control structures, and desire to devolve responsibility for ecological regulation away 
from local authorities and state agencies. One passage in the Green Paper was particularly 
illuminating with regard to the government’s aim of depoliticising decision-making, resonant with 
Paterson’s repeated desire to overcome the “sterile, lengthy and very costly legal battles” (EAC, 
2013a, p. 35) between development and environmental regulation which permeated the planning 
system: 
a simple, standard framework for evaluating the impacts of development on biodiversity can 
speed up assessment. Allowing any required compensation to be bought ‘off-the-shelf’ from 
a market removes the need for negotiation on what will be provided (Defra, 2013d, p. 5). 
Importantly however, this approach also presupposed strong government intervention, by creating 
strong no net loss policy on land development, especially if a market capable of sending price signals 
was to be generated. Even if that did not require increasing capacity and expertise in LPAs, it would 
mean giving them unambiguous policy instruments and guidance with which to refuse planning 
consent on ecological grounds. This was something the government appeared unwilling to 
countenance, as many observers noted, and government officials admitted.  
2.4: Irresolvable non-interventionism 
The landscape was of course somewhat more nuanced than the two positions presented above. Most 
conservationists for instance were not dismissive of the use of economic instruments or markets per 
se. One was broadly typical in describing their organisation as “agnostic” (interview 5b) on the issue, 
even if they found talk of commodification and trading ‘biodiversity’ much more worrying. Nor were 
they confident that what they saw as a long-term trajectory of state disinvestment and retreat from 
direct forms of ecological regulation could be undone, even if their demands frequently pushed for it. 
The same conservationist, reflecting on the Warwickshire pilot’s model of implementation argued: “it’s 
entirely doable; it’s about priorities … [and] shuffling resources around” in LPAs (interview 5b). 
Moreover, though conflicted, many ecologists and conservationists admitted they did feel a degree 
of compulsion and responsibility to participate, as highlighted in Chapter 8. This was not just for 
fiduciary reasons, but to mediate some of the greater environmental risks they thought would be 
realised without them. Correspondingly, those pursuing the establishment of a more techno-
managerial instrument were not averse to regulation as such. As the next section shows, offsetting 
was very well understood as a regulatory market, where the strength of market signals, economic 
incentives and so on all depended on the imposition of strong, clear policy around a strict baseline. 
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The baseline itself would also need to be measured, according to standardised rules set out in strong 
policy. Many believed access to ecological expertise in LPAs was still a vital issue, but not necessarily 
an immediate deal-breaking priority. In this light, the two positions were not immovable or 
irreconcilable. However, the problems which emerged revealed a deeper fault line between the 
government and the array of environmental interests they hoped to assemble to operationalise the 
system, around the issue of intervention in land use for the purposes of nature conservation.  
Developers and landowners did not have too many problems with the institutional arrangements 
proposed in the Green Paper. Yet the government was unable to escape the widespread view among 
many planners, conservationists and ecologists that the undervaluing of biodiversity in planning was 
materially bound up with politically mediated disinvestment in the ecological regulatory functions of 
the state. Its intransigence over reversing that trend exacerbated concerns that the policy’s 
implementation would be woefully under-resourced and risky. That the government was also unwilling 
to compromise on its non-interventionist attitude to create economic incentives through strong policy 
was equally damaging, adding to the perception that the stated conservation objectives were ill 
thought out at best, if not set up as a deliberate smokescreen to erode environmental protections. 
Support from the green business community remained resolute, rooted in a strong faith in strength of 
concept. However, as the more cynical and pessimistic view found growing public expression, 
conservationists became increasingly wary of engaging with policy proposals which had become so 
controversial. The final part of the chapter explores the most contentious decision: whether offsets 
would be mandatory or voluntary for developers. 
 
3: Voluntary versus mandatory offsetting 
The most intractable disagreement over the design and implementation of a new formalised system 
was over whether offsetting should be voluntary or mandatory. To restate the terms of this dispute, a 
mandatory or compulsory system would mean every planning application within the scope of the 
policy would be subject to the entire offsetting process, as set out by Defra and written into local policy 
documents. In essence, this would mean that each planning application would be required to use the 
metric to calculate impact, follow the steps of the mitigation hierarchy, and arrange a suitable offset 
if there would be residual loss of biodiversity.  Under this scenario, planning consent should be 
refused if no net loss could not be satisfactorily demonstrated and agreed by the planning authority. 
Though there was some purview for negotiation over scope, the precise meaning of no net loss, and 
caveats for exceptional circumstances, making offsets compulsory was the most vital element of the 
policy for conservation NGOs, professional ecology groups, and LPAs, if offsetting was to produce 
any meaningful environmental outcomes. This too was the view of most policy specialists and 
consultants, though green business groups were willing to be more flexible. They also joined the pro-
offsetting wing of the landowner groups who argued a mandatory system was needed to stimulate 
demand and a functioning market which could create certainty and incentives for market participants. 
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The government’s non-negotiable position, however, backed by the vast majority of developers, was 
for a voluntary or discretionary use of offsetting. Under the government’s prospective system, as 
tested in the pilot areas, it would be up to LPAs to request use of the mechanism, or for developers 
to propose and make use of it as they saw fit. Ultimately though, there would be no requirement for 
developers to use offsets, or necessarily conform to national standards, since no measurable 
definition of no net loss would carry any statutory weight. There were variations and several ‘in 
between’ ideas, but this was the basic dividing line between mandatory and voluntary offsetting which 
prevailed between 2010 and 2015. 
3.1: The need for compulsory offsetting 
The reasons put forward for a mandatory system were numerous. Critical supporters of offsetting in 
principle were strongly of the opinion compulsory offsets were necessary for the policy to meet any 
of its institutional challenges. To repeat a point made several times, the main environmental rationale 
for a formal offset programme had been the evidence of non-compliance with the existing mitigation 
regime (David Tyldesley and Associates, 2012a). Further research had showed that compensation 
for biodiversity loss occurred in an infinitesimally small number of cases (CEP & IEEP, 2013). How, 
detractors asked, would a voluntary system help address this issue? There was little evidence to 
suggest environmental protections were significantly impeding land development (Defra, 2012a), and 
there had been minimal take-up by developers in the voluntary-based pilot areas, since they had little 
incentive to do so (CEP & IEEP, 2014d, 2014b). As one pilot leader noted: “I’ve yet to come across 
any developer who has sort of come forward and voluntarily said: ‘I want to use biodiversity offsetting’” 
(interview 2b), while another explained why: 
developers recognised quite quickly that because we were asking for something new, it was 
likely to be more expensive for them. Some developers – we had some very good developers 
– who we had long discussions with, in the end, several who had expressed interest at the 
start, choose not to do it (interview 2c). 
In this context, what incentives would developers have to offer or use offsets? For conservationists 
and other critical environmental interests, the answer was clear:  
If you bring it in as voluntary or enhanced voluntary, if somebody's going to offer 
compensation or offsetting, they're going to be bumped up the system. … So, if when people 
come in like with [this one case] and they're saying: ‘look, offsetting, offsetting, offsetting’, 
thinking that that's going to win them friends, and it would have, with the council, if we hadn't 
waded in and gone, you know, they've lied about the … designation (interview 5c). 
This fear was widespread and borne of experience, that a voluntary system would be exploited by 
developers if and when it saved them money, sped up or helped them gain difficult planning consents.  
In a voluntary scenario, critics foresaw several possible negative outcomes. Firstly, the very notion of 
offsets being voluntary would muddy the waters of whether compliance with mitigation requirements 
was optional, rather than a statutory obligation: 
the whole notion of them being voluntary is very damaging. It set up all the wrong messages, 
because the way that's been interpreted was that offsetting itself – or the need to compensate 
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for harm – is somehow voluntary, and it's not voluntary at all. They have to do it, or their 
application should be refused. If you can't avoid harm and can't compensate for it, you should 
be refused (interview 5d). 
Secondly, the offer of an offset could be perceived as a bribe to the local authority, to either fast-track 
an application or influence the decision over consent, as mentioned above. This would exacerbate 
the risk of offsetting being used as an actual or perceived ‘license to trash’ (interview 2b). As a number 
of interviewees pointed out, there were several cases from around the country which could be 
perceived in this way (interviews 4f; 5e; 5f; 11a; 11b; 11c; see also FERN & FoE, 2014). Thirdly, 
developers would gain a tremendous amount of power in the negotiating process, to reduce the level 
of mitigation or compensation. As explained in Section 1, since offsets would carry far less weight in 
planning than other statutory duties, it would be easy for developers to challenge any insistence as 
additional burden, and therefore unreasonable – and there were cases where developers had 
appealed planning decisions on these grounds during piloting. Finally, a voluntary approach would 
lead to inconsistent and uneven application, which developers would further be able to exploit. In 
these circumstances, many argued offsets would not only fail to improve environmental compliance 
and outcomes, they seriously risked eroding what weak protections already existed. 
The other thematic critique of the government’s voluntary approach was that it would seriously 
hamper efforts to stimulate a market in offset credits. This criticism was made by a broad cross-
section of interests, including many conservationists, ecologists and planners, but most notably by 
the government’s green business allies and policy consultants. Framing their position in terms of 
realising the promised economic efficiencies they associated with a market-based system, they 
insisted that if the policy failed to generate demand, supply would be stifled too: 
The pilots haven't actually gone forward on any scale that makes them workable and actually 
helps to secure those benefits … [because] to bring forward a supply, there needs to be a 
demand. Obviously there are some uncertainties with the current situation – whether there 
will be, or what will be the extent of regulatory demand. … These are long-term projects 
obviously. There's a fair amount of risk, and at the moment quite a lot of uncertainty over 
what the market might be, restricting supply. Clearly if there was a clear regulatory framework 
and a recognised demand going forward that would help to bring forward supply (interview 
9b).  
Only a compulsory system could create that necessary demand, they argued, a point also made by 
landowner groups. Without certainty about demand, offset providers would not have the confidence 
in the system to come forward and enter the market (Environment Bank, 2013c; CLA, 2013a). This 
had been demonstrated in the pilots, which many pointed to as strong evidence that a voluntary 
system was effectively useless: 
the learning through the Defra pilots, which has shown that – apart from Warwickshire – it's 
a complete waste of time if you just make a sort of little quiet ask, because the development 
community will just carry on in the way. It says if you make me do things, I'll do them, but it 
you just ask me I won't bother. … [Some developers have] really got quite an appetite for it, 
but what they can't do is compete in a marketplace where others are being allowed to trash 
nature, to an acceptable degree.…That's why we would agree with the EMTF that ultimately 
some sort of mandatory scheme is needed, and it's all about having a level playing field 
(interview 6b). 
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In short, pro-offsetting consultants, economists and business leaders contended that the ‘fully 
permissive’ (Defra, 2013d, p. 17) programme the government favoured was never going to achieve 
the objectives set out. The theoretical premise of offsetting, which promised quick and easy 
compliance, competition which would raise quality while reducing costs, economies of scale and price 
signals, was entirely contingent of a market of sizeable scale and liquidity (interviews 6a; 6b; 9a; 9b; 
10a). In making this case, the government’s green business allies were clear that the state had to 
take a far more proactive and interventionist role than it was willing to, if it was serious about 
redirecting growth onto a more sustainable path using economic instruments. 
3.2: Against additional regulatory burden 
On the opposite side of the debate was the development sector, which was strongly against a 
mandatory system: 
Planning guidance must also make it quite clear that it is not permissible for local authorities 
to require offsetting or particular offsetting solutions. This approach would be entirely 
consistent with that proposed (and which we support) for offsite mitigation under the zero 
carbon homes policy (Allowable Solutions) – which would leave the choice of mechanism or 
option for realising such mitigation entirely to the developer without any interference from 
local planning authorities (HBF, 2013b, p. 3). 
They made their case on several grounds. They argued that a mandatory approach would clearly 
constitute an inflexible and additional regulatory burden: “it’s another thing LAs can hold over us, 
another box to tick, and that comes at a business cost and a capital cost” (interview 7d). As one 
energy sector representative put it: “most developers looking for ‘light touch’ approach, which is 
simple and quick. They don’t want to do more than necessary, like putting back twice as much as is 
impacted” (interview 7e). This of course chimed with the government’s rhetorical attacks on the 
planning system and environmental protection in general, and the aims of reforms and programme 
of deregulation overviewed in Chapter 7. Many backed their claims up with reference to instances 
during the piloting phase (interviews 7a; 7c). In addition, most developers claimed that they were 
already fully complying with mitigation conditions, and very rarely had any residual impact after onsite 
work (interviews 7c; 7d). This was evidently inaccurate, but they contended nevertheless that 
imposing offsets were “being leveraged as planning gain [by local authorities] post-Section 106 – 
straight off the bottom line. … [I]f it’s mandatory, it’s basically just a tax, like CIL [the Community 
Infrastructure Levy] or something” (interview 7c). If an offsetting scheme was to offer the benefits the 
government promised, in terms of speeding up planning consent and developable area, they argued 
the only way forward was a voluntary system, which would give developers more flexibility in meeting 
mitigation requirements. As noted on several occasions, developers showed willingness to challenge 
offset conditions on these grounds, and, given the increasing weight given to housing, infrastructure 
and growth in general in the planning system, and LGEs were openly wary of losing. By imposing 
extra costs, developers argued, offsetting would threaten the viability of projects, therefore inhibiting 
the supply of affordable housing, jobs and so on (interviews 7a; 7c; 7d). Compulsory offsets would 
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act as additional burden on development activity and economic growth, which the government was 
publicly and officially trying to reduce: 
it's the position of the Treasury, which is the main principle why they're blocking biodiversity 
offsetting. You've got a climate against red tape, and you've also got a Treasury position, 
which is you can't put a cost burden on business (interview 6b). 
As previously mentioned, the development sector was a highly influential and well-resourced political 
force. Developers themselves said they were individually and collectively lobbying ministers at Defra. 
Other insiders explained how developers were also bypassing Defra and making their case to more 
powerful government actors as DCLG, and, most importantly, the Treasury, where concerns about 
economic growth were taken even more seriously: 
that's certainly some of the politics that's playing out … we don't want to add anything to the 
burden of housebuilding at all. And developers have come in and said: 'this offsetting 
malarkey is going to push up the cost of every site by 4%, 5%, you'll get less homes built'. 
And the fact is that it probably is going to push up the cost of some of this stuff, and so if 
you're always thinking how can we reduce the regulation; if your argument is what are the 
things getting in the way of housebuilding it's regulation – whether it's affordable homes 
mandate or Section 106 or biodiversity offsetting – the attitude is always make that simpler, 
make that simpler, make that simpler.  And the idea of introducing anything new is very 
difficult. So, the politics make the policy very hard. … [T]he Treasury and DCLG are nervous 
about it … and you know, those two departments are more powerful than Defra when it comes 
down to it. So, that's where we are (interview 10a). 
Ultimately, the government agreed with developers, which was easy to discern in the official policy 
documents, the narratives ministers chose to mobilise in favour of the system, and the red lines they 
imposed on its implementation. 
3.3: Irresolvable tensions 
The cleavage between mandatory and voluntary approaches was severe, with the two camps deeply 
entrenched. If the government was willing to impose compulsory offsetting, there was a possibility 
that the multiplicity of other tensions described in this chapter could be overcome, at least as far as 
operationalising the programme was concerned. Yet the government was unwilling to yield on this 
issue. There was, however, a group of green economy advocates, self-identifying green business 
champions, who saw themselves in the role of bridging that gap in one way or another. These actors 
were aware of the political barriers to such an interventionist approach, and that theirs was a minority 
view in the wider business community, not shared by the vast majority of developers. Nevertheless, 
they remained confident that developers could be brought around by the promise of consistency and 
certainty, and would in any case quickly accept and adapt to a new system. In terms of the 
government, it was widely known, and confirmed by insiders, that the Treasury was the main barrier 
to the policy being implemented in any form, let alone as a mandatory system. For green economy 
advocates, it was the narrow methods of the government’s impact assessments which made the full 
economic case difficult to put forward and make stick: 
At the moment, government parcels up decisions, does impact assessments, does regulatory 
impact assessments. And very often, it leads to the conclusion that things that bring an 
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environmental gain are an additional cost, and are discounted, whereas if you take this step 
back, and say, actually, there's a different way of doing things – you're thinking sustainably 
from the outset – actually there isn't that cost. But most of government's analysis at the 
moment is unable to take that into account. … And it's as much around the inability of our 
current financial systems to deal with long-term challenges like climate change and resource 
depletion as it is around individual officials saying you can't do that. I think the example 
around impact assessments and the narrowness is the best exemplar of that. It's just if you 
talk to those people, they're bright people in the Treasury, and they get it, but at the end of 
the day, when they put on their jacket and go into that building, they know what the rules are 
they play, and they are not able to (interview 6b). 
This, they reflected, was unlikely to change under a Conservative-led government, though some held 
out hopes that a Labour administration might see things differently if they won the next election 
(interviews 6a; 6b; 10a). Nevertheless, offsetting’s most ardent proponents still believed that an 
offsetting system could be pushed through. One avenue was to make the case that the costs of offsets 
need not mean additional costs for developers – the most serious concern for government and 
developers. This was actually seen as relatively straightforward to solve, by shifting the cost of offsets 
onto landowners, where they could be absorbed by the windfall profits made when planning 
permission was given (interviews 6a; 6b). This line of thought appealed to officials in Defra too 
(interview 1a), but the idea got very little, if any, airing by political leaders or in official documents, an 
omission which was telling.  
Some sections of the green business lobby were keen to see a voluntary system officially rolled out. 
Conceding that the proposals had hit an impasse in terms of any compulsory option, they still saw 
the implementation of discretionary instrument as an important first step, which could be 
experimented with, developed iteratively and later consolidated: “I think at the moment the thing which 
will tip the balance most quickly is a clear steer from the government to do things the Warwickshire 
way, because … I think it's the learning by doing” (interview 6b). They also noted the importance of 
the natural capital agenda, which the government appeared to be committed to more broadly, in laying 
the groundwork for policies like offsetting to become mainstream in the coming years. Moreover, there 
was a belief that LPAs would gravitate towards it, once the principle had been properly established 
and its benefits demonstrated in practice: “I think that’s the way it will go. I think people with any sense 
will look at Warwickshire and think: 'What is that they've got to make it work?'” (interview 6a). The 
same logic was offered for encouraging developers: 
If you've got a good intermediary, the developer is in practice more likely to come along and 
say: 'Oh that's unhelpful, I haven't done anything about that. How do we do it? I just want to 
get on with it'. Well, you know, talk to this broker they can tell you about sites … [and] 
immediately I think that will mean that the outcome will be better for all the reasons I've 
described (interview 6b). 
Both these green business leaders put much store in the success of the Warwickshire pilot, which 
they believed could be championed as a model from which to work. Though they had not been able 
to make no net loss mandatory, the county council had managed to get offsetting written and adopted 
in many local plans in the county, such that it had significant weight in policy, and was used routinely 
in development control throughout and after the piloting phase, without significant resistance from 
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developers (interviews 6a; 6b; see also CEP & IEEP, 2014b). Many offsets were agreed during this 
time as part of planning consents, though at the time of writing, the author is only aware of one where 
development work has begun, with payment being made for the commencement of conservation 
activity. There are important caveats to make with this case too. Warwickshire was widely 
acknowledged to be a unique outlier, a county council with 11 staff in its well-resourced ecology team, 
and some of the best and regularly updated habitat datasets in the country. No other local authority 
in England has this combination of access to ecological expertise and data. The interpretation of the 
NPPF which made its way into several of Warwickshire’s local plans, pushed by the enthusiastic 
principal ecologist David Lowe, was also exceptional. It was clear from interviews with other LGEs, 
planners and consultants that other planning authorities had not or would not be willing to make such 
a bold move. As explained in Chapter 7, there were substantial risks involved in being found in breach 
of NPPF, and developers had gained considerable leverage, via DCLG, over LPAs through the 
government planning reforms.  
All these factors, in the institutional and political settings they took place, meant effectively replicating 
the Warwickshire model widely appeared far-fetched. At best, it would seem likely to lead to further 
uneven regulatory development and outcomes, most of which would be weaker than Warwickshire 
itself. The other problem which these proponents did not seem to take account of was that the policy 
had become so controversial by mid-2014 that most of those needed to operationalise offsetting had 
effectively walked away. Not only had the myriad problems discussed throughout this chapter not 
been resolved, developers and conservation NGOs had long viewed participation as a growing 
reputational risk: 
They basically massively oversold it. Developers were saying: 'How can it give those guys so 
much money, without costing me loads more money?' The conservationists said: 'Well how 
can it make it so much quicker and easier for them, if it's not a license to trash?' And then the 
Secretary of State starts talking about newt credits and ancient woodland being offset, and 
the slightly anxious peace was shattered. We saw NGOs, who had previously been quite 
engaged, just walk away. There were these complementary projects, who were basically 
private consultancies or utilities companies doing their own thing. We spoke to people there, 
after this George Monbiot article had come out, and they'd had more meetings on the back 
of that, saying: 'We need to get out of this. This is going to be a PR disaster'. So halfway 
through the pilots, everyone just splintered into groups, and those groups still exist. You can 
see them in the consultation response to the European No Net Loss policy. And you can see 
in the way that the Treasury and DCLG haven't really engaged with it, because developers 
and the HBF got a bit nervous and got cold feet. And because they've got such huge political 
strength, well, that’s the show over really (interview 9c). 
As David Hill admitted at a public event in early 2016, biodiversity offsetting had become ‘toxic’ in the 
UK, which he blamed on a relatively small group of naysayers (Scott-Campbell, 2016). Most important 
of all however, the Treasury had ultimately blocked the policy altogether, even in a voluntary form, as 
a potentially intolerable additional burden on developers. Paterson’s dismissal in July 2014 marked 
the endpoint for any kind of national framework for offsetting, and the policy dropped off the political 
airwaves very shortly afterwards.  
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4: Offsetting unravels 
This final empirical chapter revealed some of the deepest fault-lines which ultimately caused the initial 
consensus around biodiversity offsetting to collapse. Disputes around the rules and scope of the 
policy demonstrated how the government’s non-negotiable position over additional burdens and costs 
on developers seriously compromised the possibility of meaningful outcomes for environmental 
interests and regulators. Their attraction had largely centred on its potential to capture and 
compensate for low-level harm unaccounted for in the prevailing system, but since developers and 
the government insisted that the rollout of offsetting must make compliance cheaper, it was clear that 
any promised gains were highly unlikely to materialise. This tension between the ecological credibility 
of offsets and cost effectiveness proved even more fractious on the question of longevity, which led 
to a complete impasse over potential offset providers, with neither landowning and farming groups or 
NGOs satisfied by the terms being presented. Opposing views on the most appropriate form and 
purpose of regulatory oversight meanwhile animated debates on institutional roles governing offsets. 
Ecologists and conservationists were adamant that any kind of nationwide implementation would be 
impossible if understaffed and under-resourced local authorities lacked in-house ecological expertise 
to oversee offsetting. Their predicament demonstrated how heavily existing policy failures had been 
mediated by chronic underinvestment and the way biodiversity was materially undervalued in 
planning. Others thought offsetting’s qualities as a techno-managerial and economic instrument could 
help alleviate those problems, and allow more flexible and efficient forms of compliance. Yet even 
that possible compromise would require strong policy instruments and a mandatory programme, 
capable of generating market activity, price signals and economic incentives. As the final part of the 
chapter showed, even this was not possible, and without compulsion the chances of resolving the 
myriad other tensions became completely implausible for every group the government needed to 
enrol. 
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Chapter 11: Why biodiversity offsetting was abandoned 
 
Introduction 
This last chapter of the thesis constitutes a final discussion on the findings of the research, reflecting 
on how and why the UK government’s proposed biodiversity offsetting policy fell apart, and the 
broader implications which can be drawn from the case study. It aims to link theoretical work from the 
opening four chapters with the empirical study, considering the insights it offers while probing at its 
limitations in explaining the English experience.  
Chapter 11 proceeds as follows. Section 1 recapitulates the major fault-lines identified and explored 
in Chapters 9 and 10, distilling and highlighting the underlying tensions which proved difficult for the 
government to resolve. Section 2 retells the story of Chapter 7, using the analysis from Chapters 8-
10 to explain how and why the policymaking process unravelled. It more explicitly reconstructs the 
picture of how the political economic conditions, narratives, through which offsetting gained appeal in 
England, ultimately undermined its implementation. The third section reconsiders the UK 
government’s aborted plans as an example of the neoliberalisation of nature, as reviewed in Chapters 
2 and 4, asking how useful different ‘neoliberal’ framings are in understanding the complex story of 
this case study. While helpful for thinking through certain logics, processes and effects which 
animated tensions in England, I argue the existing literature lacks some explanatory power as to how 
and why governments might fail to establish market-based policies for nature altogether, as in the 
case studied. Section 4 then builds on this argument, reflecting on the possible implications of the 
findings, both for biodiversity offsetting as a policy and the critical literature which engages it.  
 
1: Fault-lines and contradictions in the policymaking process 
The table below provides an overview of the tensions, dilemmas and disputes which punctuated the 
government’s efforts to develop its offsetting proposals and were analysed in detail in Chapters 9 and 
10. It is intended to be read partly as a counterpoint to Table 15, to demonstrate how the fragile 
consensus presented in Chapter 8 was fractured along several fault-lines, entrenching divides 
between different groups the government needed to enrol to implement offsets.  
Table 16: Tensions, dilemmas and fault-lines in the policymaking process 
Debate Dilemmas and fault-lines Relevant 
groups 
Implications for policy 
operationalisation 
Metric and 
measurement 
Complexity and precision of 
measurement: necessary for 
ecological coherence and integrity of 
equivalent trades; crude metric open 
to manipulation and error 
Conservation 
NGOs and 
ecologists 
▪ Government declined to 
require more costly/complex 
forms of assessment and 
valuation 
▪ Lack of species inclusion in 
metric threatened developer 
participation  
 Simplicity of measurement: 
needed for market functionality and 
Government, 
developers 
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fluidity; and to keep assessment 
costs down for developers 
and green 
business 
▪ Not fatal, but simple metrics 
undermined ecological 
credibility and likelihood of 
consistent standards for 
environmental interests; stoked 
fear that ascendant developer 
interests would exploit 
ambiguities 
Ecological 
restoration 
and gain 
Precautionary and risk averse 
approach: necessary to hedge 
against ecological uncertainty and 
restoration failure, to ensure 
equivalent gain and no net loss 
NGOs and 
ecologists 
▪ Contributed to view among 
environmental interests that 
government approach was 
reckless 
▪ Not fatal, but government 
reticence undermined 
confidence (especially among 
NGOs) that offsets would be 
ecologically meaningful – likely 
to result in net loss outcomes 
 Economic and political 
pragmatism: to ensure participation 
from developers and landowners; 
avoid overly prescriptive measures 
for providers; avoid unreasonable or 
unrealistic costs on developers 
Government, 
developers 
and 
landowners 
Mitigation 
hierarchy 
Strong policy and guidance: 
necessary to ensure consistency of 
application and standards; ensure 
important avoidance step adhered to 
over more risky compensation 
LGEs and 
NGOs 
▪ Government’s lack of 
willingness to provide strong 
policy tools for regulators to 
use undermined credibility for 
environmental interests and 
planners, increased likelihood 
of uneven and inconsistent 
application 
▪ Added to concern that risky 
offsets would frequently be 
considered first option rather 
than last resort, compromising 
crucial avoidance stage of 
hierarchy 
▪ Ambiguous policy would favour 
ascendant and well-resourced 
development interests, 
especially in context of growth-
orientated planning reforms 
 Flexibility: needed to counteract 
inefficiencies of overly prescriptive 
bureaucracy, and allow for 
innovation 
Government, 
developers 
and green 
business 
 Strategic regulatory planning: 
scope needed for early-stage 
application of mitigation hierarchy in 
local plans as prime mechanism to 
identify no-go areas and inform 
appropriate land use before 
planning applications get submitted; 
strategic planning needed to 
maintain and shape coherent 
ecological networks 
LGEs, 
planners and 
NGOs 
▪ Government’s hostility to 
planning led to concern that 
intervention at development 
control phase would be too late 
to effectively achieve 
regulatory and no net loss 
objectives, or deliver 
landscape-level conservation 
goals 
 Techno-managerial economic 
instrument: economic incentives 
and market forces need to be 
mobilised to deliver more efficient 
allocations of land and resources; 
flexible approach more conducive to 
business innovation than 
prescriptive bureaucratic measures 
Government 
and green 
business 
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Location and 
other 
restrictions 
on offsets 
Planning for multiple values and 
needs: needed for consideration of 
complex social and environmental 
trade-offs, to deliver competing 
planning objectives 
LGEs, 
planners and 
some NGOs 
▪ Apparent disregard for other 
planning outcomes 
undermined confidence among 
planners that offsets could be 
easily operationalised with 
local consent – application 
would be contested and slow 
▪ Threatened participation of 
some NGOs as providers, 
worried about reputational 
implications of receiving money 
for unpopular system 
 Non-restrictive simplicity: 
necessary to avoid risks of 
insufficient supply which would 
undermine competitiveness and 
market efficiencies; market forces 
more efficient at responding to 
different preferences and needs 
over time 
Government, 
green 
business, 
developers 
and 
landowners, 
some NGOs 
Thresholds 
and 
significant 
impact 
Low-level screening: needed to 
capture biodiversity loss currently 
uncounted which constitutes ‘death 
by a thousand cuts’  
NGOs, 
ecologists 
and some 
LGEs 
▪ Government reluctance to 
require developers to address 
low-level loss generated fear 
offsets would instead be used 
to erode protections of high 
value sites to free up land for 
development, leading to 
greater biodiversity loss overall 
▪ Threatened participation of 
conservation NGOs, 
contributing to many walking 
away from pilots 
 Reasonable and pragmatic 
screening levels for offsets: 
necessary to avoid additional 
burden and cost on development 
and growth, and to ensure 
participation from developers under 
voluntary system 
Government, 
developers 
and some 
LGEs 
Longevity of 
offsets 
Very long-term securement of 
offsets: only realistic option to 
achieve equivalent ecological gain 
to compensate for permanent loss 
through development impact 
Conservation 
NGOs 
▪ Largely unresolved issue 
threatened crucial participation 
from both landowners and 
conservation NGOs as 
potential offset providers 
▪ Suggested loophole in 
conservation covenants 
undermined credibility of 
equivalent gain ‘in perpetuity’ 
for environmental interests 
 Pragmatic timeframes: necessary 
to ensure supply of offsets from 
landowners worried about property 
rights; avoid very high costs for 
developers; ensure possibility of 
flexible and adaptive management 
in response to future social and 
environmental pressures 
Landowners, 
developers, 
government 
and green 
business 
Regulatory 
oversight 
Strengthen regulatory capacity, 
resources and expertise: 
necessary to evaluate proposals 
and ensure timely, informed and 
appropriate decisions in 
development control, as well as 
compliance, monitoring and 
enforcement of offset conditions; 
needed for provision of competent 
local design of offset strategies at 
plan stage 
LGEs and 
planners, 
NGOs and 
ecologists 
▪ Government refusal to 
resource planning authorities 
raised serious concern from 
environmental and planning 
interests that offsets would be 
implemented unevenly and 
exploited by developers – 
undermined confidence the 
existing failures would be 
addressed without improved 
oversight 
▪ Undermined credibility of 
government’s environmental 
objectives 
 Offsetting as techno-managerial 
instrument based on economic 
incentives: required to address 
problem of uneven and limited 
resources and inefficiencies inherent 
in planning system; standards more 
realistic than regulation 
Government, 
green 
business and 
some 
ecologists 
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Mandatory or 
voluntary 
offsetting 
Compulsory offsetting: vital to 
ensure consistent compliance from 
developers and avoid risk of ‘license 
to trash’/offsets being used as 
bribes; needed to stimulate market 
of sufficient size to realise 
efficiencies 
NGOs, 
LGEs, 
ecologists, 
green 
business and 
landowners 
▪ Government insistence on 
voluntary system severely 
undermined confidence in 
credibility of system, suggested 
mitigation was ultimately not 
mandatory, but could be used 
to accelerate or buy planning 
consent 
▪ Threatened participation of all 
potential buyers and sellers of 
offsets in market, as evidenced 
in pilots 
 Voluntary offsetting: necessary to 
avoid additional costs on 
developers; reduce risk of planning 
authorities using offset requirements 
to block land development or extract 
unfair planning gain; ensure flexible 
rather than inefficient, prescriptive 
ways for developers to comply with 
mitigation requirements 
Government 
and 
developers 
 
There are two major issues to highlight before moving into the deeper discussion of the findings 
outlined above. The first is that some tensions were sharper than others, and more consequential for 
the demise of offsetting as a national programme. At the same time, the many dilemmas encountered 
were deeply interrelated and interpenetrated one another, with knock-on and cumulative effects for 
the system’s credibility among key actors, and its viability as a coherent regulatory regime. How and 
why the policy proposals eventually fell apart is explained in the next section. The second is the 
consistency of some underlying and crosscutting themes through which the disputes played out, of 
which four are identified and laid out in the Table 17 below. 
Table 17: Thematic tensions of policymaking disputes in the development of offsetting 
TENSION UNDERLYING THEMES 
COMPLEXITY VS 
SIMPLICITY 
Emanating from the technical debates, this tension surrounded debates about the 
extent to which biodiversity could be meaningfully constructed as commensurable 
and tradeable: 
▪ Based on ecological science, ecologists and conservationists saw forms of 
measurement and valuation needing to reflect the underlying complexity of 
biodiversity and ecological processes, and use tools with as much precision and 
data collection as possible, capable of capturing the full, context-specific and 
interdependent range of values 
▪ Government and green business groups maintained that the multiple benefits of 
offsetting were dependent on the economic efficiencies of markets, and therefore 
simplicity was crucial to enable a sufficiently fluid market to realise the 
advantages of competition and flexibility 
 
ECOLOGICAL 
ROBUSTNESS VS 
POLITICAL/ 
ECONOMIC 
PRAGMATISM 
The second tension revolved around disputes over what was necessary and feasible 
as pertained to achieving the stated environmental objectives: 
▪ Conservationists and ecologists saw any meaningful offsetting system, through 
which no net loss of biodiversity was a realistic outcome, as necessitating a fully 
costed and precautionary approach, with strict and robust safeguards and 
standards in place to address ecological uncertainty, practical limitations of 
restoration, and risk of offset failure 
▪ Government, in concert with developers, saw cost effectiveness as a prime 
objective, and were unwilling to entertain an offsetting framework which would 
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lead additional compliance costs or regulatory burden on land development than 
the present system, since this might compromise the viability of development 
projects, impede growth and undermine the government’s overarching and non-
negotiable economic strategy and objectives for the policy 
 
STRICT RULES 
AND STRONG 
POLICY VS 
FLEXIBLE 
COMPLIANCE 
This tension reflected a division between different interpretations of the failures of the 
prevailing mitigation regime:  
▪ Planners and conservationists viewed uneven and inconsistent implementation 
to be largely the result of ambiguous policy and guidance, and lack of clearly 
enforceable regulatory standards 
▪ Government, developers and green business proponents painted overly 
bureaucratic regulation and inflexibility of planning processes as the cause of 
inefficiencies and poor outcomes, in need of liberalisation to create room for 
private enterprise to innovate 
 
STRATEGIC 
PLANNING VS 
ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVES 
Connected to the third tension, this issue concerned different views on the most 
effective and appropriate approach to delivering economic and environmental 
outcomes through offsetting: 
▪ Planners and conservationists insisted offsetting needed to be primarily plan-led, 
exercised by well-resourced, expert-informed planning authorities, as the most 
effective method for shaping strategic and landscape-level decision-making 
which could take account of multiple social, economic and ecological values and 
needs 
▪ Government and green economy advocates wanted to move towards the use of 
MBIs, price signals and other economic incentives, as far more efficient techno-
managerial tools with which to mediate the allocation of limited resources and 
land across space, especially in a context of strained public finances 
 
In highlighting these deep fault-lines, the purpose is not to construct overly simplistic dichotomies. As 
the analysis of the previous three chapters showed, there was considerable nuance in the various 
positionalities of different groups and actors. Furthermore, there were no simple solutions to the 
dilemmas confronted. Though certain groups believed the instruments and mechanisms could be 
finetuned in a coherent manner, most of the potential resolutions put forward contained their own 
complexities, contradictions and constraints. Rather, the implication of these divisions was that 
determining the system’s design features and institutional architecture was a matter of trade-offs, with 
largely zero-sum outcomes for the policy’s (narrowly defined) economic and environmental goals. 
Moreover, as was repeatedly demonstrated as the policymaking process unfolded, the government’s 
unwillingness to overtly acknowledge the necessity of trade-offs, and countenance state intervention 
to satisfactorily settle them, only exacerbated the fractures. As will now be examined in concluding 
the analysis, it was the government’s unwillingness or inability to accept and provide this regulatory 
scaffolding which ultimately made it difficult to proceed with the whole policy. 
 
2: How and why offsetting unravelled 
Retelling the policymaking history from Chapter 7, in light of the analysis presented in the subsequent 
chapters, gives invaluable insight into how and why national implementation was abandoned by the 
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end of 2014. The first topic to dwell on was the positive narrative constructed by the government and 
its green business allies. Drawing heavily on the tropes reviewed in Chapter 3, it was proposed that 
market efficiencies could generate absolute benefits, rather than conventional trade-offs, between 
development and conservation, economic and environmental outcomes. By appealing to these 
different interests, it was possible to build some consensus around the desirability, in principle, of a 
formal biodiversity offsetting system, as outlined in Chapter 8. However, it is crucial to understand the 
government’s market exuberance as structurally entwined with a deep political animosity towards 
command-and-control regulation and planning, a backlash against environmental protections, and a 
programme of cutting down a supposedly bloated public sector system of bureaucracy and regulation, 
all presented as barriers to growth and development. These were the precise political conditions 
which gave a market-orientated offsetting system its appeal to Conservative party leaders from 2009, 
and mediated the conditions of possibility for the playing out of the national and local policymaking 
process. 
As the analysis chapters demonstrated, there were considerable technical and institutional 
complexities in establishing a coherent set of tools, rules and regulatory architecture necessary to 
operationalise such a programme, overlaid onto the existing regime of ecological regulation of land 
use. Configuring the policy in such a way that was coherent and satisfactory to all parties proved far 
from straightforward, and as the literature reviewed in Chapter 4 suggested, solving common 
problems and tensions which afflict offsetting systems tends to require significant reregulation and 
state intervention of various kinds. This was not necessarily impossible within the parameters the 
government had set. However, as soon became apparent, addressing the many dilemmas 
encountered would involve politically mediating trade-offs. This was clearly evidenced throughout 
Chapters 9 and 10, on issues such as the final features of the metric and assessment standards, 
while screening for significant impact and determining the longevity of offsets provided two particularly 
stark examples. How the government chose to settle these matters would undoubtedly favour some 
interests over others, and reduce the incentives for those who lost out to participate in and legitimate 
the system. 
In nearly all cases, the UK government maintained something of a laissez faire attitude, mobilising 
arguments around the need for flexibility and the inefficiencies of centralised control and complex 
rules. At the same time, Defra maintained a strong line that nothing would be imposed which would 
risk additional regulatory burden on businesses, while developers pushed back against such 
measures proposed by others, both publicly and behind the scenes. In practice, the UK government 
appeared willing to simply allow offsetting to play out locally, effectively deferring to planning norms. 
As explored in Chapter 7, the government’s wider programme of reform and deregulation meant that 
the planning system was increasingly tipped in favour of developers, through new duties and 
mechanisms within the NPPF, various pieces of legislation and policy, and the gutting of local 
authority and regulator capacity.  
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Though this approach allowed Defra to keep offsetting within the broader parameters of the 
government’s economic imperatives, what remained underspecified was exactly how the overall 
system was expected to cohere and meet its environmental objectives, given the presence of so 
many unresolved issues. As explained in Chapters 9 and 10, environmental interests questioned the 
contribution of offsetting if the technical instruments, policy mechanisms and regulatory safeguards 
were not strong enough to redress the (widening) imbalances in planning, which allowed developers 
to ‘get away with’ noncompliance under the prevailing mitigation regime. It was anticipated that the 
plethora of inadequately addressed challenges, evidenced in the empirical chapters, would 
institutionalise a meaningless definition of no net loss, and risk reinforcing poor standards and 
outcomes. While the government preached win-win, a deeply contradictory logic permeated every 
dispute in the policymaking process: offsetting must demonstrably cost developers less than the 
existing system, where compensation (let alone no net loss) was not happening at all to all intents 
and purposes. The government’s policy proposals were viewed as badly thought through at best, and 
likely to lead to uneven implementation with potential for exploitation by unscrupulous developers. 
Even among those initially supportive, many came to see the policy as a cynical ploy of a much 
stronger pro-development agenda. This latter position was always the viewpoint of more critical 
voices in the debate, which, as it grew in prominence, put further pressure on more conservative 
NGOs to withdraw their support for the policy for the sake of their reputations. As David Hill regretfully 
put it in early 2016, biodiversity offsetting had become ‘toxic’ in the UK (Scott-Campbell, 2016).  
Many of these concerns could probably have been addressed by a government willing to extend the 
regulatory power of planning authorities, by intervening and setting strong national policy and 
guidance around a mandatory offsetting system – though the problems of offset supply remained. 
Though conservationists, ecologists and LGEs all pushed for an offsetting system which was as 
technically and institutionally robust as possible, their organisational aims were, on balance, 
somewhat limited and pragmatic. They saw offsetting as an opportunity to consolidate the current 
system and improve environmental outcomes, through quantification, standardised practices and 
consistent application – not a panacea, but an improvement. The problem they had with the actual 
direction of the official proposals were that they risked eroding what was already in place. Specifically, 
they perceived the voluntary nature of the government’s proposed system to imply that compliance 
with mitigation ‘requirements’ was in fact optional. Under such a system, offsets would become a way 
to sway planning consents – in short, a ‘license to trash’ for developers.  
The more direct issue with the government’s unwillingness to impose compulsory offsetting was of 
course incentivising participation. Given that developers were not paying for compensation under the 
existing system, nor were they being significantly held up by mitigation compliance, they had little 
incentive to offer offsets voluntarily. Moreover, the growing unpopularity and suspicion around the 
policy meant that the supposed reputational benefits – the ‘license to operate’ argument in Chapter 3 
– looked more like reputational risks. Without forcing developers to offset residual biodiversity loss, 
which they lobbied strongly against, there was little chance of stimulating any demand. Without 
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certainty of demand, landowners and farmers could not be induced to offer receptor sites on a scale 
which would enable choice and competition. The potential buyers and sellers had effectively walked 
away. Though some pro-offsetting groups believed that a voluntary offsetting system could be 
operationalised by local authorities, the creation of a market and its slated efficiencies looked 
increasingly unviable by early 2014. Consequently, the win-win promise around which the proposals 
had been built fell apart. By this point too, the UK economy had returned to what looked like sustained 
growth. The Treasury and government leadership eventually blocked the policy altogether. The policy 
was seen as too publicly controversial, including among the Conservatives’ core rural constituency, 
in the run-up to the General Election of 2015. Biodiversity offsetting was quietly and unofficially 
dropped in July 2014, with Paterson’s dismissal from Defra. 
 
3: Biodiversity offsetting in England – neoliberalising nature? 
The opening chapters of the thesis explicitly orientated the study around literature on the 
neoliberalisation of nature and conservation. As explained in the Introduction, this was because the 
core characteristics of biodiversity offsetting look very much like they fit this mould. Offsetting is 
typically thought of as a market-orientated policy or market-based instrument. Those advocating its 
use typically mobilise particular economic narratives and arguments around such notions as 
valuation, efficiency and flexibility. It is usually presented as an antidote to the supposedly stultifying 
and ineffectual consequences of command-and-control regulation, originating from the pre-neoliberal 
era, designed to tackle environmental degradation. The literature was also offered as a source of 
critical tools, with which to analyse the theoretical application and real world examples of these types 
of policy, as a set of geographically variegated, hybridised and contradictory practices. This 
penultimate section of Chapter 11 returns to this literature, with the intention of asking how useful it 
is in explaining what transpired in England, as analysed over the last four chapters. Chapter 4 ended 
with three possible frames with which to think through biodiversity offsetting from the neoliberal 
natures perspective. Each of these are now taken in turn, and brought to bear on the empirical case 
study and analysis. Section 3 ends with some reflection on the ways the existing literature, while 
helpful, falls short in telling to the whole story, and requires some further synthesis. 
3.1: Offsetting as accumulation strategy 
As explained in Chapter 4, Section 3.4.1, ‘offsetting as accumulation strategy’ frames the policy as a 
project of capital accumulation, either direct or indirect. For the former, it asks whether offsetting can 
be considered as a state or capital led process of commodification, through which wealth is 
accumulated by capitalisation or privatisation of biodiversity. In the case of the proposed system in 
England, this played a part in the story. Defra’s White Paper of 2011, where the trialling of offsetting 
was first announced, made much of the government’s intention to grow a green economy, by 
mobilising the methods of economic valuation developed by national and international studies to 
generate new green markets. Following on from this part of the NEWP, one of the more significant 
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outcomes was the creation of the Ecosystem Markets Task Force, set up with the express intention 
of exploring opportunities in this area which UK businesses could exploit. In turn, the EMTF’s final 
report made the immediate establishment of a national biodiversity offsetting programme its priority 
recommendation for government, stating it to be worth an estimated £500 million per year in new 
business activity.  
The Task Force, made up of ten leading green business leaders, was widely recognised as influential 
in accelerating the government’s plans. Similarly motivated and overlapping green business interests, 
such as the Environment Bank and Aldersgate Group, were equally invested in the notion that 
conservation be made a profitable enterprise through constructing regulatory markets, and were 
crucial government allies in the development of policy proposals. Some of the criticism levelled 
against the Environment Bank was certainly directed at (the perception that) their openly admitted 
profit-making goals compromised their environmental credibility. Meanwhile, the benefits of 
generating a large-scale offsetting market were frequently framed as opportunities to grow rural 
economies, as much as meeting environmental objectives. This came from some local government 
ecologists, but most prominently from the CLA, who were interested in turning biodiversity on their 
land into financial assets which could be sold, or more accurately, rented for profit. On the other hand, 
criticisms of offsetting on grounds akin to ‘green grabbing’ found in the neoliberal conservation 
literature featured very little in the data. Organisations and individuals were far more concerned with 
the development end of the process. Direct accumulation of wealth through offsets clearly motivated 
some green business groups. Yet they were minor players in the wider context, and this was not the 
primary goal of the policy. When examining the detail of the proposals and talking to government 
officials, offsetting on the register of green accumulation rarely moved beyond rhetoric found in 
various policy documents, as well as Paterson’s statements. 
The second, indirect strand of ‘offsetting as accumulation strategy’ appears to have more purchase 
on the English case study. The government’s overall objectives for its policy was less concerned with 
stimulating an offsets market for its own sake, than it was with using offsets to lubricate the planning 
system. As many recognised, the potential value of offsets nationally was dwarfed by the value of 
development activity, so central to the UK economy. By establishing a quick, simple and cheap 
mechanism for allowing developers to meet their environmental compliance requirements, freeing up 
land and accelerating land development was the true prize the government hoped offsetting would 
unlock in a stagnating economy. Returning to the literature, this resonates most strongly with 
Hackett’s (2016) work on voluntary offsets in Alberta. Maintaining or maximising environmental value 
was not the primary concern of the policy. Rather, lubricating the planning system by allowing 
developers to circumvent environmental constraints, and facilitating growth in the important 
infrastructure and real estate sectors was the overriding goal. The important features of offsets, 
therefore, were that they were simple, fluid and cheap, so the landscape could be spatially reordered 
such that biodiversity was not an impediment to the creation and realisation of economic value in 
prime development locations. This could be seen in the government’s desire to create a system where 
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developers could buy credits ‘off the shelf’, and its strong opposition to any measures or restrictions 
which might hinder progress towards this ideal. It also helps explain the commitment the government 
showed in defying calls for offsets which would impose greater costs on developers, and might 
threaten project viability. Aimed partly at reducing transaction costs on development, more 
ecologically meaningful offsets would have required a distribution of surplus-value to land-based 
interests, through rent, which developers opposed as illegitimate planning gain. 
3.2: Offsetting as environmental market-making 
Contemplating the issues explored in critical studies of nature commodification and environmental 
markets gives other insights into the problems encountered in England. In the first instance, it helps 
explain the technical complexities of designing the calculative devices and attempted processes of 
commensuration, and why disputes emerged around the metric and definitions of no net loss. It is 
worth highlighting the well-versed epistemological and ontological instabilities of biodiversity, the 
resultant difficulties and contradictions of abstraction, quantification and equivalence-making in the 
face of imprecise and contested scientific knowledge, and the uncertainties of deeply unpredictable 
and relational ecological processes. The academic literature strongly suggests that, though market-
orientated, uncertainty and non-equivalence mean offsetting policies require strong reregulation and 
restrictions to manage risks and protect against failure. Moreover, they must strike some kind of 
socially acceptable and technically feasible balance between simplicity and complexity. These 
dilemmas played out in the scientifically framed, but politically mediated wrangling over the features 
of the metric, the adequacy of restoration ecology to deliver sufficient and equivalent gains, questions 
over longevity, restrictions and so on. The UK government’s apparent ‘techno-optimism’ (Moreno-
Mateos, Maris, et al., 2015) and unwillingness to intervene and meaningfully stabilise these tensions 
undermined both the legitimacy of the biodiversity valuation procedure, and the consent of those 
needed to operationalise it. Robertson’s (2006a) observation, meanwhile, that ‘more science’ cannot 
necessarily solve these kinds of contradictions partly explains the government’s reluctance to 
compromise the metric’s simplicity, and its concerns over requiring more involved forms of 
assessment. 
Drawing on other parts of the marketisation literature, it is possible too to question whether Defra’s 
proposals constituted moves towards commodification of biodiversity. More accurately, while the 
metric played a performative role in constructing value relativity between habitats, through quantified 
measures of distinctiveness and condition, monetary valuation was not part of the process. Rather, 
the price of offset credits was envisaged as a projection of likely replacement cost, certified as 
appropriate to meet negotiated planning conditions. Biodiversity itself was not to be bought or sold as 
a commodity, only legal certificates, the purchase of which would fulfil mitigation requirements. If 
anything, they would be fictitious commodities – rent enforced by the state to redistribute surplus-
value, an unavoidably politicised response to the second contradiction (Felli, 2016). Their price would 
not represent underlying biodiversity value, but rather the materialised regulatory risk – or 
‘compensation liabilities’ (Caldecott & Dickie, 2010)  – of noncompliance (Dempsey, 2013). Crucially, 
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it was the lack of credibility behind this regulatory risk which made the market so difficult to 
operationalise, given the government’s deep antipathy towards command-and-control regulation and 
state intervention. The part of the literature which stresses institutional heterogeneity and hybridity in 
‘actually existing’ offsetting regimes is useful here, in highlighting how important regulatory 
intervention has been in operationalising offsetting elsewhere.  
As Robertson (2006a, 2007) says, offsets are necessarily regulatory markets, where capitalisation 
requires the state to socially determine and enforce ecological value through law, but in such a way 
that is legible to capital, and legitimated by the natural sciences across epistemological boundaries. 
In the English case study, it appeared that this careful articulation – and subsequent enrolment of key 
groups – was made exceedingly difficult by the government’s unwillingness to intervene or extend 
the necessary regulatory powers to planning authorities. At the same time, it heavily favoured 
economic legibility in its decision-making over ecological coherence or precision, in a bid to enable 
market liquidity, but to the detriment of its efforts to enrol groups with ecological expertise – 
professional ecologists and natural scientists, as well as conservationists.  
3.3: Offsetting as the economisation of nature 
Leaving aside the question of whether the government’s plans would have constituted 
commodification or market creation in any strict sense, and their overlay onto a complex regulatory 
landscape, it is important to stress the role of marketisation at the discursive level of policymaking. 
The UK government, and groups such as the Environment Bank, the EMTF, Policy Exchange and 
eftec consistently mobilised ideas and arguments associated with market environmentalism. 
Competitiveness, price discovery, and optimal resource allocation were some of the more common 
market-efficient tropes underlying the promised reconciliation of competing demands, and the 
delivery of optimal, win-win outcomes. Interestingly though, while these were used to try to appeal to 
a range of key stakeholders, arguments around market efficiencies made little impact beyond market-
oriented green economy advocates. Regulatory and technical detail, where trade-offs quickly became 
apparent, was of far greater significance to developers, planners, ecologists and conservationists, 
and most did not buy into the market logic, either because they saw it as not credible or relevant in 
the circumstances, or because they perceived calls for market liquidity to be in tension with the 
policy’s ecological integrity, and something to be restrained.  
Often more prominent than the benefits of marketisation per se, were narratives which constructed 
offsets as economic instruments. Efficiency still lay at the heart of this framing of the proposals, but 
more emphasis was put on notions of flexibility, transparency and the power of numbers, and the role 
of price signals and economic incentives. The analysis showed how recurrently developers and green 
business interests drew on the supposed flexibility of offsets, and how they could induce innovative 
compliance practices. This was usually constructed in opposition to the inflexibilities of command-
and-control planning, regulation and state management. Transparent audit procedures were also 
frequently invoked by think tankers, policy consultants and green business representatives, as well 
as some of the more pro-offsetting professional ecologists. This intersected with the more techno-
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managerial approach espoused by some groups, as smart solutions to the regulatory problems faced 
by the prevailing regime. On one level, this techno-managerial theme reflected a widespread 
repudiation of the traditional regulatory techniques and cultures as out of date and ineffectual. On 
another it was pitched as a pragmatic path in the face of inevitable state retreat from direct 
intervention, in the face of a changing structural realities and everyday expectations. 
On its own, framing economisation in this way does little to reveal why the government’s plans fell 
apart, though it helps explain some of the quite different subjectivities and inconsistencies on display 
within certain groups. More useful perhaps, is framing offsetting as the economisation of nature with 
respect to Davies’ (2014) concept of neoliberalism as ‘the disenchantment of politics by economics’, 
and the predominance of economic logic in shaping the government’s policy. It enables some 
understanding of the processes at work, in the clearly expressed hope – most notably articulated by 
Paterson, but also to be found in documentation coming out of Defra – that the use of a market-based 
instrument could depoliticise the planning process. Returning to the literature, Felli’s (2015) analysis 
of environmental markets is helpful in explaining the government’s motivations here, linking it back to 
depoliticising the notion of environmental limits in general, in the service of capital accumulation – in 
this case, offsetting as an instrument to facilitate accumulation elsewhere. As has been shown, this 
patently did not work, and the proposals became irretrievably politicised.  
There is more however to take from the economisation frame, in explaining the structural problems 
the government faced from the start. Defra’s embrace of the ecosystem approach, and what became 
known as its natural capital agenda under the coalition government, was a deliberate attempt to 
mainstream environmental policy across government. By marshalling techniques to ‘value nature’ – 
of which biodiversity offsetting was intended as a key policy mechanism – it was designed to make 
environmental policy more economically relevant and palatable, especially to the gaze of the 
Treasury. As was clear from the policymaking history, the Treasury’s influence was hugely significant, 
most obviously through its final quashing of Defra’s proposals. It was illustrated too by the 
unprecedented intervention by the Chancellor, in ordering a review into the national implementation 
of the Habitats and Birds Directives, on grounds of regulatory burden and the government’s economic 
imperatives, which heavily shaped the direction of offsetting. It was in allowing offsets to be subsumed 
under the Treasury-led economic strategy, based on fiscal austerity and the dismantling of regulatory 
barriers to growth, which exacerbated the offsetting’s internal tensions beyond credible resolution.  
3.4: Failing to ‘neoliberalise’ nature 
The three frames drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 4 each help make sense of 
the findings of the thesis. Offsetting as accumulation strategy gives some useful insights into some 
of the core motivations underpinning offsetting in England for the state and capital, and direction it 
took. In terms of explaining why the move was unsuccessful, it is more limited, though it partially 
clarifies why governmental and environmental interests became so irreconcilable. Offsetting as 
environmental market-making certainly has explanatory power with respect to why the government 
was unable to resolve offsetting’s technical and institutional complexities, given the voluntary and 
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non-interventionist approach, and its implications for the policy’s credibility and implementation. It 
gives a solid basis for apprehending what the government got wrong, and why decisions made 
exacerbated rather than resolved offsetting’s internal tensions and contradictions. The question 
remains however, why such seemingly elementary mistakes were made. Offsetting as economisation 
of nature shines light on the role of economic rationality which underpinned so many of the 
policymaking debates, and how this shaped perceptions and expectations of offsetting. In the end, 
by subordinating the case for offsets so firmly to economic imperatives, it was unable to escape their 
quite specific constraints, which ultimately compromised the policy’s viability. The third frame is useful 
in situating the first two, and helps comprehension of the more structural conditions which mediated 
the government’s decisions and actions. In bringing the discussion and thesis to a conclusion, the 
chapter now offers some final synthesis and reflections on the case study, and wider implications for 
biodiversity offsetting. 
 
4: Synthesised findings, implications and final reflections on the case study 
This final part of the discussion chapter and thesis attempts to theorise and synthesise the thesis 
findings, presenting a fuller picture of why the introduction of biodiversity offsetting was stymied in 
England. In doing so, it draws on the frames from Section 3, yet goes further. It not only shows how 
the pieces fit together, but how they helped constitute and shape one another, mediated through the 
interlinking tensions summarised in Tables 16 and 17, in a particular historical and geographical 
moment. Having made this case, the section turns to the implications of these findings, for the study 
and application of offsetting more generally.  
4.1: A synthesised theoretical analysis of the failed English biodiversity offsetting policy 
The government’s policy proposals were built on an optimistic rhetorical foundation of win-win 
outcomes for land development and nature conservation. It drew on a well-established policy 
discourse around biodiversity offsets, reviewed in Chapter 3, grounded on ideas of the efficiency and 
flexibility of market-based instruments, as well as international examples. This relied for legitimacy 
not just on a global milieu of organisations, networks and institutions, where offsetting had been 
conceived as one mechanism for a necessary shift towards an economically-orientated ecosystem 
approach to conservation, but also on a domestic coalition of actors, comprised of a green fraction of 
the business sector and various policy consultants, advocating for a concerted governmental action 
towards the development of a green economy and greater use of environmental economics in public 
policy. Situated in this wider ideational landscape, offsetting was envisaged as one component of the 
government’s natural capital agenda, which undergirded the Natural Environment White Paper. This 
provided a framework for the roll out of novel economic and market-based instruments, designed to 
mainstream nature’s (economic) value across governmental and societal decision-making. 
Underpinning this approach was the theoretical argument that making environmental policymaking 
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economically legible was the key to managing environmental and economic objectives in the most 
efficient way. 
In the case study, this framework was crucial for several reasons. It theoretically allowed conservation 
goals to be met without compromising overriding economic imperatives. This was particularly 
important in the moment offsetting emerged in England, since environmental laws had been 
constructed by the new government – and especially the Treasury – as an obstacle to a sustained 
economic recovery in the turbulent years following the financial crash of 2008. New housebuilding, 
commercial property and infrastructure were central to the UK economy, while affordable housing 
remained a prominent political issue which demanded some kind of action. Yet since the government 
was bound by international conventions and agreements, dismantling environmental regulations was 
neither legally nor politically feasible. Offsetting looked as if it would offer a way of resolving this 
problem, freeing up land for development and accelerating planning consents. At the same time, 
offsetting appeared to speak to a host of governmental concerns and preoccupations, including 
hostility to command-and-control regulation, in need of flexible solutions, and a core role for private 
enterprise in meeting social and environmental challenges. In addition, offsetting was proffered as a 
mechanism which could lever much needed private finance for underfunded conservation, in a time 
of severely constrained and diminishing public spending under austerity. This element of the win-win 
narrative was vital for engaging environmental interests, who also saw scope for using a formal 
offsetting programme to modernise, consolidate and standardise the prevailing mitigation regime, 
which was widely recognised as seriously failing due to a variety of factors. Taken together, the win-
win promises of offsets offered solutions to multiple challenges with quite specifically neoliberal 
characteristics, in a particular historical moment of neoliberal crisis. 
However, while offsetting worked on a symbolic level, and offered a plausible theoretical story, the 
political economic moment which gave rise to its specific appeal in the UK post-2008 were also the 
structural conditions which sharpened its internal tensions and contradictions – particular to these 
kinds of environmental markets – and constrained regulatory and institutional actions capable of 
resolving them. On one level, this played out in disputes over the technical design, where the 
ecological complexity and the limitations of restoration proved difficult to reconcile with demands for 
both market functionality and cost effectiveness. Even more problematically, offsetting did not offer 
any answers itself to the manner in which nature had been structurally and materially devalued in the 
socialised and political world of planning, where economic and ecological objectives were supposed 
to be resolved through implementation. Firstly, planning authorities’ capacity to strategically plan and 
integrate offsetting into local policy was constrained by limited ecological expertise, data and financial 
resources, a situation which was being eroded further by austerity measures. Not only would this 
affect strategic planning, but also their ability to effectively discharge their planning duties in the 
moment of development control and negotiation, and to monitor and enforce compliance. Secondly, 
in coming to balanced, appropriate and reasonable decisions in planning terms, the scope to enforce 
strict interpretations of no net loss was mediated by the weighting of economic objectives, relative to 
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more ambiguously worded conservation duties in policy and guidance. Local authorities were facing 
overwhelming pressure to deliver housing and growth, while both developers and DCLG had various 
mechanisms and special measures at their disposal, such as viability assessments and five-year 
housing supply obligations, which could be used to discipline planning authorities deemed to be 
imposing additional burden or blocking development. In these circumstances, planning authorities 
were wary of the costs – financial and political – of stipulating what could be considered 
‘unreasonable’ demands through offsetting. Combined with the voluntary nature of offsets, this put 
developers in a particularly strong position when negotiating planning permission. These political 
dynamics permeated every critical moment of the proposed design features of an offsetting process. 
Consequently, it became impossible to defend its ecological integrity or regulatory credibility. With 
little to be meaningfully gained – and much to lose reputationally – through participation, the majority 
of actors walked away. Without the possibility of a sizeable and competitive offset market, the win-
win argument collapsed, together with cross-departmental agreement in central government that the 
policy was worth pursuing. 
The final analysis of the case study is therefore as follows. Many interviewees reflected that it had 
been the wrong time for offsetting in England, at a juncture where national and local government had 
been particularly ill-equipped to initiate a programme so complex and likely to be controversial without 
careful handling. Others highlighted the government’s recklessness in promising more than offsetting 
could feasibly deliver for both land development and conservation. However, the interplay between 
these seemingly contingent factors was far from coincidental. Discursively, offsetting was firmly 
situated in that same set of neoliberal social and economic arrangements which reproduced those 
very conditions. Those leading the calls for offsetting first and foremost made their argument based 
on an economic rationale and business case, which said offsets offered a market-based and flexible 
win-win solution to the failures and inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation. Constructed in 
this way, offsetting was mobilised by the government as part and parcel of a wider programme of 
environmental deregulation and liberalisation, which was nevertheless constricted by legal 
commitments to international conventions. The promise of offsets was consciously framed in this way 
as addressing these specifically neoliberal concerns, as a coherent neoliberal, techno-optimistic fix, 
which would facilitate rather than compromise growth. Even though considerable market reregulation 
was understood to be necessary by its business-led advocates, this was rhetorically downplayed for 
political buy-in. Later, when the detail had to be worked through, this made it impossible to argue for 
the kinds of interventions and regulatory measures, on a necessary scale, required to meaningfully 
resolve offsetting’s inherent tensions to almost anyone’s satisfaction. In a similar register, offsetting’s 
premise largely accepted – reinforced even – a sense in the inevitability of the continuing contraction 
of public resources dedicated to ecological regulation, instead foregrounding the role of private 
enterprise and markets as the solution to deepening economic and ecological crises. This left little 
recourse to tackle those institutional factors which had long materially undervalued biodiversity in the 
planning system, had no simple technical fix, but were desperately needed to implement the system 
effectively.  
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4.2: Contemporary developments and implications for the future of biodiversity offsetting in England 
Towards the end of the coalition government’s parliamentary term in late 2014 and early 2015, when 
it had become clear that the national policy had been abandoned, some advocates put hope for the 
policy in the return of a Labour government, who they believed were considering the introduction of 
mandatory offsetting. However, in the General Election of May 2015, Cameron led his party to 
something of a surprise victory which allowed the Conservatives to form a majority government. 
Biodiversity offsetting has not been revisited since, save in February 2016, with the long-awaited 
release of the 2013 consultation results, the evaluation of the pilots, and some other commissioned 
research completed two years before. The government’s response was largely non-committal, and it 
was clear that there would be no further work on the policy. The new secretary of state at BIS, Sajid 
Javid (now at DCLG), promised a deregulatory drive even deeper than the coalition’s, while the Red 
Tape Challenge was relaunched as ‘Cutting Red Tape’, through which ‘one-in, two-out’ was replaced 
with a ‘one-in, three-out’ rule, despite continuing criticism of the policy’s ineffectiveness.  
In terms of offsetting, what remained was the loose voluntary framework established through the 
pilots and subsequent national planning guidance. The controversial HS2 project has gradually 
moved forward with its plans to offset damage to ancient woodland on the route, which continues to 
be disputed (Natural England, 2016c). Offsetting policies have continued locally, most notably in the 
Warwickshire area, with tentative moves from other local authorities to develop similar approaches, 
though these remain largely ad hoc (Environment Bank, 2016). Pro-offsetting green economy 
advocates and others have persisted in promoting the policy too (e.g. Francis et al., 2016; Homfray 
& Webb, 2016), and have put some hope in Defra’s delayed 25-year natural capital strategy. Natural 
England (2016a) meanwhile held a consultation in early 2016 to reform its protected species licensing 
regime, with something much like offsetting under consideration. No decisions have yet been made, 
but the plans are apparently informed by major restructuring of the agency, through which it is 
expected to retreat from its traditional regulatory approach to small sites, and pursue ‘enabling’ 
policies for landscape level conservation through local partnerships (Natural England, 2016b). 
However, the most consequential moment since the policy was dropped in 2014 was the referendum 
held in June 2016, when the UK voted to leave the European Union, on the back of a campaign led 
by the right wing of the Conservative party and UKIP. Cameron resigned as prime minister the next 
day, having called and lost the vote as a result of serious political miscalculation, through which he 
hoped to defeat his rivals. Theresa May won the subsequent leadership election to take over the 
government, and is expected to trigger the UK’s exit from the EU in spring 2017. While the future is 
extremely uncertain, leaving the Union will mean the UK is no longer bound by the European Habitats 
and Birds Directives, the source of the country’s strongest conservation laws. Though environmental 
legislation played little role in the Leave campaign, right-wing anti-EU sentiment has long constructed 
European laws as illegitimate interference with national sovereignty, under the auspices of 
unaccountable bureaucrats. Since offsetting’s original appeal was largely shaped by the constrictions 
of EU laws on economic growth and land development, a far deeper round of deregulation, supported 
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by developers, is likely over the next few years – especially if the expected economic slowdown 
following ‘Brexit’ occurs, under a government considered even more hostile to environmental 
concerns than Cameron’s. In this context, and given the problems which beset the coalition’s policy, 
the possibility of offsetting re-emerging on the national level seems very unlikely. 
4.3: Implications for biodiversity offsetting globally 
The literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 4 strongly suggests that neoliberal environmental policies 
are deeply variegated and context-specific, at the same time as demonstrating common 
characteristics. The thesis has shown how important historical and geographical particularities 
shaped the English experience. The case study was unusual in showing an example of biodiversity 
offsetting completely unravelling before it was even implemented. Nevertheless, there do seem to be 
wider implications, in light of the final synthetic analysis, which posits the deeply intertwined nature 
of political economic conditions which gave rise to the policy’s appeal, and the ensuing breakdown of 
the policymaking process. The question for the study of other nascent offsetting programmes is 
whether the UK should be seen as anomalous. In the stagnating economic landscape of the post-
2008 world, the stalled process at the EU level briefly reviewed in Chapter 7 indicates that perhaps it 
is not. Initiated by the European Commission, offsetting here was firmly situated and justified in a 
deregulatory climate, where environmental protections were under attack for undermining business 
competitiveness and economic recovery, in a context where many member states were undergoing 
deep austerity measures to reduce public deficits. The proposals also coincided with a major review 
of the Habitat and Birds Directives on similar grounds, and exploration of replicating the UK’s Red 
Tape Challenge in Europe. While a law establishing conservation banking was passed in Spain in 
late 2013 (Álvarez García, 2014), there has been no reporting of activity since. Meanwhile, offsetting 
has become increasingly contentious and its credibility disputed in other parts of the industrialised 
world, most notably in Australia (Slezak, 2016) and Niagara, Canada (Walter, 2016). These examples 
of course merit further study and critical analysis. Yet returning quickly to literature reviewed at the 
end of Chapter 4, some authors note that using realistically large multipliers to mitigate restoration 
failure rates would be ‘an insurmountable institutional challenge’ (Curran et al., 2013, p. 628) or 
‘politically and economically unacceptable’ (Maron et al., 2012, p. 145). The English experience 
appears to support these claims, and its implications raise questions over suitable conditions for 
offsetting’s meaningful application anywhere at the current juncture. If advanced industrialised 
nations face such difficulties, offsetting’s potential in poorer parts of the world with even lower 
institutional and regulatory capacity seems even more doubtful.  
Leaving aside political economic conditions, the attraction of biodiversity offsets has nonetheless 
grown in recent years at the international scale. What is perhaps most important to highlight here is 
how offsetting has been fully integrated into the now dominant green economy paradigm. More than 
ever before, standards, expectations and narratives around biodiversity offsetting, explored in 
Chapter 3, are being mediated at a high scale by a global network of powerful elite actors, including 
large corporate entities, banks, multilateral bodies and development agencies, NGOs and so on. 
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Through this formation, the promise of win-win outcomes have become ever more prominent, resting 
on the business case of offsets, that their wide adoption will accelerate capital accumulation. Offsets 
are increasingly identified primarily as a business-led, market-based instrument, speaking directly to 
neoliberal concerns. To paraphrase Carton (2014, p. 1012), who makes the comment with respect to 
carbon trading, biodiversity offsets have fully internalised the economic imperatives of market society. 
However, relying so heavily on the business case has caused frictions like those in England. These 
problems were clearly on display at the BBOP summit in London, held in June 2014 to celebrate the 
organisation’s tenth birthday. In her opening address, Kerry ten Kate admitted instances of confirmed 
success were few and far between, and countless business leaders, ecologists, conservationists, 
consultants and policymakers expressed their frustrations with offsetting in practice. Among other 
issues, attendees highlighted unrealistic expectations, overly complex instruments and language, 
lack of political will, difficulties in generating ‘investable’ returns, and enduring challenges of 
translating biodiversity value into financial costs (PO4). The UK government’s aborted policy was a 
blow, and several sources have made unconfirmed claims that BBOP is being restructured by its 
parent organisation, Forest Trends, in light of its limited success over a decade into its existence. As 
noted by Benabou (2014), many multinationals have left the coalition in recent years. 
Yet events of geopolitical importance could easily overtake offsetting’s troubled transnational 
normalisation. In the weeks before this thesis was completed, Donald Trump was elected as the new 
US president. The environmental backlash may be severe, with federal laws and the EPA already 
being targeted. US environmental policy under Trump will have global implications too, for the future 
of multilateralism. The incoming administration initially said it would withdraw from the UNFCCC, 
though Trump has since backpedalled on his previous claim that climate change is a ‘Chinese hoax’. 
While the new government’s attitude towards the CBD remains unclear for now, its own status would 
appear equally precarious. Many other high-scale bodies which have become central to the 
governance of nature conservation and offsetting standards, such as the World Bank, are also likely 
to affected. With elections across Europe in 2017, far-right and anti-EU parties look set to make 
substantial gains following both Brexit and Trump’s win, putting the European project itself under 
increasing strain.  
Much of this is of course highly speculative, but at the same time the direction of travel points away 
from conditions suitable for further spread of biodiversity offsets across the globe. Environmentalism 
has been very much on the back foot since 2008, in the context of continuing social and economic 
crisis, and ever greater challenges to protect public goods in general. The weakness of the 
environmental movement leaves the multi-scalar architecture of institutions which govern nature 
conservation open to attack, in the face of an increasingly prevalent revanchist nationalism, hostile 
to environmental concerns and liberal internationalism. Biodiversity offsetting, it should be 
remembered, is largely constituted as an attempt to reconcile economic growth with the constraints 
of – and costs of transgressing – laws, policies, standards and norms emanating from this regime. If 
this component of offsetting’s rationale is weakened, through which the mechanism is constructed as 
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a necessary compromise, the increasingly prominent business case will likely fade, as it did in 
England. Given the considerable strain on offsetting’s articulation which is already apparent, and 
meaningful application under existing conditions has proven so difficult, the mechanism’s 
consolidation as a popular conservation tool faces serious obstacles. To return one final time to the 
neoliberalisation of nature literature, this thesis may act as something of a provocation to think further 
about the internal limits of environmental markets in this time of converging crises. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
References 
 
Adams, W. B. (2004). Against Extinction: The Story of Conservation: The Past and Future of Conservation. 
London ; Sterling, VA: Routledge. 
Adams, W. & Mulligan, M. (2012). Decolonizing Nature: Strategies for Conservation in a Post-Colonial Era. 
Routledge. 
Agrawal, A. (2005). Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects. Duke 
University Press. 
Aldersgate Group. (2011). Pricing the Priceless - The Business Case for Action on Biodiversity. Retrieved from 
http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/asset/download/472/Business%20and%20Biodiversity.pdf 
Aldersgate Group. (2013). Consultation Response: Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Retrieved March 4, 
2014, from 
http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/asset/download/236/1311%20AG%20biodiversity%20offset%20co
nsultation%20response.pdf 
ALGE. (2013). Consultation Response Document: Biodiversity Offsetting in England Green Paper (Defra). 
Allmendinger, P. & Haughton, G. (2012). Post-Political Spatial Planning in England: A Crisis of Consensus? 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37(1), 89–103. 
Alvarado-Quesada, I., Hein, L. & Weikard, H.-P. (2013). Market-Based Mechanisms for Biodiversity 
Conservation: A Review of Existing Schemes and an Outline for a Global Mechanism. Biodiversity 
and Conservation, 23(1), 1–21. 
Álvarez García, D. (2014). Conservation Banking Becomes A Reality In Spain. Ecosystem Marketplace. 
Retrieved November 24, 2016, from http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/conservation-
banking-becomes-a-reality-in-spain/ 
de Angelis, M. (2006). The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital. London: Pluto Press. 
Angus, I. (2016). Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and the Crisis of the Earth System. New York: 
Monthly Review Press,U.S. 
Apostolopoulou, E. (2016). Biodiversity Offsetting in England: Governance Rescaling, Socio-Spatial Injustices, 
and the Neoliberalization of Nature. Web Ecology, 16(1), 67–71. 
Apostolopoulou, E. & Adams, W. M. (2015). Biodiversity Offsetting and Conservation: Reframing Nature to 
Save It. Oryx, FirstView, 1–9. 
Apostolopoulou, E., Bormpoudakis, D., Paloniemi, R., Cent, J., Grodzińska-Jurczak, M., Pietrzyk-Kaszyńska, 
A., et al. (2014). Governance Rescaling and the Neoliberalization of Nature: The Case of Biodiversity 
Conservation in Four EU Countries. International Journal of Sustainable Development & World 
Ecology, 21(6), 481–494. 
Aronson, J., Clewell, A. & Moreno-Mateos, D. (2016). Ecological Restoration and Ecological Engineering: 
Complementary or Indivisible? Ecological Engineering, 91, 392–395. 
Arsel, M. & Büscher, B. (2012). NatureTM Inc.: Changes and Continuities in Neoliberal Conservation and 
Market-Based Environmental Policy. Development and Change, 43(1), 53–78. 
Atley, T. & Morad, M. (2009). Mind the Gap: The UK’s New Planning System, Landscape Conservation and 
Biodiversity. International Journal of Environmental Studies, 66(6), 785–790. 
Avery, M. (2014). Offputting Offsetting. MarkAvery.info. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
http://markavery.info/2014/01/16/offputting-offsetting/ 
242 
 
Bäckstrand, K. & Lövbrand, E. (2006). Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of 
Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic Environmentalism. Global Environmental 
Politics, 6(1), 50–75. 
Bacon, C. M. (2010). Who Decides What Is Fair in Fair Trade? The Agri-Environmental Governance of 
Standards, Access, and Price. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 37(1), 111–147. 
Bailey, I. (2007). Market Environmentalism, New Environmental Policy Instruments, and Climate Policy in the 
United Kingdom and Germany. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 97(3), 530–550. 
Baird, I. G. & Quastel, N. (2011). Dolphin-Safe Tuna from California to Thailand: Localisms in Environmental 
Certification of Global Commodity Networks. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
101(2), 337–355. 
Bakker, K. (2003). An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and Wales. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bakker, K. (2005). Neoliberalizing Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in England and Wales. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95(3), 542–565. 
Bakker, K. (2007). The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’: Alter-Globalization, Anti-Privatization and the 
Human Right to Water in the Global South. Antipode, 39(3), 430–455. 
Bakker, K. (2010a). Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and the World’s Urban Water Crisis. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Library. 
Bakker, K. (2010b). The Limits of ‘neoliberal Natures’: Debating Green Neoliberalism. Progress in Human 
Geography, 34(6), 715–735. 
Bakker, K. & Bridge, G. (2006). Material Worlds? Resource Geographies and the ‘Matter of Nature’. Progress 
in Human Geography, 30(1), 5–27. 
Barkham, P. (2014). Nightingales v 5,000 New Homes: The Battle over the Woods of Lodge Hill. The 
Guardian. Retrieved November 23, 2016, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/25/-sp-nightingales-lodge-hill-sanctuary-
conservation-britain 
Barnett, C. (2005). The Consolations of ‘neoliberalism’. Geoforum, 36(1), 7–12. 
Bat Conservation Trust. (2013). Bat Conservation Trust Response: Defra – Biodiversity Offsetting. 
Bawden, T. (2015). Ex-Environment Secretary Owen Paterson’s Plans for Ancient Woodland. The 
Independent. Retrieved February 2, 2015, from http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/ex-
environment-secretary-owen-paterson-s-plans-for-ancient-woodland-get-the-axe-10014614.html 
Bayon, R. (2004). Making Environmental Markets Work: Lessons from Early Experience with Sulphur, Carbon, 
Wetlands, and Other Related Markets. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_121.pdf 
Bayon, R. (2008). Banking on Biodiversity, in: The Worldwatch Institute (Ed.), State of The World 2008: 
Innovations for a Sustainable Economy, (pp. 123–137). New York; London: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Bayon, R. & Jenkins, M. (2010). The Business of Biodiversity. Nature, 466(7303), 184–185. 
BBC. (2012). Osborne Made ‘Unjustified Attack’ on EU Habitat Rules. BBC News. Retrieved July 19, 2016, 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-17479165 
BBC. (2014). Policing Badger Cull Cost ‘£1,311 per Badger’. BBC News. Retrieved August 10, 2016, from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-25719562 
243 
 
BBOP. (2009a). Business, Biodiversity Offsets and BBOP: An Overview. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3125.pdf 
BBOP. (2009b). Biodiversity Offset Design Handbook Appendices. Retrieved March 3, 2016, from 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3127.pdf 
BBOP. (2012a). Biodiversity Offset Design Handbook - Updated. Retrieved March 3, 2016, from 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3101.pdf 
BBOP. (2012b). Standard on Biodiversity Offsets. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_3078.pdf 
BBOP. (2012c). Glossary. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/doc_3100.pdf 
BBOP. (2013). To No Net Loss and Beyond: An Overview of the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme 
(BBOP). Retrieved January 25, 2016, from http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3319.pdf 
BBOP. (2014). To No Net Loss of Biodiversity and Beyond: A Summary of Discussions at the Conference. 
Retrieved March 31, 2016, from http://bbop.forest-
trends.org/documents/files/bbop_nnl_conference_report.pdf 
Beck, U. & Lash, S. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (M. Ritter, Tran.). London ; Newbury Park, 
Calif: Sage Publications UK. 
Becker, G. (2009). Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Bekessy, S. A., Wintle, B. A., Lindenmayer, D. B., Mccarthy, M. A., Colyvan, M., Burgman, M. A., et al. (2010). 
The Biodiversity Bank Cannot Be a Lending Bank. Conservation Letters, 3(3), 151–158. 
Bell, A. (2014). Can We Have a Robust Public Debate on Biodiversity Offsetting? The Guardian. Retrieved 
August 11, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/jun/03/can-we-
have-a-robust-public-debate-on-biodiversity-offsetting 
Benabou, S. (2014). Making Up for Lost Nature? A Critical Review of the International Development of 
Voluntary Biodiversity Offsets. Environment and Society: Advances in Research, 5(1), 103–123. 
Benjaminsen, T. A. & Bryceson, I. (2012). Conservation, Green/blue Grabbing and Accumulation by 
Dispossession in Tanzania. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 335–355. 
Bennett, J. (2009). Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke University Press. 
BES. (2013a). Biodiversity Offsetting: Quid pro Grow? British Ecological Society. Retrieved August 10, 2016, 
from http://www.britishecologicalsociety.org/biodiversity-offsetting-quid-pro-grow/ 
BES. (2013b). Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Retrieved August 10, 2016, from 
http://www.britishecologicalsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/Biodiversity-offsetting-BES-response-and-
report-FINAL.pdf 
BES. (2013c). Biodiversity Offsetting - What Does the Science Say? Retrieved November 12, 2013, from 
http://www.britishecologicalsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/Biodiversity-offsetting-BES-report-
FINAL.pdf 
Betts, C. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting — Help or Hype? The Institution Of Environmental Sciences. Retrieved 
July 15, 2014, from https://www.ies-uk.org.uk/analysis/help_or_hype 
Biermann, C. & Mansfield, B. (2014). Biodiversity, Purity, and Death: Conservation Biology as Biopolitics. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32(2), 257 – 273. 
244 
 
BIS. (2013). Better Regulation Framework Manual: Practical Guidance for UK Government Officials. Retrieved 
November 11, 2014, from https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/Department-for-business-
innovation-skills 
Blomley, N. (2008). Simplification Is Complicated: Property, Nature, and the Rivers of Law. Environment and 
Planning A, 40(8), 1825 – 1842. 
Boelens, R., Hoogesteger, J. & Baud, M. (2015). Water Reform Governmentality in Ecuador: Neoliberalism, 
Centralization, and the Restraining of Polycentric Authority and Community Rule-Making. Geoforum, 
64, 281–291. 
Boisvert, V. (2015). Conservation Banking Mechanisms and the Economization of Nature: An Institutional 
Analysis. Ecosystem Services, 15, 134–142. 
Boisvert, V., Méral, P. & Froger, G. (2013). Market-Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services: Institutional 
Innovation or Renovation? Society & Natural Resources, 26(10), 1122–1136. 
Bond, P. (2012). Emissions Trading, New Enclosures and Eco-Social Contestation. Antipode, 44(3), 684–701. 
Bonefeld, W. (2010). Free Economy and the Strong State: Some Notes on the State. Capital & Class, 34(1), 
15–24. 
Bonefeld, W. (2011). Primitive Accumulation and Capitalist Accumulation: Notes on Social Constitution and 
Expropriation. Science & Society, 75(3), 379–399. 
Bonefeld, W. (2012). Freedom and the Strong State: On German Ordoliberalism. New Political Economy, 
17(5), 633–656. 
Bonneuil, C. (2015). Tell Me Where You Come From, I Will Tell You Who You Are: A Genealogy of Biodiversity 
Offsetting Mechanisms in Historical Context. Biological Conservation, 192, 485–491. 
Booker, C. (2014). Sacking Owen Paterson Is an Insult to the Countryside. The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 
August 11, 2016, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/countryside/10977289/Sacking-Owen-
Paterson-is-an-insult-to-the-countryside.html 
Bos, M., Pressey, R. L. & Stoeckl, N. (2014). Effective Marine Offsets for the Great Barrier Reef World 
Heritage Area. Environmental Science & Policy, 42, 1–15. 
Boyd, W., Prudham, W. S. & Schurman, R. A. (2001). Industrial Dynamics and the Problem of Nature. Society 
& Natural Resources, 14(7), 555–570. 
Bracking, S. (2012). How Do Investors Value Environmental Harm/Care? Private Equity Funds, Development 
Finance Institutions and the Partial Financialization of Nature-Based Industries. Development and 
Change, 43(1), 271–293. 
Branson, A. (2014). Loss of Biodiversity Role at Agency Sparks Dismay. Planning Resource. Retrieved July 
18, 2016, from http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1230898/loss-biodiversity-role-agency-
sparks-dismay 
Bräuer, I., Müssner, R. & Marsden, K. (2006). The Use of Market Incentives to Preserve Biodiversity. Retrieved 
February 8, 2016, from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/biodiversity/pdf/mbi.pdf 
Braun, B. (2000). Producing Vertical Territory: Geology and Governmentality in Late Victorian Canada. Cultural 
Geographies, 7(1), 7–46. 
Braun, B. (2007). Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life. Cultural Geographies, 14(1), 6–28. 
Braun, B. (2008). Environmental Issues: Inventive Life. Progress in Human Geography, 32(5), 667–679. 
Braun, B. (2015). THE 2013 ANTIPODE RGS-IBG LECTURE New Materialisms and Neoliberal Natures. 
Antipode, 47(1), 1–14. 
245 
 
Braun, B. & Castree, N. (Eds.). (1998). Remaking Reality: Nature at the Millenium. London: Routledge. 
Brennan, K. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting – the Consultation and What Needs to Be Said. Woodland Matters. 
Retrieved August 13, 2016, from https://wtcampaigns.wordpress.com/2013/10/10/biodiversity-
offsetting-the-consultation-and-what-needs-to-be-said/ 
Brenner, N. (2004). New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Brenner, N., Peck, J. & Theodore, N. (2010a). Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, 
Pathways. Global Networks, 10(2), 182–222. 
Brenner, N., Peck, J. & Theodore, N. (2010b). After Neoliberalization? Globalizations, 7(3), 327–345. 
Brenner, N. & Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the Geographies of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’. Antipode, 
34(3), 349–379. 
Bridge, G. (2014). Resource Geographies II The Resource-State Nexus. Progress in Human Geography, 
38(1), 118–130. 
Bridge, G. & Perreault, T. (2009). Environmental Governance, in: Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, D., and 
Rhoads, B. (Eds.), A Companion to Environmental Geography, (pp. 475–497). Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Briggs, B. D. J., Hill, D. A. & Gillespie, R. (2009). Habitat Banking - How It Could Work in the UK. Journal for 
Nature Conservation, 17(2), 112–122. 
British Standards Institution. (2013). Biodiversity - Code of Practice for Planning and Development. 
Brock, A. (2015). ‘Love for Sale’: Biodiversity Banking and the Struggle to Commodify Nature in Sabah, 
Malaysia. Geoforum, 65, 278–290. 
Brockington, D., Duffy, R. & Igoe, J. (2008). Nature Unbound: Conservation, Capitalism and the Future of 
Protected Areas: The Past, Present and Future of Protected Areas. London ; Sterling, VA: Routledge. 
Brown, M. A. (2014). Towards Robust Exchanges: Evaluating Ecological Compensation in New Zealand. 
Retrieved March 31, 2016, from http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/handle/10289/8435 
Brown, M. A., Clarkson, B. D., Stephens, R. T. T. & Barton, B. (2014). Compensating for Ecological Harm - the 
State of Play in New Zealand. New Zealand Journal of Ecology, 38(1), 139–146. 
Brownlie, S. & Botha, M. (2009). Biodiversity Offsets: Adding to the Conservation Estate, or ‘no Net Loss’? 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 27(3), 227–231. 
Brownlie, S., King, N. & Treweek, J. (2013). Biodiversity Tradeoffs and Offsets in Impact Assessment and 
Decision Making: Can We Stop the Loss? Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 31(1), 24–33. 
Bruggeman, D. J., Jones, M. L., Lupi, F. & Scribner, K. T. (2005). Landscape Equivalency Analysis: 
Methodology for Estimating Spatially Explicit Biodiversity Credits. Environmental Management, 36(4), 
518–534. 
Bryant, R. (2015). The International Handbook of Political Ecology. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
BSG Ecology. (n.d.). Residential Development in Buckinghamshire – Resolving Issues with Biodiversity 
Offsetting. BSG Ecology. Retrieved September 21, 2016, from http://www.bsg-
ecology.com/project/residential-development-in-buckinghamshire-resolving-issues-with-biodiversity-
offsetting/ 
Buglife. (2013). Written Evidence Submitted by Buglife. Retrieved October 28, 2013, from 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidencePdf/3019 
246 
 
Bull, J. W. & Brownlie, S. (2015). The Transition from No Net Loss to a Net Gain of Biodiversity Is far from 
Trivial. Oryx, FirstView, 1–7. 
Bull, J. W., Gordon, A., Law, E. A., Suttle, K. B. & Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2014). Importance of Baseline 
Specification in Evaluating Conservation Interventions and Achieving No Net Loss of Biodiversity. 
Conservation Biology, 28(3), 799–809. 
Bull, J. W., Hardy, M. J., Moilanen, A. & Gordon, A. (2015). Categories of Flexibility in Biodiversity Offsetting, 
and Their Implications for Conservation. Biological Conservation, 192, 522–532. 
Bull, J. W., Milner-Gulland, E. J., Suttle, K. B. & Singh, N. J. (2014). Comparing Biodiversity Offset Calculation 
Methods with a Case Study in Uzbekistan. Biological Conservation, 178, 2–10. 
Bull, J. W., Suttle, K. B., Gordon, A., Singh, N. J. & Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2013). Biodiversity Offsets in Theory 
and Practice. Oryx, 47(3), 369–380. 
Bull, J. W., Suttle, K. B., Singh, N. J. & Milner-Gulland, E. J. (2013). Conservation When Nothing Stands Still: 
Moving Targets and Biodiversity Offsets. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 11(4), 203–210. 
Bullock, J. M., Aronson, J., Newton, A. C., Pywell, R. F. & Rey-Benayas, J. M. (2011). Restoration of 
Ecosystem Services and Biodiversity: Conflicts and Opportunities. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 
26(10), 541–549. 
Bumpus, A. & Liverman, D. (2008). Accumulation by Decarbonization and the Governance of Carbon Offsets. 
Economic Geography, 84(2), 127–155. 
Burgin, S. (2008). BioBanking: An Environmental Scientist’s View of the Role of Biodiversity Banking Offsets in 
Conservation. Biodiversity and Conservation, 17(4), 807–816. 
Burgin, S. (2010). ‘Mitigation Banks’ for Wetland Conservation: A Major Success or an Unmitigated Disaster? - 
Springer. Wetlands Ecological Management, 18, 49–55. 
Burgin, S. (2011). Biodiversity Offsets: Lessons from the American Experience. Australian Zoologist, 35(3), 
544–549. 
Burkett, P. (2014). Marx and Nature: A Red Green Perspective. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 
Büscher, B. & Arsel, M. (2012). Introduction: Neoliberal Conservation, Uneven Geographical Development and 
the Dynamics of Contemporary Capitalism. Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie, 103(2), 
129–135. 
Büscher, B., Dressler, W. & Fletcher, R. (Eds.). (2014). Nature Inc.: Environmental Conservation in the 
Neoliberal Age. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 
Büscher, B. & Fletcher, R. (2015). Accumulation by Conservation. New Political Economy, 20(2), 273–298. 
Büscher, B., Sullivan, S., Neves, K., Igoe, J. & Brockington, D. (2012). Towards a Synthesized Critique of 
Neoliberal Biodiversity Conservation. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 23(2), 4–30. 
Cadman, E. (2015). Poorest Areas Hit Hardest by UK Cuts, Research Finds. Financial Times. Retrieved July 
18, 2016, from https://next.ft.com/content/01406a4c-c34f-11e4-ac3d-00144feab7de 
Caldecott, B. & Dickie, I. (2010). Habitat Banking: Scaling up Private Investment in the Protection and 
Restoration of Our Natural World. Retrieved from 
http://www.climatesoutheast.org.uk/images/uploads/Habitat_Banking.pdf 
Callon, M. (2007). What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is Performative?, in: MacKenzie, D., Muniesa, 
F., and Siu, L. (Eds.), Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, (pp. 311–
357). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Callon, M. & Muniesa, F. (2005). Peripheral Vision Economic Markets as Calculative Collective Devices. 
Organization Studies, 26(8), 1229–1250. 
247 
 
Calvet, C., Napoléone, C. & Salles, J.-M. (2015). The Biodiversity Offsetting Dilemma: Between Economic 
Rationales and Ecological Dynamics. Sustainability, 7(6), 7357–7378. 
Cameron, D. (2010a). PM’s Speech at DECC: A Transcript of a Speech given by the Prime Minister at the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change on 14 May 2010. gov.uk. Retrieved July 12, 2016, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-decc 
Cameron, D. (2010b). Transforming the British Economy: Coalition Strategy for Economic Growth. gov.uk. 
Retrieved November 5, 2016, from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transforming-the-british-
economy-coalition-strategy-for-economic-growth 
Carpenter, J. (2015). Planning and Development Services ‘Hit by Deepest Cuts’ | Planning Resource. Planning 
Resource. Retrieved July 15, 2016, from http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1337302/planning-
development-services-hit-deepest-cuts 
Carrington, D. (2012a). Planning Reform: A Giant Gamble with Economy and Environment. The Guardian. 
Retrieved November 5, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-
blog/2012/mar/27/planning-countryside-development-environment 
Carrington, D. (2012b). No Sell-off of Forests, Promises Caroline Spelman. The Guardian. Retrieved May 7, 
2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/04/no-sell-off-forests-spelman 
Carrington, D. (2012c). Owen Paterson: True Blue Countryman Putting Wind up Green Campaigners. The 
Guardian. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/oct/11/owen-
paterson-environment-guardian-profile 
Carrington, D. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting Proposals ‘a Licence to Trash Nature’. The Guardian. Retrieved 
September 5, 2013, from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/05/biodiversity-
offsetting-proposals-licence-to-trash 
Carrington, D. (2014a). UK Climate Change Spend Almost Halved under Owen Paterson, Figures Reveal. The 
Guardian. Retrieved January 29, 2014, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/27/uk-climate-change-owen-paterson 
Carrington, D. (2014b). How Long Will the UK Government Keep Its Head above Flood Water? The Guardian. 
Retrieved August 10, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/09/flood-
defences-ukowen-paterson-new-funding 
Carrington, D. (2014c). Badger Cull: Government Abandons National Roll-out Plans. The Guardian. Retrieved 
August 10, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/03/badger-cull-owen-
paterson-cancels-national-roll-out-cattle-tb 
Carrington, D. (2014d). David Cameron’s Reshuffle Gets Rid of the ‘Green Crap’. The Guardian. Retrieved 
August 11, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-
blog/2014/jul/15/cameron-reshuffle-owen-paterson-liz-truss 
Carson, R. (2000). Silent Spring. London: Penguin Classics. 
Carter, N. & Clements, B. (2015). From ‘greenest Government Ever’ to ‘get Rid of All the Green Crap’: David 
Cameron, the Conservatives and the Environment. British Politics, 10(2), 204–225. 
Carton, W. (2014). Environmental Protection as Market Pathology?: Carbon Trading and the Dialectics of the 
‘double Movement’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32(6), 1002 – 1018. 
Carver, L. (2015). Measuring the Value of What? An Ethnographic Account of the Transformation of ‘Nature’ 
under the DEFRA Biodiversity Offsetting Metric. Retrieved August 20, 2015, from 
http://thestudyofvalue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/WP11-Carver-2015-Measuring-what-value.pdf 
Cash, W. (2014). David Cameron’s Decision to Sack Owen Paterson Will Send Rural Voters Flooding to Ukip. 
The Spectator. Retrieved August 11, 2016, from http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2014/07/8832941/ 
Castree, N. (2000). Marxism and the Production of Nature. Capital & Class, 24(3), 5–36. 
248 
 
Castree, N. (2003). Commodifying What Nature? Progress in Human Geography, 27(3), 273–297. 
Castree, N. (2008b). Neoliberalising Nature: The Logics of Deregulation and Reregulation. Environment and 
Planning A, 40(1), 131 – 152. 
Castree, N. (2008a). Neoliberalising Nature: Processes, Effects, and Evaluations. Environment and Planning 
A, 40(1), 153 – 173. 
Castree, N. (2010). Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment: A Synthesis and Evaluation of the 
Research. Environment and Society: advances in Research, 1(1), 5–45. 
Castree, N. & Braun, B. (Eds.). (2001). Social Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Retrieved October 28, 2015, from http://eu.wiley.com/remtitle.cgi?0631215670 
Castree, N. & Henderson, G. (2014). The Capitalist Mode of Conservation, Neoliberalism and the Ecology of 
Value. New Proposals: Journal of Marxism and Interdisciplinary Inquiry, 7(1), 16–37. 
Cavanagh, C. J. (2014). Biopolitics, Environmental Change, and Development Studies. Forum for 
Development Studies, 41(2), 273–294. 
CEP. (2013). Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Phase: Summary of Interim Report. Retrieved 
February 22, 2016, from http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=11689_WC1051-
SummaryEvaluationoftheBiodiversityOffsettingPilotInterimReport.doc 
CEP & IEEP. (2013). Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Phase - Indicative Costs of Current 
Compensation Arrangements for Biodiversity Loss: Illustrative Case Studies (Report on Task 4). 
London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12534_WC1051Task4ReportFINAL.PDF 
CEP & IEEP. (2014a). Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Phase – Sub Report: A Review of Recent 
Biodiversity Offsetting Practice in Germany. London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. 
Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12533_BiodiversityOffsettingreportfromGerman
yDec2014.pdf 
CEP & IEEP. (2014b). Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Programme Volume 2 (Annex): Pilot 
Reports. London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12536_Volume_2_(Annex)_Pilot_Reports.pdf 
CEP & IEEP. (2014c). Appendix 4 - Review of Pilot Local Planning Authority (LPA) Development Plans. 
London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12540_Appendix_4_Review_of_LPA_Develop
ment_Plans__Policies.pdf 
CEP & IEEP. (2014d). Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Programme: Final Report Volume 1. 
London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12535_WC1051_Volume_1_Final_Report.pdf 
CEP & IEEP. (2014e). Appendix 1 - Summary of the Complementary Projects. London: Collingwood 
Environmental Planning Ltd. Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12537_Appendix_1_Complementary_Projects.p
df 
CEP & IEEP. (2014f). Appendix 3 – Summary of Evidence. London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. 
Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12539_Appendix_3_Summary_of_Evidence.pdf 
Channel 4 News. (2014). ‘A Third World Country’: Flood Victims Turn on Paterson. Channel 4 News. Retrieved 
August 10, 2016, from http://www.channel4.com/news/flooding-somerset-weather-aerials-video 
249 
 
Christie, M., Hyde, T., Cooper, R., Fazey, I., Dennis, P., Warren, J., et al. (2011). Economic Valuation of the 
Benefits of Ecosystem Services Delivered by the UK Biodiversity Action Plan. Retrieved August 8, 
2016, from https://www.cbd.int/financial/values/uk-bapvalue.pdf 
CIEEM. (2013). Consultation Response: Biodiversity Offsetting in England Green Paper (Defra). Retrieved 
from 
http://www.cieem.net/data/files/Resource_Library/Policy/Consultation_Responses/CIEEM_offsetting_r
esponse_FINAL.pdf 
CIEEM. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting Conference Presentations Now Online. Chartered Institute of Ecology 
and Environmental Management. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
http://www.cieem.net/news/176/biodiversity-offsetting-conference-presentations-now-online 
CLA. (2009). Private Solutions to Public Problems: Developing Environmental Markets. Retrieved July 11, 
2014, from 
https://www.cla.org.uk/sites/default/files/Private%20Solutions%20to%20Public%20Problems.pdf 
CLA. (2013a). Country Land and Business Association (CLA) Response to Biodiversity Offsetting in England 
Consultation. 
CLA. (2013b). Written Evidence Submitted by Country Land and Business Association. Retrieved from 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/WrittenEvidence.svc/EvidencePdf/3021 
Clare, S. & Krogman, N. (2013). Bureaucratic Slippage and Environmental Offset Policies: The Case of 
Wetland Management in Alberta. Society & Natural Resources, 26(6), 672–687. 
Clare, S., Krogman, N., Foote, L. & Lemphers, N. (2011). Where Is the Avoidance in the Implementation of 
Wetland Law and Policy? Wetlands Ecology and Management, 19(2), 165–182. 
Clarke, K. D. & Bradford, M. J. (2014). A Review of Equivalency in Offsetting Policies. Retrieved March 3, 
2016, from 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/K_Clarke/publication/272086382_A_Review_of_Equivalency_in_
Offsetting_Policies/links/54da02010cf2970e4e7d5b66.pdf 
Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44. 
Cochrane, A., Colenutt, B. & Field, M. (2015). Governing the Ungovernable: Spatial Policy, Markets and 
Volume House-Building in a Growth Region. Policy & Politics, 43(4), 527–544. 
Coggan, A., Buitelaar, E., Whitten, S. & Bennett, J. (2013). Factors That Influence Transaction Costs in 
Development Offsets: Who Bears What and Why? Ecological Economics, 88, 222–231. 
Coggan, A., Buitelaar, E., Whitten, S. M. & Bennett, J. (2013). Intermediaries in Environmental Offset Markets: 
Actions and Incentives. Land Use Policy, 32, 145–154. 
Cohen, A. & Bakker, K. (2014). The Eco-Scalar Fix: Rescaling Environmental Governance and the Politics of 
Ecological Boundaries in Alberta, Canada. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32(1), 
128–146. 
Cohen, A. & McCarthy, J. (2015). Reviewing Rescaling Strengthening the Case for Environmental 
Considerations. Progress in Human Geography, 39(1), 3–25. 
Collard, R.-C. & Dempsey, J. (2013). Life for Sale? The Politics of Lively Commodities. Environment and 
Planning A, 45(11), 2682 – 2699. 
Collard, R.-C., Dempsey, J. & Rowe, J. (2016). Re-Regulating Socioecologies under Neoliberalism, in: 
Springer, S., Birch, K., and MacLeavy, J. (Eds.), The Handbook of Neoliberalism, (pp. 469–479). New 
York: Routledge. 
Connor, B. (2016). Biodiversity Offsetting: Cast into the Wilderness? British Ecological Society. Retrieved 
August 13, 2016, from http://www.britishecologicalsociety.org/biodiversity-offsetting-cast-into-the-
wilderness/ 
250 
 
Conway, M., Rayment, M., White, A., Berman, S., Turbé, A., Chenot, B., et al. (2013). Exploring Potential 
Demand for and Supply of Habitat Banking in the EU and Appropriate Design Elements for a Habitat 
Banking Scheme. London: ICF GHK. 
Cook, C. N., Wardell-Johnson, G., Keatley, M., Gowans, S. A., Gibson, M. S., Westbrooke, M. E., et al. (2010). 
Is What You See What You Get? Visual vs. Measured Assessments of Vegetation Condition. Journal 
of Applied Ecology, 47(3), 650–661. 
Cook, D. & Clay, N. (2013). Marine Biodiversity Offsetting and Habitat Banking – Feasibility Study. Retrieved 
February 19, 2014, from http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/397708/marine-biodiversity-
offsetting-uk-scoping-study.pdf 
Cook, W., van Bommel, S. & Turnhout, E. (2016). Inside Environmental Auditing: Effectiveness, Objectivity, 
and Transparency. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 18, 33–39. 
Coralie, C., Guillaume, O. & Claude, N. (2015). Tracking the Origins and Development of Biodiversity 
Offsetting in Academic Research and Its Implications for Conservation: A Review. Biological 
Conservation, 192, 492–503. 
Corbera, E., Brown, K. & Adger, W. N. (2007). The Equity and Legitimacy of Markets for Ecosystem Services. 
Development and change, 38(4), 587–613. 
Cornwall County Council. (2013). Consultation Response from Cornwall Council - Biodiversity Offsetting in 
England: A Green Paper. Retrieved from https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/3624376/Biodiversity-
offsetting-Cornwall-Council-response-final-.pdf 
Corson, C. (2011a). Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation, in: 
Brockington, D. and Duffy, R. (Eds.), Capitalism and Conservation, (pp. 108–134). Wiley-Blackwell. 
Retrieved August 20, 2015, from 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444391442.ch4/summary 
Corson, C. (2011b). Territorialization, Enclosure and Neoliberalism: Non-State Influence in Struggles over 
Madagascar’s Forests. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(4), 703–726. 
Corson, C. & MacDonald, K. I. (2012). Enclosing the Global Commons: The Convention on Biological Diversity 
and Green Grabbing. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 263–283. 
Corson, C., MacDonald, K. I. & Neimark, B. (2013). Grabbing Green: Markets, Environmental Governance and 
the Materialization of Natural Capital. Human Geography, 6(1), 1–15. 
Cowell, R. (1997). Stretching the Limits: Environmental Compensation, Habitat Creation and Sustainable 
Development. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 22(3), 292–306. 
Cowell, R. (2013). The Greenest Government Ever? Planning and Sustainability in England after the May 2010 
Elections. Planning Practice and Research, 28(1), 27–44. 
Crang, M. (2005). Time: Space, in: Cloke, P. and Johnston, R. (Eds.), Spaces of Geographical Thought: 
Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries, (pp. 199–220). London: Sage. 
Credit Suisse & McKinsey Centre for Business and Environment. (2016). Conservation Finance - From Niche 
to Mainstream: The Building of an Institutional Asset Class. Retrieved February 12, 2016, from 
https://www.environmental-finance.com/assets/files/research/conservation-finance-en.pdf 
Credit Suisse, World Wildlife Fund & McKinsey & Company. (2014). Conservation Finance: Moving beyond 
Donor Funding toward an Investor-Driven Approach. Retrieved February 8, 2016, from 
https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/cc/docs/responsibility/conservation-finance-en.pdf 
Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. SAGE 
Publications, Inc. 
Cronon, W. (1992). Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co. 
251 
 
CSBI. (2015). A Cross-Sector Guide for Implementing the Mitigation Hierarchy. Retrieved February 3, 2016, 
from http://www.csbi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CSBI-Mitigation-Hierarchy-Guide-Sept-2015-
1.pdf 
Curran, M., Hellweg, S. & Beck, J. (2013). Is There Any Empirical Support for Biodiversity Offset Policy? 
Ecological Applications, 24(4), 617–632. 
Curran, M., Hellweg, S. & Beck, J. (2015). The Jury Is Still out on Biodiversity Offsets: Reply to Quétier et Al. 
Ecological Applications, 25(6), 1741–1746. 
Cusick, J. (2013). Owen Paterson, His Sceptic Brother-in-Law, and How Defra Went Cold on Climate Change. 
The Independent. Retrieved December 17, 2013, from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/owen-paterson-his-sceptic-brotherinlaw-and-how-
defra-went-cold-on-climate-change-8973946.html 
Dales, J. H. (1968). Pollution, Property and Prices: An Essay in Policy-Making and Economics. University of 
Toronto P. 
Darbi, M. (2010). Biodiversity Offsets – a Tool for Environmental Management and Biodiversity Conservation, 
in: TOP Biodiversity Cyprus 2010 Conference Proceedings. Lulu.com. Retrieved from 
http://www2.ioer.de/recherche/pdf/2010_darbi_biodiversity_offsets.pdf 
Darbi, M. (2015). What Is the Business Case for Biodiversity Offsets. SQ-raising the Sustainability Quotient, 
5(1), 3–5. 
Dardot, P. & Laval, C. (2014). The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society (G. Elliot, Tran.). London and 
New York: Verso Books. 
Darier, E. (1999). Discourses of the Environment. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Retrieved November 24, 
2015, from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=4976897606766496388&hl=en&inst=56936736054743433
9&oi=scholarr 
Dauguet, B. (2015). Biodiversity Offsetting as a Commodification Process: A French Case Study as a Concrete 
Example. Biological Conservation, 192, 533–540. 
David Tyldesley and Associates. (2012a). Planning Policy and Biodiversity Offsets: Report on Phase II 
Research - Effectiveness of the Application of Current Planning Policy in the Town and Country 
Planning System. Nottingham: David Tyldesley and Associates. Retrieved December 1, 2013, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=10054_PhaseIIFINALREPORTPDF.pdf 
David Tyldesley and Associates. (2012b). Planning Policy and Biodiversity Offsets: Report on Phase III 
Research - Application of a New Biodiversity Offsetting Metric to an Existing Sample of Real-Life 
Historic Cases. Nottingham: David Tyldesley and Associates. Retrieved December 1, 2013, from 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=10054_PhaseIIFINALREPORTPDF.pdf 
Davies, W. (2014). The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
DCLG. (2011). Draft National Planning Policy Framework: Consultation. London: HMSO. Retrieved August 2, 
2016, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11802/1951747.pdf 
DCLG. (2012). National Planning Policy Framework. London: HMSO. Retrieved May 7, 2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6077/2116950.pdf 
Dearden, N. (2013). Putting a Price on Nature Would Be Disastrous. The Guardian. Retrieved August 13, 
2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/nov/27/price-
nature-markets-natural-capital 
252 
 
Dechezleprêtre, A. & Sato, M. (2014). The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Competitiveness. 
Retrieved November 20, 2014, from http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Impacts_of_Environmental_Regulations.pdf 
Defra. (2007). Conserving Biodiversity – The UK Approach. London: DEFRA. Retrieved July 1, 2016, from 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/PDF/UKBAP_ConBio-UKApproach-2007.pdf 
Defra. (2010a). UK Biodiversity Indicators in Your Pocket 2010: Measuring Progress towards Halting 
Biodiversity Loss. London: DEFRA. Retrieved November 5, 2016, from 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/pdf/BIYP_2010.pdf 
Defra. (2010b). Biodiversity Offsetting: Discussion Material. London: DEFRA. Retrieved January 9, 2013, from 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/biodiversity/offsetting/documents/110714offsetting-technical-
metric.pdf 
Defra. (2011a). The Natural Environment White Paper: The Natural Choice - Securing the Value of Nature. 
London: HMSO. 
Defra. (2011b). Options Stage Impact Assessment: Offsetting the Impact of Development on Biodiversity. 
London: DEFRA. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/218685/newp-ia-
offsets-110607.pdf 
Defra. (2011c). Government Response to the Making Space for Nature Review. London: DEFRA. Retrieved 
January 9, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69272/pb13537-lawton-
response-110607.pdf 
Defra. (2011d). Natural Capital: Supporting Evidence and Analysis to the Natural Environment White Paper – 
The Natural Choice: Securing the Value of Nature. London: DEFRA. Retrieved May 9, 2013, from 
http://www.archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/natural/documents/newp-evidence-nat-capital-
110607.pdf 
Defra. (2011e). Biodiversity Offsetting: Summary of Responses to Discussion Material on Biodiversity 
Offsetting. London: DEFRA. Retrieved January 9, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/218683/110714offsettin
g-discuss-response.pdf 
Defra. (2011f). Biodiversity Offsetting: Guiding Principles for Biodiversity Offsetting. London: DEFRA. Retrieved 
May 9, 2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/218681/110714offsettin
g-guiding-principles.pdf 
Defra. (2011g). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Technical Paper - Proposed Metric for the Biodiversity Offsetting 
Pilot in England. London: DEFRA. Retrieved May 9, 2013, from 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/biodiversity/offsetting/documents/110714offsetting-technical-
metric.pdf 
Defra. (2011h). Biodiversity 2020: A Strategy for England’s Wildlife and Ecosystem Services. London: DEFRA. 
Retrieved May 1, 2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69446/pb13583-
biodiversity-strategy-2020-111111.pdf 
Defra. (2012a). Report of the Habitats and Wild Birds Directives Implementation Review. London: DEFRA. 
Retrieved April 17, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69513/pb13724-
habitats-review-report.pdf 
Defra. (2012b). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Information Note for Local Authorities. London: DEFRA. 
Retrieved May 9, 2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69529/pb13744-bio-
local-authority-info-note.pdf 
253 
 
Defra. (2012c). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Guidance for Developers. London: DEFRA. Retrieved May 9, 
2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69528/pb13743-bio-
guide-developers.pdf 
Defra. (2012d). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Guidance for Offset Providers. London: DEFRA. Retrieved May 9, 
2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69530/pb13742-bio-
guide-offset-providers.pdf 
Defra. (2012e). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Technical Paper - the Metric for the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot in 
England. London: DEFRA. Retrieved May 9, 2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69531/pb13745-bio-
technical-paper.pdf 
Defra. (2013a). Smarter Environmental Regulation Review. Phase 1 Report: Guidance and Information 
Obligations. London: DEFRA. Retrieved November 21, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/199868/serr-phase1-
130516.pdf 
Defra. (2013b). Biodiversity Offsetting Impact Assessment. London: Defra. Retrieved from 
https://consult.defra.gov.uk/biodiversity/biodiversity_offsetting/supporting_documents/20130829Biodiv
ersity%20offsetting%20IA.pdf 
Defra. (2013c). ‘Realising Nature’s Value: The Final Report of the Ecosystem Markets Task Force’: 
Government Response. London: DEFRA. Retrieved September 5, 2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236879/pb13963-
government-response-emtf-report.pdf 
Defra. (2013d). Biodiversity Offsetting in England: Green Paper. London: DEFRA. 
Defra. (2014a). Defra Better for Business: A Strategic Reform Plan for Defra’s Regulations. London: DEFRA. 
Retrieved November 21, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/302112/pb14166-defra-
better-for-business.pdf 
Defra. (2014b). Response to EIRs Request for Information about the European Commission Consultation on 
No Net Loss of Biodiversity. Retrieved January 24, 2015, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/396937/RFI7004_2014
1203_No_Net_Loss_Redacted__2__amended.pdf 
Defra. (2016). Consultation on Biodiversity Offsetting in England: Summary of Responses. London: DEFRA. 
Retrieved February 22, 2016, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/501240/biodiversity-
offsetting-consult-sum-resp.pdf 
Demeritt, D. (2001). Scientific Forest Conservation and the Statistical Picturing of Nature’s Limits in the 
Progressive-Era United States. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 19(4), 431–459. 
Dempsey, J. (2013). Biodiversity Loss as Material Risk: Tracking the Changing Meanings and Materialities of 
Biodiversity Conservation. Geoforum, 45, 41–51. 
Dempsey, J. & Suarez, D. C. (2016). Arrested Development? The Promises and Paradoxes of ‘Selling Nature 
to Save It’. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 106(3), 653–671. 
Descartes, R. (2006). A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in 
the Sciences (I. Maclean, Tran.). Oxford: OUP Oxford. 
Dibden, J., Potter, C. & Cocklin, C. (2009). Contesting the Neoliberal Project for Agriculture: Productivist and 
Multifunctional Trajectories in the European Union and Australia. Journal of Rural Studies, 25(3), 
299–308. 
254 
 
Dickie, I., McAleese, L., Pearce, B. & Treweek, J. (2013). Marine Biodiversity Offsetting – UK Scoping Study. 
Retrieved November 22, 2016, from http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/5660/marine-biodiversity-
offsetting-uk-scoping-study.pdf 
Donnelly, M. (2014). Natural England Hails ‘Record’ Planning Response Rate. Planning Resource. Retrieved 
July 18, 2016, from http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1307160/natural-england-hails-record-
planning-response-rate 
Doswald, N., Barcellos Harris, M., Jones, M., Pilla, E. & Mulder, I. (2012). Biodiversity Offsets: Voluntary and 
Compliance Regimes. A Review of Existing Schemes, Initiatives and Guidance for Financial 
Institutions. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/Biodiversity_Offsets-
Voluntary_and_Compliance_Regimes.pdf 
Drayson, K. & Thompson, S. (2013). Ecological Mitigation Measures in English Environmental Impact 
Assessment. Journal of Environmental Management, 119, 103–110. 
Dressler, W. (2014). Green Governmentality and Swidden Decline on Palawan Island. Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, 39(2), 250–264. 
Duffy, R. (2006). Non-Governmental Organisations and Governance States: The Impact of Transnational 
Environmental Management Networks in Madagascar. Environmental Politics, 15(5), 731–749. 
Duke, G., Dickie, I., ten Kate, K., Pieterse, M., Rafiq, M., Rayment, M., et al. (2012). Opportunities for UK 
Business That Value And/or Protect Nature’s Services. Retrieved February 8, 2016, from 
http://valuing-nature.net/sites/default/files/documents/PROJECT/Final%20report.pdf 
Duke, G. & ten Kate, K. (2014). Exploring Lessons Learned from Biodiversity Offsetting Markets in Other 
Countries That Could Inform Appraisal of Options for Delivering Offsets in England. Final Report to 
Defra. Washington, DC: Forest Trends. Retrieved March 11, 2016, from http://www.forest-
trends.org/documents/index.php?pubID=5159 
EAC. (2008). Halting Biodiversity Loss: Thirteenth Report of Session 2007–08. London: HMSO. Retrieved 
November 12, 2013, from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmenvaud/743/743.pdf 
EAC. (2013a). Oral Evidence: Biodiversity Offsetting. London: HMSO. Retrieved March 28, 2014, from 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/environmental-
audit-committee/biodiversity-offsetting/oral/3165.pdf 
EAC. (2013b). Biodiversity Offsetting: Sixth Report of Session 2013-14. London: HMSO. Retrieved November 
12, 2013, from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/750/750.pdf 
EAC. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2013-
14. London: HMSO. Retrieved March 28, 2014, from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/1195/1195.pdf 
Early, C. (2013). Council Planners ‘Lack Biodiversity Offsetting Skills’. Planning Resource. Retrieved August 
13, 2016, from http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1222759/council-planners-lack-biodiversity-
offsetting-skills 
EBI. (2003). Integrating Biodiversity Conservation into Oil & Gas Development. Retrieved February 18, 2016, 
from http://www.theebi.org/pdfs/ebi_report.pdf 
Edmonds, B., Butcher, B., Carey, P., Norton, L. & Treweek, J. (2015). Do Recent Developments in Mapping 
Technology and Assessment Demand a Comprehensive New Habitat Classification? In Practice, 87, 
10–13. 
EFRA Committee. (2012a). Natural Environment White Paper: Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, Volume I. 
London: HMSO. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvfru/492/492.pdf 
255 
 
EFRA Committee. (2012b). Natural Environment White Paper: Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, Volume II. 
London: HMSO. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvfru/492/492vw.pdf 
EFRA Committee. (2013). Departmental Annual Report 2012-13: Ninth Report of Session 2013-14. London: 
HMSO. Retrieved January 8, 2014, from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvfru/741/741.pdf 
EFRA Committee. (2015). Defra Performance in 2013-14: Eighth Report of Session 2014-15. London: HMSO. 
Retrieved August 11, 2016, from 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmenvfru/802/802.pdf 
eftec et al. (2010). The Use of Market-Based Instruments for Biodiversity Protection – The Case of Habitat 
Banking – Technical Report. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/eftec_habitat_technical_report.pdf 
eftec & IEEP. (2012). Innovative Financial Instruments and Approaches to Enhance Private Sector Finance of 
Biodiversity. Retrieved February 9, 2016, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/biodiversity/pdf/BD_Finance_summary-300312.pdf 
Ehrlich, P. (1971). The Population Bomb. London: Macmillan. 
EMTF. (2012). Ecosystem Markets Task Force Interim Report. London: Ecosystem Markets Task Force. 
Retrieved March 5, 2013, from http://www.defra.gov.uk/ecosystem-markets/files/Ecosystem-Markets-
Task-Force-Interim-Report.pdf 
EMTF. (2013). Realising Nature’s Value: The Final Report of the Ecosystem Markets Task Force. London: 
Ecosystem Markets Task Force. Retrieved April 12, 2013, from http://www.defra.gov.uk/ecosystem-
markets/files/Ecosystem-Markets-Task-Force-Final-Report-.pdf 
ENDS Report. (2011a). DEFRA to Slash Quango Funding over Four Years. The ENDS Report. Retrieved July 
18, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/26951/defra-to-slash-quango-funding-over-four-
years 
ENDS Report. (2011b). DEFRA Warned over Voluntary Offset Approach. The ENDS Report, 433, 30. 
ENDS Report. (2011c). DEFRA Weighs up Costs of Environmental Regulation. The ENDS Report. Retrieved 
July 20, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/30489/defra-weighs-up-costs-of-environmental-
regulation 
ENDS Report. (2012a). Environment Law Largely Survives Red Tape Cull. The ENDS Report. Retrieved July 
20, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/33114/environment-law-largely-survives-red-tape-
cull 
ENDS Report. (2012b). DEFRA Pushes Ahead with Red-Tape Reforms. The ENDS Report. Retrieved July 20, 
2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/35439/defra-pushes-ahead-with-red-tape-reforms 
Energy UK. (2013). Response to Defra Consultation on Biodiversity Offsetting in England - Green Paper. 
Retrieved December 10, 2013, from http://www.energy-uk.org.uk/publication/finish/158/973.html 
Environment Bank. (2013a). Biodiversity Offsetting Information Sheet 8: The Advantages of Biodiversity 
Offsetting. Retrieved November 20, 2016, from 
http://www.environmentbank.com/files/8advantagesofmandatorysysteminfosheetsept2013-1.pdf 
Environment Bank. (2013b). Written Evidence Submitted by the Environment Bank. Retrieved April 4, 2014, 
from 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/environmental-
audit-committee/biodiversity-offsetting/written/2955.pdf 
Environment Bank. (2013c). Environment Bank Response to Defra Consultation on Green Paper on 
Biodiversity Offsetting. Retrieved March 6, 2014, from http://www.environmentbank.com/files/eb-
defra-gp-response-final.pdf 
256 
 
Environment Bank. (2016). Newsletter – Spring 2016. Retrieved from 
http://www.environmentbank.com/files/eb-newsletter-spring-2016.pdf 
Escobar, A. (1998). Whose Knowledge, Whose Nature? Biodiversity, Conservation, and the Political Ecology 
of Social Movements. Journal of Political Ecology, 5(1), 53–82. 
European Commission. (n.d.). REFIT – Making EU Law Lighter, Simpler and Less Costly. European 
Commission. Retrieved March 18, 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/index_en.htm 
European Commission. (1992). Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the Conservation of Natural 
Habitats and Wild Flora and Fauna. 
European Commission. (2011a). Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020. 
Brussels: European Commission. 
European Commission. (2011b). Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe. Brussels: European Commission. 
Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0571 
European Commission. (2012). Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020. 
European Parliament Resolution of 20 April 2012 on Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU 
Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 (2011/2307(INI)). Retrieved February 18, 2016, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/pdf/EP_resolution_april2012.pdf 
European Commission. (2015). No Net Loss: Results of the No Net Loss Public Consultation. European 
Commission. Retrieved March 18, 2015, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/results_en.htm 
European Parliament. (2013). Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020. 
European Parliament Resolution of 20 April 2012 on Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU 
Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 (2011/2307(INI)). Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/pdf/EP_resolution_april2012.pdf 
Evans, B., Richmond, T. & Shields, J. (2005). Structuring Neoliberal Governance: The Nonprofit Sector, 
Emerging New Modes of Control and the Marketisation of Service Delivery. Policy and Society, 24(1), 
73–97. 
Evans, D. M., Altwegg, R., Garner, T. W. J., Gompper, M. E., Gordon, I. J., Johnson, J. A., et al. (2015). 
Biodiversity Offsetting: What Are the Challenges, Opportunities and Research Priorities for Animal 
Conservation? Animal Conservation, 18(1), 1–3. 
Evans, S. (2013a). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: One Year on. The ENDS Report, 459, 38–42. 
Evans, S. (2013b). Thameslink Test the Potential of Offsetting. The ENDS Report, 459, 41. 
Evans, S. (2013c). Rush to Biodiversity Offsetting ‘massively Premature’. The ENDS Report. Retrieved May 
17, 2013, from http://www.endsreport.com/38839/rush-to-biodiversity-offsetting-massively-premature 
Evans, S. (2013d). MPs Demand Delay in Biodiversity Offsetting to ‘get It Right’. The ENDS Report, 466, 34–
35. 
Evans, S. (2014). DEFRA Delays Decision on Biodiversity Offsetting. The ENDS Report. Retrieved August 13, 
2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/43401/defra-delays-decision-on-biodiversity-offsetting 
Everard, M. (2014). Nature Is Worth a Lot More than Nothing! The Institution Of Environmental Sciences. 
Retrieved August 13, 2016, from https://www.the-ies.org/analysis/nature-worth-lot-more-nothing 
Fairhead, J., Leach, M. & Scoones, I. (2012). Green Grabbing: A New Appropriation of Nature? The Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 39(2), 237–261. 
Fallding, M. (2014). Biodiversity Offsets: Practice and Promise. Environmental and Planning Law Journal, 31, 
11–33. 
257 
 
Farnham, T. J. (2007). Saving Nature’s Legacy: Origins of the Idea of Biological Diversity. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
F&C Asset Management. (2004). Is Biodiversity a Material Risk for Companies? An Assessment of the 
Exposure of FTSE Sectors to Biodiversity Risk. Retrieved February 3, 2015, from 
https://www.globalnature.org/bausteine.net/f/6645/FC20Biodiversity20Report20FINAL.pdf?fd=2 
Felli, R. (2015). Environment, Not Planning: The Neoliberal Depoliticisation of Environmental Policy by Means 
of Emissions Trading. Environmental Politics, 24(5), 641–660. 
Felli, R. (2016). The Carbon Forum rather than the Carbon Market: Land-Use Rights as a Model for the 
Allocation of GHG Emissions. 
Ferguson, J. (2010). The Uses of Neoliberalism. Antipode, 41, 166–184. 
FERN. (2013). FERN’s Response to ‘Biodiversity Offsetting in England’ Green Paper. Retrieved September 5, 
2013, from 
http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/FERN%20response%20to%20UK%20consultation%20on%20o
ffsetting.pdf 
FERN. (2014). Nature Is Not for Sale! fern.org. Retrieved August 11, 2016, from 
http://www.fern.org/publications/presentations/nature-not-sale 
FERN & FoE. (2014). Case Studies of Biodiversity Offsetting: Voices from the Ground. Retrieved November 
24, 2016, from http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/Offset%20stories%20-%20Final.pdf 
Fioramonti, L. (2014). How Numbers Rule the World. Zed Books. 
Fischer, F. & Hajer, M. A. (1999). Living with Nature: Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Fisher, M. (2009). Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Winchester: O Books. 
Fitzsimons, J., Heiner, M., McKenney, B., Sochi, K. & Kiesecker, J. (2014). Development by Design in Western 
Australia: Overcoming Offset Obstacles. Land, 3(1), 167–187. 
Fletcher, R. (2010). Neoliberal Environmentality: Towards a Poststructuralist Political Ecology of the 
Conservation Debate. Conservation and Society, 8(3), 171–181. 
Fletcher, R. (2012). Using the Master’s Tools? Neoliberal Conservation and the Evasion of Inequality. 
Development and Change, 43(1), 295–317. 
Fletcher, R. (2013). How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Market: Virtualism, Disavowal, and Public 
Secrecy in Neoliberal Environmental Conservation. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 
31(5), 796 – 812. 
Fletcher, R. (2014). Orchestrating Consent: Post-Politics and Intensification of Nature TM Inc. at the 2012 
World Conservation Congress. Conservation and Society, 12(3), 329–342. 
Fletcher, R. & Breitling, J. (2012). Market Mechanism or Subsidy in Disguise? Governing Payment for 
Environmental Services in Costa Rica. Geoforum, 43(3), 402–411. 
FoE. (2013). Friends of the Earth Consultation Response: Biodiversity Offsetting in England Green Paper. 
Retrieved January 28, 2014, from 
http://forum.foe.co.uk/campaignhubs/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=2373.0;attach=616 
FoE. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting: Friend or Foe? Retrieved June 27, 2014, from 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/biodiversity-offsetting-friend-or-foe-45606.pdf 
Foley, P. & Hébert, K. (2013). Alternative Regimes of Transnational Environmental Certification: Governance, 
Marketization, and Place in Alaska’s Salmon Fisheries. Environment and Planning A, 45(11), 2734–
2751. 
258 
 
Foster, J. B. (1999). Marx’s Theory of Metabolic Rift: Classical Foundations for Environmental Sociology. 
American Journal of Sociology, 105(2), 366–405. 
Foster, J. B. (2000). Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. Monthly Review Press. 
Foster, J. B., Clark, B. & York, R. (2011). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. New York: 
Monthly Review Press,U.S. 
Foucault, M. (2010). The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979: Lectures at the 
College De France, 1978-1979 (M. G. Burchell, Tran.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fox, J. & Nino-Murcia, A. (2005). Status of Species Conservation Banking in the United States. Conservation 
Biology, 19(4), 996–1007. 
Francis, A., Armstrong Brown, S., Andrews Tipper, W. & Wheeler, N. (2016). New Markets for Land and 
Nature: How Natural Infrastructure Schemes Could Pay for a Better Environment. Retrieved 
November 24, 2016, from http://www.green-
alliance.org.uk/resources/New_markets_for_land_and_nature.pdf 
Froger, G., Ménard, S. & Méral, P. (2015). Towards a Comparative and Critical Analysis of Biodiversity Banks. 
Ecosystem Services, 15, 152–161. 
Gane, N. (2013). The Emergence of Neoliberalism: Thinking Through and Beyond Michel Foucault’s Lectures 
on Biopolitics. Theory, Culture & Society, 263276413506944. 
Gardner, T. A., Von Hase, A., Brownlie, S., Ekstrom, J. M. M., Pilgrim, J. D., Savy, C. E., et al. (2013). 
Biodiversity Offsets and the Challenge of Achieving No Net Loss. Conservation Biology, 27(6), 1254–
1264. 
Geoghegan, J. (2014). Further Planning Changes: EIA ‘Screening’ Thresholds to Be Raised. Planning 
Resource. Retrieved July 19, 2016, from http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1306230/further-
planning-changes-eia-screening-thresholds-raised 
George, S. (2010). Converging Crises: Reality, Fear and Hope. Globalizations, 7(1–2), 17–22. 
Ghosh, S. (2015). Capitalisation of Nature: Political Economy of Forest/Biodiversity Offsets. Economic and 
Political Weekly, 50(16), 53–60. 
Gibbons, M. & Parker, D. (2012). Impact Assessments and Better Regulation: The Role of the UK’s Regulatory 
Policy Committee. Public Money & Management, 32(4), 257–264. 
Gibbons, P., Evans, M. C., Maron, M., Gordon, A., Le Roux, D., von Hase, A., et al. (2015). A Loss-Gain 
Calculator for Biodiversity Offsets and the Circumstances in Which No Net Loss Is Feasible. 
Conservation Letters, n/a-n/a. 
Gibbons, P. & Lindenmayer, D. B. (2007). Offsets for Land Clearing: No Net Loss or the Tail Wagging the 
Dog? Ecological Management & Restoration, 8(1), 26–31. 
Githiru, M., King, M. W., Bauche, P., Simon, C., Boles, J., Rindt, C., et al. (2015). Should Biodiversity Offsets 
Help Finance Underfunded Protected Areas? Biological Conservation, 191, 819–826. 
Glassman, J. (2007). Neoliberal Primitive Accumulation, in: Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S., and 
Robbins, P. (Eds.), Neoliberal Environments: False Promises and Unnatural Consequences, (pp. 94–
97). New York: Routledge. 
Godden, D. P., Vernon, D. & others. (2003). Theoretical Issues in Using Offsets for Managing Biodiversity, in: 
2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia. Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society. Retrieved March 25, 2016, from 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aare03/57872.html 
Goldman, M. (2006). Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of 
Globalization. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
259 
 
Gómez-Baggethun, E., de Groot, R., Lomas, P. L. & Montes, C. (2010). The History of Ecosystem Services in 
Economic Theory and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and Payment Schemes. Ecological 
Economics, 69(6), 1209–1218. 
Gómez-Baggethun, E. & Ruiz-Perez, M. (2011). Economic Valuation and the Commodification of Ecosystem 
Services. Progress in Physical Geography, 35(5), 613–628. 
Gonçalves, B., Marques, A., Soares, A. M. V. D. M. & Pereira, H. M. (2015). Biodiversity Offsets: From Current 
Challenges to Harmonized Metrics. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 14, 61–67. 
Gordon, A., Bull, J. W., Wilcox, C. & Maron, M. (2015). FORUM: Perverse Incentives Risk Undermining 
Biodiversity Offset Policies. Journal of Applied Ecology, 52(2), 532–537. 
Gordon, A., Langford, W. T., Todd, J. A., White, M. D., Mullerworth, D. W. & Bekessy, S. A. (2011). Assessing 
the Impacts of Biodiversity Offset Policies. Environmental Modelling & Software, 26(12), 1481–1488. 
Gordon, T. & Webber, J. R. (2008). Imperialism and Resistance: Canadian Mining Companies in Latin 
America. Third World Quarterly, 29(1), 63–87. 
Gray, L. (2009a). ‘Bio-Banking’ System Proposed by David Cameron to Protect Wildlife. The Telegraph. 
Retrieved July 12, 2016, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/earthnews/5172584/Bio-
banking-system-proposed-by-David-Cameron-to-protect-wildlife.html 
Gray, L. (2009b). Defra Consider ‘Bio-Banking’ System. The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved July 12, 2016, from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/earthnews/5552603/Defra-consider-Bio-banking-system.html 
Guthman, J. (2007). The Polanyian Way? Voluntary Food Labels as Neoliberal Governance. Antipode, 39(3), 
456–478. 
Guthman, J. (2008). Neoliberalism and the Making of Food Politics in California. Geoforum, 39(3), 1171–1183. 
Habib, T. J., Farr, D. R., Schneider, R. R. & Boutin, S. (2013). Economic and Ecological Outcomes of Flexible 
Biodiversity Offset Systems. Conservation Biology, 27(6), 1313–1323. 
Hackett, R. (2015a). Offsetting Dispossession? Terrestrial Conservation Offsets and First Nation Treaty Rights 
in Alberta, Canada. Geoforum, 60, 62–71. 
Hackett, R. (2015b). Market-Based Environmental Governance and Public Resources in Alberta, Canada. 
Ecosystem Services, 15, 174–180. 
Hackett, R. (2016). ‘Shell Games’, Displacement and the Reordering of Boreal Landscapes in Alberta, Canada. 
Area, 48(2), 153–160. 
Hahn, T., McDermott, C., Ituarte-Lima, C., Schultz, M., Green, T. & Tuvendal, M. (2015). Purposes and 
Degrees of Commodification: Economic Instruments for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Need 
Not Rely on Markets or Monetary Valuation. Ecosystem Services, 16, 74–82. 
Hajer, M. A. (1997). The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process. 
Oxford: OUP Oxford. 
Halme, P., Allen, K. A., Auniņš, A., Bradshaw, R. H. W., Brūmelis, G., Čada, V., et al. (2013). Challenges of 
Ecological Restoration: Lessons from Forests in Northern Europe. Biological Conservation, 167, 248–
256. 
Hannis, M. & Sullivan, S. (2012). Offsetting Nature?: Habitat Banking and Biodiversity Offsets in the English 
Land Use Planning System. Green House. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. 
Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, Nature and the Geography. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Harvey, D. (2007a). Limits to Capital. London ; New York: Verso Books. 
260 
 
Harvey, D. (2007b). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D. (2015). Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. Profile Books. 
Harvey, F. (2011). Autumn Statement: George Osborne Slams ‘Costly’ Green Policies. The Guardian. 
Retrieved July 19, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/nov/29/autumn-statement-
george-osborne-green-policies 
Haughton, G. & Allmendinger, P. (2013). Spatial Planning and the New Localism. Planning Practice & 
Research, 28(1), 1–5. 
Haughton, G. & Allmendinger, P. (2016). Think Tanks and the Pressures for Planning Reform in England. 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 0263774X16629677. 
Hawdon, A., Parham, E. & Marsh, D. (2015). Biodiversity Offset Schemes Country Summary Report: Australia. 
Retrieved January 29, 2016, from http://www.fauna-flora.org/wp-content/uploads/FFI-2015-
Biodiversity-Offsets-Australia.compressed.pdf 
Hayns, S., Pope, W. & Reeves, N. (2013). Open Letter to Rt Hon Owen Paterson MP Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Re: Developers Can Pay To Rip Up Nature. 
HBF. (2013a). Written Evidence Submitted by the Home Builders Federation. Retrieved November 8, 2013,  
HBF. (2013b). HBF Response to DEFRA’s Consultation on Biodiversity Offsetting in England. 
Henderson, G. (2009). Marxist Political Economy and the Environment, in: Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, 
D., and Rhoads, B. (Eds.), A Companion to Environmental Geography, (pp. 266–293). Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Heynen, N., Kaika, M. & Swyngedouw, E. (2006). Urban Political Ecology: Politicizing the Production of Urban 
Natures, in: Heynen, N., Kaika, M., and Swyngedouw, E. (Eds.), In the Nature of Cities: Urban 
Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism, (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge. 
Heynen, N., McCarthy, J., Prudham, S. & Robbins, P. (Eds.). (2007). Neoliberal Environments: False Promises 
and Unnatural Consequences. New York: Routledge. 
Heynen, N. & Robbins, P. (2005). The Neoliberalization of Nature: Governance, Privatization, Enclosure and 
Valuation. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 16(1), 5–8. 
Higgins, V., Dibden, J. & Cocklin, C. (2008). Neoliberalism and Natural Resource Management: Agri-
Environmental Standards and the Governing of Farming Practices. Geoforum, 39(5), 1776–1785. 
Hilderbrand, R. H., Watts, A. C. & Randle, A. M. (2005). The Myths of Restoration Ecology. Ecology and 
society, 10(1), 19. 
Hill, D. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting. In Practice, (81), 7–11. 
Hill, D. & Arnold, R. (2012). Building the Evidence Base for Ecological Impact Assessment and Mitigation. 
Journal of Applied Ecology, 49(1), 6–9. 
Hill, D. & Gillespie, R. (2009). Habitat Banking Is the Future of Nature Conservation in the UK. The Guardian. 
Retrieved July 13, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/cif-
green/2009/nov/16/habitat-banking-conservative-conservation-credits 
Himley, M. (2008). Geographies of Environmental Governance: The Nexus of Nature and Neoliberalism. 
Geography Compass, 2(2), 433–451. 
Hobbs, R. J., Hallett, L. M., Ehrlich, P. R. & Mooney, H. A. (2011). Intervention Ecology: Applying Ecological 
Science in the Twenty-First Century. BioScience, 61(6), 442–450. 
261 
 
Hodge, P. (2009). Rural Economy Experts Call for Environmental ‘Stock Exchange’. greenwisebusiness.co.uk. 
Retrieved July 12, 2016, from http://www.greenwisebusiness.co.uk/news/rural-economy-experts-call-
for-environmental-stock-exchange.aspx#.V4UspLgrLIU 
Holifield, R. (2004). Neoliberalism and Environmental Justice in the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency: Translating Policy into Managerial Practice in Hazardous Waste Remediation. Geoforum, 
35(3), 285–297. 
Holling, C. s. & Meffe, G. K. (1996). Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural Resource 
Management. Conservation Biology, 10(2), 328–337. 
Holmes, G. (2014). What Is a Land Grab? Exploring Green Grabs, Conservation, and Private Protected Areas 
in Southern Chile. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(4), 547–567. 
Holmes, G. & Cavanagh, C. J. (2016). A Review of the Social Impacts of Neoliberal Conservation: Formations, 
Inequalities, Contestations. Geoforum, 75, 199–209. 
Homfray, L. & Webb, M. (2016). Biodiversity Net Gain – A New Role for Infrastructure and Development in 
Improving Britain’s Wildlife. Retrieved September 12, 2016, from http://www.wsp-
pb.com/Globaln/UK/WSPPB%20Biodiversity%20whitepaper.pdf 
Hough, P. & Robertson, M. (2009). Mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Where It Comes 
From, What It Means. Wetlands Ecology and Management, 17(1), 15–33. 
Howard, B., Benmayor, B., Ausden, M., Butcher, B., Bull, J., Burrows, L., et al. (2013). Species Considerations 
in the Design of Biodiversity Offset Schemes in England. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
http://nora.nerc.ac.uk/id/eprint/507110 
Howard, E. (2015). Defra Hit by Largest Budget Cuts of Any UK Government Department, Analysis Shows. 
The Guardian. Retrieved July 15, 2016, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/11/defra-hit-by-largest-budget-cuts-of-any-uk-
government-department-analysis-shows 
Howarth, L. (2013). A License to Trash? Why Biodiversity Offsetting (BO) Will Be a Disaster for the 
Environment. The Ecologist. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2048513/a_license_to_trash_why_biodiversity_offse
tting_bo_will_be_a_disaster_for_the_environment.html 
Hrabanski, M. (2015). The Biodiversity Offsets as Market-Based Instruments in Global Governance: Origins, 
Success and Controversies. Ecosystem Services, 15, 143–151. 
ICE. (2013). The Role of Coastal Engineers in Delivering No Net Loss through Biodiversity Offsetting: A 
Discussion Paper from the ICE Maritime Expert Panel. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from 
https://www.ice.org.uk/getattachment/disciplines-and-resources/best-practice/the-role-of-coastal-
engineers/Biodiversity-offsetting.pdf.aspx 
ICF Consulting & IEEP. (2014). Study on Specific Design Elements of Biodiversity Offsets: Biodiversity Metrics 
and Mechanisms for Securing Long Term Conservation Benefits. Retrieved September 1, 2015, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/pdf/Biodiversity%20offsets%20metrics%20and
%20mechanisms.pdf 
ICMM. (2005). Biodiversity Offsets – A Briefing Paper for the Mining Industry. Retrieved from 
https://www.icmm.com/document/25 
ICMM & IUCN. (2013). Independent Report on Biodiversity Offsets. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from 
https://www.icmm.com/document/4934 
IEMA. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting in England – Green Paper November 2013: Response by the Institute of 
Environmental Management and Assessment (IEMA). Retrieved from 
https://www.iema.net/readingroom/articles/iemas-response-biodiversity-offsetting-england-green-
paper-november-2013 
262 
 
IFC. (2012). Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability. Retrieved February 4, 2016, 
from 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/115482804a0255db96fbffd1a5d13d27/PS_English_2012_Full-
Document.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
Ioris, A. A. R. (2014). The Political Ecology of the State: The Basis and the Evolution of Environmental 
Statehood. London ; New York: Routledge. 
IUCN. (2014). Biodiversity Offsets Technical Study Paper. Retrieved January 25, 2016, from 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/final_biodiversity_offsets_paper__9nov2014_1.pdf 
IUCN. (2016). IUCN Policy on Biodiversity Offsets. Retrieved October 23, 2016, from 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_biodiversity_offsets_policy_jan_29_2016.pdf 
Ives, C. D. & Bekessy, S. A. (2015). The Ethics of Offsetting Nature. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 
13(10), 568–573. 
Jameson, F. (2003). Future City. New Left Review, (21), 65–79. 
Jenkins, M., Scherr, S. J. & Inbar, M. (2004). Markets for Biodiversity Services: Potential Roles and 
Challenges. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 46(6), 32–42. 
Jessop, B. (2002). Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective. 
Antipode, 34(3), 452–472. 
Jivanda, T. (2014). Ancient Woodland Could Be Destroyed to Make Way for Building in. The Independent. 
Retrieved August 13, 2016, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ancient-
woodland-could-be-destroyed-to-make-way-for-building-in-offsetting-push-9038794.html 
Johnstone, R. (2014). Council Spending ‘cut by Nearly One-Third since 2010’ | Public Finance. 
PublicFinance.co.uk. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from 
http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/news/2014/08/council-spending-%E2%80%98cut-nearly-one-third-
2010%E2%80%99 
Jowit, J. (2010). Spending Review: ‘Greenest Government Ever’ Reserves Worst Cuts for Defra. The 
Guardian. Retrieved May 3, 2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/20/spending-
review-cuts-environment 
Juniper, T. (2014). The Destruction of Ancient Woodland Is Non-Negotiable, Mr Paterson. The Independent. 
Retrieved August 13, 2016, from http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-destruction-of-
ancient-woodland-is-non-negotiable-mr-paterson-9039088.html 
Kamat, S. (2004). The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a Neoliberal Era. Review 
of International Political Economy, 11(1), 155–176. 
Kaminski, I. (2013). DEFRA’s ‘radical’ Changes to Environmental Guidance and Reporting. The ENDS Report. 
Retrieved June 17, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/38775/defras-radical-changes-to-
environmental-guidance-and-reporting 
Kaminski, I. (2014a). Controversial Deregulation Bill Laid before Parliament. The ENDS Report. Retrieved 
February 21, 2015, from http://www.endsreport.com/42919/controversial-deregulation-bill-laid-before-
parliament 
Kaminski, I. (2014b). Shake-up of Environmental Legislation. The ENDS Report. Retrieved February 20, 2015, 
from http://www.endsreport.com/43740/shake-up-of-environmental-legislation 
Kaminski, I. (2014c). Europe Urged to Copy UK’s Red Tape Challenge. The ENDS Report. Retrieved March 
18, 2015, from http://www.endsreport.com/45737/europe-urged-to-copy-uks-red-tape-challenge 
Kaminski, I. (2015a). The Green Tape Challenge. The ENDS Report. Retrieved July 16, 2016, from 
http://www.endsreport.com/article/47289/the-green-tape-challenge 
263 
 
Kaminski, I. (2015b). DEFRA Study Reveals Increasing Benefits of Environmental Regulation. The ENDS 
Report. Retrieved July 20, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/47328/defra-study-reveals-
increasing-benefits-of-environmental-regulation 
Kaminski, I. (2015c). MPs Fear Continued Erosion of DEFRA Capabilities. The ENDS Report. Retrieved July 
18, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/47698/mps-fear-continued-erosion-of-defra-
capabilities 
Kaminski, I. (2015d). Environmental Regulation in Line for Further Red Tape Reforms. The ENDS Report. 
Retrieved July 20, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/48997/environmental-regulation-in-
line-for-further-red-tape-reforms 
Kaminski, I. (2016b). Experts Slam Treasury’s ‘deeply Damaging’ Effect on Green Policy. The ENDS Report. 
Retrieved July 20, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/53031/experts-slam-treasurys-
deeply-damaging-effect-on-green-policy 
Kaminski, I. (2016a). ‘No Clear Evidence’ That Deregulation Drive Saves Business Money. The ENDS Report. 
Retrieved July 5, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/53036/no-clear-evidence-that-
deregulation-drive-saves-business-money 
Kareiva, P., Lalasz, R. & Marvier, M. (2011). Conservation in the Anthropocene. Breakthrough Journal, 2, 26–
36. 
ten Kate, K., Bishop, J. & Bayon, R. (2004). Biodiversity Offsets: Views, Experience, and the Business Case. 
London: IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, Cambridge, and Insight Investment. Retrieved from 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/bdoffsets.pdf 
ten Kate, K. & Inbar, M. (2008). Biodiversity Offsets, in: Carroll, N., Fox, J., and Bayon, R. (Eds.), Conservation 
and Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to Setting Up and Running Biodiversity Credit Trading Systems, 
(pp. 189–203). London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Katz, C. (1998). Private Productions of Space and the ‘preservation’ of Nature, in: Braun, B. and Castree, N. 
(Eds.), Remaking reality: Nature at the millenium, (pp. 46–63). London and New York: Routledge. 
Retrieved December 8, 2015, from 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zgKIAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA45&dq=info:D7Muktf6S
bkJ:scholar.google.com&ots=W-JBF4yJSq&sig=sjLQlY55xCFCVZX63-qE44cva1c 
Kay, K. (2015). Breaking the Bundle of Rights: Conservation Easements and the Legal Geographies of 
Individuating Nature. Environment and Planning A, 0308518X15609318. 
Kelly, A. B. & Peluso, N. L. (2015). Frontiers of Commodification: State Lands and Their Formalization. Society 
& Natural Resources, 28(5), 473–495. 
Kelly, A. L., Franks, A. J. & Eyre, T. J. (2011). Assessing the Assessors: Quantifying Observer Variation in 
Vegetation and Habitat Assessment. Ecological Management & Restoration, 12(2), 144–148. 
Kenny, A. (2010). Can This British Ecologist Save the English Countryside by Putting a Price on Nature? 
Ecosystem Marketplace. Retrieved January 29, 2014, from 
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id=7775 
Kiesecker, J. M., Copeland, H., Pocewicz, A. & McKenney, B. (2009). Development by Design: Blending 
Landscape-Level Planning with the Mitigation Hierarchy. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 
8(5), 261–266. 
Kill, J. (2014). Economic Valuation of Nature: The Price Worth Paying for Conservation? Brussels: Rosa 
Luxembourg Foundation. Retrieved from http://rosalux-europa.info/publications/books/economic-
valuation-of-nature/ 
Kill, J. & Franchi, G. (2016). Rio Tinto’s Biodiversity Offset in Madagascar: Double Landgrab in the Name of 
Biodiversity? Retrieved April 16, 2016, from http://wrm.org.uy/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/RioTintoBiodivOffsetMadagascar_report_EN_web.pdf 
264 
 
King, M. (2013a). Biodiversity Offsetting: Replacing the Irreplaceable. a new nature blog. Retrieved May 17, 
2013, from http://anewnatureblog.wordpress.com/2013/05/14/biodiversity-offsetting-replacing-the-
irreplaceable/ 
King, M. (2013b). Biodiversity Offsets and the Antique Woodland Roadshow. a new nature blog. Retrieved 
August 13, 2016, from https://anewnatureblog.wordpress.com/2013/11/08/biodiversity-offsets-and-
the-antique-woodland-roadshow/ 
King, M. (2013c). The New Natural England Chair: Andrew Sells. a new nature blog. Retrieved July 19, 2016, 
from https://anewnatureblog.wordpress.com/2013/12/02/the-new-natural-england-chair-andrew-sells/ 
Klooster, D. (2005). Environmental Certification of Forests: The Evolution of Environmental Governance in a 
Commodity Network. Journal of Rural Studies, 21(4), 403–417. 
Klooster, D. (2010). Standardizing Sustainable Development? The Forest Stewardship Council’s Plantation 
Policy Review Process as Neoliberal Environmental Governance. Geoforum, 41(1), 117–129. 
Kormos, R., Mead, D. L. & Vinnedge, B. (2015). Biodiversity Offsetting in the United States: Lessons Learned 
on Maximizing Their Ecological Contribution. Retrieved January 29, 2016, from http://www.fauna-
flora.org/wp-content/uploads/Biodiversity-offsetting-in-the-United-States-2015.pdf 
Kosoy, N. & Corbera, E. (2010). Payments for Ecosystem Services as Commodity Fetishism. Ecological 
Economics, 69(6), 1228–1236. 
KPMG. (2011). The Nature of Ecosystem Service Risks for Business. Retrieved February 13, 2014, from 
https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/sustainable-
insight/Documents/ecosystem-service-risks.pdf 
KPMG, FFI & ACCA. (2011). Is Natural Capital a Material Issue? An Evaluation of the Relevance of 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services to Accountancy Professionals and the Private Sector. Retrieved 
June 5, 2014, from http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/environmental-
publications/natural-capital.pdf 
Kujala, H., Burgman, M. A. & Moilanen, A. (2013). Treatment of Uncertainty in Conservation under Climate 
Change. Conservation Letters, 6(2), 73–85. 
Kujala, H., Whitehead, A. L., Morris, W. K. & Wintle, B. A. (2015). Towards Strategic Offsetting of Biodiversity 
Loss Using Spatial Prioritization Concepts and Tools: A Case Study on Mining Impacts in Australia. 
Biological Conservation, 192, 513–521. 
Kumaraswamy, S. & Udayakumar, M. (2011). Biodiversity Banking: A Strategic Conservation Mechanism. 
Biodiversity and Conservation, 20(6), 1155–1165. 
Laitila, J., Moilanen, A. & Pouzols, F. M. (2014). A Method for Calculating Minimum Biodiversity Offset 
Multipliers Accounting for Time Discounting, Additionality and Permanence. Methods in Ecology and 
Evolution, 5(11), 1247–1254. 
Lansing, D., Collard, R.-C., Dempsey, J., Sundberg, J., Heynen, N., Büscher, B., et al. (2015). Nature Inc.: 
Environmental Conservation in a Neoliberal Age. Environment and Planning A, 47(11), 2389–2408. 
Lanzerath, D. & Friele, M. (Eds.). (2014). Concepts and Values in Biodiversity. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Lapeyre, R., Froger, G. & Hrabanski, M. (2015). Biodiversity Offsets as Market-Based Instruments for 
Ecosystem Services? From Discourses to Practices. Ecosystem Services, 15, 125–133. 
Larner, W. (2003). Neoliberalism? Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 21(5), 509–512. 
Latimer, W. & Hill, D. (2007). Mitigation Banking: Securing No Net Loss to Biodiversity? A UK Perspective. 
Planning Practice & Research, 22(2), 155–175. 
265 
 
Latorre, S., Farrell, K. N. & Martínez-Alier, J. (2015). The Commodification of Nature and Socio-Environmental 
Resistance in Ecuador: An Inventory of Accumulation by Dispossession Cases, 1980–2013. 
Ecological Economics, 116, 58–69. 
Laurie, N. & Marvin, S. (1999). Globalisation, Neoliberalism, and Negotiated Development in the Andes: Water 
Projects and Regional Identity in Cochabamba, Bolivia. Environment and Planning A, 31(8), 1401–
1415. 
Lave, R. (2012). Fields and Streams: Stream Restoration, Neoliberalism, and the Future of Environmental 
Science. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 
Lave, R. (2014). Neoliberal Confluences: The Turbulent Evolution of Stream Mitigation Banking in the US, in: 
Frickel, S. and Hess, D. J. (Eds.), Fields of Knowledge: Science, Politics and Publics in the Neoliberal 
Age, (pp. 59–88). Political Power and Social Theory. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Retrieved 
January 11, 2016, from http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/S0198-871920140000027010 
Law Commission. (2013). Conservation Covenants: A Consultation Paper. Retrieved November 25, 2016, from 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/cp211_conservation_covenants.pdf 
Lawton, J., Brotherton, P., Brown, V., Elphick, C., Fitter, A., Foreshaw, J., et al. (2010). Making Space for 
Nature: A Review of England’s Wildlife Sites and Ecological Network. Retrieved May 8, 2013, from 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/biodiversity/documents/201009space-for-nature.pdf 
Lawton, R. N. & Rudd, M. A. (2013). Strange Bedfellows: Ecosystem Services, Conservation Science, and 
Central Government in the United Kingdom. Resources, 2(2), 114–127. 
Lawton, R. N. & Rudd, M. A. (2014). A Narrative Policy Approach to Environmental Conservation. AMBIO, 
43(7), 849–857. 
Lawton, R. N. & Rudd, M. A. (2016). Scientific Evidence, Expert Entrepreneurship, and Ecosystem Narratives 
in the UK Natural Environment White Paper. Environmental Science & Policy, 61, 24–32. 
Leach, M., Mearns, R. & Scoones, I. (1999). Environmental Entitlements: Dynamics and Institutions in 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management. World Development, 27(2), 225–247. 
Lee Peluso, N. (2012). What’s Nature Got To Do With It? A Situated Historical Perspective on Socio-Natural 
Commodities. Development and Change, 43(1), 79–104. 
Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Levrel, H., Pioch, S. & Spieler, R. (2012). Compensatory Mitigation in Marine Ecosystems: Which Indicators for 
Assessing the ‘no Net Loss’ Goal of Ecosystem Services and Ecological Functions? Marine Policy, 
36(6), 1202–1210. 
Liverman, D. (2004). Who Governs, at What Scale and at What Price? Geography, Environmental 
Governance, and the Commodification of Nature. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 94(4), 734–738. 
Liverman, D. & Vilas, S. (2006). Neoliberalism and the Environment in Latin America. Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources, 31(1), 327–363. 
Local Government Association & English Heritage. (2013). Making the Most of Your Heritage Assets: The 
Future of Local Historic Environment Services. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from 
http://www.local.gov.uk/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=5607c46f-1dc8-4f69-86cf-
b81d0905751d&groupId=10180 
Lockie, S. & Higgins, V. (2007). Roll-out Neoliberalism and Hybrid Practices of Regulation in Australian Agri-
Environmental Governance. Journal of Rural Studies, 23(1), 1–11. 
Loftus, A. (2012). Everyday Environmentalism: Creating an Urban Political Ecology. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
266 
 
Lohmann, L. (2011a). Financialization, Commodification and Carbon: The Contradictions of Neoliberal Climate 
Policy, in: Panitch, L., Albo, G., and Chibber, V. (Eds.), Socialist Register 2012: Crisis and the Left, 
(pp. 85–107). London: The Merlin Press. 
Lohmann, L. (2011b). The Endless Algebra of Climate Markets. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 22(4), 93–116. 
Lord, A. & Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2014). Is Planning ‘Under Attack’? Chronicling the Deregulation of Urban and 
Environmental Planning in England. European Planning Studies, 22(2), 345–361. 
Lorimer, J. (2007). Nonhuman Charisma. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 25(5), 911–932. 
Lorimer, J. (2010). Elephants as Companion Species: The Lively Biogeographies of Asian Elephant 
Conservation in Sri Lanka. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 35(4), 491–506. 
Luke, T. W. (1995). On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourses of Contemporary 
Environmentalism. Cultural Critique, (31), 57–81. 
Luke, T. W. (1999). Environmentality as Green Governmentality, in: Darier, E. (Ed.), Discourses of the 
Environment, (pp. 121–151). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Retrieved November 24, 2015, from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=14124569406780391725&hl=en&inst=5693673605474343
39&oi=scholarr 
MacDonald, K. I. (2010). The Devil Is in the (Bio)diversity: Private Sector ‘Engagement’ and the Restructuring 
of Biodiversity Conservation. Antipode, 42(3), 513–550. 
MacDonald, K. I. & Corson, C. (2012). ‘TEEB Begins Now’: A Virtual Moment in the Production of Natural 
Capital. Development and Change, 43(1), 159–184. 
MacLeod, G. (2002). From Urban Entrepreneurialism to a ‘Revanchist City’? On the Spatial Injustices of 
Glasgow’s Renaissance. Antipode, 34(3), 602–624. 
Madsen, B., Carroll, N., Kandy, D. & Bennett, G. (2011). 2011 Update: State of Biodiversity Markets. 
Washington, DC: Forest Trends. Retrieved January 7, 2014, from http://www. 
ecosystemmarketplace.com/reports/2011_update_sbdm 
Madsen, B., Carroll, N. & Moore Brands, K. (2010). State of Biodiversity Markets Report: Offset and 
Compensation Programs Worldwide. Washington, DC: Forest Trends. Retrieved January 7, 2014, 
from http://www.ecosystemmarketplace. com/documents/acrobat/sbdmr.pdf 
Mann, C. (2015). Strategies for Sustainable Policy Design: Constructive Assessment of Biodiversity Offsets 
and Banking. Ecosystem Services, 16, 266–274. 
Mann, C. & Absher, J. D. (2014). Adjusting Policy to Institutional, Cultural and Biophysical Context Conditions: 
The Case of Conservation Banking in California. Land Use Policy, 36, 73–82. 
Mann, C. & Simons, A. (2015). Local Emergence and International Developments of Conservation Trading 
Systems: Innovation Dynamics and Related Problems. Environmental Conservation, 42(4), 325–334. 
Mann, C., Voß, J.-P., Simons, A., Amelung, N. & Runge, T. (2014). Challenging Futures of Biodiversity Offsets 
and Banking : Critical Issues for Robust Forms of Biodiversity Conservation. Retrieved August 20, 
2015, from https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-tuberlin/frontdoor/index/index/docId/6661 
Mansfield, B. (2004). Rules of Privatization: Contradictions in Neoliberal Regulation of North Pacific Fisheries. 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 94(3), 565–584. 
Mansfield, B. (2008a). Introduction: Property and the Remaking of Nature-Society Relations, in: Mansfield, B. 
(Ed.), Privatization: Property and the Remaking of Nature-Society Relations, (pp. 1–13). Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell. 
Mansfield, B. (Ed.). (2008b). Privatization: Property and the Remaking of Nature-Society Relations. Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell. 
267 
 
Maron, M., Bull, J. W., Evans, M. C. & Gordon, A. (2015). Locking in Loss: Baselines of Decline in Australian 
Biodiversity Offset Policies. Biological Conservation, 192, 504–512. 
Maron, M., Dunn, P. K., McAlpine, C. A. & Apan, A. (2010). Can Offsets Really Compensate for Habitat 
Removal? The Case of the Endangered Red-Tailed Black-Cockatoo. Journal of Applied Ecology, 
47(2), 348–355. 
Maron, M., Gordon, A., Mackey, B. G., Possingham, H. P. & Watson, J. E. M. (2015). Interactions between 
Biodiversity Offsets and Protected Area Commitments: Avoiding Perverse Outcomes. Conservation 
Letters, n/a-n/a. 
Maron, M., Hobbs, R. J., Moilanen, A., Matthews, J. W., Christie, K., Gardner, T. A., et al. (2012). Faustian 
Bargains? Restoration Realities in the Context of Biodiversity Offset Policies. Biological Conservation, 
155, 141–148. 
Maron, M., Ives, C. D., Kujala, H., Bull, J. W., Maseyk, F. J. F., Bekessy, S., et al. (2016). Taming a Wicked 
Problem: Resolving Controversies in Biodiversity Offsetting. BioScience, biw038. 
Maron, M., Rhodes, J. R. & Gibbons, P. (2013). Calculating the Benefit of Conservation Actions. Conservation 
Letters, 6(5), 359–367. 
Marshall, A. (2013a). Biodiversity Offsetting Attracts Local Opposition. The ENDS Report. Retrieved August 
13, 2013, from http://www.endsreport.com/40363/biodiversity-offsetting-attracts-local-opposition 
Marshall, A. (2013b). Environment Agency Cuts: Surviving the Surgeon’s Knife. The ENDS Report. Retrieved 
July 15, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/41733/environment-agency-cuts-surviving-the-
surgeons-knife 
Marshall, A. (2013c). Autumn Statement Spells More Pain for DECC and DEFRA. The ENDS Report. 
Retrieved July 15, 2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/41967/autumn-statement-spells-
more-pain-for-decc-and-defra 
Marshall, A. (2014). Agency Staff Lack Confidence in Restructuring. The ENDS Report. Retrieved July 15, 
2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/44020/agency-staff-lack-confidence-in-restructuring 
Martinez-Alier, J., Munda, G. & O’Neill, J. (1998). Weak Comparability of Values as a Foundation for Ecological 
Economics. Ecological Economics, 26(3), 277–286. 
Marx, K. (1990). Capital: Critique of Political Economy v. 1 (B. Fowkes, Tran.). Penguin Classics. 
Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative Researching. Sage Publications Ltd. 
Mason, R. (2013). David Cameron at Centre of ‘Get Rid of All the Green Crap’ Storm. The Guardian. Retrieved 
January 29, 2014, from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/21/david-cameron-green-
crap-comments-storm 
Mathiesen, K. (2013). Is Biodiversity Offsetting a ‘License to Trash Nature’? The Guardian. Retrieved June 1, 
2015, from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/12/biodiversity-offsetting-license-trash-
nature 
Mathiesen, K. (2014). Will the Environment Suffer from Cameron’s Green Regulation Cuts? The Guardian. 
Retrieved July 15, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/27/environment-
suffer-camerons-green-regulation-cuts 
Matose, F. (2014). Nature, Villagers, and the State: Resistance Politics from Protected Areas in Zimbabwe, in: 
Büscher, B., Dressler, W., and Fletcher, R. (Eds.), Nature Inc.: Environmental Conservation in the 
Neoliberal Age, (pp. 66–83). Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 
Matthews, J. W. & Endress, A. G. (2008). Performance Criteria, Compliance Success, and Vegetation 
Development in Compensatory Mitigation Wetlands. Environmental Management, 41(1), 130–141. 
268 
 
Mazza, L. (2015). European Commission’s Deregulation Drive Threatens EU Nature Laws. The Ecologist. 
Retrieved July 23, 2015, from 
http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_analysis/2943361/european_commissions_deregulation_driv
e_threatens_eu_nature_laws.html 
McAfee, K. (1999). Selling Nature to Save It? Biodiversity and Green Developmentalism. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space, 17(2), 133 – 154. 
McAfee, K. (2003). Neoliberalism on the Molecular Scale. Economic and Genetic Reductionism in 
Biotechnology Battles. Geoforum, 34(2), 203–219. 
McAfee, K. (2012). The Contradictory Logic of Global Ecosystem Services Markets. Development and Change, 
43(1), 105–131. 
McAfee, K. & Shapiro, E. N. (2010). Payments for Ecosystem Services in Mexico: Nature, Neoliberalism, 
Social Movements, and the State. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 100(3), 579–
599. 
McCarthy, J. (2004). Privatizing Conditions of Production: Trade Agreements as Neoliberal Environmental 
Governance. Geoforum, 35(3), 327–341. 
McCarthy, J. (2005a). Devolution in the Woods: Community Forestry as Hybrid Neoliberalism. Environment 
and Planning A, 37(6), 995–1014. 
McCarthy, J. (2005b). Scale, Sovereignty, and Strategy in Environmental Governance. Antipode, 37(4), 731–
753. 
McCarthy, J. (2006). Neoliberalism and the Politics of Alternatives: Community Forestry in British Columbia 
and the United States. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96(1), 84–104. 
McCarthy, J. (2012). The Financial Crisis and Environmental Governance ‘after’neoliberalism. Tijdschrift voor 
economische en sociale geografie, 103(2), 180–195. 
McCarthy, J. & Prudham, S. (2004). Neoliberal Nature and the Nature of Neoliberalism. Geoforum, 35(3), 275–
283. 
McCarthy, M. (2010). Rural Watchdog Posts to Be among First to Go in Race to Cut Deficit. The Independent. 
Retrieved July 18, 2016, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/rural-watchdog-posts-to-
be-among-first-to-go-in-race-to-cut-deficit-2025977.html 
McCarthy, M. A., Parris, K. M., Van Der Ree, R., McDonnell, M. J., Burgman, M. A., Williams, N. S. G., et al. 
(2004). The Habitat Hectares Approach to Vegetation Assessment: An Evaluation and Suggestions 
for Improvement. Ecological Management & Restoration, 5(1), 24–27. 
McGrath, M. (2013). ‘Licence to Trash’ Offsetting Scheme Set Back until Autumn. BBC News. Retrieved 
August 10, 2016, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-23502362 
McKenney, B. A. & Kiesecker, J. M. (2010). Policy Development for Biodiversity Offsets: A Review of Offset 
Frameworks. Environmental Management, 45(1), 165–176. 
McNish, T. (2012). Carbon Offsets Are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights Revolution. Harvard 
Environmental Law Review, 36(1), 387–443. 
MEA. (2005). Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis Report. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Mead, D. L. (2008). History and Theory: The Origin and Evolution of Conservation Banking, in: Carroll, N., Fox, 
J., and Bayon, R. (Eds.), Conservation and Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to Setting Up and Running 
Biodiversity Credit Trading Systems, (pp. 9–31). London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J. & Behrens, W. W. (1972). The Limits to Growth: A Report for the 
Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. Retrieved 
January 21, 2016, from http://www.dartmouth.edu/~library/digital/publishing/meadows/ltg/ 
269 
 
Merchant, C. (1990). The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution. New York: 
HarperOne. 
Miller, K. L., Trezise, J. A., Kraus, S., Dripps, K., Evans, M. C., Gibbons, P., et al. (2015). The Development of 
the Australian Environmental Offsets Policy: From Theory to Practice. Environmental Conservation, 
42(4), 306–314. 
Miraftab, F. (2004). Public-Private Partnerships The Trojan Horse of Neoliberal Development? Journal of 
Planning Education and Research, 24(1), 89–101. 
Mirowski, P. (1992). More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature’s Economics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mirowski, P. (2013). Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial 
Meltdown. London and New York: Verso Books. 
Mirowski, P. & Plehwe, D. (2009). The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought 
Collective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Mitchell, T. (2002). Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 
Moilanen, A. & Laitila, J. (2016). FORUM: Indirect Leakage Leads to a Failure of Avoided Loss Biodiversity 
Offsetting. Journal of Applied Ecology, 53(1), 106–111. 
Moilanen, A., Van Teeffelen, A. J. A., Ben-Haim, Y. & Ferrier, S. (2009). How Much Compensation Is Enough? 
A Framework for Incorporating Uncertainty and Time Discounting When Calculating Offset Ratios for 
Impacted Habitat. Restoration Ecology, 17(4), 470–478. 
Mol, A. P. J. & Spaargaren, G. (2000). Ecological Modernisation Theory in Debate: A Review. Environmental 
Politics, 9(1), 17–49. 
Monbiot, G. (2012). Biodiversity Offsetting Will Unleash a New Spirit of Destruction on the Land. The Guardian. 
Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2012/dec/07/biodiversity-offsetting-
unleash-wildlife-destruction 
Monbiot, G. (2013). Why Andrew Sells Is the Wrong Choice for Natural England. The Guardian. Retrieved 
December 17, 2013, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2013/dec/06/andrew-sells-natural-england 
Monbiot, G. (2014). Can You Put a Price on the Beauty of the Natural World? The Guardian. Retrieved August 
13, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/22/price-natural-world-agenda-
ignores-destroys 
Moore, J. W. (2015). Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital. London: Verso. 
Moore, J. W. (2016). Anthropocene or Capitalocene? : Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism. Oakland, 
CA: PM Press. 
Moreno-Mateos, D., Maris, V., Béchet, A. & Curran, M. (2015). The True Loss Caused by Biodiversity Offsets. 
Biological Conservation, 192, 552–559. 
Moreno-Mateos, D., Meli, P., Vara-Rodríguez, M. I. & Aronson, J. (2015). Ecosystem Response to 
Interventions: Lessons from Restored and Created Wetland Ecosystems. Journal of Applied Ecology, 
52(6), 1528–1537. 
Moreno-Mateos, D., Power, M. E., Comín, F. A. & Yockteng, R. (2012). Structural and Functional Loss in 
Restored Wetland Ecosystems. PLOS Biol, 10(1), e1001247. 
Morton, A. (2010). Making Housing Affordable: A New Vision for Housing Policy (N. Evans, Ed.). London: 
Policy Exchange. Retrieved August 2, 2016, from 
270 
 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/making%20housing%20affordable%20-
%20aug%2010.pdf 
Morton, A. (2011). Cities for Growth: Solutions to Our Planning Problems. London: Policy Exchange. Retrieved 
August 2, 2016, from 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/cities%20for%20growth%20-
%20nov%202011.pdf 
Mossman, H. L., Davy, A. J. & Grant, A. (2012). Does Managed Coastal Realignment Create Saltmarshes with 
‘equivalent Biological Characteristics’ to Natural Reference Sites? Journal of Applied Ecology, 49(6), 
1446–1456. 
Mowat, H. (2013). 140 Organisations from across the World Call for an End to Biodiversity Offsetting Plans. 
Save Our Woods. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from http://saveourwoods.co.uk/biodiversity-offsetting-
2/140-organisations-from-across-the-world-call-for-an-end-to-biodiversity-offsetting-plans/ 
Mowat, H. & Anderson, H. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting Smacks of Middle Class Environmentalism. The 
Guardian. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2014/jan/15/biodiversity-offsetting-housing-ancient-
woods-environmentalism 
Murray, J. (2011). George Osborne Vows UK Carbon Emissions Cuts Will Not Lead Europe. The Guardian. 
Retrieved May 3, 2013, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/03/osborne-uk-carbon-
emissions-europe 
Murray, J. (2012). Report: Caroline Spelman Axed from Defra in Cabinet Reshuffle. Business Green. Retrieved 
August 9, 2016, from http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2202622/report-caroline-spelman-axed-
from-defra-in-cabinet-reshuffle 
NAO & BIS. (2014). Business Perception Survey 2014. Retrieved November 11, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/314378/14-p145-
business-survey-2014.pdf 
National Trust. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting in England - Green Paper: Resposnse from the National Trust. 
Retrieved March 10, 2014,  
Natural England. (2016a). Proposed New Policies for European Protected Species Licensing: Public 
Consultation. Retrieved March 17, 2016, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504824/eps-
consultation-document.pdf 
Natural England. (2016b). Conservation 21: Natural England’s Conservation Strategy for the 21st Century. 
Retrieved November 9, 2016, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/562046/conservation-
21.pdf 
Natural England. (2016c). Review of the High Speed 2 No Net Loss in Biodiversity Metric. Retrieved November 
9, 2016, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/565691/review-of-hs2-
no-net-loss-metric.pdf 
NatureVest & EKO Asset Management. (2014). Investing in Conservation: A Landscape Assessment of an 
Emerging Market. Retrieved February 8, 2016, from 
http://www.naturevesttnc.org/pdf/InvestingInConservation_Report.pdf 
NCI. (2010a). Addressing Practical Challenges for Biodiversity Offsetting in the UK. Summary Report for Policy 
Makers on the First ‘Towards No Net Loss, and Beyond’ Workshop, 22nd June, 2010. Retrieved May 
28, 2013, from http://www.naturalcapitalinitiative.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/NCI_Offsetting_Workshop_Report_FINAL13.pdf 
NCI. (2010b). Addressing Scientific Knowledge and Environmental Information Challenges for Biodiversity 
Offsetting in the UK. Summary Report for Policy Makers on the Second ‘Towards No Net Loss, and 
Beyond’ Workshop, 29th September, 2010. Retrieved May 28, 2013, from 
271 
 
http://www.naturalcapitalinitiative.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Workshop_3_report_FINAL_230211.pdf 
NCI. (2011). Designing a System to Offset for the Residual Impacts of Terrestrial Development on Ecosystem 
Service Provision. Summary Report for Policy Makers of the Third ‘Towards No Net Loss, and 
Beyond’ Workshop, 7th December, 2010. Retrieved May 28, 2013, from 
http://www.naturalcapitalinitiative.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Workshop_2_report_FINAL_011210-2.pdf 
Neimark, B. D. (2012). Industrializing Nature, Knowledge, and Labour: The Political Economy of 
Bioprospecting in Madagascar. Geoforum, 43(5), 980–990. 
Neimark, B. D. & Wilson, B. (2015). Re-Mining the Collections: From Bioprospecting to Biodiversity Offsetting 
in Madagascar. Geoforum, 66, 1–10. 
Nelson, S. H. (2014). Resilience and the Neoliberal Counter-Revolution: From Ecologies of Control to 
Production of the Common. Resilience, 2(1), 1–17. 
Nelson, S. H. (2015). Beyond The Limits to Growth: Ecology and the Neoliberal Counterrevolution. Antipode, 
47(2), 461–480. 
Neumann, R. P. (2009). Political Ecology: Theorizing Scale. Progress in Human Geography, 33(3), 398–406. 
New Economics Foundation. (2014). New Economics Foundation (NEF) Response to the Regulatory Reform 
Committee Inquiry. Retrieved July 17, 2014, from http://www.neweconomics.org/page/-
/NEF%20Response%20-%20Regulatory%20Reform%20Committee%20-
%20Better%20Regulation%20Inquiry%20FINAL.pdf 
Newell, P. (2008). The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance. Review of International 
Studies, 34(3), 507–529. 
Newey, G. (2012). Nurturing Nature: Policy to Protect and Improve Biodiversity (S. Less, Ed.). London: Policy 
Exchange. 
Newey, G. (2014). Monbiot’s Attacks on Biodiversity Offsetting Are Wide of the Mark. Business Green. 
Retrieved August 13, 2016, from http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/opinion/2343270/monbiots-
attacks-on-biodiversity-offsetting-are-wide-of-the-mark 
NFU. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting Consultation Response. Retrieved from 
http://www.nfuonline.com/assets/19774 
Norton, D. A. (2008). Biodiversity Offsets: Two New Zealand Case Studies and an Assessment Framework. 
Environmental Management, 43(4), 698–706. 
Norton, D. A. & Warburton, B. (2015). The Potential for Biodiversity Offsetting to Fund Effective Invasive 
Species Control. Conservation Biology, 29(1), 5–11. 
Nottinghamshire County Council. (2013). Report of the Corporate Director of Policy, Planning and Corporate 
Services: Biodiversity Offsetting in England - Green Paper. Retrieved from 
http://www.nottinghamshire.gov.uk/DMS/Document.ashx?czJKcaeAi5tUFL1DTL2UE4zNRBcoShgo=
Xl%2FNXNn5MSwCanzmNdPr2gUGxKh%2FRoDZvp02bAa0fob701X9i7GzLg%3D%3D&rUzwRPf%
2BZ3zd4E7Ikn8Lyw%3D%3D=pwRE6AGJFLDNlh225F5QMaQWCtPHwdhUfCZ%2FLUQzgA2uL5jN
RG4jdQ%3D%3D&mCTIbCubSFfXsDGW9IXnlg%3D%3D=hFflUdN3100%3D&kCx1AnS9%2FpWZQ
40DXFvdEw%3D%3D=hFflUdN3100%3D&uJovDxwdjMPoYv%2BAJvYtyA%3D%3D=ctNJFf55vVA%
3D&FgPlIEJYlotS%2BYGoBi5olA%3D%3D=NHdURQburHA%3D&d9Qjj0ag1Pd993jsyOJqFvmyB7X0
CSQK=ctNJFf55vVA%3D&WGewmoAfeNR9xqBux0r1Q8Za60lavYmz=ctNJFf55vVA%3D&WGewmo
AfeNQ16B2MHuCpMRKZMwaG1PaO=ctNJFf55vVA%3D 
O’Connor, J. (1998). Natural Causes: Essays In Ecological Marxism. New York: Guilford Press. 
272 
 
ODPM. (2005). Planning Policy Statement 9: Biodiversity and Geological Conservation. Retrieved October 13, 
2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11481/143792.pdf 
ODPM & Defra. (2005). Government Circular: Biodiversity and Geological Conservation – Statutory Obligations 
and Their Impact Within the Planning System. Retrieved October 13, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7692/147570.pdf 
ODPM, Defra & English Nature. (2005). Biodiversity and Geological Conservation: A Guide to Good Practice. 
Retrieved October 13, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/11481/143792.pdf 
OECD. (2013). Scaling-up Finance Mechanisms for Biodiversity. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. Retrieved August 21, 2015, from http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264193833-en 
Ojeda, D. (2012). Green Pretexts: Ecotourism, Neoliberal Conservation and Land Grabbing in Tayrona 
National Natural Park, Colombia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 357–375. 
O’Neill, J. (2007). Markets, Deliberation and Environment. London: Routledge. Retrieved August 21, 2015, 
from http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=9qZyVycy-
3sC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=info:rOTefNosR_gJ:scholar.google.com&ots=WpzcXidJ7j&sig=ygBdQ_43
MByqp4wDxBqeNTvm9fQ 
Overton, J. M., Stephens, R. T. T. & Ferrier, S. (2012). Net Present Biodiversity Value and the Design of 
Biodiversity Offsets. AMBIO, 42(1), 100–110. 
Oxford, M. (2013). Ecological Capacity and Competence in Local Planning Authorities: What Is Needed to 
Deliver Statutory Obligations for Biodiversity? 
Palmer, M. A. & Filoso, S. (2009). Restoration of Ecosystem Services for Environmental Markets. Science, 
325(5940), 575–576. 
Pape, D. & Tyldesley, D. (2013). An Overview of Biodiversity Offsetting Within the Planning System. In 
Practice, (81), 12–16. 
Parenti, C. (2015). The 2013 ANTIPODE AAG Lecture The Environment Making State: Territory, Nature, and 
Value. Antipode, 47(4), 829–848. 
Parkes, D., Newell, G. & Cheal, D. (2003). Assessing the Quality of Native Vegetation: The ‘habitat Hectares’ 
Approach. Ecological Management & Restoration, 4, S29–S38. 
Paterson, O. (2013). Speech to Policy Exchange. GOV.UK. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/owen-paterson-speech-to-policy-exchange 
Paterson, O. (2014). Owen Paterson: I’m Proud of Standing up to the Green Lobby. The Daily Telegraph. 
Retrieved August 11, 2016, from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10978678/Owen-Paterson-
Im-proud-of-standing-up-to-the-green-lobby.html 
Pawliczek, J. & Sullivan, S. (2011). Conservation and Concealment in SpeciesBanking.com, USA: An Analysis 
of Neoliberal Performance in the Species Offsetting Industry. Environmental Conservation, 38(4), 
435–444. 
Pearce, F. (2013). Does Habitat Replacement Let Developers off the Hook? New Scientist. Retrieved August 
10, 2016, from https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21829220.200-does-habitat-replacement-let-
developers-off-the-hook/ 
Peck, J. (2002). Political Economies of Scale: Fast Policy, Interscalar Relations, and Neoliberal Workfare*. 
Economic Geography, 78(3), 331–360. 
Peck, J. (2004). Geography and Public Policy: Constructions of Neoliberalism. Progress in Human Geography, 
28(3), 392–405. 
273 
 
Peck, J. (2012). Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: OUP Oxford. 
Peck, J., Theodore, N. & Brenner, N. (2010). Postneoliberalism and Its Malcontents. Antipode, 41, 94–116. 
Peck, J. & Tickell, A. (1994). Jungle Law Breaks out: Neoliberalism and Global-Local Disorder. Area, 26(4), 
317–326. 
Peck, J. & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode, 34(3), 380–404. 
Peet, R., Robbins, P. & Watts, M. (2010). Global Political Ecology. London: Routledge. 
Pellizzoni, L. (2011). Governing through Disorder: Neoliberal Environmental Governance and Social Theory. 
Global Environmental Change, 21(3), 795–803. 
Peluso, N. L. & Vandergeest, P. (2001). Genealogies of the Political Forest and Customary Rights in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Journal of Asian Studies, 60(3), 761–812. 
Penca, J. (2015). Biodiversity Offsetting in Transnational Governance. Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law, 24(1), 93–102. 
Pereira, H. M., Ferrier, S., Walters, M., Geller, G. N., Jongman, R. H. G., Scholes, R. J., et al. (2013). Essential 
Biodiversity Variables. Science, 339(6117), 277–278. 
Perreault, T. (2006). From the Guerra Del Agua to the Guerra Del Gas: Resource Governance, Neoliberalism 
and Popular Protest in Bolivia. Antipode, 38(1), 150–172. 
Perreault, T. (2008). Custom and Contradiction: Rural Water Governance and the Politics of Usos Y 
Costumbres in Bolivia’s Irrigators’ Movement. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
98(4), 834–854. 
Perreault, T., Bridge, G. & McCarthy, J. (Eds.). (2015). The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology. 
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge. 
Peters, M. (2009). Education, Enterprise Culture and the Entrepreneurial Self: A Foucauldian Perspective. The 
Journal of Educational Enquiry, 2(2). Retrieved December 11, 2015, from 
http://www.ojs.unisa.edu.au/index.php/EDEQ/article/view/558 
Petras, J. & Veltmeyer, H. (2001). Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century. New York: Zed 
Books Ltd. 
Pickett, E. J., Stockwell, M. P., Bower, D. S., Garnham, J. I., Pollard, C. J., Clulow, J., et al. (2013). Achieving 
No Net Loss in Habitat Offset of a Threatened Frog Required High Offset Ratio and Intensive 
Monitoring. Biological Conservation, 157, 156–162. 
Pilgrim, J. D. & Bennun, L. (2014). Will Biodiversity Offsets Save or Sink Protected Areas? Conservation 
Letters, 7(5), 423–424. 
Pilgrim, J. D., Brownlie, S., Ekstrom, J. M. M., Gardner, T. A., von Hase, A., ten Kate, K., Savy, C. E., Theo 
Stephens, R. T., Temple, H. J., Treweek, J. & Ussher, G. T. (2013). Offsetability Is Highest for 
Common and Widespread Biodiversity: Response to Regnery et Al. Conservation Letters, 6(5), 387–
388. 
Pilgrim, J. D., Brownlie, S., Ekstrom, J. M. M., Gardner, T. A., von Hase, A., ten Kate, K., Savy, C. E., Theo 
Stephens, R. T., Temple, H. J., Treweek, J., Ussher, G. T., et al. (2013). A Process for Assessing the 
Offsetability of Biodiversity Impacts. Conservation Letters, 6(5), 376–384. 
Pirard, R. (2012). Market-Based Instruments for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services: A Lexicon. 
Environmental Science & Policy, 19–20, 59–68. 
Pirard, R. & Lapeyre, R. (2014). Classifying Market-Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services: A Guide to the 
Literature Jungle. Ecosystem Services, 9, 106–114. 
274 
 
Pittman, C. & Waite, M. (2009). Paving Paradise: Florida’s Vanishing Wetlands and the Failure of No Net Loss. 
University Press of Florida. 
Polanyi, K. (2001). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: 
Beacon Press. 
Pouzols, F. M., Burgman, M. A. & Moilanen, A. (2012). Methods for Allocation of Habitat Management, 
Maintenance, Restoration and Offsetting, When Conservation Actions Have Uncertain 
Consequences. Biological Conservation, 153, 41–50. 
Prudham, S. (2004). Poisoning the Well: Neoliberalism and the Contamination of Municipal Water in 
Walkerton, Ontario. Geoforum, 35(3), 343–359. 
Prudham, S. (2007). The Fictions of Autonomous Invention: Accumulation by Dispossession, Commodification 
and Life Patents in Canada. Antipode, 39(3), 406–429. 
Prudham, S. (2009). Commodification, in: Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, D., and Rhoads, B. (Eds.), A 
Companion to Environmental Geography, (pp. 123–142). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Purvis, A. & Hector, A. (2000). Getting the Measure of Biodiversity. Nature, 405(6783), 212–219. 
PWC. (2010). Biodiversity and Business Risk: A Global Risks Network Briefing. Retrieved July 18, 2013, from 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AM10_PwC_Biodiversity_BriefingMaterial.pdf 
Quétier, F. & Lavorel, S. (2011). Assessing Ecological Equivalence in Biodiversity Offset Schemes: Key Issues 
and Solutions. Biological Conservation, 144(12), 2991–2999. 
Quétier, F., Regnery, B. & Levrel, H. (2014). No Net Loss of Biodiversity or Paper Offsets? A Critical Review of 
the French No Net Loss Policy. Environmental Science & Policy, 38, 120–131. 
Quétier, F., Van Teeffelen, A. J. A., Pilgrim, J. D., von Hase, A. & ten Kate, K. (2015). Biodiversity Offsets Are 
One Solution to Widespread Poorly Compensated Biodiversity Loss: A Response to Curran et Al. 
Ecological Applications, 25(6), 1739–1741. 
Quigley, J. T. & Harper, D. J. (2006). Compliance with Canada’s Fisheries Act: A Field Audit of Habitat 
Compensation Projects. Environmental Management, 37(3), 336–350. 
Quintero, J. D. & Mathur, A. (2011). Biodiversity Offsets and Infrastructure. Conservation Biology, 25(6), 1121–
1123. 
Rainey, H. J., Pollard, E. H. B., Dutson, G., Ekstrom, J. M. M., Livingstone, S. R., Temple, H. J., et al. (2015). A 
Review of Corporate Goals of No Net Loss and Net Positive Impact on Biodiversity. Oryx, 49(2), 232–
238. 
Rajvanshi, A. (2015). Biodiversity Offsets: Incentivizing Conservation for Managing Business Impacts. 
Emerging Economy Studies, 1(1), 22–36. 
Ramsar Bureau. (1973). Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat Command Paper 5483. London: HMSO. 
Rayment, M., White, A., Dickie, I. & Pieterse, M. (2011). Costing Potential Actions to Offset the Impact of 
Development on Biodiversity – Final Report. London: GHK Consulting Limited. Retrieved April 30, 
2013, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/218687/110714offsettin
g-technical-costing-potential.pdf 
Reed, M. G. & Bruyneel, S. (2010). Rescaling Environmental Governance, Rethinking the State: A Three-
Dimensional Review. Progress in Human Geography, 34(5), 646–653. 
Regan, H. M., Ben-Haim, Y., Langford, B., Wilson, W. G., Lundberg, P., Andelman, S. J., et al. (2005). Robust 
Decision-Making Under Severe Uncertainty for Conservation Management. Ecological Applications, 
15(4), 1471–1477. 
275 
 
Regan, H. M., Colyvan, M. & Burgman, M. A. (2002a). A Taxonomy and Treatment of Uncertainty for Ecology 
and Conservation Biology. Ecological applications, 12(2), 618–628. 
Regan, H. M., Colyvan, M. & Burgman, M. A. (2002b). A Taxonomy and Treatment of Uncertainty for Ecology 
and Conservation Biology. Ecological Applications, 12(2), 618–628. 
Regnery, B., Kerbiriou, C., Julliard, R., Vandevelde, J.-C., Le Viol, I., Burylo, M., et al. (2013). Sustain Common 
Species and Ecosystem Functions through Biodiversity Offsets: Response to Pilgrim et Al. 
Conservation Letters, 6(5), 385–386. 
RGS. (n.d.). Valuing Nature. rgs.org. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from 
http://www.rgs.org/OurWork/Advocacy+and+Policy/Environment+and+Society+Forum/Valuing+nature
.htm 
Rincon, P. (2013). Green ‘Compensation’ Scheme Outlined. BBC. Retrieved September 5, 2013, from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-23972980 
Rio Tinto. (2004). Rio Tinto’s Biodiversity Strategy: Sustaining a Natural Balance. Retrieved February 18, 
2016, from 
http://www.riotinto.com/SustainableReview/Landaccess/programmes/Biodiversity/pdf/BiodiversityStrat
egy.pdf 
Robbins, P. (2007). Lawn People: How Grasses, Weeds, and Chemicals Make Us Who We Are. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Robbins, P. & Luginbuhl, A. (2005). The Last Enclosure: Resisting Privatization of Wildlife in the Western 
United States. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 16(1), 45–61. 
Robertson, M. (2000). No Net Loss: Wetland Restoration and the Incomplete Capitalization of Nature. 
Antipode, 32(4), 463–493. 
Robertson, M. (2004). The Neoliberalization of Ecosystem Services: Wetland Mitigation Banking and Problems 
in Environmental Governance. Geoforum, 35(3), 361–373. 
Robertson, M. (2006a). The Nature That Capital Can See: Science, State, and Market in the Commodification 
of Ecosystem Services. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 24(3), 367–387. 
Robertson, M. (2006b). Emerging Ecosystem Service Markets: Trends in a Decade of Entrepreneurial Wetland 
Banking. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 4(6), 297–302. 
Robertson, M. (2007). Discovering Price in All the Wrong Places: The Work of Commodity Definition and Price 
under Neoliberal Environmental Policy. Antipode, 39(3), 500–526. 
Robertson, M. (2012). Measurement and Alienation: Making a World of Ecosystem Services. Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers, 37(3), 386–401. 
Robertson, M. (2013a). Jimmy Carter and the Archaeology of Market Environmentalism, Part I. Wetlandia. 
Retrieved January 4, 2016, from http://wetlandia.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/coase-carter-and-
archaeology-of-market.html 
Robertson, M. (2013b). Jimmy Carter and the Archaeology of Market Environmentalism, Part II. Wetlandia. 
Retrieved January 4, 2016, from http://wetlandia.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/jimmy-carter-and-
archaeology-of-market.html 
Robertson, M., BenDor, T. K., Lave, R., Riggsbee, A., Ruhl, J. & Doyle, M. (2014). Stacking Ecosystem 
Services. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 12(3), 186–193. 
Robertson, M. & Hayden, N. (2008). Evaluation of a Market in Wetland Credits: Entrepreneurial Wetland 
Banking in Chicago. Conservation Biology, 22(3), 636–646. 
Robertson, M. & Wainwright, J. (2013). The Value of Nature to the State. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 103(4), 890–905. 
276 
 
Robin, L. (2011). The Rise of the Idea of Biodiversity: Crises, Responses and Expertise. Quaderni. 
Communication, technologies, pouvoir, (76), 25–37. 
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin, F. S., Lambin, E. F., et al. (2009). A Safe 
Operating Space for Humanity. Nature, 461(7263), 472–475. 
Ross, A. (1994). The Chicago Gangster Theory of Life: Nature’s Debt to Society. New York: Verso Books. 
Roth, R. J. & Dressler, W. (2012). Market-Oriented Conservation Governance: The Particularities of Place. 
Geoforum, 43(3), 363–366. 
RPC. (2013). Impact Assessment Opinion: Biodiversity Offsetting. Retrieved May 3, 2014, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260635/2013-10-03-
RPC13-DEFRA-1840-Biodiversity-Offsetting.pdf 
RSPB. (2010). Financing Nature in an Age of Austerity. Retrieved November 6, 2016, from 
https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/Financingnature_tcm9-262166.pdf 
RSPB. (2013). Consultation on the Green Paper on Biodiversity Offsetting. Retrieved January 28, 2014, from 
https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/biodiversity-offsetting_tcm9-358604.pdf 
Ruhl, J. B. & Salzman, J. E. (2006). The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on People. National Wetlands 
Newsletter, 28(2), 7–13. 
Rundcrantz, K. & Skärbäck, E. (2003). Environmental Compensation in Planning: A Review of Five Different 
Countries with Major Emphasis on the German System. European Environment, 13(4), 204–226. 
Rutherford, S. (2007). Green Governmentality: Insights and Opportunities in the Study of Nature’s Rule. 
Progress in Human Geography, 31(3), 291–307. 
Saad Filho, A. (2005). From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: Neoliberal Agendas for Economic 
Development, in: Saad Filho, A. and Johnston, D. (Eds.), Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader, (pp. 113–
119). London: Pluto Press. Retrieved December 9, 2015, from http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9287/ 
Salvidge, R. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting: Trading Nature. The ENDS Report. Retrieved June 20, 2016, from 
http://www.endsreport.com/article/44848/biodiversity-offsetting-trading-nature 
Salvidge, R. (2016). Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots Bear Little Fruit. The ENDS Report. Retrieved August 12, 
2016, from http://www.endsreport.com/article/51652/biodiversity-offsetting-pilots-bear-little-fruit 
Salzman, J. & Ruhl, J. B. (2000). Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law. Stanford Law 
Review, 53(3), 607–694. 
Salzman, J. & Ruhl, J. B. (2005). ‘No Net Loss’ - Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection. Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network. Retrieved March 3, 2016, from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=796771 
Santos, R., Schröter-Schlaack, C., Antunes, P., Ring, I. & Clemente, P. (2015). Reviewing the Role of Habitat 
Banking and Tradable Development Rights in the Conservation Policy Mix. Environmental 
Conservation, 42(4), 294–305. 
Scoones, I. (1999). New Ecology and the Social Sciences: What Prospects for a Fruitful Engagement? Annual 
Review of Anthropology, 28, 479–507. 
Scott, J. (1999). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Scott-Campbell, R. (2016). Biodiversity Offsetting – a Way Forward for a Lawton Levy? BSG Ecology. 
Retrieved November 24, 2016, from http://www.bsg-ecology.com/biodiversity-offsetting-a-way-
forward-for-a-lawton-levy/ 
277 
 
Seagle, C. (2012). Inverting the Impacts: Mining, Conservation and Sustainability Claims near the Rio 
Tinto/QMM Ilmenite Mine in Southeast Madagascar. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 447–477. 
Sell, S. (2015). EIA Rules Revised: How New Screening Thresholds Could Erode Expected Time Savings for 
Councils. Planning Resource. Retrieved July 19, 2016, from 
http://www.planningresource.co.uk/article/1329166 
Shapiro-Garza, E. (2013). Contesting the Market-Based Nature of Mexico’s National Payments for Ecosystem 
Services Programs: Four Sites of Articulation and Hybridization. Geoforum, 46, 5–15. 
Slezak, M. (2016). Tree Planting ‘Offset’ Allowing Miners to Destroy Ecosystems. The Guardian. Retrieved 
November 24, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/17/tree-planting-offset-
allowing-miners-to-destroy-ecosystems 
Smith, N. (2006). Nature as Accumulation Strategy, in: Panitch, L. and Leys, C. (Eds.), Socialist Register 2007: 
Socialist Register, (pp. 19–41). New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Smith, N. (2010a). Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space. London: Verso. 
Smith, N. (2010b). Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space. London and New York: 
Verso. 
Snyder, R. (2001). Politics After Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Sparrow, A. (2014). I Was Sacked by David Cameron to Appease ‘the Green Blob’, Says Paterson. The 
Guardian. Retrieved August 11, 2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/20/owen-
paterson-sacked-cabinet-appease-green-lobby 
Spash, C. L. (2015). Bulldozing Biodiversity: The Economics of Offsets and Trading-in Nature. Biological 
Conservation, 192, 541–551. 
Spencer, B. (2014). Developers Want to Bulldoze 12th-Century Forest to Make Way for a Motorway Petrol 
Station under New Planning Loophole. Mail Online. Retrieved August 13, 2016, from 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2590198/Developers-want-bulldoze-12th-century-forest-make-
way-motorway-petrol-station-attempt-use-possible-new-planning-loophole.html 
Srinivasan, K. (2014). Caring for the Collective: Biopower and Agential Subjectification in Wildlife 
Conservation. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32(3), 501–517. 
Stake, R. E. (2000). Case Studies, in: Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, (pp. 435–454). SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Steffen, W., Crutzen, P. J. & McNeill, J. R. (2007). The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the 
Great Forces of Nature. AMBIO:  A Journal of the Human Environment, 36(8), 614–621. 
Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockström, J., Cornell, S. E., Fetzer, I., Bennett, E. M., et al. (2015). Planetary 
Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet. Science, 1259855. 
Stratton, A. (2011). UK Economy: Of Mice, Men and a Growth Problem. The Guardian. Retrieved July 19, 
2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/12/uk-economy-growth 
Suding, K. N. (2011). Toward an Era of Restoration in Ecology: Successes, Failures, and Opportunities Ahead. 
Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 42(1), 465–487. 
Sullivan, S. (2009). Green Capitalism, and the Cultural Poverty of Constructing Nature as Service-Provider. 
Radical Anthropology, 3, 18–27. 
Sullivan, S. (2013a). After the Green Rush? Biodiversity Offsets, Uranium Power and the ‘Calculus of 
Casualties’ in Greening Growth. Human Geography, 6(1), 80–101. 
278 
 
Sullivan, S. (2013b). Banking Nature? The Spectacular Financialisation of Environmental Conservation. 
Antipode, 45(1), 198–217. 
Sullivan, S. & Hannis, M. (2015). Nets and Frames, Losses and Gains: Value Struggles in Engagements with 
Biodiversity Offsetting Policy in England. Ecosystem Services. Retrieved August 21, 2015, from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212041615000108 
Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Globalisation or ‘glocalisation’? Networks, Territories and Rescaling. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, 17(1), 25–48. 
Swyngedouw, E. (2005). Dispossessing H2O: The Contested Terrain of Water Privatization. Capitalism Nature 
Socialism, 16(1), 81–98. 
Swyngedouw, E. & Heynen, N. C. (2003). Urban Political Ecology, Justice and the Politics of Scale. Antipode, 
35(5), 898–918. 
Syal, R. (2013). Global Warming Can Have a Positive Side, Says Owen Paterson. The Guardian. Retrieved 
January 29, 2014, from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/30/owen-paterson-
minister-climate-change-advantages 
Tait, M. & Inch, A. (2016). Putting Localism in Place: Conservative Images of the Good Community and the 
Contradictions of Planning Reform in England. Planning Practice & Research, 31(2), 174–194. 
Takacs, D. (1996). The Idea of Biodiversity: Philosophies of Paradise. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
TEEB. (2010a). The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity for Local and Regional Policy Makers. 
Geneva: UNEP. 
TEEB. (2010b). The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature: A 
Synthesis of the Approach, Conclusions and Recommendations of TEEB. Geneva: UNEP. 
van Teeffelen, A. J. A., Opdam, P., Wätzold, F., Hartig, F., Johst, K., Drechsler, M., et al. (2014). Ecological 
and Economic Conditions and Associated Institutional Challenges for Conservation Banking in 
Dynamic Landscapes. Landscape and Urban Planning, 130, 64–72. 
Temple, H. J., Edmonds, B., Butcher, B. & Treweek, J. (2010). Biodiversity Offsets: Testing a Possible Method 
for Measuring Biodiversity Losses and Gains at Bardon Hill Quarry, UK. In Practice, 70, 11–14. 
Tew, T. (2013). Comment from Tom Tew: Biodiversity Offsetting - a New Way of Thinking. The ENDS Report, 
459, 36–37. 
The Biodiversity Consultancy. (2012). Private Sector No Net Loss Commitments. Retrieved February 2, 2016, 
from http://www.thebiodiversityconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/IBN-Private-Sector-No-
Net-Loss-Commitments_August-2012.pdf 
The Biodiversity Consultancy. (2014). Government Policies on Biodiversity Offsets. Retrieved February 2, 
2016, from http://www.thebiodiversityconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/IBN-Government-
Policies-on-Biodiversity-Offsets_June-20141.pdf 
The Guardian. (2014). Campaigners Attack Proposals to Allow Destruction of Ancient Woodlands. The 
Guardian. Retrieved August 21, 2015, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/04/ancient-woodland-cut-down-biodiversity-
offsetting 
The Royal Society. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting: Can It Work in England? royalsociety.org. Retrieved 
September 2, 2016, from https://royalsociety.org/science-events-and-lectures/2013/biodiversity-
offsetting/ 
Thébaud, O., Boschetti, F., Jennings, S., Smith, A. D. M. & Pascoe, S. (2015). Of Sets of Offsets: Cumulative 
Impacts and Strategies for Compensatory Restoration. Ecological Modelling, 312, 114–124. 
Town and Country Planning Association. (2004). Biodiversity by Design: A Guide for Sustainable Communities. 
279 
 
Tregidga, H. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting: Problematisation of an Emerging Governance Regime. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 26(5), 806–832. 
Treweek, J. (2009). Scoping Study for the Design and Use of Biodiversity Offsets in an English Context. 
London. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/218689/BiodiversityOffs
ets12May2009.pdf 
Treweek, J., Butcher, B. & Temple, H. J. (2010). Biodiversity Offsets: Possible Methods for Measuring 
Biodiversity Losses and Gains for Use in the UK. In Practice, 69, 29–32. 
Treweek, J. & ten Kate, K. (2014). Biodiversity Offsetting Outside the UK: An Overview, in: Birmingham, UK. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.academia.edu/6466680/Biodiversity_Offsetting_Outside_the_UK_an_Overview 
Treweek, J. & Thompson, S. (1997). A Review of Ecological Mitigation Measures in UK Environmental 
Statements with Respect to Sustainable Development. International Journal of Sustainable 
Development & World Ecology, 4(1), 40–50. 
Tucker, G., Allen, B., Conway, M., Dickie, I., Hart, K., Rayment, M., et al. (2013). Policy Options for an EU No 
Net Loss Initiative. London: The Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP). 
Turnhout, E., Neves, K. & Lijster, E. de. (2014). ‘Measurementality’ in Biodiversity Governance: Knowledge, 
Transparency, and the Intergovernmental Science–Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES). Environment and Planning A, 46(3), 581 – 597. 
Turnhout, E., Waterton, C., Neves, K. & Buizer, M. (2013). Rethinking Biodiversity: From Goods and Services 
to ‘living With’. Conservation Letters, 6(3), 154–161. 
TWT. (2013). Biodiversity Offsetting Green Paper Consultation - The Wildlife Trusts Response. 
UK Biodiversity Action Plan Steering Group. (1994). Biodiversity: The UK Action Plan. Retrieved from 
http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/PDF/UKBAP_Action-Plan-1994.pdf 
UK NEA. (n.d.). Why Did We Need a NEA for the UK? UK National Ecosystem Assessment. Retrieved 
November 4, 2016, from http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/About/tabid/56/Default.aspx 
UK NEA. (2011). UK National Ecosystem Assessment: Synthesis of the Key Findings. Cambridge: UNEP-
WCMC. Retrieved from http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/Resources/tabid/82/Default.aspx 
UNEP-FI. (2010). Demystifying Materiality: Hardwiring Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services into Finance. 
Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/CEO_DemystifyingMateriality.pdf 
Vadrot, A. B. M. (2014). The Politics of Knowledge and Global Biodiversity. London ; New York: Routledge. 
Vaissière, A.-C. & Levrel, H. (2015). Biodiversity Offset Markets: What Are They Really? An Empirical 
Approach to Wetland Mitigation Banking. Ecological Economics, 110, 81–88. 
Vanderduys, E. P., Reside, A. E., Grice, A. & Rechetelo, J. (2016). Addressing Potential Cumulative Impacts of 
Development on Threatened Species: The Case of the Endangered Black-Throated Finch. PLOS 
ONE, 11(3), e0148485. 
Vatn, A. (2015). Markets in Environmental Governance. From Theory to Practice. Ecological Economics, 117, 
225–233. 
Vatn, A., Barton, D. N., Lindhjem, H., Movik, S., Ring, I. & Santos, R. (2011). Can Markets Protect Biodiversity. 
An evaluation of different financial mechanisms, Noragric Report, 60. Retrieved August 21, 2015, 
from http://www.umb.no/statisk/noragric/publications/reports/2011_nor_rep_60.pdf 
Vaughan, A. (2010). Government Axes UK Sustainability Watchdog. The Guardian. Retrieved May 3, 2013, 
from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/22/government-axes-sustainability-watchdog 
280 
 
Vidal, J. (2014). Conservationists Split over ‘Biodiversity Offsetting’ Plans. The Guardian. Retrieved February 
20, 2015, from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/03/conservationists-split-over-
biodiversity-offsetting-plans 
Villarroya, A., Barros, A. C. & Kiesecker, J. (2014). Policy Development for Environmental Licensing and 
Biodiversity Offsets in Latin America. PLoS ONE, 9(9), e107144. 
Virah-Sawmy, M., Ebeling, J. & Taplin, R. (2014). Mining and Biodiversity Offsets: A Transparent and Science-
Based Approach to Measure ‘no-Net-Loss’. Journal of Environmental Management, 143, 61–70. 
Wacquant, L. (2009). Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Wade, R. (2010). Is the Globalization Consensus Dead? Antipode, 41, 142–165. 
Walker, J. & Cooper, M. (2011). Genealogies of Resilience From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of 
Crisis Adaptation. Security Dialogue, 42(2), 143–160. 
Walker, R. (2016). Value and Nature: From Value Theory to the Fate of the Earth. Human Geography, 9(1), 1–
15. 
Walker, S., Brower, A. L., Stephens, R. T. T. & Lee, W. G. (2009). Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails. 
Conservation Letters, 2(4), 149–157. 
Walter, K. (2016). Critics Say Wetlands Relocation Plan All Wet. St. Catharines Standard. Retrieved November 
24, 2016, from http://www.stcatharinesstandard.ca/2016/04/08/critics-say-wetlands-relocation-plan-
all-wet 
Watt, N. (2012). David Cameron Says EU Directives and Planning Laws Are Throttling Recovery. The 
Guardian. Retrieved February 20, 2015, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/28/david-cameron-economic-recovery-nerves 
Watts, C. (2014). Farmers’ Willingness to Participate in Biodiversity Offsets and How Contract Attributes May 
Influence the Supply of Land for Offsets. Retrieved November 25, 2016, from 
https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/541248/11011114/Watts_Charlotte.pdf/cd69e9a4-0535-49a3-bdca-
5c741f87e167 
Watts, M. (2004). Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Geopolitics, 
9(1), 50–80. 
Watts, M. (2005). Nature: Culture, in: Cloke, P. and Johnston, R. (Eds.), Spaces of Geographical Thought: 
Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries, (pp. 142–174). London: Sage. 
WCL. (2013). Wildlife and Countryside Link Response to the Green Paper on Biodiversity Offsetting. Retrieved 
June 12, 2016, from 
http://www.wcl.org.uk/docs/Link_response_green_paper_on_biodiversity_offsetting_Nov13.pdf 
Whatmore, S. (2006). Materialist Returns: Practising Cultural Geography in and for a More-than-Human World. 
Cultural Geographies, 13(4), 600–609. 
Wheeler, B. (2011). David Cameron Says Enterprise Is Only Hope for Growth. BBC News. Retrieved 
November 5, 2016, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12657524 
White, W. (2008). The Advantages and Opportunities, in: Carroll, N., Fox, J., and Bayon, R. (Eds.), 
Conservation and Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to Setting Up and Running Biodiversity Credit 
Trading Systems, (pp. 33–41). London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Whitehead, M., Jones, R. & Jones, M. (2007). The Nature of the State: Excavating the Political Ecologies of 
the Modern State. Oxford University Press. 
Williams, R. (1983). Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London: Fontana Press. Retrieved 
October 26, 2015,  
281 
 
Williams, R. (2005). Culture and Materialism. London and New York: Verso Books. 
Wood, E. M. (2013). The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. S.l.: Aakar Books. 
Woodland Trust. (2013). Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: Response to the Green 
Paper on Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Retrieved June 19, 2014,  
Working Group on No Net Loss of Ecosystems and their Services. (2013b). Scope and Objectives of the No 
Net Loss Initiative. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/pdf/Subgroup_NNL_Scope_Objectives.pdf 
Working Group on No Net Loss of Ecosystems and their Services. (2013a). Development of Operational 
Principles of Any Proposed EU No Net Loss Initiative. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/pdf/NNL_Operational_Principles.pdf 
Wotherspoon, D. & Burgin, S. (2009). The Consultant Ecologist’s Role in the New South Wales (Australia) 
Approach to Biodiversity Offsets: ‘BioBanking’. Local Environment, 14(1), 61–71. 
Wynne-Jones, S. (2012). Negotiating Neoliberalism: Conservationists’ Role in the Development of Payments 
for Ecosystem Services. Geoforum, 43(6), 1035–1044. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods: (Applied Social Research Methods, Volume 5): 
005. Sage Publications, Inc. 
Zimmerer, K. (2000). The Reworking of Conservation Geographies: Nonequilibrium Landscapes and Nature-
Society Hybrids. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 90(2), 356–369. 
Zimmerer, K. (2009). Biodiversity, in: Castree, N., Demeritt, D., Liverman, D., and Rhoads, B. (Eds.), A 
Companion to Environmental Geography, (pp. 50–65). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Zimmerer, K. S. (2006). Cultural Ecology: At the Interface with Political Ecology - the New Geographies of 
Environmental Conservation and Globalization. Progress in Human Geography, 30(1), 63–78. 
 
